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ABSTRACT
In international law, there is no officially accepted definition of a minority. The 
traditional view on the definition of a minority requires that in order for persons 
belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic groups to receive minority status and enjoy 
relevant minority rights, they must hold the citizenship of their State of residence. This 
thesis questions the traditional approach to the concepts of minority and minority 
rights with special reference to the case of the ethnic, linguistic Russians in Estonia 
and Latvia.
It presents an analysis of the international legal and normative bases for justifying 
the effective protection of the ethnic, linguistic Russians in Estonia and Latvia as 
persons belonging to minorities with reference to their citizenship status. It is argued 
that at least three international legal and normative bases may be invoked for the 
effective protection of the ethnic, linguistic Russians in Estonia and Latvia. Such legal 
and normative bases can be found in minorities-specific standards with the focus on 
the protection of cultural identity for minorities, general human rights standards with 
an emphasis on substantive equality, and the right to internal self-determination. The 
linkage of these legal and normative bases to the protection of the ethnic, linguistic 
Russians in Estonia and Latvia as persons belonging to minorities with reference to 
citizenship in their States of residence strongly suggests that Estonian and Latvian 
citizenship laws are problematic from the perspective of minority protection. It also 
implies that Estonia and Latvia should protect the minority rights of the ethnic, 
linguistic Russians in an effective manner at the domestic legal level through the 
implementation of concrete protective measures to that effect, by taking into account 
their various needs and problems, including the matter of citizenship for the ethnic, 
linguistic Russian non-citizens and stateless persons.
The discussion about the legal and normative bases for the protection of the ethnic, 
linguistic Russians in Estonia and Latvia with reference to their citizenship status also 
indicates that a State’s power to regulate citizenship can be constrained ‘to the extent’ 
that it is obliged to protect minority rights in an effective manner at the domestic legal 
level under international law.
Key words: Minority, minority rights, minority protection, human rights, citizenship, 
the non-discrimination principle, internal self-determination
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NOTE ON THE TEXT
1. The expressions ‘protection of minority rights’ and ‘minority protection’ are used 
alternatively in this thesis. The former focuses on the protection of specific rights of 
persons belonging to minorities within specific standards of minority rights at the 
international and regional levels, while the latter concerns the comprehensive 
coverage of the protection of persons belonging to minorities in a variety of areas. As 
a matter fact, however, it is difficult to distinguish between the multiple meanings of 
each term exactly, because present international standards of minority rights remain 
vaguely worded and thus unclear in terms of the contents and effects of minority rights. 
Thus, it is possible to state that to protect minority rights is to advance minority 
protection in the end. Given the difficulty arising from appropriate terminology, the 
terms ‘protection of minority rights’ and ‘minority protection’ will be used 
alternatively in this thesis, depending on given contexts.
2. One may distinguish between the terms ‘nationality’ and ‘citizenship’ in a technical 
legal sense. While essentially the same concept, these words reflect two different legal 
dimensions. Both terms identify the legal status of an individual in light of his or her 
State membership. But the term ‘citizenship’ is confined mostly to domestic legal 
forums, while the term ‘nationality’ is connected to the international legal forum. In 
this thesis, both terms will be used alternatively, according to given contexts.
3. The terms ‘people’ and ‘peoples’ are used alternatively in this thesis, depending on 
given contexts. This is necessary to avoid terminological confusion in discussing the 
right to self-determination in international law. In this thesis, the term ‘people’ refers 
to the entire body of persons who satisfy the criteria generally accepted for 
determining the existence of a people in a territorial unit. However, if the holders of 
the right to self-determination are to be referred to universally beyond a single 
territorial unit, the expression of ‘peoples’ will be used instead.
4. Unless otherwise stated, the term ‘minorities’ refers to all categories of minorities, 
including persons belonging to national, ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities.
5. Unless otherwise stated, ethnic, linguistic Russian populations in Estonia and Latvia 
in this thesis refer to ‘citizens’, ‘non-citizens’ or ‘stateless persons’ of Russian origin. 
Although some members of the ethnic, linguistic Russian populations in these States 
have received citizenship through the naturalisation process, this thesis focuses on 
those who have not.
15
6. In terms of subject-matter, including the description of the status of the ethnic, 
linguistic Russian in Estonia and Latvia, the work now presented is based on the law 
and materials in existence as of 31 August, 2005, as this revised thesis has corrected 
the original thesis which covered that period.
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Chapter I
Introduction
Whatever rights are due to states or nations or other actors in international relations, they are 
subject to and limited by the rights o f the international community. The rights o f sovereign 
states, and o f sovereign peoples or nations, derive from the rules o f  the international community 
or society and are limited by them.
Hedley Bull1
1. Background and Main Questions
After the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) fractured into fifteen 
States on 21 December 1991, the vast majority of new States, formerly republics of
0  • • • • « 'Xthe Soviet Union, adopted laws on citizenship as the expression of their sovereignty. 
In formalising rules for the initial body of citizens and the acquisition of their
1 H. Bull, Justice in International Relations: The 1983 Hagey Lectures (Waterloo, Ontario: University 
of Waterloo, 1984), p. 11.
2 On 8 December 1991 in Viskuli, the residence of the Belarusian Government in Belovezhskaya forest 
preserve, the leaders o f  the Republic o f Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine signed the 
Agreement on establishment o f  the Commonwealth o f Independent States (CIS). On 21 December 1991 
in Alma-Ata the heads o f eleven sovereign States (except the Baltic States and Georgia) signed the 
Protocol to the above Agreement, in which they stressed that the Azerbaijan Republic, Republic of 
Armenia, Republic o f Belarus, Republic o f Kazakstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Republic o f Moldova, Russian 
Federation, Republic o f  Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Republic of Uzbekistan and Ukraine on a basis of 
equality established the Commonwealth of Independent States. The participants o f the meeting 
unanimously adopted the Alma-Ata Declaration, which confirmed the devotion of the former union 
republics to cooperation in various fields o f external and internal policies, and announced the 
guarantees for implementation of international commitments of the former Soviet Union. In December 
1993 the Commonwealth was joined by Georgia. Alma-Ata Declaration, reprinted in 31 ILM 148 
(1992). See also, Accord on the Commonwealth o f Independent States (1991), reprinted in C. F. Furtado 
& A. Chandler (eds.), Perestroika in the Soviet Republics: Documents on the National Question 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 355-58.
3 M. Iogna-Prat, “An introduction to the Workshop on International Law and Nationality Laws in the 
Former USSR”, Austrian J. Publ. Intl. Law, Vol., 49, 1995, pp. 21-27.
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citizenship, the States concerned followed various patterns.4 Some took a liberalist 
approach, known as the ‘zero option’, trying to include in the initial body of citizens 
‘all persons residing permanently in their territory’ at the date of the entry into force of 
citizenship laws5 and, in some cases, extending the acquisition of citizenship to 
persons residing outside but having a link with the State concerned.6 Others adopted 
quite a restrictive approach and limited the granting of their citizenship to some
n
categories of persons having a strong ‘ethnic link’ of attachment to the State.
The Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia in 1991 proclaimed that only 
citizens of pre-war Latvia and their descendants would be granted automatic 
citizenship in the newly independent State of Latvia.8 With this measure, some half a 
million ethnic, linguistic Russians in Latvia became ‘instant aliens’ in the place they 
considered home. Neighboring Estonia also adopted a restrictive citizenship law in 
1992 as it reclaimed independence following fifty-one years of Soviet rule.9
These two countries adopted more restrictive citizenship laws compared with 
another country in the Baltic region, Lithuania, where automatic citizenship was 
granted to all permanent inhabitants in its territory when it regained independence 
from the former USSR.10 There has been an ongoing debate, involving international 
organisations and human rights groups, about the difficulty of the language 
examinations given in the naturalisation processes in Estonia and Latvia. Some view 
the procedure as a means of denying citizenship to ethnic, linguistic Russian
4 For a general observation, see European Commission for Democracy through Law, Consequences o f  
State Succession for Nationality, Report by the Venice Commission (Strasbourg: Council o f Europe 
Publishing, 1998), pp. 34-39.
5 Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and Lithuania granted automatic citizenship to all permanent residents in 
their respective territories.
6 For instance, Kyrgystan and Georgia linked their new citizenship to the citizenship of the respective 
former Soviet republics.
7 Estonia and Latvia restricted automatic citizenship to persons who either had been Estonian or 
Latvian citizens prior to the annexation by the USSR or who were linked to their territory o f the 
respective State by their origin.
8 Republic o f Latvia Supreme Council Resolution, “On the Renewal o f Republic o f Latvia Citizens’ 
Rights and Fundamental Principles of Naturalization”, in the Republic o f Latvia: Human Rights Issues 
(Riga: 5th Saeima’s Standing Commission on Human Rights, 1993/1994), p. 76.
9 L. W. Barrington, “The Making o f Citizenship Policy in the Baltic States”, Geo. Immigr. L.J, Vol., 13, 
1999, pp. 159-199.
10 As for different background in Lithuania compared to Estonia and Latvia in relation to citizenship 
policies, See Chapter 2 below, pp. 35-43. The new citizenship laws o f the States emerging from the 
dissolution of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were influenced by the pre-existing citizenship laws of  
these countries’ constituent parts. In the successor States o f Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, persons 
possessing the citizenship o f the respective federated entity which had become independent and their 
descendants acquired ipso facto  the new citizenship. See also, B. Bowring, “New Nations and National 
Minorities: Ukraine and the Question of Citizenship”, P. Cumper and S. Wheatley (eds.), Minority 
Rights in the New Europe (The Hague/London/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999), pp. 233-250.
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populations residing in the countries, most of whom do not speak the local 
languages.11 In response to this criticism, the Estonian and Latvian governments have 
maintained that they have inherent international legal rights to regulate citizenship 
within the domains of domestic jurisdiction as independent sovereign States and that 
they have no international legal obligations to grant the ethnic, linguistic Russian 
residents who had resided therein before independence automatic citizenship of
Estonia and Latvia.12
1 ^Citizenship is like a guarantee for every human being to enjoy normal lives in 
various aspects of political, civil, economic and other activities in a State. One can 
easily recognise that a great deal hinges on which passport one possesses; whether one 
may enter and leave a country at will, live and work there, own and inherit property, 
vote and serve in public office. On the other hand, it is true that citizenship is 
something which one usually thinks of as a ‘given’, objective aspect of his or her 
existence, much like gender or ethnic character. This is because the legal character of 
citizenship has long been recognised as belonging to ‘reserved domains of domestic 
jurisdiction’ deriving from an attribute of State sovereignty.
In a similar vein, citizenship has served as an institutional tool for nation States to 
form and maintain their statehood on the basis of a particular ethnic or national 
grouping.14 Almost all modem constitutions have assumed a State, a unit of 
international society, as ‘one nation State’, although the ethnically plural structure of 
their population has not always corresponded to the ‘one nation State model’ in its tme 
sense. 15 Political membership as legally expressed in citizenship within the
11 D.F. Orentlicher, “Citizenship and National Identity”, in D. Wippman (ed.), International Law and 
Ethnic Conflict (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 296-325.
12 Ibid.
13 One may distinguish between the terms ‘nationality’ and ‘citizenship’ in a technical legal sense. 
While essentially the same concept, these words reflect two different legal dimensions. Both terms 
identify the legal status o f an individual in light of his or her State membership. But the term 
‘citizenship’ is confined mostly to domestic legal forums, while the term ‘nationality’ is connected to 
the international legal forum. As Weis states, "conceptually and linguistically, the terms...emphasize 
two different aspects o f the same notion...'Nationality' stresses the international, 'citizenship' the 
national, municipal aspect." P. Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law (London: 
Stevens & Sons, 1956), pp. 5-6. In this thesis, both the terms o f nationality and citizenship will be used 
interchangeably.
14 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origins and Spread o f  Nationalism (London: 
Verso, 1991).
15 It is to be remembered that the nation-State as an established institution has been historically shaped 
with the process o f formation o f modem ethno-nations in the very specific European context from the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries on. It was in this sense that nation-State acquired its ethnic identity 
and content. The nation-State was understood as a specific means or even the only mechanism that 
could realise certain national interests o f nations as specific ethnic communities. The majority of  
modem States were established and are still perceived as nation-States o f certain nations, even though
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framework of a nation State is a human creation, at the same time, and given the 
importance of political membership for the normal lives of natural persons within a 
State structure, one might reasonably ask why citizenship of a State is given to some 
and not to others. The years in Estonia and Latvia since independence in 1991 have 
witnessed the formation of new minorities of long-term residents that live without 
some of the basic rights associated with citizenship because of restrictive citizenship 
laws. In Estonia and Latvia there are a large number of individuals who are not 
citizens because neither they nor their descendants were citizens of Estonia and Latvia 
prior to the Soviet occupation. Prior to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, these 
minorities settled down and lived in States of the Union which they regarded as 
‘home’ in factual terms.16 The ethnic, linguistic Russians in Estonia and Latvia did to 
some extent return to their homelands, but there are a considerable amount of those 
who want to stay within the territory they have been living in and to become citizens 
of Estonia and Latvia. If the governments of the States which they inhabit try to limit 
the legal parameters of citizenship by enacting citizenship laws, the problem of 
protecting the persons who have not been recognised as citizens of the State of which 
they are inhabitants becomes a critical issue. Because they do not possess citizenship, 
and indeed often find this status effectively denied, they are blocked from the 
enjoyment of those rights that flow from the status of citizenship, including 
participation in the political process. The consequence was that over 30% of the non­
ethnic Estonians in Estonia and about 40% of the non-Latvians were excluded from 
citizenship. They were effectively consigned instead to a sort of legal and political
1 7limbo, a perpetual state of partial membership and disenfranchisement.
the population is not usually ethnically homogenous today. See K.W. Deutsch, Political Community at 
the International Level: Problems o f  Definition and Measurement (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1953); E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca &London: Cornell University Press, 1983); 
C.A. Macartney, National States and National Minorities (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), EJ. 
Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); D. 
Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1985).
16 For a general understanding, see B. Stem, (ed.), Dissolution, Continuation and Succession in Eastern 
Europe (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998); C.D. Harris, “New European Countries and 
Their Minorities”, Geographical Review , Vol., 83, 1993, pp. 301-320.
17 It needs to be noted that while Russia generally is considered a continuation of the former Soviet 
Union for most purposes such as the United Nations seat, it did not necessarily assume all o f the rights 
and obligations o f the former Soviet Union. Russia did not purport to inherit all the territories and 
populations of other former Soviet republics. Thus, rather than extending its citizenship to all former 
Soviet citizens, Russia's Nationality Act o f 1991, which entered into force in 1992, generally limited the 
granting o f automatic nationality to former citizens who permanently resided on Russian territory as of  
the law's adoption date. It did not purport to inherit the territories and populations o f other former 
Soviet republics. The approach o f the Russian Nationality Act, which took effect on February 6, 1992, 
generally coincided with former Soviet law whereby a person's respective citizenship was determined
20
The question why some long-term resident ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities
are included in many socio-economic spheres but remain barred or restricted from
18political membership is in one sense a political issue, and in another a legal issue. 
The subordination of long-term ethnic, religious or linguistic residents to status as 
‘second class residents’ prompts one to ask the following questions: on what basis 
may they be denied political membership and to what extent does a State have 
discretion to justify such exclusion in the form of citizenship? By raising these 
questions, two issues become essential in calling for desired solutions from the point 
of view of international law. The first is the problem of statelessness, and the other is 
the protection of ethnic, religious or linguistic minority groups residing within a State. 
This thesis is concerned with the latter and it situates the approach to the issue in the 
context of the protection of human rights for persons belonging to minority groups 
under international law.
according to the republic in which the person permanently resided. See Venice Commission, 
Consequences o f  State Succession fo r  Nationality, European Commission for Democracy through Law, 
Consequences o f State Succession for Nationality 20, No. 11, 1997, pp. 32-33; W. R. Brubaker, 
“Citizenship Struggles in Soviet Successor States”, International Migration Review , Vol., xxvi, 1992, 
pp. 269-291. However, in 1993, an amendment to the Russian Nationality Act was adopted. The main 
change o f the amendment refers to the option for Russian nationality by former USSR citizens. An 
application for Russian citizenship could be made by former citizens o f the USSR who reside in the 
territory o f other States that were within the former USSR, provided they declare their intention to 
acquire Russian citizenship by 31 December 2000; stateless persons permanently residing in Russia on 
6 February 1992, or other republics o f the former USSR as o f 1 September 1991, who within one year 
o f the 1992 Act declared their intention to acquire Russian Federation citizenship. On 31 December 
2000, the possibility for former USSR citizens (who resided on the territory o f the former USSR and 
arrived for permanent residence in the Russian Federation after 6 February 1992) o f obtaining Russians 
citizenship through a simplified procedure, provided for under Article 18 (d) ceased to be available. The 
Presidential Commission on Citizenship stated that those holding a former USSR passport, who had not 
acquired the citizenship o f any country before this deadline, would, as of 1 January 2001, be considered 
as stateless persons. As a consequence, they would have to apply for Russian citizenship according to 
the provision o f the law applicable to stateless persons. From 1 January 2001, all citizens o f any former 
USSR country have to apply according to the rules for foreign citizens, as the simplified procedure for 
acquiring Russian citizenship no longer applies. Thus, the Russian Nationality Law has enlarged 
considerably the categories o f persons who may be entitled to Russian nationality. Nevertheless, many 
ethnic, linguistic Russians (former Soviet citizens) remain non-citizens or stateless persons in Estonia 
and Latvia, because their life-long base has been in Estonia and Latvia. At the same time, it should be 
noted that Estonia and Latvia do not allow dual nationality. Russian Federation Nationality Law, Nov. 
28, 1991; Amendment to the Russian Federation Nationality Citizenship Law o f  1993; J. Putzer, 
“Overview o f Nationality Laws in the Former USSR”, Austrian J. Publ. Intl. Law , Vol., 49, 1995, pp. 
29-41; Statute on Russian Federation Citizenship Matters, Russian Federation President's Edict No. 386, 
Apr. 10, 1992, Article 2(1) & (2); Amnesty International, Annual Report 2001: Russian Federation, 
2001; Human Rights Watch, World Report 2001: The Russian Federation, 2001; See also Chapter 2 
below, pp. 55-58.
18 There is a voluminous body o f literature devoted to this debate. See, M. Waltzer, Spheres o f  Justice: 
A Defence o f  Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1983); W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, 
Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); A. Buchanan, Secession: The morality o f  
political divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); D.L. Phillips, 
Looking Backward: A Critical Appraisal o f  Communitarian Thought (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1993).
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The attitudes of the Estonian and Latvian governments toward their ethnic, 
linguistic Russian residents have been based on the Baltic restorationism or legal 
continuity theory.19 They have argued that as the incorporation of the Baltic States 
into the Soviet Union was illegal, it had no legal consequences for Estonia and Latvia. 
On this basis, they have consistently maintained that they have no legal obligations to 
grant automatic citizenship to the Russian residents who had resided in the territories 
of what are now Estonia and Latvia before independence in 1991. However, should 
not the automatic citizenship have been granted to the ethnic, linguistic Russian 
residents in Estonia and Latvia, given that they had established their life base in the 
territories of what are now Estonia and Latvia for a significant period of time? Do the 
Estonian and Latvian citizenship laws, under which historic and habitual residence of 
the ethnic, linguistic Russians is denied, conform to international standards on 
nationality with particular emphasis on the human rights aspect of citizenship?20
The Estonian and Latvian governments have asserted that the Soviet State policy 
that transferred individuals into territories inhabited by a primarily different ethnic 
group and subjugated the latter constituted virtually the infringement of the host 
population’s right to self-determination.21 Some Estonians and Latvians have argued 
that the presence of the ethnic, linguistic Russians in these republics represents a 
denial of self-determination for all Estonians and Latvians.22 The status of the ethnic, 
linguistic Russians in Estonia and Latvia has been the main cause of conflict between 
titular Estonian and Latvian nationals and the ethnic, linguistic Russian populations in 
Estonia and Latvia. Self-determination is based on the idea that all ‘peoples’ have the 
right to determine freely their political status and pursue freely their economic, social 
and cultural development. Self-determination has been recognised as a ‘right’ under 
international law.23 Numerous international instruments have codified the strong 
desire on the part of the inhabitants who have a shared consciousness to determine as a 
‘group’ their own future.24 This common identity may be based on a number of shared
19 See section “The Baltic Restorationism and International Law”, Chapter 2 below, pp. 44-51.
20 See section “The Right to Nationality under International Law”, Chapter 3 below, pp. 69-77.
21 E. Kolodner, “Population Transfer: The Effects o f Settler Infusion Policies on a Host Population’s 
Right to Self-Determination”, N.Y.U.J.Int’l & Pol, Vol., 27, 1994, pp. 159-84.
22 UNPO. Report, Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), Self-Determination in 
Relation to Individual Human Rights, Democracy and the Protection o f the Environment, UNPO 
GA/1993/CR/1 (Conference Report 1993), at 3; See also, I. Grazin, “The International Recognition o f  
National Rights: The Baltic States’ Case”, Notre Dame Law Review , Vol., 66, 1991, pp. 1385-1419.
23 A. Cristescu, “The Right to Self-Determination: Historical and Current Developments on the Basis 
of United Nations Instruments”, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/404/Rev (1981).
24 Ibid.
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ethnic, religious and civic traits. Where the group’s desire is coupled with claims to a 
specific territory, it often has led to calls for the formation of an independent nation 
State. As peoples who have managed to free themselves from foreign domination of 
the former Soviet Union, the titular Estonian and Latvian can safely argue that they 
have the right to self-determination. By this standard, the Baltic peoples’ desire to 
reassert their sovereignty and strengthen their national culture after years of repressive 
Soviet rule is legally justified under the right to self-determination. Estonia and Latvia 
seem to have the right to pass language laws that not only made their native languages 
the official languages of their respective States, but also imposed language 
requirements for citizenship and for certain jobs in the field of public affairs, such as
9 Sthe police. As a matter of fact, it is readily observable that many countries have an 
official language and its requirement in certain circumstances, such as civil service 
jobs, is a reasonable one. The Baltic States put the question of independence to a 
referendum as they underwent historical transformation in the 1990s. Relying on the 
claim to the right to self-determination, the Balts argued that if their populations voted 
for self-governance, then continued rule from Moscow would be impermissible.27 If 
this is the case, how can one explain that despite 30% to 40% of the former Soviet 
residents in Estonia and Latvia having supported the move to independence in the 
referendum, Estonia and Latvia disenfranchised most of them through citizenship laws 
after regaining independence from the Soviet Union?28 What is the definition of the 
concept of peoples for the right to self-determination? Should not the ethnic, linguistic 
Russian residents who had been bom or resided in the former republics of Estonia and 
Latvia in the Soviet Union before the independence of Estonia and Latvia in 1991 be 
included in the membership of the peoples?
Moreover, the restrictive citizenship laws of Estonia and Latvia raise fundamental 
questions about the protection of the ethnic, linguistic Russian residents as persons 
belonging to minorities and holders of minority rights recognised under international 
law. The question arises whether the protection of minorities is exclusively reserved 
for citizens whose ethnic affiliation is different from that of the majority, or whether
25 S.B. Green, “Language o f Lullabies: the Russification and de-Russification o f the Baltic States”, 
Mich. J. Int'l L, Vol., 19, 1997, pp. 219-275.
26 H. Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation o f  Conflicting 
Rights (Philadelphia: University o f Pennsylvania, 1990), p. 112.
27 G. Smith, A. Aasland & R. Mole, “Statehood, Ethnic Relations and Citizenship”, in G. Smith (ed.), 
The Baltic States: The National Self-Determination o f  Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (London: 
Macmillan Press, 1996), pp. 181-205.
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foreigners or stateless persons also fall within the scope of this protection. This 
question is directly related to the definitional question of the concept of a minority in 
international law and is indeed, a very critical matter for the discussion about effective 
international minority protection, because the definition of a minority has 
consequences with respect to the nature and content of minority rights in international 
law. The Law on Cultural Autonomy for National Minorities of Estonia lists 
citizenship as a requirement for recognition as a member of a minority as the holder of 
minority rights.29 The Law on Unrestricted Development of National or Ethnic 
Groups in Latvia has no definition of a minority,30 but the holding of citizenship of 
the State of residence is not a requirement for receiving minority status at least in 
formal terms. To this extent, Latvia is ahead of Estonia. This Law speaks for equal 
human rights for all the residents of Latvia, regardless of their nationality,31 but later 
in paragraph 4 the Law emphasises the importance of “preserving] the national 
identity as well as historical and cultural environment of Latvia’s ancient indigenous 
nationality, the Livs.” The Latvian government and institutions shall be responsible 
“ ...for the renewal and development of the socio-economic infrastructure of the 
territory, inhabited by them (the Livs).”32 This example shows concretely how one 
article in law contradicts the other. In this case, equality of ‘all’ later becomes priority 
of some. Furthermore, given that Latvia has not granted automatic citizenship to the 
Russian residents who had resided in the territory of what is now Latvia before 
independence in 1991, and many ethnic, linguistic Russians have been left as non­
citizens or stateless persons, the effectiveness of minority rights for the ethnic, 
linguistic Russian non-citizens and stateless persons in Latvia is, if at all, very 
questionable. Putting together this state and paragraph 4 of the Law above, one could 
conclude that the indigenous Latvians seem to take priority in terms of enjoyment of 
the socio-economic development of the country.
The important point is that, because of the restrictive citizenship requirements for 
naturalisation, such as fluency in the dominant native languages, persons who have a 
common ethnic, linguistic identity in Estonia and Latvia and who are not citizens of
28 For an overview of the citizenship laws in Estonia and Latvia, see Chapter 2 below, pp. 52-54.
29 Article 1 o f the Law on Cultural Autonomy of National Minorities, RT I, No. 71, 1993.
30 Law on the unrestricted development and right to cultural autonomy, Latvijas Republikas Saeimas un 
Ministru Kabineta Zinotajs, No. 21, 1991; Human Rights Debate in Latvia 1995-1997, Latvian Human 
Rights Quarterly, 3/4, 1998.
3'Paragraph 1 of the Law.
32 Paragraph 4 o f the Law.
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Estonia and Latvia, do not receive the benefits of common human rights. Persons 
within a population sharing the same ethnic characteristics, language, culture, tradition 
and history may have a different legal status which threatens the preservation of their 
identity, depending on whether or not they hold the citizenship of their State of 
residence. This case shows the serious consequences of relying on the status of 
citizenship for applying various human rights, as well as minority rights.
Herein lies the fundamental problem of the protection of the ethnic, linguistic 
Russians in Estonia and Latvia from the perspective of the effective protection of 
minority rights under international law. If the citizenship criterion is required for 
recognising minority rights under international law, it follows that minority rights are 
basically citizens’ rights. Are minority rights merely citizens’ rights? Are the ethnic, 
linguistic Russians who do not hold the citizenship of Estonia and Latvia the members 
of minority as the right holders of minority rights for the purpose of present 
international law? What are the nature and contents of minority rights under present 
international law? Are the contents of minority rights confined to the cultural aspects 
in the context of the right to identity for persons belonging to minority groups, or 
beyond these? What are the international legal and normative bases for justifying the 
effective protection of the ethnic, linguistic Russians as persons belonging to 
minorities with reference to their citizenship status under international law? What is 
the implication of the justification for the effective protection of the ethnic, linguistic 
Russians under international law with respect to a State’s power to regulate 
citizenship?
2. Importance of the Research
The issues raised within ‘minority problems’ are at the root of several international 
conflicts and humanitarian disasters. Conflicts and disputes in the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Former Yugoslavia) and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, 
Northern Ireland and East Timor can all be traced to the existence of ethnic, religious 
or linguistic groups asserting various rights. The suppression of groups within a State 
leads to continued political instability and unrest and, in extreme cases, to regional 
destabilisation. In this sense, minority protection is integral to a civilised standard of
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international good governance that legitimises States.
The development of ‘specific rights’ of persons belonging to ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minority groups is a feature of 20th century international law; The 
emergence of the protection of minority groups under the Peace Treaties concluded in 
191934 preceded the modem concept of human rights. The rights of persons belonging 
to minorities include rights to cultural identity, religious freedom and others. By their 
nature, they are less easily identified and less easily implemented than other rights, as 
States have been worried that full guarantee of minority rights can give rise to 
secessionist movements of ethnic, religious or linguistic groups within existing 
boundaries of nation States. Despite the long history of the discussion on the 
protection of persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities in 
international relations, international legal standards on the rights of persons belonging 
to such minorities still remain vague.
Today, co-existing with other more general international legal standards, the 
problem of the protection of persons belonging to minorities raises unique issues and 
gives rise to tensions with other topics of international law. The affirmation of the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities as presently understood can be seen in 
Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)35 as 
follows:
“In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging 
to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members o f  
their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to 
use their own language.”36
In principle, States’ international obligation to protect the rights of persons belonging 
to minorities is evidenced in Article 27 of the ICCPR, and other relevant international 
and regional instmments should ensure the existence and development of minorities, 
their distinct language, culture and organisation within the political system of their 
State of residence.
There is no doubt that respecting the cultural identity of persons belonging to
33 See, generally, B. Harff & T. R. Gurr, 2nd ed., Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 2004); T.R. Gurr, Minorities at Risk (Washington, D.C: United States Institute o f Peace Press, 
1993).
34 For instance, minorities treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland was 
concluded in June 28, 1919, 225 Consol. T.S. 412.
35The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, 999 UNTS 171.
36Article 27 o f  the ICCPR.
37Human Rights Committee (HRC) General Comment No. 23, UN Doc.HRI\GEN\l\REV.l\ at 35 
(1994), para. 9; See, generally, Chapter 5 below, pp. 131-134.
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minorities has been regarded as the most essential aspect of minority protection. It 
should be noted, however, that the protection of the cultural identity of ethnic, 
religious or linguistic minorities is not an isolated phenomenon and should be realised
- lO
in conjunction with the guarantee of various other civil, political and social rights. A 
need to take a comprehensive and integrative approach to the issue of the protection of 
minority rights beyond the narrow defined framework with emphasis on preservation 
of cultural identity for minority groups has been ignored or consciously avoided in the 
discussion on the protection of persons belonging to minorities in international law. 
The requirement of holding citizenship of the State of residence for receiving minority 
status as the holder of minority rights espoused by the traditional view on the 
definition of a minority clearly illustrates this inherent controversial aspect of the
IQ
protection of persons belonging to minorities under international law. Granted that 
citizenship has been regarded as an indispensable legal element in exercising various 
civil and political rights for individuals within their State of residence as well as a 
condition for full membership in a State unit, the restrictive approach to definition of a 
minority under which only ‘citizens’ of their State of residence can be eligible as 
possible members of minorities as the holders of minority rights would be nothing but 
the denial of the protection of persons belonging to minorities in its true sense. The 
existence of the ethnic, linguistic Russian stateless persons and non-citizens in Estonia 
and Latvia illustrates the problem of this narrow approach to the protection of 
minority rights under international law.
The present research questions this narrow approach to minority protection in 
international law. The thesis presents an analysis of the international legal and 
normative bases for justifying the effective protection of the ethnic, linguistic Russians 
in Estonia and Latvia as persons belonging to minorities with reference to the Estonian 
and Latvian restrictive citizenship laws. In this thesis, it is argued that at least three 
international legal and normative bases may be invoked for the effective protection of 
the ethnic, linguistic Russians in Estonia and Latvia. Such legal and normative bases 
can be found in minorities-specific standards with the focus on the protection of 
cultural identity for minorities, general human rights standards with an emphasis on 
substantive equality, and the right to internal self-determination. The linkage of these 
legal and normative bases to the protection of the ethnic, linguistic Russians in Estonia
38 See Article 5 o f the proposed convention in Chapter 8 below, pp. 260-262.
39 See section “Traditional Definition of a Minority”, Chapter 4 below, pp. 90-92.
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and Latvia with reference to citizenship in their States of residence strongly suggests 
that Estonian and Latvian citizenship laws are problematic from the perspective of 
minority protection. It also suggests that these countries should protect the minority 
rights of the ethnic, linguistic Russians in an effective manner at the domestic legal 
level through the implementation of protective measures to that effect, including the 
matter of citizenship.
A study on minority protection is not a new doctoral project in international legal 
scholarship. However, previous studies on the issue have been focused on the 
description of international standards on minority rights without raising underlying 
questions about them.40 In this regard, it should be emphasised that the features of the 
protection of minority rights discourse is a fertile area of theoretical study in 
international legal studies, as the topic itself is a wide-ranging one in which the rights 
of ethnic, religious or linguistic groups intersect and interact with other international 
rules and principles. Of particular importance are the inherent tensions between the 
guarantee of the rights of persons belonging to minority groups, such as the right to 
political participation, and a State’s territorial sovereignty and stability of boundaries. 
Minority rights implicate matters going to the heart of a State’s existence and could 
entail the reordering of internal State structure. For these reasons, the topic is very 
sensitive and complex. The matter is further complicated by associated doctrines like 
the right to self-determination, given its indeterminate scope and the imprecise nature 
of the category of ‘peoples’. Indeed, the issue of the international protection of 
persons belonging to minority groups presents a crossing point between the respect of 
State sovereignty and the protection of human rights in international law.
This is the reason why the case of the ethnic and linguistic Russians in Estonia and 
Latvia in the Baltic region has been selected and it is a critically important case for the 
purpose of elaborating and consolidating the legal and normative bases for the 
effective protection of persons belonging to minorities under contemporary 
international law. The discussion about the problem of the protection of the ethnic, 
linguistic Russians in Estonia and Latvia provides an important test to show the
40 Primes examples are as follows. Z. Skurbaty, As if  peoples mattered: Critical appraisal o f  'peoples' 
and 'minorities' from the international human rights perspective and beyond (The Hague and Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2000); K. Henrard, Devising an Adequate System o f  Minority Protection: 
Individual Human Rights, Minority Rights and the Right to Self-Determination (The Hague and 
London: Martinus Nijhoff, 2000); J. Rehman, The Weaknesses in the International Protection o f  
Minority Rights (The Hague: Kluwer Law International Law, 2000); A.S. Akermrk, Justifications o f  
Minority Protection in International Law (London/The Hague/Boston: Kluwer Law International Law,
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necessity and validity of an integrative approach to international legal protection of 
persons belonging to minorities against the backdrop of the end of the Cold War.41 
This is so, because, as noted in the previous section, the issue of the protection of the 
ethnic, linguistic Russians in Estonia and Latvia as persons belonging to minorities 
with reference to citizenship status under international law is inherently interlinked to 
general questions of the protection of minority rights and human rights as well as self- 
determination, all of which may be invoked and used generally as the legal and 
normative bases for effective minority protection under international law, and all of 
which have been evolving and will likely further develop such that they may be 
applied to other instances of minority oppression in principle.42
An extensive examination of State practice is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
although this will be treated briefly depending on given contexts. Rather, a more 
important point in this thesis is to examine the relevant international legal rules and 
principles that may be used generally as ‘constraints’ to ‘influence’ a State’s power in 
treating ethnic, religious or linguistic residents in the form of enacting citizenship 
policies by using the example of the ethnic, linguistic Russians in Estonia and Latvia 
from the viewpoint of international minority protection. This may be justified, given 
the reality that international standards of minority rights still remain vague and there is 
no authoritative formulation of who the beneficiaries of minority protection schemes 
are, although the problem is clearly global in reach 43
This research is not the first project to examine the protection of minorities under 
international law, but it should be regarded as a tentative, although admittedly not
1997).
41 The greater need to promote respect for the Conference on Security and Co-operaton in Europe 
(CSCE) norms in areas where democratic institutions are being consolidated and questions relating to 
minorities are o f special concern was recognised. Section 1, Report o f the CSCE Meeting o f Experts on 
National Minorities, Geneva 19 July 1991, 12 HRLJ 332 (1991). This is unsurprising, as minorities’ 
situations in the transitional societies o f the Baltic and Balkan States provided the major impetus 
towards the normative developments and implementation efforts. In 1992, members o f the Organisation 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) decided by consensus to create a specific institution to 
address minority problems, particularly in the Baltic and Balkan States in the form o f the OSCE High 
Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). CSCE Helsinki Document 1992/ The Challenge o f  
Change, 10 July 1992, 13 HRLJ 284 (1992). This office was designed to prevent conflict as an ‘early 
warning’ mechanism, further promoting the application o f OSCE national minorities’ standards to 
enhance stability, particularly within ‘nascent’ European democracies. That the HCNM has in practice 
focused on the protection o f the ethnic Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia illustrates the point.
42 For a dynamic understanding o f international law, see W. Friedmann, The Changing Structure o f  
International Law  (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964); L. Henkin, International Law: 
Politics and Values (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995); R. Higgins, Problems and 
Process- International Law and How We Use It (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
43 See Article 4 o f the proposed convention in Chapter 8 below, pp. 258-260.
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comprehensive, effort aimed at providing broader and more solid legal and normative 
bases for the effective international minority protection. This research may be 
described as falling into the category of international human rights law insofar as it 
provides a logical description of present legal institutions for rulings on human rights 
and the effects of the international legal order in connection with the protection of 
persons belonging to minorities in contemporary global society. Since the laws which 
have been subjected to analysis are mainly governed by international law, treaties, 
decisions and soft law, this study may also be described as a study of public 
international law. It is hoped that this study will contribute to the understanding of the 
protection of the ethic, linguistic Russians in Latvia and Estonia at the micro level, but 
also to broaden the academic horizon in the field of international minority protection 
under general international law at the macro level.
3. Conceptual Problems
3.1. Minority Rights
In this thesis, ‘minority rights’ are understood as broadly as possible, meaning that 
minority rights can be implied and derived not only from the instruments of minority 
rights that directly refer to them, such as Article 27 of the ICCPR, but also from other 
instruments of human rights and relevant legal principles and rules. This seems to be 
proper and inevitable, as legal provisions on the rights of persons belonging to 
minorities in relevant international and European documents have been worded quite 
vaguely, and at the same time, the scope of minority rights has been broadened by the 
development of minority rights jurisprudence, as will be discussed in the subsequent 
chapters in this thesis.
This is also the reason why use of the contextual approach to the concept of 
minority rights is necessary in this work. It should be noted that contextual or 
teleological interpretation was often used to justify the protection of persons belonging 
to minorities under international law. For instance, in the Acquisition o f  Polish 
Nationality Case, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) held that the 
refusal of Poland to grant citizenship to members of ethnic German minorities in the 
country was a violation of the principle of the prohibition of discrimination as
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incorporated in the Minorities Treaty with Poland. Otherwise, the Court observed that 
“the value and sphere of application of the Treaty” would be greatly diminished.44
It is thus sufficient to note here that the term ‘minority rights’ is to denote every 
interest that will serve the benefits of persons belonging to ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minorities in their States of residence. In other words, minority rights are 
defined as just or legal claims and what one has a just claim to for the benefits of 
persons belonging to minorities.45
3.2. Complementary Aspect of Individual Rights and Group Rights46
Much of the literature in law, jurisprudence and political science focusing on the issue 
of individual versus group (or collective) rights seeks in fact to address the question of 
whether it is the individual or the community to be given priority in terms of rights 
recognition and protection. Thus, it may be possible to classify writers roughly as 
individualists or communitarians. Unlike individualists, communitarians emphasise 
the social dimension of the individual and describe his or her rights and duties on the 
basis of their relations to other individuals and groups.
Legally speaking, group rights are ascribed to a group of people and can only be 
invoked by the group and its authorised agents. Some commentators reject the notion 
of group rights because, in their view, it would pose a threat to the territorial integrity 
of States or to individual rights, whereas others accept it on purely empirical grounds. 
They contend that national and international law have recognised rights of groups such 
as peoples and minorities. In fact, both these positions appear flawed in whole or in 
part.47 For instance, the right to self-determination is a widely acknowledged group 
right. However, the right to self-determination as a ‘group right’ does not necessarily 
imply its automatic priority over individual rights. In this latter respect, individual 
human rights can be seen as limiting the exercise of group rights, on the one hand, and
44 Acquisition o f  Polish Nationality Case, PCIJ, Series B, No. 7 (1923), p. 16.
45 Of course, it is necessary to categorise minority rights in terms o f the concrete contents through 
which they can be implemented and enjoyed by persons belonging to minorities within international 
standards o f minority rights, such as the right to identities, the right to existence, the right to use their 
mother tongue, etc. Yet, this type o f minority rights distinction is understood as one in a narrow sense in 
this thesis.
46 See Article 8 o f the proposed convention in Chapter 8 below, pp. 266-268.
47See, generally, Akermrk, Justifications o f  Minority Protection in International Law, op.cit., pp. 42-46; 
M.A Jovanovic, “Recognizing Minority Identities Through Collective Rights”, HRQ, Vol., 27, 2005, pp. 
625-651.
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often contributing to defining and enriching their actual content, on the other. It should 
be underscored that the right to self-determination is generally considered to a ‘human 
right’ while constituting the necessary condition for the exercise of all individual 
human rights.48 The dynamic relation between the right to self-determination and the 
entire range of human rights, in combination with the evaluation of the importance of 
minority protection of both categories of rights in themselves tends to confirm the 
close link between individual rights and group rights for effective minority 
protection.49 For the purposes of this thesis, ‘group rights’ may be understood as the 
aggregate sum of rights of individual group members. The group is a vehicle through 
which collective action can be taken on its members’ behalf, usually in relation to 
discriminatory treatment. While the group as an aggregate of individuals sharing 
interests and jointly holding rights, may have better political leverage in its claim, the 
right still inheres in individual members. In other words, when the group secures the 
rights, the benefits rebound to its individual members belonging to the groups and are 
distributed as individual human rights.50
4. Methods and Structure
Chief reliance will be placed on the international legal documents on the rights of 
persons belonging to minorities, i.e. treaty provisions which are in force and 
customary international law, as well as international and European documents which 
are not, or not yet, legally binding, as the premises from which the relevant domestic
48 Several statements about the interrelation between the right to self-determination and individual 
human rights are based on Article 1 o f the ICCPR. The United Nations Human Rights Committee 
(HRC) itself underscores in its General Comment on Article 1 o f the ICCPR that: “the right o f  self- 
determination is o f particular importance because its realization is an essential condition for the 
effective guarantee and observance of individual human rights and for the promotion and strengthening 
o f those rights.” HRC General Comment 12 (Article 1 ICCPR), UN Doc.HRI\GEN\l\Rev.l at 12 
(1994), para. 1. According to Thomberry, “the relationship between self-determination and individual 
human rights humanizes the former and lends to the latter a powerful meta-language to harness the 
totality o f a people’s demands and aspirations.” P. Thomberry, “The Democratic or Internal Aspect o f  
Self-Determination with Some Remarks on Federalism”, in C. Tomuschat (ed.), M odem Law o f  Self- 
Determination (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), p. 137.
49 In this regard, the present writer does agree with Miillerson’s following view. He states as follows: 
“Application o f the principle o f the self-determination o f peoples, which is one o f the most important 
human rights norms, should not lead to the limitation o f existing human rights- especially the rights o f  
minorities. On the contrary, its implementation must result in greater protection o f the rights and 
freedoms o f individuals as well as minorities.” R. Miillerson, International Law, Rights and Politics 
(London: Routledge, 1994), p. 72.
50 See Chapter 5 below, pp. 129-131; See also the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada Case, Chapter 5 below, 
p. 133.
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laws of Latvia and Estonia will be analysed. Judicial decisions and advisory opinions 
by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international, and regional 
tribunals are examined, along with the review of relevant scholarly articles.
Chapter 2 is confined to the consideration of the historical and legal background of 
the Baltic independence and citizenship matters with reference to the existence of the 
ethnic, linguistic Russian residents in Estonia and Latvia. The recent history of the 
Baltic countries in relation to the former Soviet rule is described and the so-called 
Baltic restorationism is discussed. On this premise, Chapter 2 also describes the Baltic 
citizenship laws.
Chapter 3 examines the question of citizenship matters under international law for 
the purpose of reviewing whether the Estonian and Latvian restrictive citizenship laws 
conform to international standards on nationality. This chapter also pays special 
attention to the fact that citizenship has a human rights aspect, as expressed in the 
phrase ‘right to nationality’ in various international and regional instruments. The 
examination of citizenship matters from the point of international law is necessary to 
investigate more detailed aspects of the Baltic issues from the perspective of minority 
protection under international law.
The purpose of Chapter 4 is to explore the definition of the concept of a minority 
under present international law. If international law is the legal foundation for the 
protection of persons belonging to minorities, the problem of identification of persons 
belonging to such minorities becomes a matter of international concern. Without 
identification of what constitutes the concept of a minority, the discussion on the 
protection of the rights of persons belonging to minorities under international law may 
lack effectiveness, as the ambiguities in defining the concept of a minority directly 
impinge on the protection of minority rights. In particular, this chapter is concerned 
with the problems of the citizenship criterion of the definition of a minority espoused 
by the traditional view on the definition of a minority.
Chapter 5 attempts to examine international legal standards on minority rights in a 
narrow sense or ‘minorities-specific standards’ with an emphasis on the protection of 
cultural identity for minorities, which have been reflected in international and 
European instruments relating to minority protection. For this purpose, the chapter 
focuses on the international and European instruments that are ‘directly’ related to the 
protection of the rights of persons belonging to minorities, along with the relevant case 
law and practice of the international tribunals and organisations. It is observed in this
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chapter that the protection of minority rights in the sense of the protection of identity 
for minorities requires States concerned to protect and promote the cultural identity of 
persons belonging to minority groups in their State of residence through the 
implementation of protective measures at the domestic legal level under minorities- 
specific standards. Moreover, the protection of cultural identity for minorities under 
minorities-speciflc standards is presented as the legal and normative basis for the 
justification of the protection of the ethnic, linguistic Russians as a protected minority 
group in Estonia and Latvia.
In Chapter 6, general human rights standards with emphasis on the non­
discrimination principle in the sense of substantive equality are presented as another 
basis for the protection of minority rights. It is argued that the non-discrimination 
principle should be understood in a positive way, which means substantive equality, 
not formal equality, for the applicability of the principle to various situations for the 
effective protection of persons belonging to minorities. Furthermore, it is critical that 
the non-discrimination principle in the sense of substantive equality be able to limit a 
State’s policies to treat residents belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic groups in a 
discriminatory way by means of citizenship.
Chapter 7 discusses internal self-determination for the effective protection of 
minority rights. This chapter attempts to link the right to internal self-determination to 
the guarantee of the political rights of the ethnic, linguistic Russians in Estonia and 
Latvia, thereby drawing the conclusion that internal self-determination may serve as a 
legal and normative basis for the justification of the protection of the ethnic, linguistic 
Russians in Estonia and Latvia.
The concluding chapter 8 provides a proposal for the effective protection of 
minority rights in the form of a mini-sample draft international convention as a 
recommendation with commentary based on the arguments developed in this research.
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Chapter II
Historical and Legal Background to Contemporary 
Problems of the Ethnic, Linguistic Russians In Estonia and 
Latvia
1. Introduction
The changes caused by the dissolution of the former Soviet Union require an appraisal 
of the application of international law to the problem of minorities in connection with 
the problem of State succession and new laws which determine citizenship by 
reference to ethnic, or linguistic identity. The issue that has attracted much attention on 
the part of international legal experts concerns the restrictive citizenship laws of 
Estonia and Latvia with special reference to the protection of the ethnic, linguistic 
Russian residents under international law.
Estonia and Latvia became independent countries with the goal of establishing 
their own national identities, and getting rid of the negative legacies of the past Soviet 
rule. The urgently necessary and difficult problem for them has been how they could 
be independent States with a national identity while at the same time respecting the 
rights of the existing ethnic, linguistic Russian populations in their territories. Given 
the fact that many Russian residents in Estonia and Latvia supported the independence 
movements in Estonia and Latvia, the treatment of the Russian populations has been 
regarded as the crucial point by which the two countries could be said to be real 
democratic republics which integrated non-national ethnic, linguistic minority groups 
into the mainstream of their respective societies.1 In this regard, it should be 
remembered that most ethnic, linguistic Russian residents in question hoped that their 
status would not be changed fundamentally after independence, even if they admitted
1 Referenda for independence were held in each Baltic State. Most ethnic, linguistic Russians in 
Lithuania were opposed to independence, but a large minority in both Latvia and Estonia voted in 
favour. A. Lieven, The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993) p. 79; A. Klotins and B. Abraitiene, et al.(eds.), The Baltic 
States: A Reference Book (Tallinn, Riga, Vilnius: Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Encyclopedia
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that there might be some changes in the laws governing citizenship. But the reality has 
been different from this common expectation. Estonia and Latvia enacted citizenship 
laws which grant automatic citizenship only to successive generations that had 
possessed Estonian and Latvian citizenships before the Soviet annexation of Estonia 
and Latvia in 1940. Other persons not included in this category had to apply for 
naturalisation in order to be citizens. A major requirement for naturalisation is 
knowledge of the Estonian and Latvian languages. Since competence in the Estonian 
and Latvian languages was very difficult for the Russian populations, most of them 
gave up on seeking naturalisation and remained stateless in the territories which they 
had previously considered as their homelands when the former Soviet Union existed.
The problems of the status of the ethnic, linguistic Russians in Estonia and Latvia, 
as a matter of fact, have their historical origin in the Soviet Russification policy of the 
Baltic States. The result of Russified policies was the structural change of demography 
in Estonia and Latvia. For example, by 1991, ethnic Latvians made up less than 52 
percent of the country’s population, down from 75.5 percent in 1935.4 Some 42 
percent of the country’s population were Russian residents, most of whom settled in 
Latvia after World War II as a result of the USSR’s Russification and Sovietisation 
policies. Thus, just as Latvians regained their independence after half a century of 
annexation, they found themselves barely the majority in their own country. In 
response, the Supreme Council of Latvia acted to limit automatic citizenship in the 
revived State to those who had possessed Latvian citizenship of June 17, 1940, and 
their descendants.5
Similar concerns prompted neighbouring Estonia to adopt a restrictive citizenship 
law in 1992. During five decades of Soviet rule, Estonia’s demographics also changed 
dramatically as a result of Moscow’s policies. While some 28,000 non-Estonians
Publishers, 1991), p. 7.
2 Russians are distinguished sharply from Estonians and Latvians from ethnic, linguistic, and religious 
standpoints. The Estonian language is part o f the Finno-Ugric group, along with Finnish and Hungarian. 
Latvians speak the only two surviving varieties of the Indo-European Baltic family o f languages. 
Russians, on the other hand, are Slavic in origin, and their language belongs to the Indo-European 
family. Latvians and Estonians, ruled for centuries by German barons, still share their protestant 
religion. Ethnic Russians claiming religious convictions tend to subscribe to the Orthodox faith.
3 A. Fehervary, “Citizenship, Statelessness and Human Rights: Recent Development in the Baltic 
States”, International Journal o f  Refugee Law, Vol., 5, 1993, pp. 392-423.
4 United Nations Report o f the Secretary-General on the Work o f the Organization, The Situation o f  
Human Rights in Estonia and Latvia, UN Doc. A/47/748, Annex, at 3, para. 4 (1992).
5 Republic of Latvia Supreme Council Resolution, “On the Renewal o f Republic o f Latvia Citizens’ 
Rights and Fundamental Principles o f Naturalization,” in the Republic o f Latvia: Human Rights Issues 
(Riga: 5th Saeima’s Standing Commission on Human Rights, 1993/1994, p. 76.
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migrated to Estonia between 1944 and 1959, thousands of Estonians were deported to 
Siberia from 1944 to 19496 and thousands of others were killed. In 1939, ethnic 
Estonians constituted roughly 88 percent of Estonia’s population, while approximately 
8 percent of Estonia’s population were ethnic Russians. By 1989, ethnic Estonians had 
decreased to 61 percent of Estonia’s population, with ethnic Russians constituting 
some 30 percent. While most ethnic Estonians spoke Russian, only 10 percent of the
• • 7non-Estonian population learned to communicate in Estonian.
Resulting from the effects of the two world wars and the period of Soviet rule, the 
demographic changes in Estonia and Latvia have been a decisive element in the debate 
over citizenship in the two countries. Sharp decreases in the percentage of the titular 
nationality were seen in Estonia and Latvia. In the view of the Russian government, 
however, these citizenship laws were a sweeping infringement of human rights of the 
ethnic, linguistic Russians.8 The Estonian and Latvian governments saw matters quite 
differently. From their point of view, Russian settlers could not lose a citizenship they 
never lawfully possessed. Russian migration to Estonia and Latvia was incidental to 
an illegal occupation by the Soviets. Taking into account the situation of the ethnic, 
linguistic Russian populations in Estonia and Latvia, the international community has 
expressed the desire that the two countries be more liberal on the status of their ethnic, 
linguistic Russian residents, and emphasised that this should be desirable for them to 
be democratic countries in Europe.9 In Lithuania, however, the percentage of the 
Lithuanian population remained fairly constant during the 1990s, averaging around 80 
percent. The differences between Lithuania and its Baltic neighbours, Estonia and
6 United Nations Report o f Secretary-General, Situation o f Human Rights in Estonia and Latvia, UN 
Doc. A /48/511, Annex, at 6, para. 20 (1993).
7 Ibid.
8 The Russian government reacted very harshly to the Estonian and Latvian citizenship policies, 
declaring them to be a violation o f human rights law, and branding these policies on ethnic Russians as 
‘apartheid and racism’. See, “More Tough Talk From Moscow On Troop Withdrawal,” REF/RL Daily 
Report, July 21, 1994.
9 Letter from OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities to Estonian President L. Men, 1 July 
1993, “Most o f the Russian-speaking minority have lived in your country for many years and have 
established their roots in Estonia. They prefer to live in your country, and many o f them have expressed 
their attachment to it by voting for its independence in the referendum. They were citizens of the former 
Soviet Union, living in Estonia. Now, under the new law, they would be considered to be aliens”, in V. 
Poleshchuk, Advice not welcomed: Recommendations o f  the OSCE High Commissioner to Estonia and 
Latvia and the response (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2001), p. 41. In this 
regard, Varennes’s remark is very suggestive. As to the situation in Latvia, he noted that “in practice, 
that means that more than half a million people, many o f them bom in the country, have lost the right to 
vote in national elections since that country ‘becomes’ a democracy.” See F. Varennes, “Towards 
Effective Political Participation and Representation o f  Minorities”, Working Paper to the Fourth Session 
o f the UN Working Group o f Minorities (1998), p. 10.
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Latvia are critical in understanding the ‘Baltic issues’. For Lithuanians, there was no 
threat of ‘cultural extermination’, a rallying cry for both Estonian and Latvian 
nationalists, because of the smaller degree of Russian settlement. Lithuanians felt less 
threatened culturally than the Estonians and Latvians. Because of this social 
background, Lithuania could enact very liberal citizenship laws in contrast to Estonia 
and Latvia.
This chapter is confined to the consideration of the historical origin of the existence 
of the Russians residents in the Baltic region and the problems of citizenship matters 
for the ethnic, linguistic Russian residents in Estonia and Latvia. For this purpose, 
Chapter 2 will describe briefly the recent history of the two countries in relation to the 
former Soviet rule and discuss the Baltic restorationism upon which Estonian and 
Latvian citizenship laws are based. Finally, this chapter will describe the Baltic 
citizenship laws.
2. Recent History of Estonia and Latvia
2.1. Russification in Estonia and Latvia
Estonia and Latvia enjoyed their own independent periods between the two world 
wars. During this period, they attempted to establish democratic parliamentary 
systems, and enjoyed the flourishing of their own national cultures and economic 
growth. They became members of the League of Nations. It is not a coincidence that 
the interwar period has served as a model for many Estonian and Latvian politicians in 
the post-Soviet period, who hoped to eliminate the effects of incorporation into the 
Soviet Union.10
World War II and its conclusion caused many changes in the countries lying 
between Germany and the USSR. There was much economic loss and heavy casualties. 
There were also significant geographic changes. Poland moved to the west, and the 
Soviet Union gained Moldavia, western Ukraine, and the Baltic States. These 
acquisitions were not the result of warfare. Rather, the incorporation of these
10 G. Smith (ed.), The Baltic States: The National Self-Determination o f  Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).
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territories was the result of the Nazi-Soviet pact and secret protocols11 prior to the 
Soviet-German fighting which divided the area between Germany and the USSR into 
spheres of influence. Latvia, Estonia, Finland, Moldavia and later Lithuania were 
under the control of the Soviet Union. After the fighting, Finland was the only country 
not directly incorporated into the USSR.
While the Soviets temporarily lost control of the territory due to the German
advance in 1941, by the end of the war the formerly independent Baltic States had
1 ^
become simply three of the union republics of the USSR. Much of the population in 
the Baltic States as well as western countries did not recognise the legitimacy of the 
incorporation into the USSR.13 The fiercest resistance was found in Lithuania, where 
armed conflict continued until 1953. As a result, Lithuanians were faced with 
repression and deportation campaigns. The situation was similar in Estonia and Latvia 
with the exception of much immigration. From the period of incorporation into the 
USSR until the German occupation, almost 350,000 people in Latvia were either 
deported to other parts of the Soviet Union, or fled to the West. World War II 
decreased the Latvian population by over a half million, or by about one-fourth.14 
After World War II another 100,000 people disappeared in Latvia. Many of these 
returned from Siberia after Stalin’s death, but another 25,000 were killed in anti-Soviet 
guerrilla fighting.15 From 1939 to 1955, the prewar Latvian population excluding the 
natural death rate declined by 36 percent, while new immigration accounted for the 
increase of 31 percent. Figures in Estonia were comparable.16 Thus, Estonia and 
Latvia achieved their prewar population totals more quickly than Lithuania, but only 
through the addition of large numbers of mostly Russian immigrants.
11 The text of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its secret protocols is printed in RJ. Sontag and J.S. 
Beddie (eds.), Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941: Documents from the Archives o f  the German Foreign 
Office (Washington D.C: U.S. Department o f State, 1948), pp. 76-77. Lithuania was also assigned to the 
Soviet sphere o f influence in a supplementary agreement signed September 28, 1939.
12 A.N. Tarulis, Soviet Policy toward the Baltic States, 1918-1940 (Notre Dame: Notre Dame 
University Press, 1959), pp. 216-235. The Supreme Soviet o f the USSR admitted Lithuania into the 
Soviet Union on August 3, 1940; Latvia on August 5, 1940; Estonia on August 6, 1940.
13 W.J. Hough, “The Annexation o f the Baltic States and Its Effect on the Development o f Law 
Prohibiting the Forcible Seizure o f Territory”, N.Y.L. Sch. J. In t’l & Comp. L, Vol., 6, 1985, pp. 303- 
333. The effects o f this policy o f non-recognition were that Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia continued to 
enjoy de jure  statehood; A. Shtromas, “Political and Legal Aspects o f the Soviet Occupation and 
Incorporation o f the Baltic States”, Baltic Forum, V ol.l, 1984, pp. 24-38; R.A. Vitas, The United States 
and Lithuania: The Stimson Doctrine o f  Nonrecognition (New York: Praeger, 1990).
14 E. Vebers, “Demography and Ethnic Politics in Independent Latvia: Some Basic Facts”, 
Nationalities Papers, Vol., XXI, No. 2, 1993, pp. 179-194.
15 Ibid.
16 R. Taagepera, “Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia 1940-1980: Similarities and Differences”, Baltic 
Forum, Vol., 1, 1984, pp. 39-52.
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Since the birth rates of the Estonian and Latvian nationalities were very low, the 
influx of Russian immigrants meant significant decreases in the percentage of the 
‘native’ population of the republics. While the population of Russians in Estonia and 
Latvia increased by 585,000 from 1959-1989, the titular populations increased by only 
160,000. In Lithuania, meanwhile, Russians increased by just 113,000, while ethnic
1 7Lithuanians grew by 773,000. These differences in migration and birth rates had 
clear effects. In Estonia, the pre-World War II population was over 88 percent 
Estonian. In 1989, it was 61.5 percent. In Latvia, the decrease was even greater: from 
around 75 percent to just over 50 percent. Only in Lithuania did the percentage stay
1 ftroughly the same: 80.6 percent before the war, 79.6 percent in 1989. By the end of 
the Soviet period, the Lithuanian government faced as little or less of a threat from its 
minorities than it confronted in 1920.19 The same could not be said about Estonia and 
Latvia. If the above-mentioned trends had continued after the 1980s, the Estonians and 
especially Latvians would have quickly become minorities of their own republics.
The substantial migration into the Baltic republics was due to the Soviet 
industrialisation policy. All three republics had gone through industrialisation, but 
Estonia and Latvia were more heavily targeted in part because their infrastructure was 
superior to that of Lithuania. In addition, while Lithuania’s Communist elites 
generally came from within the republic, in Estonia and Latvia the high-level officials 
were usually either Russians or Balts who were bom in Russia. Therefore, the 
Lithuanian Communist Party was more able than its counterparts to direct 
industrialisation to benefit the local population.
At the same time, the influx of Russians meant that Russian had become a basic 
language in schools and the media. The non-Russians across the USSR during the 
Soviet period deeply felt the impact of ‘Russification’ during the Soviet period, 
particularly in the 1970s. Especially in areas where Russians constituted a significant 
part of the population Russian was stressed as the language for daily communication 
between nationalities. Thus, while many non-Russians learned the Russian language, 
Russians had little incentive to learn the local language.
17 R. Misiunas, “The Baltic Republics: Stagnation and Strivings for Sovereignty”, in L. Hajda & M. 
Beissinger (eds.), The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics and Society (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1990), p. 217.
18 Ibid., p. 214.
19 A. Senn, “Comparing the Circumstances o f Lithuanian Independence 1918-1922 and 1988-1992”, 
Journal o f  Baltic Studies, Vol., XXV, No. 2, 1994, pp. 123-130.
20 Misiunas, The Baltic Republics: Stagnation and Strivings fo r  Sovereignty, op.cit., p. 206.
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The Soviets were able to reassert control by force in the face of postwar guerrilla 
resistance movements in the three Baltic republics. For the Soviets, however, it was 
not easy to find loyal cadres to fill positions in the administrative apparatus. As of 
1940, there were only about 1,000 members of the Latvian Communist Party, while 
other non-Communist elites perished in the terror or fled to the West. The Soviets
51brought in loyal and trustworthy cadres from elsewhere to overcome this shortage. 
Many of these were ethnic Latvians who had grown up in the Soviet Union and spoke 
only Russian.22 These Russified Latvian were referred to as Tatovichi’ by other 
Latvians, while in Estonia, the Russian-Estonians in the Estonian Communist Party 
were called ‘Yestonians’ because of their heavy Russian accents. The ‘imported’ 
Communists were considered the most reliable and thus were given the most 
prestigious and powerful positions. The Russian elements dominated the ruling 
hierarchy in Riga, while Latvians were given most of the posts in the countryside. In 
1970, only two of the thirteen members of the politburo of the Latvian Communist 
Party were bom in Latvia.23 It was important that the ruling elite was primarily 
Russian, as this meant that Russian became the language of public administration and 
that promotion in the hierarchy required proficiency in Russian.
The infusion of reliable cadres from other parts of the Soviet Union was followed 
by massive waves of immigration of Russians, Belorussians and Ukrainians into 
Latvia. A similar process was occurring in Estonia, with about 210,000 new arrivals in 
the same period.24 This trend continued for the next thirty-five years. This massive 
influx of Russians into Estonia and Latvia created additional social problems which 
led to anxiety and resentment on the part of Estonians and Latvians. Russian 
immigrants were often granted privileged access to housing as an inducement to settle 
in the Baltics. But by far the greatest irritant to the Latvians and Estonians as a 
result of the immigration process was the growing dominance of the Russian language 
and the unwillingness of immigrants to learn the local languages. They would often
21 R. Misiunas and R. Taagepera, The Baltic States: Years o f  Dependence 1940-1990 (Berkeley: 
University o f California Press, 1993), p. 80.
22A. Silde, “The Role o f Russian-Latvians in the Sovietization o f Latvia,” Journal o f  Baltic Studies, 
Vol., XVIII, No. 2, 1987, pp. 191-208.
23 J. Dreifelds, “Latvian National Demands and Group Consciousness Since 1959”, in G.W. Simmonds 
(ed.), Nationalism in the USSR & Eastern Europe in the Era o f  Brezhnev & Kosygin (Detroit: 
University o f Detroit Press, 1977), pp. 136-156.
24 Misiunas and Taagepera, The Baltic State, op.cit., p. 112.
25 A. Lieven, The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence (New  
Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), p. 184.
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have to use Russian for daily communication, such as consulting a doctor or 
contacting telephone operators. Moreover, it was impossible for them to receive higher 
education without fluency in Russian during the Soviet period.26 The competitive 
examinations for entrance to higher learning institutions were customarily taken in 
Russian, thereby providing a distinct advantage to those most thoroughly trained in 
Russian.27 The prestige accorded to the Russian language was symbolic of the status 
of the Russian nation in the Soviet Union.28
2. 2. Regaining Independence and the Issue of Citizenship
It was Gorbachev’s liberalising polices during the late 1980s that reawakened national 
sentiment in the Baltic republics and permitted the independence movements. Nearly 
two million people formed a human chain from Estonia and Latvia to demonstrate 
against the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1989. It was an unprecedented display of 
Baltic solidarity against the iniquities of the past. Within this social atmosphere, 
Lithuania proclaimed its independence, but subsequently backed down under pressure 
from Moscow. In the same year, Estonia and Latvia passed decrees announcing the 
beginning of transitional periods which were to end with the establishment of 
sovereignty.
In August 1991, hard-line communists attempted to overthrow President 
Gorbachev’s regime and take control of Moscow. However, this coup failed, and the 
Baltic States successfully declared their full independence. Having gained diplomatic
• 2Qrecognition from the international community, including Russia under the new 
leadership of Yeltsin, Lithuania and Estonia began enacting basic laws governing all
26 R. Misiunas, “Baltic Nationalism and Soviet Language Policy: From Russification to Constitutional 
Amendment”, H. Huttenbach (ed.), Soviet Nationality Policies: Ruling Ethnic Groups in the USSR 
(London: Mansell, 1990), pp. 206-220.
27 W. Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984), p. 261.
28 The elevation of the Russians was begun by Stalin during World War II and continued in the postwar 
period. Stalin offered a victory toast on May 24, 1945, saying: “I drink above all to the health o f the 
Russian people because it is the most outstanding nation o f all the nations comprising the Soviet 
Union.” Pravda, May 25, 1945, quoted in B. Nahaylo and V. Swoboda, Soviet Disunion: A History o f  
the Nationalities Problem in the USSR (New York: The Free Press, 1990), p. 95.
29 Denmark recognised the Baltic States on 26 August, other EU countries on 27 August. On 4 
September, the USA recognised the independence o f the Baltic States, and 6 September the newly 
created Council o f the Federation, which was composed o f leaders o f all the republics o f the Soviet 
Union, finally recognised the independence o f the Baltic States.
30 The Soviet Union adopted a law under which its constituent republics could secede. USSR Law on
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aspects of life in their Republics. These included laws on citizenship and the rights of 
non-citizens residing in the Republic.
Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia each had citizenship laws governing who could 
become a citizen of the republic during the inter-war period. However, following the 
Baltic’s annexation by the Soviet Union, individuals in the Republic became subject to 
Soviet citizenship law, which provided that every person residing within the Soviet
-5 1
Union was a citizen of the Soviet Union. The Soviet citizenship law provided some 
jurisdiction for union-republics over citizenship issues. Article 26 of the Law of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Citizenship of the USSR granted to the union- 
republics exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for admission to citizenship of the 
union-republics and, ipso facto , to citizenship of the USSR by citizens of foreign 
States or stateless persons who are residents of the USSR.32
When the Soviet Union collapsed, citizenship became a more acute concern 
because Soviet citizens were left holding the citizenship of a non-existent State. These 
people had three choices: taking the citizenship of the republics in which they resided, 
which may have strict language and residency requirements; accepting Russian 
citizenship and losing certain privileges such as voting; or becoming stateless, which 
carries its own significant implications. A number of international organisations, 
including the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) and Helsinki Watch, actively took part in the enactment of the Baltic 
laws on citizenship and the question of the status of non-citizens.33
Procedure for Deciding Secession of a Union Republic, April, 3, 1990. Register o f the Congress o f the 
People's Deputies o f USSR and Supreme Soviet o f USSR. 1990, issue No. 13, p. 252.
31 A distinction was drawn between the concept o f citizenship and nationality under modem Soviet 
domestic law. Nationality has an ethno-linguistic connotation, whereas citizenship is purely a legal 
status. Under Soviet law, every Soviet person not only possesses Soviet citizenship, but also a 
nationality. Every Soviet citizen as such is officially regarded as belonging to one of the many nations 
that compromise the territory o f the USSR. There are three levels o f citizenship in the USSR, that is, 
federal, union-republican and autonomous-republican. A citizen o f an autonomous-republic and/ or o f a 
union-republic is ipso facto  a citizen of the USSR. Citizenship o f a union is not coterminous with 
permanent residence in a given union-republic, since an individual who is permanently resident in 
Lithuania, for example, may belong to the citizenship o f Russia or Moldavia. Citizens o f one union- 
republic enjoy equal protection o f the laws in any other union-republic in which they may be resident. C. 
Osakwe, Comment, “Recent Soviet Citizenship Legislation”, Am. J. Comp. L, Vol., 28, 1980, pp. 625- 
641.
32 The Law o f the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics on Citizenship o f the USSR, July 1, 1979, 20 
ILM 1207.
33 For instance, Estonia’s draft version o f its Aliens Law generated international criticism and led to 
allegation that local Russian residents are targets o f racial discrimination. The OSCE High 
Commissioner on National Minorities was concerned that its vague wording could lead to arbitrary 
interpretation and implementation by granting too much discretion to government officials. In particular, 
it did not guarantee that aliens would be granted a residency permit and those who did obtain permits
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3. The Baltic Restorationism and International Law
3.1. Ex iniuria ius non oritur
The Estonian and Latvian citizenship laws have been based on the Baltic States’ 
restorationism or legal continuity theory. That is, the principle of ex iniuria ius non 
oritur (legal rights will not arise from wrongdoing). They have argued that as the 
incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union was illegal, it had no legal 
consequences for the Baltic States. The legal continuity theory produced other relevant 
legal consequences. As they are not successor States to the Soviet Union, absent their 
consent or some independent basis under international law, the Baltic States are not 
legally required to assume the rights and duties of the former Soviet Union.34 At the 
same time, having been restored, the Baltic States logically cannot claim the ‘clean
 ^r
slate’ to which newly independent States may be entitled. Instead, they purport to 
have retained the rights and obligations they possessed during the period prior to their 
independence.36 In other words, Baltic States have the legal right to be returned to 
their earlier position under the principle of restitutio in integrum.
The legality of annexation depends upon whether the ‘use of force’ appears to be 
legitimate. Thus, the legality of the incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet 
Union in 1940 should be evaluated on the basis of international law in force in 1940. 
This is related to the rule of intertemporal law, but the jurisprudence regarding 
problems of intertemporal law has remained quite ambiguous. This was illustrated by 
the South West Africa (1966) and Namibia (1971) Cases at the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ). In the former, the ICJ ruled that:
“...the Court must place itself at the point in time when the mandate system was being 
instituted.. .the Court must have regard to the situation as it was that tim e.. .”37
However, in the Namibia Case, the ICJ used contrary argumentation to support its 
judgment as follows:
would be required to renew them every five years. Russian residents viewed this as a license for the 
authorities to expel them from the country. Estonian President L. Meri refused to sign the bill until it 
was endorsed by legal experts from the OSCE and the Council o f Europe. Poleshchuk, Advice Not 
Welcomed, op cit., pp. 37-42.
34 R. Miillerson, “New Developments in the Former U.S.S.R and Yugoslavia”, Va.J. In t’l. L, Vol., 33, 
1993, pp. 299-315.
35 M. N. Shaw, International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 604-605.
36 R. Miillerson, International Law, Rights and Politics (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 146.
37 South West Africa Case, ICJ Reports, 1966, p. 23.
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“The Court must take into consideration the changes which have occurred in the 
supervening half-century, and its interpretation cannot remain unaffected by the 
subsequent development o f law.”38
In light of the ICJ dictum in the Namibia Case, it has been suggested that post-1940 
development in the international prohibition of the use of force and threat cannot be 
completely disregarded in legal evaluations of the Baltic case.
With the adoption of the Kellogg-Briand Pact39 in 1928 in which States banned 
war as an instrument of national policy, the prohibition of aggressive wars became a 
part of general international law. It is debatable whether the ‘threat’ of military force 
was equally prohibited in general international law before such a prohibition was 
explicitly expressed in the Charter of the United Nations, adopted in 1945. A 
conservative view maintains that before the entry into force of the United Nations 
Charter, general international law did not explicitly prohibit the ‘threat’ of military 
force.40 Although this view is questionable, one needs to look at legal commitments 
between the USSR and the Baltic States.41 Article 2 of the Convention on Definition 
of Aggression stated:
38Legal Consequences fo r  States Case (Namibia Case), ICJ Reports, 1971, p. 31
39 General Treaty for Renunciation o f War as an Instrument o f National Policy, 94 LNTS 57, entered 
into force on July 24, 1929.
40 L. Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law: Historical Development, 
Criteria, Present Status (Helsinki: Lakimiesliiton Kustannus, 1988), p. 135.
41 The Baltic States, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, gained their independence from Russia in 1920. 
Russia recognised their independence through a set o f bilateral peace treaties. See the Treaty o f Peace 
between Estonia-Russia, 1920, 11 LNTS 51. Article 2 o f the Treaty states: “on the basis o f the right of  
all peoples freely to decide their own destinies, and even to separate themselves completely from the 
State of which they form part, a right proclaimed by the Federal Socialist Republic of Soviet Russia, 
Russia unreservedly recognises the independence and autonomy o f the State of Estonia, and renounces 
voluntarily and forever all rights o f sovereignty formerly held by Russia over the Estonian people and 
territory by virtue of the former legal situation, and by virtue o f international treaties, which, in respect 
of such rights, shall henceforth lose their force.” Russian treaties with Latvia, signed August 11, 1920, 
and Lithuania, signed July 12, 1920, contain similar clauses. The treaties also included the recognition 
by Russia o f the internationally provided neutrality o f the Baltic States. Bilateral relations between the 
Baltic States and the Soviet Union are also evidenced in several treaties. See Pact o f Mutual Assistance 
Between the Republic o f Latvia and the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, 1939, Latvia-USSR, 198 
LNTS 381; Pact o f Mutual Assistance Between the Republic of Estonia and the Union o f Soviet 
Socialist Republics, 1939, Estonia-USSR, 198 LNTS 227; Convention Relating to Conciliation 
Procedure Between Latvia and the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, 1932, Latvia-USSR, 148 LNTS 
129; Convention Between Lithuania and the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics for the Definition o f  
Aggression, July 5, 1933, 148 LNTS 79; Conciliation Convention Between Estonia and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, 1932, Estonia-USSR, 131 LNTS 309; Treaty of Non-Aggression and 
Peaceful Settlement o f Disputes Between Estonia and the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, 1932, 
Estonia-USSR, 131 LNTS 297; Treaty o f Non-Aggression Between the Republic o f Lithuania and the 
Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, 1926, Lithuania-USSR, 60 LNTS 145. None o f these documents 
had expiration dates before Dec. 31, 1945. The Baltic States were also legally related to the Soviet 
Union through a number o f multilateral legal documents. These included the Convention for the 
Definition o f Aggression (or the so-called Litvinov Convention, July 3, 1933, 147 LNTS 69), Treaty o f  
Paris of 1928.
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“Accordingly, the aggressor in an international conflict shall, subject to the agreements in 
force between the parties to the dispute, be considered to be the State which is the first to 
commit any o f the following actions: (1) Declaration o f war upon another State; (2) 
Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration o f war, o f the territory o f  
anther State; (3) Attack by its land, naval or air forces, with or without a declaration o f  
war, on the territory, vessels or aircraft o f anther State; (4) Naval blockade o f the coasts 
or ports o f another State; (5) Provisions o f support to armed bands formed in its territory 
which have invaded the territory o f another State, or refusal, notwithstanding the request 
o f the invaded State, to take in its own territory all the measures in its power to deprive 
those bands o f all assistance or protection.”42
Moreover, Article 3 of the Convention for the Definition of Aggression provided:
“No political, military, economic or other considerations may serve as an excuse or 
justification for the aggression referred to in Article 2.”43
It can be stated that the international treaties binding the Soviet Union and the Baltic 
States prohibited any aggression or violent measures against any of the contracting 
States. In this regard, it is clear that the Soviet occupation of the Baltic Republics in 
the summer of 1940 was an illegal aggression or intervention under general 
international law.
The occupation of the Baltic States by the USSR in 1940 can be characterised as a 
quasi-belligerent occupation. As no belligerent confrontation occurred and there was 
no disruption of the diplomatic relations, a state of war between the Baltic States and 
the USSR never came into existence. Rather than war, the Soviet military advance can 
be characterised as illegal intervention.44
The Baltic States have argued that Russians entered their countries illegally and 
therefore, they have no legal right to stay. Based on this principle, the Baltic States 
have claimed that they fall under the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.45 The following 
stipulation of the fourth Geneva Convention has been invoked in Estonia and Latvia:
“The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts o f its own civilian population 
into the territory it occupies.”46
Yet, the view that the IV Geneva Convention became formally applicable in the Baltic 
States may be challenged. First, the Baltic States had been occupied and annexed for
42 Article 2 o f the Convention, The Convention for the Definition o f Aggression (or the so-called 
Litvinov Convention), 1933, 147 LNTS 69.
43 Article 3 o f the Convention.
44 A. Roberts, “What is a Military Occupation?”, Brit. Y.B. Int'/L., Vol., 55, 1984, pp. 249-305.
45 Geneva Convention No. IV Relative to the Protection o f Civilian Persons in Time o f War, Aug. 12, 
1949,75 UNTS 287; J. Skolnick, “Grappling with the Legacy o f Soviet Rule: Citizenship and Human 
Rights in the Baltic States”, U.T. Fac. L. Rev., Vol., 54, 1996, pp. 387-417.
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ten years already when the Geneva Convention became binding for the USSR. 
Moreover, it was seldom argued during the Soviet annexation period that the USSR 
was bound to respect the Geneva Convention in the Baltic States. In addition, it 
remains open whether certain Geneva rules relating to foreign occupation were still 
legally applicable before 1949. However, it seems clear that the 1949 Soviet mass 
deportation from the Baltic States would be illegal both under 1907 and 1949 rules.47
Some Balts have considered the ethnic Russian civilian settlers as ‘occupiers’. It is 
difficult to agree with this view, however, because most of the ethnic Russians moved 
to the Baltics after World War II. Furthermore, the Convention came into force four 
years after the War ended. But even if the Baltic claim is accepted, most Russians in 
question settled in the Baltic States ‘individually’ and the settlement of Russians 
should be separated from Soviet State polices.48
3.2. Inconsistent Practice and Controversial Aspects of the Non-Recognition 
Policy in the Baltic Case
46 The last passage o f Article 49 o f the Convention.
47 In the context o f World War II the applicability o f the 1907 Hague Regulation to forcible peacetime 
occupation has been affirmed in legal practice and literature. It is then correct to conclude that the 
standards o f the 1907 Hague rules were legally applicable in the occupied Baltic States. The bulk o f the 
law o f occupation, still largely applicable today, is contained in the annex to the IV Hague Convention, 
titled as Regulations respecting the laws and customs o f war on land, adopted on October 18, 1907. The 
Hague law o f occupation was applicable during both World Wars and serves as the important source for 
the analysis o f the Baltic situations, whose origins lay in 1940. The gist o f  the law o f occupation is 
contained in Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulation, which states: “The authority o f the legitimate 
power having in fact passed into the hands o f the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his 
power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless 
absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.” The civilian population in the occupied territory 
is, inter alia, protected by Articles 46 and 50 o f the 1907 Hague Regulation. Article 46 read: “Family 
honour and rights, the lives o f persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and 
practice, must be respected. Private property cannot be confiscated.” These prescriptions for the 
occupant are complemented by Article 50: “No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be 
inflicted upon the population on account o f the acts o f individuals for which they cannot be regarded as 
jointly and severally responsible.” All o f these fundamental rules protecting the ousted governments 
and the civilians living in occupied territories were massively violated during World War II.
48 In this regard, it would be useful to deal with Russian minority issues in the Baltic States in terms of 
the protection o f the right not to be displaced. The term ‘displacement’ is interpreted to mean ‘forced’ 
or ‘forcible’ or ‘involuntary,’ as opposed to ‘voluntary’ movement o f people from their area o f habitual 
residence. It is used interchangeably with terms such as ‘flight’, ‘involuntary migration’, or ‘forced 
movement’. Displacement is defined broadly so as to include all cases o f expulsion, deportation, forced 
resettlement, relocation, and transfer, whether across national borders or within the home country. Also, 
the term ‘displaced’ refers to refugees, asylum seekers, persons internally displaced or forcibly resettled, 
expellees, and uprooted individuals or groups, unless otherwise specified. The detailed assessment of  
this issue is beyond the scope o f this thesis. However, it should be emphasised that the UN report 
approaches the problem o f population transfer in the context o f the protection o f the inhabitants in the 
case of State succession. This is quite suggestive o f the case for the protection o f the ethnic Russian 
populations in Estonia and Latvia. See United Nations Report on Freedom o f  Movement: Human
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In the case of the Baltic Republics, the situation created by illegal acts lasted for half a 
century. It must be asked whether the illegality of the annexation was by some means 
cured during this long period. The non-recognition of the annexation of the Baltic 
States by many Western countries has been presented as evidence of its illegality.49 
The United States, for instance, froze assets belonging to Baltic States to protect them 
from the seizure by the Soviets and permitted the maintenance of diplomatic 
representatives from the Baltic States.50 As is widely known, this US’s position had 
been based on the ‘Stimson doctrine’. In 1932, Stimson, Secretary of State, stated that 
the United States did not recognise the Japanese occupation of Manchuria due to its 
violation of the prohibition against the use of force in the Kellogg-Briand Pact.51 The 
non-recognition by the United States and Western countries continued unchanged, at 
least formally.
The non-recognition of the Soviet annexation by many States during such a long 
period was an unprecedented phenomenon. However, this practice was never 
unanimous. While non-recognition policy was adopted as a formal legal position, then 
in terms of ‘political reality’, there was the new world order established at the Yalta 
conference in February 1945. While the US and the UK never recognised the 
absorption of the Baltic States in terms of law, they occasionally had to accept it in 
terms of political reality. In the Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941, President 
Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill had promised to stand for the freedom of all 
illegally subjugated peoples. However, during the conference at Teheran, Yalta and 
Potsdam, they ‘tacitly’ accepted Stalin’s control over the Baltic States. According to 
Kissinger, “Roosevelt agreed to Stalin’s plan to move the frontiers of Poland 
westward and indicated that he would not press Stalin on the question of the 
Baltics.”52 Benvenisti concluded that “the international community acquiesced to the 
Soviet resurrection of the 1940 international borders, although formal recognition of 
the incorporation was generally withheld.”
Rights and Population Transfer, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/23; A.F. Bayefsky and J. Fitzpatrick (eds.), Human 
Rights and Forced Displacement (The Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2000).
49 For the discussion on the international community’s attitude toward the recognition o f the Soviet 
annexation, see Hough, The Annexation o f  the Baltic States and Its Effect on the Development o f  Law 
Prohibiting Forcible Seizure o f  Territory, op.cit., pp. 326-328.
50 Ibid
51 Ibid.
52H. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 394.
53 E. Benvenisti, The International Law o f  Occupation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 
68 .
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The political dimension of the recognition of the virtual Baltic States by the US 
becomes apparent during 1987-1991 when the attitude of the US with respect to Baltic 
independence became much more reserved. In an effort to support Gorbachev’s 
policies, the United States did not actively encourage the Baltic independence 
movements. Rather, the Bush administration, touching on self-determination within 
the Soviet Union, expressed concern about the devastating effects of the “suicidal 
nationalism” in the Baltic region.54
When one considers the fact that the USSR was one of the original members of the 
United Nations, one of the fundamental purposes of which is to prohibit the use of 
force, the question of inconsistent practice becomes more complex. The UN Charter 
distinguished between original and admitted members. The distinction was pointed out 
by the Rapporterur (Membership) of the Committee 1/2 to the Commission I at the 
San Francisco Conference:
“As regards original members their participation in the Organization is considered as 
‘acquired by right', while that o f future members is dependent on the fulfillment of 
certain conditions.. .”55 (Emphasis added.)
The membership of the two constituent Republics of the USSR, Belorussia and 
Ukraine, deserves mention. Stalin had proposed that, pursuant to a 1944 amendment to 
the Soviet Constitution, all sixteen federal Republics should be admitted. At the Yalta 
Conference it was agreed that the United Kingdom and the United States would 
support the original membership of the two Republics. However, as a United States’ 
memorandum pointed out, the Soviet constitution did not permit the Soviet Republics 
to control their own foreign policy or affairs and they were accordingly not sovereign 
States. Stetinnius and Eden supported the membership proposal at San Francisco on 
the basis of the contribution of the two Republics to the war effort, rather than on 
grounds of status.56 As to the question of to what extent UN organs have conformed 
to the criteria of statehood in examining and approving application for membership, 
Higgins concluded that “variations in United Nations practice concerning claims of 
statehood are a result not of an abandonment of traditional legal criteria...but of the 
proper use of flexibility in interpreting these criteria in relation to the claim in which
54 M. H. Halperin& D.J. Scheffer, Self-Determination in the New World Order (Washington, D.C: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), pp. 27-29.
55 7 United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco (UNCIO) 324, Doc. 1178, 
1945.
56 Ibid.
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they are presented.”57 She also pointed out that purely “political considerations” often
c o
intrude in decisions concerning admission. This statement may be understood such 
that in considering claims to admissions under ‘Article 4 ’ of the UN Charter, legal and 
political factors may be difficult to separate. Moreover, if the UN Charter permits 
certain political considerations to be taken into account, it remains difficult to 
determine in specific cases whether the real political factors at issue have been 
permissible ones.
The world’s most important international organisation, the United Nations, was 
created after the Baltic States had already been annexed by the USSR. The League of 
Nations, of which the Baltic Republics had been members, was abolished in 1946. 
Therefore, on 17 September, 1991, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were admitted as 
new members to the United Nations according to Article 4 of the Charter.59 The 
President of the UN Security Council, in a brief statement made after the admission of 
the Baltic States to the UN, mentioned that these countries had ‘regained’ their 
independence.60 However, at the same time, the UN determined the Baltic States’ 
membership contribution on the basis of data supplied previously by the USSR.61 
Thus, the Baltic States were treated as if they were States that had separated from the 
USSR and not as States which had ‘regained’ their independence, at least for practical 
purposes.
3.3. The Problem of Effective Control
Under the Baltic restorationism or legal continuity theory, even if the former Soviet 
Union exercised effective control over their territories and inhabitants, the Baltic 
States theoretically were not extinguished and, instead, retained their legal personality 
under international law. Such an approach, however, went beyond traditional criteria 
to determine statehood: a permanent population, territory, government and capacity to 
enter into diplomatic relations. Thus the restoration thesis or legal continuity theory 
does not conform to reality. It cannot explain the dissolution of the Baltic States’
57 R. Higgins, The Development o f  International Law Through the Political Organs o f  the United 
Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 54.
58 Ibid.
59 Estonia, UN GA-Res. 46/4, September 17, 1991; Latvia, UN GA-Res. 46/5, September 17, 1991; 
Lithuania, UN GA-Res. 46/6, September 17, 1991.
60 UN Doc. S/INF/47, 1991,48-49.
61 UN Doc. A/49/11, 1994, para. 28.
62 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties o f States, Article 1, 165 LNTS 25 (1936).
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boundaries, the demographic changes of the population in the region and the lack of 
consistent independent movements against the Soviet Union during the period of 
Soviet rule. Had the former Soviet Union ruled the Baltic States for more than one 
hundred years, the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States would undoubtedly have 
acquired legal consequences under international law. In other words, the principle of 
ex factus ius oritur (i.e., law springs from facts) may replace the principle of ex iniuria 
ius non oritur at some points. In fact, it has been suggested that such a shift already 
had taken place in relation to the Baltic States. The grounds for this argument lay in 
the fact that the Baltic States had been independent, sovereign States for only two 
decades during the inter-war periods, while they had been occupied by the Soviet 
Union for over twice this period of time.64 From this perspective, Baltic independence 
in the early 1990s was not a restoration of sovereignty to existing States, but the 
secession from the former Soviet Union of new, successor States, as may be found in 
the Hanneman’s following statement that “the international recognition of Baltic 
secessionist movements in 1991 led to the emergence of three new states: Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania.”65 It may be argued that after more than 50 years as part of the 
Soviet Union, ‘restitutio ad integrum’ is more a legal fiction than reality.66 The 
passage of time causes legal consequences and obligations. Though Marek’s following 
opinion was not directed to the situation of the status of the Russian settlers in Estonia 
and Latvia, her remark is quite relevant to the question:
“To pretend that everything in an illegally occupied territory or under a puppet 
government is non-existent, is not only to press legal fiction beyond all reasonable limits, 
but to create a situation never to be disentangled in future. Apart from the sheer practical 
impossibility o f enforcing such an extreme point o f view, it would hardly be in the 
interest o f the restored State itself to plunge the liberated country into endless chaos and 
anarchy.”67
How long could it be said that the legal identity of the State is preserved, despite its 
lack of effective control, in face of effective but illegal annexation? International law 
does not provide a clear answer to this question.
63 Cassese’s remark is relevant in this regard. He stated that “the survival o f the international subjects 
rests on legal fiction-politically motivated-and warranted by the hope o f recovering control over a 
particular territory. Once this prospect vanishes, the legal fiction is discarded by the other states.” A. 
Cassese, International Law in a Divide World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 78.
64 Hough, The Annexation o f  the Baltic States and Its Effect on the Development o f  Law Prohibiting 
Forcible Seizure o f  Territory, op.cit., p. 330.
65 A.J. Hanneman, “Independence and Group Rights in the Baltic States: A Double Minority Problem”, 
Va. J. Int'lL., Vol.,35, 1995, p. 485.
66Mullerson, New Developments in the Former U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia, op.cit., p. 310.
67 K. Marek, Identity and Continuity o f  States in Public International Law  (Geneva: Droz, 1968), p. 
583, cited in Mullerson, New Developments in the Former USSR and Yugoslavia, op.cit., p. 311.
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4. Citizenship in the Baltic States and the Ethnic, Linguistic Russians 
in Estonia and Latvia
4.1. Estonia
The Estonian citizenship law68 of 1992 is based on the Supreme Council resolution, 
“On the Application of the Law on Citizenship”.69 This resolution essentially 
reinstated the 1938 citizenship law, establishing the base of post-independence citizens 
as those who were citizens before the Soviet period and their descendants. According 
to Article 3 of this law, only those who were citizens before 1940 and their direct 
descendants would be automatically granted citizenship. All other residents, 
irrespective of their length of residency, have to go through a naturalisation process.70 
A residency period of two years followed by a one-year application period, as well as 
proficiency in the Estonian language and an oath of loyalty to the State are required 
for naturalisation.
The Estonian Parliament amended the citizenship law on January 19, 1995.71 The 
major change was the extension of the residency requirement to five years, followed 
by a one-year waiting period. This change applies only to new immigrants and does 
not affect persons who arrived in Estonia prior to July 1990. Under this new law, 
applicants have to pass not only the titular language test but also the test on the 
Estonian Constitution.
The Estonian citizenship law has been basically left alone since 1995. As in Latvia, 
however, discussion in 1997 and 1998 emerged about the need to amend the law. 
Since Estonia did not have the “window” naturalisation policy adopted in Latvia, the 
focus was on granting citizenship to children bom to non-citizens following the 
restoration of independence. There were amendments to the Law on Citizenship 
concerning the children bom in Estonia after 26 February 1992 if their parents were 
stateless persons. According to these amendments, parents have the right to apply for 
Estonian citizenship for their children. The draft was adopted by the Parliament in
68 Estonian Citizenship Law 1992, RT, 1992, No. 7. For the English unofficial translation o f the full 
text, Estonian Legal Translation Centre, http://www.legaltext.ee/indexen.htm.
69 On the Application o f the Law on Citizenship (1992), Resolution o f the Estonian Supreme Council, 
RT (Riigi Teataja, Official Gazette), 1991, No. 39.
70 Article 3 o f the Estonian Citizenship Law, 1992.
71 Estonian Citizenship Law 1995, RT I, 1995, No. 12.
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December 1998 under international pressure.72 To precipitate the proceedings, the 
members of the Russian faction of the Parliament introduced a bill on amendments to 
the Law on Citizenship in accordance with the European Convention on Nationality in 
March 1998. Their initiative, however, was rejected by other parliamentary factions.
4. 2. Latvia
Latvia did not even adopt an official law following independence, but simply restored 
the citizenship of those who had it prior to the Soviet period and their descendants.74 
Latvian citizenship law,75 adopted on 22 July, 1994, is based on the 1991 
parliamentary resolution that restored citizenship to prewar citizens. Under the law, 
citizenship is automatically granted to all those who were Latvian citizens on 17 June, 
1940 and to their descendants, as well as to orphans and foreign-born children of
7 f*Latvian parents.
Priority is given to several categories of people: those who have an ethnic Latvian 
or Livonian77 parent and who are permanent residents of Latvia; those who have been 
married to a Latvian or Livonian for at least ten years and who have lived in Latvia for 
at least five years; former citizens of the Soviet Union and their descendants who were 
entitled to, but did not apply for citizenship under the 1919 Latvian citizenship law; 
those who were legally and permanently residing in Latvia on 17 June, 1940; those 
who were deported to Latvia during World War II and have lived there since that time;
72 RT I, 1998, No. I l l ;  L. W. Barrington, “The Making o f Citizenship Policy in the Baltic States”, Geo. 
Immigr. L.J, Vol., 13, 1999, pp. 159-199.
73 Ibid.
74 Republic o f Latvia Supreme Council Resolution, “On the Renewal o f Republic o f Latvia Citizens’ 
Rights and Fundamental Principles o f Naturalization”, in the Republic o f Latvia: Human Rights Issues 
(Riga: 5th Saeima’s Standing Commission on Human Rights, 1993/1994), p. 76.
75 Latvian Citizenship Law, Latvijas Republikas Saeimas un Ministru Kabineta Zinotajs (Official 
Gazette), No. 17, 1994. For the English translation o f the Latvian Citizenship Law, see Latvian Human 
Rights Quarterly, Documents, 3/4,1998; Five drafts o f the Latvian citizenship law were considered. The 
bill that was finally adopted by the Latvian Parliament (Saeima) included a controversial provision on 
quotas that barred most o f the Russian minorities in Latvia from applying for naturalisation until after 
the year 2000. Even then they could do so only at the annual rate o f 0.1 percent o f the previous year’s 
total number o f citizens. Thus, even if  a resident fulfilled the language, residency, and other 
requirements, he or she could not predict when citizenship might be granted. Since approximately 2,000 
Russian minorities would have been granted citizenship under the quota system each year, most Russian 
minorities would have been precluded from ever acquiring citizenship. This provision was deleted due 
to international pressure from the Council o f Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe. Other draft proposals called for a residency requirement for naturalisation o f ten or even 16 
years, but the requirement was reduced to five years in the final version.
6 Article 2 o f Latvian Citizenship Law.
77 Latvian and Estonian territory conquered several centuries ago by ethnic Germans called Livonia. A
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those who have completed their education in a Latvian language school and have 
resided in the country for at least five years; and those who have performed
7 0
outstanding services for Latvia.
Others, who were not included for this priority case, may apply for naturalisation 
under the regular process if they have lived in Latvia for at least five years as of 4 May, 
1990, have a basic command of the Latvian language, have sworn an oath of loyalty to 
Latvia, and have a legal source of income. Applicants will be considered according to 
a schedule based on age; residents who were bom in the country and are between 16 
and 20 years of age will be considered first. The review of all applicants is expected to 
take several years. Persons who have posed a threat to Latvian security, those who 
have worked for the Soviet Secret Service or who were KGB informants, and persons 
who, after 4 May, 1990, have promoted fascist or communist ideologies will never be 
eligible for naturalisation under the citizenship law.
Even though the Latvian government attempted to preclude ex-Soviet military 
officers from both residency and naturalisation processes, it made concessions on this 
issue because of its negotiation with Russia on the withdrawal of Russian troops from 
Latvian territory.79 The Latvian government granted permanent residency and social 
benefits to Russian military pensioners who retired before 28 January, 1992, the date 
on which the former Soviet army was officially transferred to Russia under the
on
provisions of a 15 March, 1994 withdrawal agreement. These persons are eligible to 
apply for citizenship, too.
While amendments to the law were passed in March 1995, these were minor
Q 1
changes having little impact on the vast majority of the non-citizens. This reluctance 
to make alterations in the law began to change in 1997, and in particular during 1998. 
Finally, the amendments were agreed to, and they were passed by the parliament on 22 
June, 1998. The amendments eliminated the naturalisation schedule (the “window 
policy”) and allowed children bom to non-citizens in Latvia since the restoration of
0 7
independence to claim automatic citizenship.
small group o f Livonians still live in Latvia.
78 Article 13 o f Latvian citizenship law.
79 RFL/RL Daily Report, No. 52, 16 March 1994.
80 Under Latvian-Russian agreements, Russian troops withdrew from Latvia on 31 August, 1994.
81 Latvijas Republikas Saeimas un Ministru Kabineta Zinotajs, No. 8, 1995; Barrington, The Making o f  
Citizenship Policy in the Baltic States, op.cit., pp.171-177.
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4.3. Lithuania
Lithuania was the first of the Baltic States to declare independence from the Soviet 
Union. Lithuania also considered that the incorporation of the Lithuanian State into 
the Soviet Union was an illegal act in light of International Law. But unlike Estonia 
and Latvia, Lithuania did not extend the Soviet occupation to the question of 
citizenship. Lithuania adopted its official law on citizenship in December 1991. But 
prior to the enactment of the law, in November 1989, it made citizenship freely 
available to any permanent resident of the Lithuanian SSR, regardless of nationality or 
language abilities. At the time, the requirements were two years’ residence in 
Lithuania, a legal source of income/support, and an oath of allegiance to the 
Lithuanian constitution and laws.84 Permanent residents had until November 1991 to 
register for citizenship through this very liberal law. Ninety percent of non-Lithuanian 
permanent residents opted for citizenship under these provisions.85 Only 1% of the 
pre-independence electorate chose not to become citizens of the Republic of Lithuania,
o r
and thus were no longer eligible to vote. Thus, due to this zero-option, Lithuania has 
not been criticized as harshly, if at all, for its treatment of its ethnic, linguistic 
minorities. Few stateless persons remained in Lithuania, since most qualified for 
citizenship under the simplified procedure. The December 1991 law, addressing those 
individuals who did not take citizenship in the period prescribed by the 1989 zero-
87option, requires similar qualifications. The enactment of the liberal citizenship law 
has protected Lithuania from international criticism to an extent not enjoyed by Latvia 
and Estonia.
4. 4. The Ethnic, Linguistic Russian Non-Citizens and Stateless Persons in 
Estonia and Latvia
The ethnic, linguistic Russian residents in Estonia that became non-citizens after 1991 
do not have any special status. However, they are protected by a special clause in
82 Latvijas Republikas Saeimas un Ministru Kabineta Zinotajs, No. 5, 1997; Ibid; S. Johnson, People 
Get the Last Word on Citizenship Reform, BALTIC TIMES (July 2-8, 1998).
SiThe Baltic States: A Reference Book, op.cit., p. 40
84Lithuanian Law on Citizenship, Nov. 3, 1989, Articles 1(3), 2.
85 Report on the Application o f the Republic o f Lithuania for Membership o f the Council o f Europe, 
Eur. Consult. Ass., 44th Sess., 1993, Doc. No. 6787.
86 Ibid.
87 Article 12 o f the Lithuanian Citizenship Law, 1991.
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Article 20 (1) of the Law on Aliens.88 It provides that:
“An alien who applied for a residence permit before 12 July 1995 and to whom a 
residence permit has been issued.. .retains the rights and duties provided for in earlier 
legislation o f Estonia.”
This rule is not applied to, inter alia, members of former Soviet/Russian military 
service and security officers and their family members. Due to pressure of Western 
countries and organisations, however, in 1996 these people were entitled for special 
Alien’s passports that can be used as an ID both internally and internationally.89
In Estonia, the term ‘non-citizens’ refers to all Estonian residents without domestic 
citizenship. Almost all of them resided on the territory of Estonia before 1991 when 
the country restored independence.90 The term ‘stateless persons’ refers to Soviet-era 
residents who do not hold any citizenship. Estonian authorities normally call them 
“persons with undetermined citizenship”.91 Non-citizens in Latvia are a special 
category of persons defined by the Law on the Status of Those Former USSR Citizens 
Who are not Citizens of Latvia or Any Other State92 as persons who resided in Latvia 
on 1 July 1991 and have not obtained the citizenship of any other country.
Estonians and Latvians have consistently maintained that the Russian settlers who 
did not qualify for automatic Estonian and Latvian citizenship retained their Soviet 
nationality until the USSR dissolved in December 1991. Thereafter, they have argued 
that they theoretically inherited Russian nationality by virtue of the Russian 
Federation's status as the continuation of the former Soviet Union. However, it should 
be noted that while Russia generally is considered a continuation of the former Soviet 
Union for most purposes such as the United Nations seat, it did not necessarily assume 
all of the rights and obligations of the former Soviet Union. Russia did not purport to 
inherit all the territories and populations of other former Soviet republics.
Prior to the enactment of citizenship laws in each of the newly independent Baltic 
States, individuals in the former Soviet Union became stateless. Although the Soviet 
government did not actually strip them of nationality, their State of nationality (the
88 Estonian Law on Aliens was adopted on 8th July 1993. By 2004, the parliament has made 23 
amendments to this act. Law on Aliens, RT I, No. 44, 1993, consolidated text RT I, No. 50, 1999.
89 Governmental regulations No. 16 o f  16 January 1996, RT I, No. 5, 1996; V. Poleshchuk, Report on 
Non-Citizens in Estonia (Tallinn: Legal Information Centre For Human Rights, 2004), p. 9.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid., p. 5.
92 The Law on the Status o f Those Former USSR Citizens Who are not Citizens o f Latvia or Any Other 
State, adopted on 12th, April 1995. It was amended on 18th June and 27th August 1998. Latvijas 
Republikas Saeimas un Ministru Kabineta Zinotajs, No. 10, 1995; No. 16, 1997. For the English 
translation o f the text o f the Law that includes the amendments, see Latvian Human Rights Quarterly,
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Soviet Union) ceased to exist, leaving them with the citizenship of a non-existent State. 
Citizens of the former Soviet Union could not receive Russian citizenship 
automatically, but the process for receiving it was easier than that of the Baltic 
republics.
In practice, ‘stateless’ often refers to de facto and de jure  stateless persons. De jure  
stateless persons fit into a juristic definition; he or she is not seen as a State’s citizens 
according to that State’s law. De facto stateless persons often have formal citizenship 
of a given State, but do not enjoy or do not want to enjoy that State’s protection. In 
other words, de facto stateless persons do not, for some reasons, want to be citizens of 
the State to which he or she would be entitled to citizenship.
The collapse of the Soviet Union naturally brought to and end Soviet citizenship. 
Still, many persons continued to hold the old Soviet time passports. They became 
literally stateless persons. However, de jure  most of them did have the possibility to 
seek the citizenship of the Soviet successor States. As noted, in the case of Estonia and 
Latvia, those persons who did not receive Estonian or Latvian citizenship did have the 
possibility to apply for Russian citizenship. Many of them have done so, but many 
also have not. They thus remain de facto stateless persons. There are many reasons 
why some ethnic, linguistic Russians in Estonia and Latvia might wish not to become 
Russian citizens, but rather Estonian and Latvian ones. The fact that living conditions 
in Estonia and Latvia were preferable, given long-term residency, may be a major 
reason for staying. It is thus possible to use the terms ‘non-citizen’ and ‘stateless 
persons’ to describe the status of the ethnic, linguistic Russians in Estonia and Latvia 
who have not received citizenship of the States in which they reside.
The overwhelming majority of all non-citizens are ethnic non-Estonians (97%). 
The largest groups of non-citizens are former Soviet citizens. Nearly 53% of ethnic, 
linguistic Russians were bom in Estonia. The majority of stateless persons (52%) were 
bom in Estonia and their first language is Russian.94 According to more recent data 
(as of July 2005) non-citizens account for 20% of the total population. These figures 
include stateless persons who comprise 12% of the total population. The total 
percentage of persons of non-Estonian ethnic origin was 32% of the total population,
Documents, 3/4,1998.
93 See Chapter 1 above, footnote 17, pp. 20-21.
94 V. Poleshchuk, Report on Non-Citizens in Estonia (Tallinn: Legal Information Centre For Human 
Rights, 2004), p. 9.
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most of whom are Russian native-speakers.95 Approximately one million residents are 
of non-Latvian ethnicity, including more than 700,000 ethnic, linguistic Russians. 
There are approximately 452,033 resident non-citizens, of whom an estimated 68 
percent are ethnic, linguistic Russian.96 This is quite a significant number. The United 
Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC) concluded that this situation has adverse 
consequences in terms of the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms included in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The HRC has 
recommended that the two countries should further strengthen their effort to reduce
07the number of stateless persons.
5. Conclusions
(1). This chapter has examined the historical and legal background of the origins of 
conflicts regarding the status of ethnic, linguistic Russians in Estonia and Latvia with 
regard to their citizenship. All three Baltic States considered that their incorporation 
into the Soviet Union in 1940 was an illegal act and that their existence de jure  never 
ceased. To some extent, it appears that the so-called Baltic claim to restorationism has 
grounds under international law.
(2). In Estonia and Latvia, the illegality of the Baltic incorporation into the former 
USSR was extended to cover also those persons who had migrated to these republics 
during the Soviet occupation. However, compared to other Baltic States, in Lithuania, 
the citizenship issue was solved much more easily. For Lithuanians, there was no 
threat of ‘cultural extermination’, a rallying cry for both Estonian and Latvian 
nationalists, because of the smaller degree of Russian settlement. These differences 
between Lithuania and its Baltic neighbours are important to keep in mind. Because a 
smaller percentage of the population was made up of Russians who came during the 
Soviet period, the ethnic, linguistic Russians in Lithuania were less likely to be seen as 
‘colonisers’ or ‘transients’. In Estonia and Latvia, however, the ethnic, linguistic 
Russians were considered as illegal immigrants and as representative of the Soviet
95 Ibid; From the present writer’s interview with Vadim Poleshchuk. He is a legal advisor o f the Legal 
Information Centre for Human Rights, Tallinn, Estonia.
96 Statistical data taken from the home page of the Latvian Naturalisation Department in July 2005, 
www.np.gov. lv/fakti/index.htm.
97Concluding Observation o f the HRC: Latvia, CCPR/CO/79/LVA, 2003, para. 18; Concluding 
Observation o f the HRC: Estonia, CCPR/CO/77/EST, 2003, para. 17.
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occupation. To a large extent, this is the reason why they were excluded from 
citizenship. These Estonian and Latvian attitudes towards the Russian residents in 
question seem problematic in that those individuals have been accused of 
responsibility for the Soviet policies.
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Chapter III
Nationality in International Law and the Baltic Implications
1. Introduction
Nationality is described by Starke as “the most frequent and sometimes the only link 
between an individual and a State, ensuring that effect be given to that individual’s 
rights and obligations in international law.”1 Nationality or Citizenship laws define 
the nature and content of this legal status, the relationship and links between the 
citizen and the State, and the rights and obligations of the citizens and the State at the 
domestic legal level.2 In today’s world, citizenship plays a vital role- both for States 
and individuals. The international legal community has also recognised that 
statelessness leaves persons particularly vulnerable.
This chapter continues from the previous chapter 2 and is concerned with the 
question of the Estonian and Latvian citizenship laws in the context of nationality 
matters in international law with an emphasis on the human rights aspect of 
citizenship. One of the most dramatic results of the end of the Cold War was the 
emergence of new States in the international community. After the break-up of the 
former Soviet Union, some of the former republics of the USSR and Eastern bloc 
countries sought independence. In the course of this process, each republic with the 
exception of the Russian Federation declared its independence. On 8 December 1991, 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was founded in Minsk by Belarus, the 
Russian Federation and Ukraine, and eight other republics joined this community on 
21 December 1991 in Alma-Ata. All these republics, with the exception of the Russian 
Federation, regarded themselves as ‘successor States’ to the former Soviet Union and 
declared their commitment to observing the obligation deriving from international
1 J.G. Starke, Introduction to International Law (London: Butterworths, 1989), p.340.
2 W. R. Brubaker, (ed.), Immigration and the Politics o f  Citizenship in Europe and North America 
(Lenham and London: University Press o f America, 1989).
3 See section “The Right to Nationality under International Law” in this chapter, pp. 69-77.
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treaties and agreements concluded by the former USSR.4 By contrast, the Baltic 
States declared that they were never successor States to the former Soviet Union, but 
totally independent States. In particular, after regaining independence in Estonia and 
Latvia, long-settled ethnic, linguistic Russians were not allowed an opportunity to 
obtain automatic citizenship in the newly independent States of Estonia and Latvia. 
Whether the Estonian and Latvian citizenship laws conform to the international 
standards on nationality or not is the main concern of this chapter. This is important 
issue in that citizenship has been recognised as a human right in today’s global society. 
As citizenship is basic in realising various rights of residents in their States of 
residence at the domestic legal level, it is necessary to examine the citizenship matters 
in public international law for the discussion on the protection of human rights of 
ethnic, linguistic Russians in Estonia and Latvia.
2. Nationality under International Law
2.1. Nationality and the Principle of the Genuine and Effective Link
As the presence of a sufficient population in a specified territory is one of the basic 
elements of statehood required by international law, the relationship between a State 
and its population is critical for the stable lives of the population within their State of 
residence. For a long time, the question of nationality has been recognised as a 
question of domestic jurisdiction of individual States.5 Various international 
instruments have expressed this traditional view. Article 1 of the Convention on 
Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws6 (the Hague 
Convention) provided that “it is for each State to determine under its own laws who 
are its nationals.” Under Article 2, “Any questions as to whether a person possesses 
the nationality of particular State shall be determined in accordance with the law of 
that State.”7
4 The Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States, Dec. 8, 1991, 3 1 ILM 143.
5 According to Professor Brownlie, the evidence o f this traditional view dates back to the 19th century. 
See I. Brownlie, “The Relations of Nationality in Public International Law”, Brit. Y.B. In t’l. L, Vol., 39, 
1963, p. 286.
6 Article 1 o f the Hague Convention. The Hague Convention Concerning Certain Questions Relating to 
the Conflict o f Nationality Laws, opened for signature on April 12, 1930, 179 LNTS 89 (entered into 
force on 1 July, 1937).
7 Article 2 o f the Hague Convention.
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International tribunals have also taken the same position, which is found in the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCU) Advisory Opinion concerning the 
Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees Case:
“In the present state o f international law, questions o f nationality are, in the opinion o f the 
Court, in principle within this ‘reserved domain ' o f domestic jurisdiction.”8 (Emphasis 
added.)
However, this does not mean that the ‘traditional view’ of nationality has been 
acknowledged unreservedly under international law. In fact, the limitation on the 
State’s discretion over nationality matters is found in the Tunis and Morocco 
Nationality Decrees Case. Even though the PCU expressed the basic opinion that the 
questions of nationality matters were reserved to a State’s domestic jurisdiction, the 
tribunal also made clear that the question is a ‘relative’ one, depending on the 
development of international law.9 The Court thus showed the possibility that 
international law could ‘evolve’ to limit the States’ discretion over nationality matters. 
The Court held the quite ‘futuristic’ view in the following terms:
“For the purpose o f the present opinion, it is enough to observe that it may well happen 
that, in a matter which, like that o f nationality, is not, in principle, regulated by 
international law, the right o f a State to use its discretion is nevertheless restricted by 
obligations which it may have undertaken towards other States. In such a case, 
jurisdiction which, in principle, belongs solely to the State, is limited by rules o f  
international law. ”10
The opinion of the Court is significant in that it has provided two critical propositions 
on the relationship between nationality and a State’s power to regulate nationality: 
State discretion over nationality matters is subject to international law and these 
limitations by international law ‘evolve’ along with the development of international 
law.
The Nottebohm Case was the proceeding by Liechtenstein on behalf of a 
naturalised citizen, Nottebohm, for compensation for the damages arising from the 
acts of Guatemala.11 It concerned a German national who had lived and conducted 
business in Guatemala for most of his adult life. Shortly after the outbreak of war in 
1939, Nottebohm made moves to acquire the nationality of Liechtenstein and was 
granted it in October of that year. After the grant, Nottebohm stayed in Liechtenstein
%Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees Case, PCIJ Series B, No. 4, 1923, p. 24.
9 Ibid., “The question whether a certain matter is solely within the jurisdiction o f a State or not is an 
essentially relative question; it depends upon the development o f international relations. Thus, in the 
present o f international law, questions of nationality are, in the opinion o f this Court, in principle within 
the reserved domain.”
10 Ibid.
11 Nottebohm Case, ICJ Reports, 1955, p. 23.
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for some seven years before returning to Guatemala, this time on Liechtenstein papers. 
Despite having acquired the nationality of Liechtenstein, Nottebohm was declared an 
enemy alien in Guatemala, was deported, and his property was confiscated. In 
response, Liechtenstein sought to seize the court, asserting an alleged breach of 
international law in relation to its national, Nottebohm. At the hearing, the preliminary 
question was whether Nottebohm's Liechtenstein nationality was effective under 
international law vis-a-vis Guatemala. In finding that it was not, the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) held that: “nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social 
fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, 
together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties.”12
While municipal law regarding citizenship is binding within a State, it is only 
recognised in the international arena when “the legal bond of nationality accords with 
the individual's genuine connection with the state which assumes the defense of its
1 -j
citizens by means of protection against other states.”
The preference for social connections over legal formalities could be read to allow 
the recognition under international law of effective links of the persons to their States 
of residence in determining nationality, even though this does not appear to be main 
concern of the Court in the Nottebohm Case.14 In this sense, the Nottebohm Case has 
provided an important clue in relation to the principle of ‘dominant and effective 
nationality’ in the sense that it emphasised the existence of a ‘genuine link’ of 
nationality in determining the status of one’s nationality. The Court held that 
Nottebohm had no genuine and effective connection with Liechtenstein on which it 
could exercise diplomatic protection for its nationals:
“Naturalization was asked for not so much for the purpose o f obtaining a legal 
recognition o f Nottebohm’s membership in fact in the population o f Liechtenstein, as it 
was to enable him to substitute for his status as a national o f the belligerent State o f  
Germany that o f a national o f a neutral State, with the sole aim o f thus coming within the 
protection o f Liechtenstein but not o f becoming wedded to its traditions, its interests, its 
way o f life, or o f assuming its obligation... Guatemala is under no obligation to recognize 
a nationality granted in such circumstance.”15
The Court looked beyond the formality of nationality to ascertain whether there were 
any effective factual ties between the person and the State concerned as found in the 
following statement:
12 Ibid., p. 23
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., pp.20-21.
15 Ibid., pp. 23-26.
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“International arbitrators have decided in the same way numerous cases o f dual 
nationality, where the question arose with regard to the exercise of protection. They have 
given their preference to the real and effective nationality, that which accorded with the 
facts, that based stronger factual ties between the person concerned and one o f the States 
whose nationality is involved. Different factors are taken into consideration, and their 
importance will vary from one case to the next: the habitual residence o f the individual 
concerned is an important factor, but there are other factors such as the centre o f his 
interests, his family ties, his participation in public life, attachment shown by him for a 
given country and inculcated in his children, etc.”16
The Court went on to hold that:
“a State can not claim that the rules it has thus laid down are entitled to recognition by 
another State unless it has acted in conformity with the general aim o f making the legal 
bond of nationality accord with the individual’s genuine connection with the State.”17
The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal was established in 1981 and the goal of the 
Tribunal was to terminate all litigation between the two parties through deciding the
1 ficlaims of nationals of the United States and claims of Iran against the United States. 
In the Decision in Case No. A/18 concerning the Question of Jurisdiction over Claims 
of Persons with Dual Nationality, the Tribunal noted the principle of the ‘dominant 
and effective nationality’ of the claimant and stated that it will determine 
jurisdiction.19 The tribunal accepted this principle rejecting the traditional State- 
orientated view of nationality. The individual is allowed an opportunity for redress 
if the fact is confirmed that he has a ‘more’ substantial connection with the claimant
91State than with the respondent State.
16 Ibid., p. 22. In this context, it is necessary to point out that Article 5 o f the Hague Convention was 
keeping with the principle o f dominant and effective nationality: “ Within a third State, a person having 
more than one nationality shall be treated as if  he had only one... A third State shall, o f the nationalities 
which any such person possesses, recognize exclusively in its territory either the nationality o f the 
country in which he is habitually and principally resident, or the nationality o f the country with which 
in the circumstances he appears to be in fact most closely connected.”
17 Ibid., p. 23.
18 The Declaration o f the Government o f the Democratic and Popular Republic o f Algeria Concerning 
the Settlement o f Claims by the Government of the United States o f America and The Government o f  
the Islamic Republic o f Iran, initialled 19 January, 1981, United States-Iran, provides for the 
establishment o f an international arbitral tribunal. 2 0 ILM 230 (1981).
19 Decision in Case No. A/18 Concerning the Question o f Jurisdiction over Claims o f Persons with 
Dual Nationality, reprinted in 23 ILM 489,496 (Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, 1984).
20 Case No. A/18 is the most important case in the Tribunal’s dual nationality jurisprudence. After 
Chamber Two issued awards finding jurisdiction over dual nationals in the Esphahanian and Golpira 
cases, the Iranian government asked the Full Tribunal to consider whether the claims o f individuals who 
were nationals o f Iran under Iranian law should ever be admissible against Iran. Iran argued that the 
Tribunal did not have jurisdiction over claims against Iran by those who were Iranian nationals under 
Iranian law, and that the fact that an individual was a US national under US law should not create an 
exception to this rule. The United States, in contrast, argued that the Tribunal had jurisdiction over 
claims against Iran by anyone who was a US citizen under US law, irrespective o f whether that person 
was also an Iranian citizen under Iranian law. The Full Tribunal rejected both o f these contentions. It 
then examined the 1930 Hague Convention, a number o f arbitral and judicial decisions dealing with the 
conflict o f nationality laws, and legal literature relating to conflict o f nationality laws.
21 I. Brownlie, Principles o f  Public International Law, Sixth Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
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The Tribunal asserted that the dominant and effective nationality is the prevailing 
rule of present international law.22 The affirmation of the ‘rule of dominant and 
effective nationality’ may be understood as the application of the principle of 
‘dominant and effective’ nationality articulated in the Merge Case. The Italian-US 
Conciliation Commission in the Merge Case stated that the “principle of 
nonresponsibility, based on the sovereign equality of States, which excludes 
diplomatic protection in the case of dual nationality, must yield before the principle of 
effective nationality whenever such nationality is that of the claiming State.”24 The 
Commission then established the standard by which the validity of the United States 
nationality would be evaluated:
“Habitual residence can be one of the criteria along with the conduct o f the individual in 
his economic, social, political, civic and family life, as well as the closer and more 
effective bond with one o f the two States... .”25
The Case No. A/18 may be said to have represented the affirmative statement that 
the ‘dominant and effective nationality’ is the applicable principle of international law 
in the matter of dual nationals. The Tribunal expressed its view of the principle of 
dominant and effective nationality in the following terms:
“This trend toward modification o f the Hague Convention rule o f non-responsibility by 
the search for dominant and effective nationality is scarcely surprising as it is consistent 
with the contemporaneous development o f international law to accord legal protections to 
individuals, even against the State of which they are nationals.”27
2.2. Determining Nationality in the Case of State succession: Theory and Practice
Political changes may create a situation where one State or a part thereof is replaced 
by another. This may occur in a variety of ways, for instance, by the transfer of 
territory to another State, whether pre-existing or newly established; unification of 
States; or dissolution of a State in such a way that various parts of its territory form 
two or more new States while the original States ceases to exist. State succession for
2003), pp.396-406.
22 Case No.A/18, op.cit., p. 501. The Tribunal stated that “whatever the state o f the law prior to 1945, 
the better rule at the time the... Declarations were concluded and today is the rule o f dominant and 
effective nationality.” Ibid., p. 499.
™Merge Case (US. v. Italy), 14 RIAA 236 (1955).
24 Ibid., p. 247.
25 Ibid.
26 Case No. A/18, op.cit., p. 501; A. I. Muchmore, “Passports and Nationality in International Law”, 
U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y, Vol., 10, 2004, pp. 342-346; “Note: Claims o f Dual Nationals in the 
Modem Era: The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal”, Mich. L. Rev, Vol., 83, 1984, pp. 597-624.
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the purpose of international law is defined as the transfer of rights and duties to a 
successor State which arises from any change to the status of States as international 
subjects. 28 State succession concerning nationality is usually governed by 
international acts or similar legal treaties as well as by constitutional and the other 
internal laws of the States concerned. Professor O’Connell, one of the most 
distinguished writers on the problem of State succession explains:
“The majority o f writers have asserted that upon change o f sovereignty the inhabitants o f  
the territory concerned lose the nationality o f the predecessor State and become ipso facto  
nationals o f the successor. There is a collective naturalization which takes place the 
moment ratification o f a treaty o f cession are exchanged, or, if  there is no treaty, upon the 
declaration o f annexation or independence.”29
The Harvard Draft Convention on Nationality in 1929 shares the same view:
“When a part of the territory o f a State is acquired by another State.. .the nationals of the 
first State who continue their habitual residence in such territory lose the nationality o f  
the State and become nationals o f the successor State, in the absence o f treaty provisions 
to the contrary, unless in accordance with the law o f the successor State they decline the 
nationality thereof.”30
Brownlie, who deals with the nationality matter quite progressively, expresses the 
important proposition that the population must go with the territory. The successor 
States have an obligation to confer nationality on nationals of the predecessor State 
who have ‘effective links’ to the territory concerned:
“The general principle is that o f a substantial connection with the territory concerned by 
citizenship or residence or family relation to a qualified person. This principle is perhaps 
merely a special aspect o f the general principle o f the effective link.”31
It needs to be emphasised that he argues that ‘domicile’ in the territory is the primary 
criterion for determining a natural person’s nationality in the context of State 
succession. His perceptive statement is worth quoting at length:
“The link, in cases o f territorial transfer, has special characteristics. Territory, both 
socially and legally, is not to be regarded an empty plot: territory...connotes population, 
ethnic groupings, loyalty patterns, national aspiration, a part o f humanity, or, if  one is 
tolerant o f the metaphor, an organism... The population goes with the territory: on the 
other hand, it would be illegal, and derogation from the grant o f territory, for the 
transferor to try to retain the population as its own nationals, and, on the other hand, it 
would be illegal for the successor to take any steps which involved attempts to avoid
27 Ibid., p. 501.
28 Brownlie, Principles o f  Public International Law, op. cit., p.621.
29 D.P. O’Connell, State Succession in Municipal Law and International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1967), pp. 498-501.
30 Draft Convention and Comments Prepared by the Research in International Law o f the Harvard Law 
School on the Law of Nationality, AJIL, Vol., 23, 1929, pp. 11-13. Article 18 of the Draft Convention. 
The commentary on Article 18 states that this provision is believed to express a rule o f international law 
which is generally recognized, although there might be differences o f opinion with regard to its 
application under particular conditions.
31 Brownlie, The Relations o f  Nationality in Public International Law, op. cit., pp.324-325.
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responsibility for conditions on the territory, for example, by treating the population as de 
facto  stateless or by failing to maintain order in the area. The position is that the 
population has a territorial or local status, and this is unaffected whether there is a 
universal or partial succession and whether there is a cession.”32
However, O’Connell does not acknowledge that there are any positive obligations 
on the States concerned:
“Undesirable as it may be that any persons become stateless as a result o f a change o f  
sovereignty, it cannot be asserted with any measure o f confidence that international law, 
at least in its present stage o f development, imposes any duty on the successor State to 
grant nationality.”33
Weis has the similar view that he found no evidence of a positive rule of 
international law which imposes obligation on the States concerned. The effect is a 
merely presumptive. By examining State practice, he concludes in the following 
terms:
“There is no rule o f international law under which the nationals o f the predecessor State 
acquire the nationality o f the successor State. International law cannot have such a direct 
effect, and the practice of States does not bear out the contention that there is inevitably 
the result o f the change o f sovereignty. As a rule, however, States have conferred their 
nationality on the former nationals o f the predecessor State, and in this regard one may 
say that there is, in the absence of statutory provision o f municipal law, a presumption o f  
international law that municipal law has this effect.”34
If Estonia and Latvia should be regarded as new, successor States to part of the 
territory of the USSR, then there would be a growing body of State practice 
supporting the position that automatic citizenship should have been offered to all 
Soviet settlers residing in Estonia and Latvia. Until a new State defines its citizenship 
policies either through legislation or a treaty, it generally is presumed that natural 
persons who have been habitually resident in the territory of that State will 
automatically acquire its nationality. This practice typically is enshrined in 
international legal instruments that are adopted by successor States. For instance, the 
Versailles Peace Treaties, which rearranged Europe at the end of World War I, 
generally conferred the nationality of the successor State upon persons who had been 
living in territory that was transferred. Similarly, when Ireland separated from the 
United Kingdom in 1922, Irish citizenship was offered to persons domiciled in Ireland 
who: had been bom in Ireland, had a parent bom in Ireland, or had been resident in
32 Ibid., pp. 325-326.
33 O ’Conell, State Succession in Municipal Law and International Law, op. cit., p.503.
34 P. Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law  (London: Stevens & Sons, 1956), p. 149.
35 J. Crawford, The Creation o f  States in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. 40- 
42; Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, op.cit., pp. 140-149. (noting that while 
there is no rule, there is a presumption).
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Ireland for at least seven years. Likewise, the peace treaty by which Italy ceded 
territory to various Allies at the conclusion of World War II provided that Italian 
citizens residing in such territory prior to the war would “become citizens with full 
civil and political rights of the State to which the territory was transferred.”36 
Furthermore, in seceding from Pakistan in the early 1970s, Bangladesh gave residents 
who were not indigenous to its territory the option of accepting its nationality or 
returning to Pakistan.37 More recently, upon separating from the USSR, Belarus, 
Moldova and Ukraine granted automatic citizenship to all permanent residents in their 
respective territories.38 Soviet citizens who were citizens of the republics of 
Kyrgyzstan and Georgia were also extended automatic citizenship in those newly 
independent States.39 One of the Baltic States, Lithuania followed suit. The new 
citizenship laws of the States emerging from the dissolution of Czechoslovakia and 
Yugoslavia are influenced by the pre-existing citizenship laws of these countries’ parts. 
In their successor States, persons and their descendents possessing the citizenship of 
the respective federated entity which had become independent acquired ipso facto the 
new citizenship.40 Based on such past practice, the Council of Europe's Venice 
Commission declared that successor State nationality should be granted in future cases 
of succession to all nationals of the predecessor State residing permanently on the 
transferred territory.41
However, even if a rule requiring the extension of citizenship has emerged in the 
case of State succession, it arguably cannot apply to Estonia and Latvia as long as 
post-occupation Estonia and Latvia can be regarded as being restored States. As a 
matter of fact, where control over territory has been ‘restored’, the approach to 
nationality issues often has resembled that of Estonia and Latvia. For instance, the 
restoration of French sovereignty over Alsace-Lorraine after almost fifty years of
36 Treaty of Peace with Italy, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 19(1), 61 Stat. 1245, 1257-58, 49 UNTS 3, 14-15.
37 R. Donner, The Regulation o f  Nationality in International Law (New York: Transnational Publishers, 
1994), pp. 286-87.
38 The Venice Commission, op.cit., pp. 29-39.
39 In discussing the citizenship issue, the Russian Federation’s Presidential Commission on Citizenship 
Matters stated: “The situation in Estonia and Latvia is different, and that is why our meeting today is 
devoted to the status o f our countrymen there and to the solution o f these problems o f citizenship in 
those two states. Indeed, all the other newly emerging states, including Lithuania, have actually granted 
citizenship to all permanent residents in their territories who have applied for it.” See Press Conference 
with the Russian Federation Presidential Commission on Citizenship Concerning the Situation in Latvia 
and Estonia (Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast, July 20, 1994). (Discussing 1991 recognition 
agreement).
40 The Venice Commission, op.cit., pp. 29-39.
41 Ibid., p 5.
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German rule marked an exception to the general approach of the 1920 Versailles Peace 
Treaties. Rather than granting nationality automatically, France required Germans who 
were bom in or residing in Alsace-Lorraine to go through naturalisation procedures if 
they wanted to become French nationals.42 Another example is Austria, which 
claimed its annexation by Germany in 1938 had been unlawful. Austria therefore 
declined to extend its nationality to all residents and, instead, chose to “reinstate” as its 
nationals only those persons who had been Austrian nationals in 1938 and their 
descendants.43
Whatever the uniformity of State practice, it might be short of being an opinio 
juris. Nor is there evidence of opinio juris in the Special Rapporteur’s investigation of 
State practice in this matter,44 even if it should be admitted that the weight of recent 
State practice after the end of the Cold War has been for a successor State to confer 
nationality on the nationals of the predecessor State domiciled on the territory 
concerned.
3. The Right to Nationality under International Law
3.1. The Right to Nationality
Notwithstanding the past practice of other restored States and the discretion 
traditionally afforded to States in determining nationality rules, Estonia and Latvia’s 
regulation of nationality should also be viewed in relation to their international 
obligations to protect human rights. Estonia and Latvia have expressed their 
commitment to observe international law. The principles and norms of international 
law are incorporated into domestic law under Article 3 of the Estonian Constitution 45 
The Latvian Declaration on the Renewal of Independence affirms the supremacy of
42 Ibid., pp. 29-33.
A7> Brownlie, Principles o f  Public International Law, op.cit., pp. 81-82.
44 V. Mikulka’s Second Report mentions 31 instances o f State succession, ranging from the territorial 
transfer from Mexico to the United States in 1848 to the succession o f Eritrea in 1992. See V. Mikulka, 
Second Report on State Succession and its Impact on the Nationality o f Natural and Legal Persons, ILC, 
Forty-eighth Session, UN Doc. A./CN.4/474 (1996), at 19-38.
45 “The state authority shall be exercised solely pursuant to the Constitution and laws which are in 
conformity therewith. Generally recognised principles and rules o f  international law are an inseparable 
part o f the Estonian legal system.” Article 3(1) o f the Estonian Constitution translated by Estonian 
Legal Translation Centre. The Constitution o f the Republic o f Estonia, RT 26, 1992.
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international law over municipal law.46 Both States have also ratified principal 
international human rights instruments, such as the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR), the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).47
The United Nations (UN) efforts to deal with the plight of stateless persons have 
alerted the international community to the problem of nationality in the context of the 
protection of human rights.48 The UN issued a study denouncing statelessness, finding 
that “the fact that the stateless person has no nationality places him in an abnormal and 
inferior position which reduces his social value and destroys his own self- 
confidence.”49 Commentators have also observed that statelessness, at best, creates an 
unhappy lot for the individual, a vexatious problem for the nation and an undesirable 
phenomenon in modem civilisation, where every person has a right to expect the 
privileges and perform the duties incident to full citizenship status.50 In other words, 
the nationality problem not only establishes a passive legal relationship between the 
State and its subjects, but also creates a ‘human problem’. The failure to acquire legal 
status which is expressed as ‘nationality’ may have a negative impact on many 
important elements of life, including the right to vote, to own property, to be properly 
educated, to work and so on.
It seems that there is growing support for a human right to nationality. Such an 
inherent right to nationality is found in numerous international human rights 
conventions. For instance, Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights51 
declares that: (1). Everyone has a right to a nationality. (2). No one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality. But, it does 
not explicitly indicate which State has a duty to grant nationality. Various other 
international legal instruments address the right to nationality. The 1957 Convention
46 Declaration o f the Supreme Soviet o f the Latvian SSR on the Renewal o f the Independence o f the 
Republic o f Latvia, 4 May 1990, in The Republic o f  Latvia: Human Rights Issues (Riga: Saeima o f the 
Republic o f Latvia, Standing Commission on Human Rights, 1993), p. 58.
47 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, 993 UNTS 3; the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, 999 UNTS 171; International Convention 
on the Elimination o f All Forms o f Racial Discrimination, 1966, 660 UNTS 195.
48 Second Report on the Elimination or Reduction of Statelessness (1953), 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 196, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/75.
49 United Nations Department of Social Affairs, A Study o f Statelessness, at 139, UN Doc. E/1112, UN 
Sales No. 1949.XIV.2 (1949).
50 P. Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, op.cit., pp. 126-29 (commenting on the 
status o f being stateless).
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on the Nationality of Married Women52 echoes the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights by stipulating the right to nationality and the right not to be deprived of a 
nationality. The first two Articles of the Convention contain specific provisions 
concerning a wife’s nationality. Article 1 of the Convention asserts that “neither the 
celebration nor the dissolution of a marriage between one of its nationals and an alien, 
nor the change of nationality by the husband during marriage, shall automatically 
affect the nationality of the wife.”53 Article 2 states that “neither the voluntary 
acquisition of the nationality of another State nor the renunciation of its nationality by 
one of its nationals shall prevent the retention of its nationals by the wife of such 
national.”54
The 1965 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination55 
obliges States to “guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, 
colour or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law,” particularly in the 
enjoyment of several fundamental human rights, including the right to nationality.56 
Article 24 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that 
“every child has the right to acquire a nationality.” Article 9 of the 1979 Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women58 states that:
“(1). States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men to acquire, change or retain 
their nationality. They shall ensure in particular that neither marriage to an alien nor 
change o f nationality by the husband during marriage shall automatically change the 
nationality o f the wife, render her statelessness or force upon her the nationality o f the 
husband. (2). States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men with respect to the 
nationality o f their children.”59
51GA Res. 217 A, UN Doc. A/810 (1948), at 71.
52 The Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, 309 UNTS 65. The Convention entered into 
force on 11 August 1958. As o f 31 August 2005, it has 70 States parties. Latvia acceded to the 
Convention on 14 April 1992.
53 Article 1 o f the Convention.
54 Article 2 o f the Convention.
^International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms o f Racial Discrimination, 660 UNTS 195. 
This convention entered into force on 1 January 1969. There are 172 States parties to this convention as 
o f 31 August 2005 including all member States o f the Council o f Europe.
56 Article 5 of the Convention.
57 Article 24 (3) o f the Covenant. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 
171. The Covenant entered into force on 23 March 1976. It has 156 States parties. Estonia acceded to 
the Covenant on 21 October 1991. Latvia acceded to the Covenant on 14 April 1992.
58 The Convention on the Elimination o f All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1249 UNTS 13. 
The Convention entered into force on 3 September 1981. There are 180 States parties to this 
Convention as o f 31 August 2005. Estonia acceded to this Convention on 21 October 1991 and Latvia 
acceded to it on 14 April 1992.
59 Article 9 of the Convention.
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The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child60, which has been ratified by
almost every State, contains two important articles relevant to nationality. Article 2 of 
the Convention stipulates that:
“States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the...Convention to each 
child within their jurisdiction without discrimination o f any kind, irrespective o f the 
child’s or his or her parent’s or legal guardian’s race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or 
other status.”61
Article 7 states that:
“The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth 
to a name, the right to acquire a nationality, and, as far as possible, the right to know and 
be cared for by his or her parents... States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these 
rights in accordance with their national law and their obligations under relevant 
international instruments in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be 
stateless.”62
Regional instruments, such as the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights63 
also provide for the right to a nationality. Article 20 of the American Convention 
provides that:
“Every person has the right to a nationality. Every person has the right to the nationality 
of the State in whose territory he was bom if he does not have the right to any other 
nationality. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived o f his nationality or the right to change 
it.”64
Article 4 of the 1997 European Convention on Nationality65 incorporates as a 
basic principle the right to a nationality for all, the avoidance of statelessness, the 
prohibition against arbitrary deprivation of nationality, and the preservation of 
nationality in marriage or the dissolution of marriage.66 Article 6(3) of the Convention, 
for instance, takes a significant step forward in this matter. Article 6(3) provides:
“Each State Party shall provide in its internal law for the possibility o f naturalisation o f
60The Convention on the Rights o f Child, 1989, 1577 UNTS 3. The Convention entered into force on 2 
September 1990. There are 192 States parties to this convention as o f 31 August 2005. Estonia acceded 
to this Convention on 21 October 1991 and Latvia acceded to on 14 April 1992.
61 Article 2 o f the Convention.
62Article 7 o f the Convention.
63 American Convention on Human Rights, 1144 UNTS 123. The Convention entered into force on 18 
July 1978. There are 24 States parties to the Convention as o f 31 August 2005.
64 Article 20 o f the Convention.
65The European Convention on Nationality, ETS No. 166. The Convention entered into force on 1 
March 2000. The total number o f signatures not followed by ratifications is 12 States, as of 31 August 
2005. The total number o f ratification/accessions is 15 States as o f 31 August 2005. As all three Baltic 
republics are members o f the Council o f Europe, the Convention is o f particular importance. Only 
Latvia is a signatory.
66 Article 4 of the European Convention o f Nationality.
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persons lawfully and habitually resident in its territory. In establishing the conditions for 
naturalisation, it shall not provide for a period o f residence exceeding ten years before the 
lodging o f an application.”67
Thus, habitual residence, along with place of birth and descent, is formally recognised 
as a source basis for the granting of nationality. The individual will have the right to 
apply for citizenship after a maximum period of 10 years of residence following which, 
the habitual residence in itself constitutes a sufficient basis upon which to ensure the 
individual is allowed to try to naturalise. Yet it needs to be noted that the 10-year 
period is for the normal process of naturalisation. It may be argued that this period of 
time will be less for stateless persons, refugees and persons belonging to ethnic, 
religious or linguistic minorities who have resided in their State of residence over a 
significant period of time, as, for instance, Article 6(4)(g) goes on to recommend that 
the access of such individuals to naturalisation procedures should be facilitated.
In particular, in Chapter VI of the 1997 European Convention on Nationality, with 
provisions concerning State succession, habitual residence and a genuine and effective 
link are primary factors which the State should take into consideration in determining 
the attribution of nationality. The will of the person concerned should also be taken 
into account by the State, giving the individual the opportunity to indicate expressly 
which nationality is desired. States are encouraged, in Article 19 of the Convention, to 
promote the conclusion of treaties which shall respect the principles and rules 
contained and referred to in the chapter, including, non-discriminatory consideration 
of the genuine and effective link, habitual residence, and the will of the persons 
concerned, in particular, so as to avoid statelessness.69 As a matter of fact, the 
European Convention on Nationality essentially adopted the approach of the 1961 
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. Article 10 of the 1961 Reduction 
Convention declares that every treaty between States providing for the transfer of 
territory shall include provisions designed to ensure that no persons shall become
67 European Convention on Nationality and Explanatory Report, ETS No. 166, Council o f Europe, 
Strasbourg, 1997.
68 Article 6 (4) provides as follows: “Each State Party shall facilitate in its internal law the acquisition 
o f its nationality for the following persons: a. spouses of its nationals; b. children of one o f its nationals, 
falling under the exception o f Article 6, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph a; c. children one o f whose parents 
acquires or has acquired its nationality; d. children adopted by one o f its nationals; e. persons who were 
bom on its territory and reside there lawfully and habitually; f. persons who are lawfully and habitually 
resident on its territory for a period of time beginning before the age o f 18, that period to be determined 
by the internal law o f the State Party concerned; g. stateless persons and recognised refugees lawfully 
and habitually resident on its territory.”; C. A. Batchelor, “Statelessness and the Problem o f Resolving 
Nationality Status”, International Journal o f  Refugee Law, Vol., 10, 1998, pp. 162-165.
69 Article 19 o f the European Convention on Nationality.
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stateless as a result of the transfer.70
All above international and regional instruments show that international law has 
encroached on what once was considered a mainly domestic ‘reserved domain’ to 
effectuate the right to nationality, as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has 
correctly held in the Costa Rica Case. The Court examined whether the proposed 
amendments were in conflict with the right to nationality enumerated in the American 
Convention on Human Rights:
“It is generally accepted today that nationality is an inherent right o f all human beings.
Not only is nationality the basic requirement for the exercise o f political rights, it also has 
an important bearing on the individual's legal capacity. Thus, despite the fact that it is 
traditionally accepted that the conferral and regulation o f nationality are matters for each 
State to decide, contemporary developments indicate that international law does impose 
certain limits on the broad powers enjoyed by the States in that area, and that the manner 
in which States regulate matters bearing on nationality cannot today be deemed within 
their sole jurisdiction; those powers o f the State are also circumscribed by the obligations 
to ensure the full protection o f human rights.”71
The difference between the American Court’s approach in the Costa Rica Case and the 
Permanent Court’s approach in Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees Case is that in 
the latter case, the Court held that essentially the question of nationality is to be 
decided by each individual State and only if a State limited its power voluntarily by 
signing treaties to that effect, would it be obliged to adhere to the international 
obligations. In the Costa Rica Case, however, the Inter-American Court based its 
ruling on the premise that rules of international human rights laws on the issue of 
nationality are already in force. That being so, a State’s capacity to decide on the 
issues of nationality is limited by the regulations already provided in the various law 
treaties.
3.2. The Duty to Prevent Statelessness under International Law
Closely related to the right to nationality is preventing statelessness. This may be 
conceived as a duty arising from the right to nationality. There are two international 
conventions, concluded under the auspices of the United Nations, which address the 
issue of statelessness. The first, the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons (the 1954 Status Convention), was concluded in New York on 28 September,
70 Article 10 o f the Convention.
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1954. It came into force on 6 June, 1960. The second, the Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness (the 1961 Reduction Convention), was concluded on 30 
August, 1961. It came into force on 13 December, 1975.73 Of the Baltic States, Latvia 
and Lithuania acceded to the 1954 Status Convention.74
Statelessness is generally understood as the legal condition of being without a 
nationality. What is serious for practical purposes is that being stateless renders the
nc
individual concerned unable to enjoy various rights and protections afforded by law. 
Although Estonia is not bound by the language of the convention because it has not 
yet to sign it, if the convention’s principles become customary international law, then 
it will be bound to them.
71 Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions o f the Constitution o f Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion 
No. OC-4/84, Inter-Am. C.H.R. paragraph 32 (Jan. 19, 1984), reprinted in 5 HRLJ, 161, 167 (1984).
72 Convention Relating to the Status o f Stateless Persons, 360 UNTS 130. The 1954 Status Convention 
presently has 66 States parties and 60 States have ratified it, as o f 31 August 2005.
3 Convention on the Reduction o f Statelessness, 989 UNTS 176. The 1961 Reduction Convention has 
34 States parties and 31 States have ratified it, as o f 31 August 2005.
74Latvia made reservation in the application o f the provisions o f Articles 24 and 27 o f the Convention as 
follows: “In accordance with article 38 of the [Convention] the Republic o f  Latvia reserves the right to 
apply the provisions o f paragraph 1 (b) o f Article 24 subject to limitations provided for by the national 
legislation.” “In accordance with article 38 o f the [Convention] the Republic o f Latvia reserves the right 
to apply the provisions o f Article 27 subject to limitations provided for by the national legislation.”
75Statelessness is caused by the loss o f nationality without the acquisition of another nationality by 
deprivation or by conflict o f laws. Statelessness may also result at birth when the child fails to qualify 
for the nationality o f a particular State. However, the case o f being stateless at birth has received far 
more sympathy under international law. See P. Weis, “The United Nations Convention on the Reduction 
o f Statelessness”, ICLQ, Vol.,11, 1962, pp.1073-1075. Changes to citizenship laws are also a common 
mechanism o f statelessness. Changes to citizenship laws often create the risk that persons who were 
considered citizens according to old laws might be rendered stateless by new laws. For example, in 
Zaire, a law passed in 1971 granted nationality to the Banyarwanda people, who thus obtained certain 
civil and political rights such as the right to stand for election and the right to vote. In 1981, however, 
Law No. 81-002 amended the previous legislation and retroactively denied nationality to thousands of  
Banyarwanda. These Banyarwanda, having no other nationality, have been rendered stateless. (See 
Report on the Situation o f  Human Rights in Zaire, Prepared by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Roberto 
Garreton, in Accordance with Commission Resolution 1994/87, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 
51st Sess., Agenda Item 12, 26, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/6/Add. 1 (1995)).) Likewise, in 2001, 
Zimbabwe instituted laws that revoked Zimbabwean citizenship from Zimbabwean nationals who held 
a foreign citizenship or who had failed to renounce any claim to foreign citizenship, even if  they did not 
know about the claim. Essentially, Zimbabweans with dual citizenship or with a potential claim to 
foreign citizenship had to renounce their foreign citizenship or their claims to foreign citizenship in 
order to keep their Zimbabwean status. The result o f the Zimbabwean legislation was that millions of 
Zimbabweans with foreign parentage or with foreign sounding names, most of whom were bom and 
raised in Zimbabwe, have had their citizenships withdrawn and have had their national identities 
confiscated by the State until they prove that they have renounced any claims to foreign citizenship. 
Zimbabweans Team Up to Fight New Citizenship Act, FINANCIAL GAZETTE, 20 December 2001. 
Indeed, whenever citizenship laws are changed, the possibility always exists that persons considered 
citizens according to the old laws might be rendered stateless by the new laws. Take, for example, an 
ethnic minority who was bom and has always lived in the State o f their nationality. The State's territory, 
however, is dissolved and succeeded by another State. The former citizen would expect to be given 
citizenship of the successor State, given that it took control o f the territory in which the former citizen 
has always lived and resided. However, if the successor State strictly imposes ju s sanguinis citizenship 
laws, and only grants citizenship to the territory's ethnic majority, then the former citizen would be
75
The 1954 Status Convention is the primary international instrument that aims to 
regulate and improve the status of stateless persons and to ensure that stateless persons 
are accorded their fundamental rights and freedom without discrimination. Although 
the Convention’s drafters felt it was necessary to make the distinction between de jure 
stateless persons (those who have not received nationality automatically or through an 
individual decision under the operation of any State’s laws) and de facto stateless 
persons (those who cannot establish their nationality), they did not recognise the 
similarity of their positions. Most of the 1954 Status Convention is devoted to the 
protection of stateless persons rather than the elimination of statelessness. However, 
the 1954 Status Convention, in Article 32, does require States parties to “as far as 
possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of stateless persons.”
The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness focuses exclusively on 
decreasing statelessness. The 1961 Convention does not, however, require a 
contracting State to unconditionally grant its nationality to any stateless person but 
rather bases the right to nationality on ties held with a State based on either jus soli in 
Article 1 or jus sanguinis in Article 4. The granting of nationality is further contingent 
on the fact that a person “would otherwise be stateless.”77 Also, both Articles 1 and 4 
present a contracting State with the opportunity to impose further conditions on the 
granting of its nationality to stateless persons, in addition to the jus soli or jus 
sanguinis links that exist. These conditions include: that an application under the
no
Convention is lodged while the applicant is in a prescribed age range; that the
70person has habitually resided in the State’s territory for a fixed period of time; that
OA
the person has not been convicted of an offence against national security; also 
includes that a person has not been sentenced to imprisonment for five or more years
o 1
on a criminal charge and that the person has always been stateless. Furthermore, the 
1961 Reduction Convention only provides for the granting of nationality to stateless 
individuals within a contracting States territory based on ‘de jure  stateless’ factors. As
rendered stateless.
76 Article 32 o f the Convention.
77 Article 1 provides: “A Contracting State shall grant its nationality to a person bom in its territory 
who would otherwise be stateless.” Article 4 provides: “A Contracting State shall grant its nationality to 
a person, not bom in the territory o f a Contracting State, who would otherwise be stateless, if  the 
nationality o f one o f his parents at the time o f the person's birth was that o f that State.”
78 Articles l(2)(a) and 4(2)(a) o f the Convention.
79 Articles l(2)(b) and 2(2)(b) of the Convention.
80 Articles l(2)(c) and4(2)(c), Article l(2)(c) o f the Convention.
81 Article l(2)(d) and 4(2)(d) o f the Convention.
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a result there are a number of gaps in the prevention of statelessness that the 1961 
Reduction Convention does not envisage or remedy. It is clear that the circumstances 
in which statelessness is created are much wider and varied than that which the 1961 
Convention attempts to prevent.
Article 8 of the 1961 Reduction Convention provides that a contracting State shall 
not deprive a person of his or her nationality if that person would be rendered 
stateless.82 This provision, however, is vaguely worded and subject to flexible 
interpretation. Under Article 9, persons may not be deprived of their nationality on 
racial, ethnic, religious, or political grounds.83 Unlike Estonia, Latvia acceded to this 
convention on 14 April, 1992.
4. The Right to Nationality as a Part of Customary International 
Law?
The Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) describes custom as “evidence 
of a general practice accepted as law.”84 Custom is generally considered to have two
• o c  ,
elements: State practice and opinio juris. State practice refers to general and 
consistent practice by States, while opinio juris means that the practice is followed out 
of a belief of legal obligation. It is held by certain authors that global treaties (i.e., 
those that are open for participation by all States) with general provisions create law 
that is binding on all States in the international system, irrespective of whether they 
are parties to the treaty or not. Just how these treaties create obligations for third 
parties has been a matter of considerable discussion among international law 
scholars.86 One of the ways suggested is that these treaties create ‘instant customary 
international law’ and since all States are obligated to obey customary international 
law, States are, ipso facto , obligated by the customary law created by the law-making 
treaty. Treaties can suggest new customary international law or articulate nascent 
customary international law, but in either case recognition by a substantial number of 
States in the international system is required before it can be converted into customary
82Article 8 of the Convention.
83 Article 9 o f the Convention.
84 Article 38(l)b of the International Court o f Justice Statute.
85 North Sea Continental Shelf Case (FRG/Den.; FRG/Neth.), ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 44.
86 See, generally, A. D'Amato (ed)., International Law Anthology (Cincinnati: Anderson, Pub.Co., 
1994).
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international law obligating all States. It is generally believed that widespread 
acceptance of a legal principle is necessary for it to be understood as part of customary 
international law. The ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case suggests the 
number of States parties to the multilateral convention is an important factor in 
identifying the evidence of the existence of State practice for customary international 
law.87
Opinio juris is one of the two requirements for the existence of a rule of customary 
international law. The standard formulation of opinio juris is that a practice must be 
accepted as law. However, the precise contours of opinio juris are somewhat uncertain. 
The ICJ, for its part, does not clearly identify which States must possess the 
psychological element that is opinio juris, but it seems to have in mind States as a 
group. For instance, in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case, the ICJ stated that “the 
States concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a 
legal obligation.”88
International legal instruments which mention the right to nationality noted above 
are copious, but differ in their normative values. More than anything else, not all 
relevant treaties noted above are adhered to by the same number of States. The fact 
that the granting of citizenship is handled in international law by myriad treaties of 
varying normative values also makes the task of tracing the nature and legal 
effectiveness of the right to nationality as a human right very difficult. Of relevant 
international and regional instruments regarding the right to nationality, only the 
American Convention on Human Rights augments the ‘general right’ to a nationality 
by imposing a duty on States to grant nationality to persons bom within their territory
• , QO *if such persons have no right to any other nationality. No other relevant convention 
imposes a ‘direct obligation’ upon States to grant citizenship. As noted, the 1954 
Status Convention merely instmcts States to facilitate, as far as possible, the 
assimilation and naturalisation of stateless persons. As to the right to obtain citizenship, 
relevant international instmments do not instmct States when to attribute citizenship 
except in order to avoid statelessness. While the 1961 Reduction Convention makes 
this duty conditional upon either the age of the stateless person or the fact that he
87 North Sea Continental Shelf Case, op.cit., p. 43.
88 Ibid., p. 44.
89 Article 20 (2) o f the Convention. It provides that “Every person has the right to the nationality o f the 
state in whose territory he was bom if he does not have the right to any other nationality.”
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resides in his State of birth,90 the American Convention on Human Rights establishes 
a general rule that every stateless person has a right to obtain the citizenship of his 
State of birth without further conditions.91 The only instrument to speak explicitly 
about binding rules regarding State attribution of citizenship, other than in the cases of 
statelessness alone, is the European Convention on Nationality. This Convention calls 
upon States to apply the jus sanguinis principle as the basis rule for the acquisition of 
citizenship, alongside the principles of jus soli and habitual residence if application of
92the jus sanguinis leads to statelessness.
A question also arises as to whether the duty to prevent statelessness has become a 
norm of ‘customary international law’. In this regard, given that the 1954 and 1961 
Conventions have been ratified by few States, it seems difficult to say that the duty to
no
prevent statelessness has become a norm of customary international law.
The ‘persistent objector’ doctrine also suggests that the sense of legal obligation 
must be held by States in general. According to the persistent objector doctrine, these 
objectors (States) shall be exempt from the norm after it becomes law, so long as the 
State can prove that it exercised clear and consistent objections throughout the norm’s 
emergence. The only exceptions to the persistent objector doctrine are cases involving 
jus cogens. Jus cogens are a subset of norms deemed by the international community 
to be so important that absolutely no derogation from them will be tolerated.94 Courts 
and scholars usually determine whether a norm is jus cogens based on qualitative, 
descriptive analyses. Currently, only a small number of human rights norms are 
considered jus cogens; they include proscriptions of only the most egregious acts such
90 Article 1 (2) o f the 1961 Reduction Convention.
91 Article 20 (2) o f the Convention.
92 Article 6 of the Convention.
93Although only few States have ratified the 1961 Reduction Convention, it is important to note that it 
elaborates on the general obligation set out in Article 15 o f the UDHR, and the principles embodied in it 
are reflected in the European Convention on Nationality. Some authors have argued that its provisions 
therefore reflect reference points for determining customary international law and reflect an 
international consensus on minimum legal standards to be applied to nationality. Others have taken a 
more cautious position that, while with such a low level o f ratifications it could hardly represent 
customary international law, it nevertheless does provide the right to nationality with some substantive 
content and is indicative o f the extent o f obligations of, or the international expectations o f States in the 
elimination and reduction o f statelessness. The UN Special Rapporteur on Zaire has gone as far as 
stating, despite the small number o f ratifications, that the principles contained in the 1961 Convention 
are principles o f international customary law that are impossible for States, even those which are not 
party to it, to disregard. UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/66, para. 85. According to the Explanatory Report on 
the European Convention on Nationality, “the obligation to avoid statelessness has become part of 
customary international law.” (European Convention on Nationality and Explanatory Report 
(Strasbourg: Council o f Europe Publishing, 1997), p. 30.
94 Article 53 o f the Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties, 8 ILM 679, 1969.
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as genocide, slavery, and torture.95 ‘Preventing statelessness’ does not belong to the 
category of jus cogens at present. In the case of Estonia and Latvia in relation to the 
existence of the ethnic, linguistic Russian stateless persons therein, given that they 
have consistently argued that the ethnic, linguistic Russian settlers are not stateless 
persons, Estonia and Latvia may be regarded as being ‘persistent objectors’.
In sum, there has clearly been a widespread consensus on the right to a nationality 
and the right to nationality is clearly recognised in various international and regional 
instruments, but it has not yet reached the level of a ‘general right to nationality’ as 
part of customary international law in the sense that a State has a positive obligation to 
grant citizenship to everyone. Although there is an international ‘expectation’ for 
States’ efforts to reduce the possibility of statelessness,96 and the trend in international 
law suggests a strong presumption in favour of prevention of statelessness in the case
07of State succession, it would be correct to say that the duty to prevent statelessness 
has not yet become a norm of customary international law.
5. Estonian and Latvian Citizenship Laws and the Problem of the 
Protection of Human Rights of the Ethnic, Linguistic Russians
5.1. Conformity of the Estonian and Latvian Citizenship Laws with Public 
International law on Nationality
From the preceding analysis, it would be correct to state that Estonia and Latvia have 
no public international law obligations to grant automatic citizenship to the ethnic, 
linguistic Russians in question. It seems that the Estonian and Latvian citizenship
QO
laws conform to the rule of public international law on nationality in general. 
Estonia and Latvia derive their competence to legislate citizenship qualifications from 
the generally accepted principle of the domestic sovereignty of each State to regulate 
its own citizenship. It is observed that setting requirements of national language and
95 H. Lau. “Rethinking the Persistent Objector Doctrine in International Human Rights Law”, Chi. J. 
Int'l L., Vol., 6, 2005, pp. 495-510.
95 K. Knop & C. Chinkin, “Remembering Chrystal Macmillan: Women’s Equality and Nationality in 
International Law”, Mich. J. Int'lL., Vol., 22, 2001, pp. 562-563.
97 J. L Blackman, “State Succession and Statelessness: The Emerging Right to an Effective Nationality 
under International Law”, Mich. J. Int'l L, Vol., 19, 1998, pp. 1141-1145.
98 See Chapter 2 above, pp. 52-54.
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residency fall within the accepted range."
States do grant citizenship to people. They do so either by applying the jus soli 
principle according to which birth in the territory of a State entitles a person to be a 
citizen of that State, or by applying the jus sanguinis principle, according to which 
citizenship is granted to descendants of persons who are already citizens of a State, or 
by a combination of the two systems. The problem is that the lack of uniformity in the 
laws of the various States can create situations in which people are left without 
citizenship.
One thing that cannot be ignored when one analyses citizenship matters of Estonia 
and Latvia is their unique historical situation which is quite different from 
neighbouring countries. Drawing simple comparisons with other European legislation 
would be pointless, to some extent. Even if the laws in question may conform to 
legislation in other European countries and international general standards in the area 
of nationality matters, they are not necessarily adequate for the situation of Estonia 
and Latvia. This was adequately pointed out in the letter by the Council of Europe in 
the following terms:
“The experts are o f the opinion that the status o f persons already resident on the territory 
of Estonia cannot be compared to that o f non-citizens not presently residing in Estonia, 
and that, whatever the historical background, the law must be subjected to a particular 
close scrutiny...”100
Even though the laws in question may be adequate for new immigrants, it is not 
‘fair’ to place long-term settled ethnic, linguistic Russians in the same category. As a 
matter of fact, the citizenship laws of Estonia and Latvia are unique, as they are 
retrospective and aim to define the status of people presently living in the republics.101 
Conversely, the citizenship laws of most Western countries are prospective and 
address future immigration.102 An individual who has resided in a country for decades 
and is suddenly faced with the prospect of being stateless has, in this writer’s opinion, 
a greater claim to citizenship and protection by his or her State of residence, than an
99 F. Horn, “Conceptions and Principles of Citizenship in Modem Western Democracies”, in 
Citizenship and State Succession (Strasbourg: European Commission for Democracy through Law, 
1997), pp. 39-85.
100 Letter from Council o f Europe Secretary-General C. Lalumiere to Estonian President L. Meri (2 
July 1993), cited in “the Law on Aliens” in Controversy in the Republic o f  Estonia (New York: 
UBA/BATUN, 1994), p. 22. UBA/BATUN is a New York-based non-governmental organisation 
concerned with human rights issues in the Baltic States.
101 Report on the Application by Latvia for Membership o f the Council o f Europe, Eur. Consult. 
Ass., 44th Sess. Doc. No. 7169, app IX (1994).
102 Ibid.
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103immigrant who has recently arrived in a country.
Although Estonian and Latvian governments have repeatedly asserted that their 
laws meet international standards, however, mere adherence to the formal contents 
which are similar to provisions in Western European legislation does not tell the whole 
story. It should be noted that, while the United Nations, the Organisation for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe have expressed that the 
legislation is adequate, this may be seen as diplomatic rhetoric that expresses their 
criticism in moderate tones. Having been conscious of international criticism about the 
status of the ethnic, linguistic Russian populations in Estonia and Latvia, the Estonian 
and Latvian governments have provided invitations to international organisations that 
have visited, not only to investigate the social situation in relation to ethnic conflicts, 
but also to comment on domestic laws in question.104
5.2. The Controversial Aspects of the Estonian and Latvian Citizenship Laws 
from a Human Rights Perspective
There is no mention of ethnicity in the Estonian and Latvian citizenship laws, but it is 
evident that ethnic, linguistic Russians are targeted. 1940 is the cut-off date for 
automatic citizenship in both Estonian and Latvian legislation, and most ethnic, 
linguistic Russians settled in the Baltics after that date.105 In Latvia, the draft 
citizenship law included the controversial provision of a quota system based on 
demographic situation for naturalising a large portion of the population, many of 
whom were bom in Latvia, had lived most of their lives there, and which they 
considered their homeland. The quota system was obviously discriminatory and the 
provision was deleted under intense pressure from the international community. 
Article 9 of it, which stated that its purpose “is to ensure the development of Latvia as
103 As noted, Brownlie argued that the granting o f citizenship to the residents o f the new State was 
obligatory by virtue o f the practice of States and amounted to an international binding custom. Brownlie, 
The Relations o f  Nationality in Public International Law, op.cit., pp. 319-326. Brownlie’s opinion was 
attacked as being too far reaching. However, it is important to note that the criticism was not directed at 
the idea that it was desirable and proper to grant the citizenship o f a new State to the residents living 
within its boundaries, but rather at Brownlie’s assertion that this principle amounted to a binding rule of 
customary international law.
104 Poleshchuk, Advice Not Welcome, op.cit., pp. 14-16.
105 Helsinki Commission Reports, Human Rights and Democratization in Latvia (Washington, D.C., 
1993), at 16-18; Helsinki Commission Reports, Human Rights and Democratization in Estonia 
(Washington, D.C., 1993), at 13.
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a single nation-state,” was the most troubling aspect.106 Such a desire for ethnic purity 
and a mono-ethnic State contravenes a significant body of international human rights 
law.
In Estonia, the adoption of a series of laws, beginning with the language law in 
1989, while not explicitly discriminating on the grounds of ethnic origin, in effect put 
most of the ethnic, linguistic Russians at a disadvantage.107 Although the Estonian 
government argued that it was restoring its pre-World War II citizenship laws based on 
the principle of restorationism or legal continuity, it is interesting to note that no other 
pre-war laws were restored. According to Helsinki Watch, the denial of automatic 
citizenship to the ethnic, linguistic Russians under the restored 1938 Citizenship Law
10Rwas “not an unfortunate, unforeseen by-product, but an intentional goal.”
It is somewhat incongruous that the Estonian and Latvian governments deny that 
they are targeting ethnic, linguistic Russians, while defending their positions based on 
legal continuity at the same time. As one commentator notes, “laws on citizenship and 
immigrants do more than regulate the entry and status of non-citizens; they reveal 
much about how a nation conceives of itself.”109 The Estonian and Latvian underlying 
goal of ethnic homogeneity is certainly troubling from the present international human 
rights law perspective.
A UN report on Estonia and Latvia stated as follows:
“the specific factual situation o f annexation accompanied by the influx o f very large 
numbers o f persons into a small State with a different ethnic origin, followed by 50 years 
of settlement and multi-ethnic coexistence, followed by the re-emergence o f the original 
State as an independent entity, does not seem to have been envisaged by drafters o f the 
relevant human rights instruments.”110
It should be noted that most ethnic, linguistic Russian residents in Estonia and Latvia 
would have preferred the citizenship of the country in which they had resided at a time 
when Estonia and Latvia regained independence, either due to family and other ties or 
most importantly because they would have had little prospect of finding jobs and 
homes in Russia. For instance, the UN Report noted that over 91 percent of the
106 Article 9 of Draft Citizenship Law.
107 Poleshchuk, Advice Not Welcome, op.cit., pp. 14-16.
108 C. Panico, Integrating Estonia’s Non-Citizen Minority (New York: Helsinki Watch, 1993), p. 12.
109 D. Kanstroom, “Wer Sind Wir Wieder? Laws of Asylum, immigration, and Citizenship in the 
Struggle for the Soul o f the New Germany”, YaleJ.Int’l. L, Vol., 18, 1993, p. 158.
110 Report o f the Secretary-General: Situations o f Human Rights in Estonia and Latvia, 1993, UN  
Doc.A/48/511, p. 7.
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registered non-citizen population in Latvia wished to become Latvian citizens.111 The 
majority of the ethnic, linguistic Russians in both countries did not apply for any 
citizenship, presumably because they did not want Russian citizenship and were not
119eligible for Latvian or Estonian citizenship. Ethnic, linguistic Russians who have 
been living and working in what are now Estonia and Latvia, who have few 
substantial ties with Russia and who regarded Estonia and Latvia as their real home, 
could meet the ‘genuine link’ standard on the basis of long-term and habitual 
residence. In this case, one may arguably say that the change of sovereignty may not 
break that link.113 Bildt’s comment seems to point out accurately the essence of the 
problem:
“They never felt that they were moving abroad when they settled in Estonia or Latvia.
They do not consider themselves immigrants at all, and in some respects they are right.
Most o f them have no personal responsibility for past Soviet actions...they too are 
casualties o f the Soviet system, now that they have lost the equal status with Estonians 
and Latvians that they used to enjoy by virtue o f common Soviet citizenship.”114
Estonia and Latvia, however, have argued that they were never successor States of 
the former Soviet Union because they claim de jure continuity during Soviet 
occupation. From the Baltic perspective, therefore, all consequences of illegal 
annexation are invalid. Demographic changes could not be an exception. However, 
regardless of whether Estonia and Latvia are restored States or successor States, the 
fact that Estonia and Latvia did not award automatic citizenship to the settlers of the 
Soviet period after independence is problematic, even if one admits that Estonia and 
Latvia had no direct public international law obligations to grant automatic citizenship 
to the ethnic, linguistic Russians in question. Estonia and Latvia have been criticised 
by the Russian Federation as discrimination for the Russians settlers. Russia has 
invoked the 1991 Fundamentals Treaties with Estonia and Latvia which in Articles 2 
and 3 envisages for the residents the right to choose the nationality in accordance with 
the laws of the respective States. Russia and the respective Baltic States have 
interpreted this stipulation differently: while Russia lays emphasis at the ‘right to 
choose citizenship’, Estonia and Latvia have insisted that the qualification in 
accordance with the laws of the respective States only includes the right to apply for
1,1 Ibid. p. 11.
112 Poleshchuk, Advice not welcomed, op.cit., p. 41.
113 See Article 10 o f the proposed Convention in Chapter 8 below, pp. 270-271.
114 C. Bildt, “The Baltic Litmus Test”, Foreign Affairs, Vol., 73, 1994, pp. 72-79.
84
citizenship, subject to naturalisation conditions. According to this interpretation, 
Estonia and Latvia only committed themselves to not refusing naturalisation to these 
Soviet settlers who wish to become citizens of Estonia and Latvia.115
It is also true that in many ways the European institutions mentioned above took 
the view that these two States should extend nationality to persons who settled after 
1940, which is to respect the genuine link of the ethnic, linguistic Russians to their 
States of residence. In this regard, it can be argued that Estonia and Latvia, even after 
accepting the legitimacy of their restoration thesis, have thus not accorded ‘complete 
liberty’ in regulating citizenship policies. A fundamentalist approach to the continuity 
of nationality principle is problematic in terms of the protection of human rights, given 
that the effective right to nationality or citizenship is emerging as a human right in 
international law, although admittedly vague in substance.116
Citizenship means ‘membership’ of a State. It represents the condition of 
integration of the individuals within the political and social framework of that State. 
Citizenship carries basic rights. It carries a set of rights pertaining to the empowerment 
of the individual: the right to vote, hold office and participate in decision-making in 
the allocation of the State’s resources. Also included are rights to social action, 
protection and economic rights, which are key determinants of the quality of life for 
an individual. Granted by the State, citizenship confirms the individual’s full 
membership in the national community and his or her right to enjoy the same rights 
and freedoms as any other member of that community.
The citizenship laws of Estonia and Latvia are problematic from the perspective of 
the protection of the ethnic, linguistic Russians as members of minority groups. If a 
State considers itself to be a nation-State and it grants citizenship solely to its 
members on the basis of ethnicity and language, persons who do not belong to that 
nation will not have the capacity to become full members of the State. As a matter of 
fact, the existence of a one-nation State is rare. Most States host more than one nation. 
A strict adherence to the majority’s national (nexus to the past) criteria for granting 
citizenship is problematic for the other ethnic, linguistic minorities living in the State. 
When those who are not given citizenship coincide with ethnic and linguistic identity, 
the group’s ability to protect itself through the political system and to maintain group
115 R. Miillerson, “New Developments in the Former U.S.S.R and Yugoslavia”, Va.J. In t’l. L, Vol., 33, 
1993, pp. 310-315.
ll6See Article 10 in the proposed Convention in Chapter 8 below, pp. 270-271.
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identity becomes severely limited. Given that citizenship generally connotes full 
membership, typically endowing its holder with the full range of domestic rights 
recognised by the State in which he or she resides, a distinct link between citizenship 
and the maintenance and promotion of identity for members of minority groups is 
evident.
6. Conclusions
(1). There is a clear tendency to substitute the classical view that the granting of 
nationality lies solely within the domestic jurisdiction of a State, with the more human 
rights-oriented view as to the nature of nationality. Moreover, the discussion of 
nationality matters in relation to the status of inhabitants who have been affected by 
State succession indicates an evolution in international law on nationality; it is 
evolving from the conferral of nationality as a negative function of delimiting the 
competence of States in their attribution of nationality to the assigning of positive 
obligations on States to confer nationality to the persons who have been in the 
territories of their States of residence based on the principle of genuine, dominant and 
effective links.
(2). Although there has clearly been a widespread consensus on the right to nationality, 
and this right is recognised under various international and regional instruments, its 
major practical limitation as a ‘positive human right’ is that it does not prescribe which 
nationality there may be a right to in any given situation. The genuine and effective 
link is strongly evidenced in State practice and is an appropriate and effective 
principle in determining which nationality an individual may have the right to. It 
seems clear that the ethnic, linguistic Russians who have been living and working in 
what are now Estonia and Latvia, who have few substantial ties with Russia and who 
regard Estonia and Latvia as their real home, could meet the ‘genuine link’ standard 
on the basis of long-term and habitual residence. However, the present state of 
international law does not support the conclusion that a State has a ‘binding 
obligation’ to grant nationality to a person who has a genuine and effective link on the 
basis of residence within that State.
(3). Even though the legal status and contents of the right to nationality and 
corresponding States’ obligations to respect the right to nationality under international
86
law still remain unclear, the important point is that the right is developing, as 
evidenced in the increasing number of international Conventions and regional 
instruments that refer to it. As such, it is possible that through increased State 
willingness to protect the right to a nationality and subsequent State practice in 
granting individuals nationality on that basis, the right to nationality could become 
effectively a human right.
(4). As observed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the Estonian and Latvian citizenship laws 
have undergone significant changes over the past few years. Under the present state of 
development of public international law on the matters of nationality, it cannot be said 
that the citizenship laws of Estonia and Latvia, under which automatic citizenship is 
not granted to the ethnic, linguistic Russians who had resided over a significant period 
of time in what are now Estonia and Latvia since before independence in 1991, are in 
violation of public international law regarding nationality matters.
(5). Aside from the Estonian and Latvian citizenship laws’ conformity with the general 
standards of nationality matters under public international law, however, the 
citizenship laws of Estonia and Latvia can be problematic from the perspective of the 
protection of human rights of the ethnic, linguistic Russians, particularly from the 
perspective of the protection of such persons as members of minority groups. Given 
that citizenship is a basic legal element in materialising various human rights at the 
domestic legal level, including civil, political and social rights, as well as a condition 
for full membership of a State, the importance of citizenship as a critical element in 
maintaining and promoting identity for members of minority groups in their States of 
residence cannot be overestimated. The case of Estonian and Latvian restrictive 
citizenship laws, which basically ignore the historic and habitual residence of the 
ethnic, linguistic Russians in this regard, provides an opportunity to consider the 
effects of citizenship on the protection of persons belonging to ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minority groups in international law. This issue will be discussed in the 
subsequent chapters of this thesis.
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Chapter IV
The Definitional Question of the Concept of a Minority
1. Introduction
The historical review of the origin of the existence of ethnic, linguistic Russian 
populations in Estonia and Latvia in Chapter 2 clearly illustrates the marginal status of 
being a minority within a State. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the 
definitional question of the concept of a minority in international law. If international 
law is the legal basis for the protection of minority groups in States, the problem of 
identification of persons belonging to such minorities becomes a matter of 
international concern. Without identification of what constitutes the concept of a 
minority, the discussion on the protection of minorities under international law may 
lack effectiveness, as the ambiguities in defining a concept of a minority directly 
impinge on the protection of minorities themselves.1 One can easily imagine a 
situation in which a number of States can deny minority rights by arguing that they do 
not have minorities within their territory by reference to the definition of a minority in 
international law. A study on the definition of a minority is thus a critically important 
task for the substantive and effective protection of persons belonging to minorities 
under international law.
how ever, this does not mean that international protection o f minority groups is not possible in the 
absence of an official definition o f the concept o f a minority; this absence has nevertheless contributed 
to the insufficiency and weakness of the present international protection o f minority rights. The positive 
role o f the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) High Commissioner on 
National Minorities (HCNM) illustrates this point. In the absence o f a formal definition o f the concept 
o f a minority, the Commissioner has preferred a practical approach in defining a minority status. He has 
addressed minority issues regardless o f traditional definitional criteria such as citizenship or historical 
presence in the territory. The HCNM has acted with regard to a variety o f groups, including non­
citizens, for instance, the ethnic Russian stateless persons in Estonia and Latvia. See V. Poleshchuk, 
Advice not welcomed: Recommendations o f  the OSCE High Commissioner to Estonia and Latvia and 
the response (Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick and London, 2001).
2 For example, the French government argued that they could not recognise “the existence o f ethnic 
groups, whether minorities or not.” Thailand found that the translation o f “minority” has “no social and 
cultural connotation whatsoever.” Special Rapporteur F. Capotorti, Study on the Rights o f  Persons 
belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, UN Sub-Commission o f Prevention of  
Discrimination and Protection o f Minorities (New York: United Nations, 1991), p. 13; UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev. 1, UN Sales No. E.78.XIV.1 (1979).
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Despite this fundamental importance, however, the question of how to define the 
concept of a minority has not been solved in a consensual way that is internationally 
binding. There are many reasons for the lack of a legally binding definition of a 
minority, but the most apparent would be the concern of many States in which 
minorities reside that an official recognition of the existence of minorities might have 
a negative impact on national unity and domestic social order. However, this is a 
fundamentally flawed stance that fails to realise the nature of the protection of the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities under international law, because leaving the 
identification of minority status to the arbitrary discretion of States would be nothing 
less than the denial of the protection of minority rights under international law.3 The 
problem of determining minority status to which various minority rights are attached, 
therefore, must be solved by examining relevant international practice and doctrinal 
views, thereby establishing a more precise and desirable definition of a minority for 
the purpose of international law.
This chapter attempts to propose a definition of the concept of a minority through 
investigating the traditional definition4 of a minority. In particular, this chapter will 
highlight the requirement of holding nationality or citizenship of the State of residence 
for receiving minority status as right-holders of minority rights under the traditional 
definition. The Estonian and Latvian governments view their citizenship laws as 
‘justified’ legislative measures derived from the domestic jurisdiction of independent 
States under international law, since regulating citizenship has long been recognised as 
one of the most basic rights of independent nation-States.5 Aside from the recognition 
of Estonian and Latvian discretion to regulate citizenship under international law, it
3 In this sense, the view that defining minority status is not necessary for the protection of minorities 
cannot be accepted as such. Simon, for instance, argues as follows: “Adjudicatory mechanisms could 
help alleviate the harm experienced by innocent minorities. The quests for positive identities, however 
noble in certain contexts, have impeded judicial resolution o f minority problems. A definition demands 
precision. The political reality o f minorities yields not only imprecision but a phenomenon that defies 
clarity. The reality o f how individuals form into minorities dooms any conceptual attempt to impose a 
priori limits on what counts as a minority and what does not. Minorities, by their very nature, create 
issues o f exclusion and inclusion.” Even if he considered the complexity in applying the unified rules of  
minority protection to particular factual situations when he commented on the feasibility o f defining the 
concept of a minority, he seems to have devalued the importance o f minority rights under present 
international law. As long as minority rights are recognised under international standards o f minority 
rights, those who are considered holders o f minority rights must be clarified for the cause o f the 
protection o f minority rights under international law. See T. W. Simon, “Minorities in International 
Law”, Can. J.L. & Juris, Vol., 10, 1997, pp. 519.
4 For the lack o f a better term in referring to the majority view on the definition o f the concept of a 
minority, the ‘traditional definition’ may be ussed for referring to the majority view on the question o f a 
minority.
5 R. Jennings & A. Watts, (eds.), Oppenheim’s International Law (Harlow: Longman, 1992), p. 852.
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should be noted that all disputes on the possibility of human rights violations of the 
ethnic, linguistic Russian populations with reference to ‘citizenship matters’ in Estonia 
and Latvia are basically related to how the concept of a minority is defined for the 
purpose of international law in terms of minority protection. The citizenship 
requirement is controversial in nature because under the traditional definition, even 
those persons who have met objective and subjective constitutive elements for 
receiving minority status, but who are not nationals or citizens of their State of 
residence, are not considered persons belonging to minorities, which means that they 
are not entitled to minority rights under international law.
2. Traditional Definition of a Minority
Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), one of 
the most representative binding legal provisions for minority rights under present 
international law, reads:
"in those states in which ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging 
to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members o f  
their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to 
use their own language."6
Article 27 neither defines its terms nor specifies who is to determine whether a 
minority exists. Although the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities participated in the task of defining the concept of a 
minority at an early stage of its work, the most comprehensive study on minorities was 
done by the Special Rapporteur Capotorti of the UN Sub-Commission. His definition 
of a minority has often been cited in international law. Capotorti’s 1977 study on the 
Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities was made 
for the UN Sub-Commission to provide insights for further development of the 
principles enshrined in Article 27 of the ICCPR. However, it should be noted that his 
definition of a minority has no binding force on the States parties of the United 
Nations, even if it has been widely cited in the literature of international law. Capotorti 
relied on a broad range of material, such as the views of the Permanent Court of
6 Article 27 o f the ICCPR.
7 In 1999, the Economic and Social Council changed its title from Sub-Commission on Prevention of  
Discrimination and Protection o f Minorities to Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of  
Human Rights.
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International Justice (PCIJ), the proposals of the UN Sub-Commission8 and the 
various discussions within the UN Commission on Human Rights. He defines a 
minority group as:
“A group which is numerically inferior to the rest o f the population of a state and in a 
non-dominant position, whose members-being nationals o f the State-possess ethnic, 
religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from those o f the rest o f the population 
and who, if  only implicitly, maintain a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving 
their cultures, tradition, religion or language.”9
The definition suggested by Deschenes in 1985 does not introduce true much of 
novelty. According to his definition, a minority is:
“A group of citizens o f a State, constituting a numerical minority and in a non-dominant 
position in that State, endowed with ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which 
differ from those o f the majority of the population, having a sense o f solidarity with one 
another, motivated, if  only implicitly, by a collective will to survive and whose aim is to 
achieve equality with the majority in fact and in law.”
Thomberry, a leading scholar on the status of minorities in international law, 
predicts “it is doubtful if any international instrument of the future will depart greatly 
from this [Capotorti's] line of approach.”10 It is possible, then, to state that Capotorti’s 
definition within which objective and subjective elements are constituted for the 
concept of a minority may thus be referred to as the ‘traditional definition’ of a 
minority.
From the definition given above, it is generally accepted that a distinction is made 
between objective and subjective elements for defining minority status. The objective 
elements include such features as having ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics 
differing from the rest of the populations, a non-dominant position and holding the 
nationality of the State of residence. Conversely, the subjective element requires that 
the members of a minority group have a strong sense of community and a will to 
preserve and maintain their distinctive characteristics.
This traditional definition of a minority is confirmed by subsequent practice at the 
European level. A number of instruments were adopted and proposed within the 
Council of Europe which evidence continuity of the traditional definition of a minority.
8 The UN Sub-Commission prepared the following guidelines for the definition o f a minority: A)the 
term minority includes only those non-dominant groups in a population which possess and wish to 
preserve stable ethnic, religious or linguistic traditions; B)such minorities should properly include a 
number o f persons sufficient in themselves to develop such characteristics; C) the members o f such 
minorities must be loyal to the State o f which they are nationals. UN Doc. E/CN4/358.
9 Capotorti Study,op.cit., para. 568.
10 P. Thomberry, International Law and the Rights o f  Minorities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991), p.7.
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The concept of a minority essentially designates historical minority groups, namely 
groups which have long acquired a permanent status within a State and whose 
members are ‘citizens’, and desire to preserve their ethno-cultural traits that make 
them markedly different from the rest of the population.11 With this background in 
mind, the next section will examine each element of the concept of a minority based 
on the traditional view from various angles, taking into account the relevant doctrinal 
views on the issue.
2.1. Objective Elements
2 .1 .1 . Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Characteristics of the Group
Recognising ethnic, religious and linguistic characteristics differing from those of the 
rest of the population is considered a crucial factor in distinguishing a minority from 
the rest of the population within a State. It is widely recognised that this is an essential 
element of the definition of a minority in international law. Thus one may naturally 
raise the question why the international protection of minorities restricts the scope of 
its application of protection into the specific category of ‘racial’, ‘ethnic’, ‘religious’ 
or ‘linguistic’ minorities? Are there no other marginalised groups that are equally in 
need of protection with special measures for substantive equality with the rest of the 
population within a State? The answer to this question may be due to the fact that 
special attention for minorities which have ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic 
characteristics has been thought necessary because of past experiences in which these 
characteristics have been often the basis for oppression and discrimination, and even 
so-called ‘ethnic cleansing’. This is also the reason why the current international 
standards of minority rights are discussed in terms of these minorities.
There are a number of diverse views on the exact meaning of ‘racial’ and ‘ethnic’. 
In the League of Nations, the term ‘racial’ was used to identify the minorities for the
1 9provisions relating to minority protection. Although the UN Sub-Commission 
decided in 1950 to replace the term ‘racial’ by ‘ethnic’ in reference to minorities, the
11 For instance, Article 2, paragraph 1, o f the Proposal for a European Convention for the Protection of  
Minorities, adopted on 8 February 1991 by the Venice Commission o f the Council o f Europe; Article 1 
o f the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages o f 1992; Article 1 o f the draft additional 
protocol on the rights o f minorities to the ECHR, adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly o f the 
Council o f Europe in 1993 by Recommendation 1201.
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term of ‘racial’ has not disappeared in the UN documents.13 According to certain 
members of the Sub-Commission, the reason for the change from ‘racial’ to ‘ethnic’ is 
that the term ‘racial’ would not be a scientifically justified standard of distinction. 
However, the term ethnic is broader and includes all biological, cultural and historical 
characteristics. Other authors see ‘ethnic’ groups as being determined by an emotional 
relationship in a certain cultural background while ignoring special physical 
characteristics.14 The 1965 UN International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) is useful in discussing the meaning of 
‘racial’ and ‘ethnic’. The Convention uses a broad view of the term ‘racial’ in Article 
1, which gives a definition of racial discrimination. Article 1 states that:
“In this Convention, the term o f ‘racial discrimination’ shall mean any distinction, 
exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic 
origin...”
It would be quite advisable, in this regard, to use both the expressions ‘racial’ and 
‘ethnic’ to prevent any gaps of meaning in applying the minority protection provision.
Religious and linguistic minorities are often treated together and tend to overlap. 
Eide describes the relationship between religious and linguistic minorities in the 
following way:
“I recognise that we cannot easily separate the ethnic identification from the religious. In 
many cases it is unclear whether a given group is essentially a religious or an ethnic 
community. The self-identification o f a group may focus on its national or ethnic 
character while the Government or State in which it lives may prefer to define it as a 
religious entity.”15
It should be noted that the fact that one is a member of a racial and ethnic minority 
does not necessarily mean that one has an objective tie with the religion or language 
that is connected to that community. In other words, several ‘different ethnic 
minorities’ can be a part of a particular religious or linguistic community. Like the 
term ‘racial’, the term ‘religious’ for the purpose of the concept of a minority is broad. 
Benino, Special Rapporteur of the UN Sub-Commission, concluded that ‘religion and 
belief not only include several theistic beliefs but also other systems of belief like 
agnosticism, atheism, etc.16 In the case of the term ‘linguistic’, it is difficult to
12 Thomberry, International Law and the Rights o f  Minorities, op.cit., p. 159.
13 Capotorti study, op. cit., p. 34. For instance, the General Assembly Resolution 217 c (III) entitled 
‘Fate o f Minorities’ referred to ‘racial’ minorities, not ‘ethnic’ minorities.
14 P.V. Ramaga, “The Bases o f Minority Identity”, HRQ Vol., 14, 1992, p. 417.
15 A. Eide, “Possible Ways and Means o f Facilitating the Peaceful and Constructive Solution o f  
Problems Involving Minorities”, UN Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/43, para.3.
16 E.O. Benito, Elimination o f  all Forms o f  Intolerance and Discrimination based on Religion or Belief 
(New York: United Nations, 1989), paras.2,3.
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determine the precise scope of the ‘language’ for the purpose of a linguistic minority. 
According to several authors’ views, the classification of a linguistic system as a
dialect or language depends on a rather arbitrary standard, taking into account specific
11circumstances in combination with the proportionality principle. Therefore, a 
flexible approach in determining the meaning of the terms of ‘religious’ and 
‘linguistic’ is needed as is the case for ‘racial’ and ‘ethnic’ for the effective protection 
of minority rights.
Unlike Article 27 of the ICCPR and the large majority of UN instruments which 
use the expression ‘ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities’, some instruments, 
including the 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of the Persons belonging to National 
or Ethnic, Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Minorities,18 the 1995 Framework 
Convention of the Protection of National Minorities,19 and the 1960 UNESCO
90 • •Convention Against Discrimination in Education, deal with ‘national’ minorities. 
As a matter of fact, the term ‘national’ has been traditionally used at the European 
level. The term ‘national’ minority has a political dimension which includes ‘national 
self-consciousness’, or ‘political group consciousness’. States have been concerned by 
the possibility that this kind of consciousness could naturally be developed into 
political aspiration for independence. As Ermacora aptly pointed out, “the protection 
of national minorities is always closely linked to the issue of the territorial integrity of 
states.”21 This does not mean, however, that there is a consensus over the meaning of 
the term ‘national’. The various European reports on the issue within the framework of 
the Council of Europe acknowledged that no concrete and conclusive answer is 
possible. Some authors have argued that the term of ‘national minority’ should be 
understood as including ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities.22
The above analysis indicates that it is difficult to define accurately the terms 
‘racial’, ‘ethnic’, ‘religious’, ‘national’ and ‘linguistic’ as minority adjectives. 
However, the desirable solution to this difficulty would be to use the expressions 
simultaneously, depending on given minority situations. The merit of this approach is 
that such combination use would be that the widest category of persons can invoke
17 M. Tabory, “Language Rights as Human Rights”, Israel YB. H.R., Vol., 10, 1980, p.188.
18 A/47/135.
1934 ILM 351.
20429 UNTS 93.
21 F. Ermacora, “The Protection o f Minorities before the United Nations”, Recueil des Cours, 1983, 
p.295.
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23their relevant minority rights under international law.
2.1. 2. Numerical Inferiority
Setting an absolute percentage that can be used as a numerical factor in the definition 
of a minority is not easy. The prevailing stance on this factor is also a pragmatic 
approach. Capotorti noted that:
“In principle, even quite a small group has the right to claim the protection provided for 
in article 27, to the extent to which it seems reasonable to expect the state to introduce 
special measures o f protection.”24
However, there seems to be a measure of agreement that order to be a minority, a 
group must be of a certain number that need not be large (e.g., the people of micro 
States), but must be more than a mere association of individuals within a State,25 
because the size of the population in question may have influence on the special 
measures of the government concerned for the protection of minority rights.
2.1. 3. Non-Dominant Position
A non-dominant position is generally considered one of the essential components of 
the concept of a minority. The need to protect minorities is the natural and logical 
result of their vulnerable, weak and non-dominant position in the society in which they 
live.26 Yet, as the word ‘non-dominance’ has a multi-dimensional meaning, it needs to 
be approached separately depending on each circumstance. The European definition of 
a minority provides a clue on this issue. The European Commission for Democracy 
through Law, which was established in 1990 by Resolution (90) 6 of the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe, has suggested a definition of the concept of a
97minority as a proposal for a European Convention for the Protection of Minorities. 
Under Article 2 in the proposal, a minority is understood as follows:
22 M. Tabory, “Minority rights in the CSCE context”, in Y. Disnstein & M. Tabory (eds.), The 
Protection o f  Minorities and Human Rights (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992), pp. 187-196.
23 Except where otherwise indicated in this thesis, a minority means national, ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minority.
24 Capotorti study, op. cit., p. 12.
25 J.Packer, “On the Definition o f Minorities”, in J.Packer & K. Myntti (eds.), The Protection o f  Ethnic 
and Linguistic Minorities in Europe (Abo/ Turku: Abo Akademi University Press, 1993), p. 48.
26 Capotorti study, op.cit,, p. 12 , p. 96.
27 European Commission for Democracy through Law, CDL (91) 7, 4 March 1991
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“ a. For the purpose o f this Convention, the term “minority” shall mean a group which is 
smaller in number than the rest o f the population o f a state, whose members, who are 
nationals of that State, have ethnical, religious or linguistic features different from the 
those o f the rest o f the population and are guided by the will to safeguard their culture, 
traditions, religion or language, b. Any group coming within the terms o f this definition 
shall be treated as an ethnic, religious or linguistic minority, c. To belong to a national 
minority shall be a matter of individual choice and no disadvantage may arise from the 
exercise o f such choice.”
This definition appears to have followed the Capotorti’s view in general, but is slightly 
different from it in that there is no requirement of non-dominance of a minority within 
a State. In a modem plural society, several ethnic, religious or linguistic groups could 
be regarded as minorities. It seems that the non-dominant position does not necessarily 
imply being oppressed or subordinated. Furthermore, as to the domains in which there 
can be dominance, not only political power relations but also the minority’s economic 
and social or cultural status must be considered.28
2.1. 4. State’s Official Recognition
As will be observed in Chapter 5, whether or not a State has recognised the existence 
of ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities within its territory is irrelevant to its 
obligation to protect the rights of such persons under present international law. In 
other words, the existence of minorities in a given State does not depend upon 
recognition of it by the State, but instead is to be determined on the basis of objective 
criteria. This principle has been confirmed in the views of the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) in the renowned case Lovelace v. Canada,29 and its General 
Comment.30 The HRC held the view in the Lovelace v. Canada Case that a State’s 
recognition is not a decisive element for determining whether or not someone belongs 
to a minority. This principle was already enunciated in the Greco-Bulgarian 
Communities Case by the PCIJ as follows: “existence of communities is a fact, and 
not... of law.”31
2.1. 5. Nationality of the State of residence
28 P.V. Ramaga, “Relativity o f the Minority Concept”, HRQ„ Vol., 14, 1992, p. 114.
29 Lovelace v Canada, HRC Communication No 24/1977, UN Doc/A36/40, paras. 166-172.
30 General Comment No. 23, UN. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.5 (1994), reprinted in 15 H R U  234 
(1994), p. 235.
31 Greco-Bulgarian Communities Case, PCIJ Series A/B, No. 17, 1930, p. 22.
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Whether being a national or citizen of one’s State of residence is a prerequisite for 
minority status appears to be the most disputed criterion in the discussion on the 
definition of the concept of a minority in present international law. From a practical 
point of view, too, this requirement is critical, because depending on the stance of the 
interpretation of the nationality requirement in identifying a minority status as the 
holder of minority rights, the scope of minority protection itself could differ 
fundamentally.
One may ask the question whether the protection of minorities must be exclusively 
reserved for ‘citizens’ whose ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation is different from 
that of the majority, or for other persons who belong to a different category, such as 
foreigners, stateless persons, or permanent residents. If minorities are identical to 
citizens of the State of residence, it logically follows that minority rights are 
essentially the citizens’ rights. Thus, the question of whether the holding of citizenship 
of the State of residence is a required element for minority status has a direct impact 
on the protection of minority rights in general, since there is a possibility that States 
can ignore the existence of minorities arbitrarily in the form of the enactment of 
domestic legislature, arguing that persons belonging to the group in question are not 
citizens according to its internal laws. This requires more detailed analysis about the 
nationality or citizenship requirement in constructing minority status in international 
law. A separate section of this chapter will discuss this requirement in detail.
2. 2. Subjective Element of the Definition of a Minority
The PCIJ in 1930 gave an elaborate description of the subjective factor in the concept 
of a minority through the Greco-Bulgarian Communities Case. By way of interpreting 
the concept of ‘communities’ used in the Greco-Bulgarian Treaty of 1919, the Court 
explained the meaning of community taking note of the minoritarian character of the 
concept of communities within a State. According to the definition of the Court, a 
‘community’ is:
“A group o f persons living in a given country or locality, having a race, religion, 
language and traditions o f their own and united by this identity o f race, religion, language 
and traditions in a sentiment of solidarity, with a view to preserving their traditions, 
maintaining their form of worship, ensuring the instruction and upbringing o f their 
children in accordance with the spirit and traditions o f their race and rendering mutual 
assistance to each other.”32
32 Ibid., p. 33.
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Ermacora also explains the critical aspect of the subjective element for determining 
a minority status in the following terms:
“Those groups who are indifferent as to the problems o f assimilation lose their interest to 
be protected as such and therefore they lose the qualification to be considered a minority 
in the sense o f international law.”33
Capotorti takes the same position, stating that “a group cannot have an identity 
throughout history if its members have no wish to help preserving it.”34 Thus, the 
existence of a minority group is questioned if that group is not conscious of itself as a 
distinct group, even if the objective requirements of differing from the rest of the 
population within a State are met. Without “a sentiment of solidarity” for preserving 
cultural identity, a group of persons cannot be called a minority.
Apart from accepting a subjective factor as one of the constitutive elements for 
receiving minority status, it is not clear how such a subjective factor should be 
identified. This is an important question from a practical point of view, because the 
States concerned can easily abuse this factor arbitrarily, arguing that they cannot 
identify the will of the minority groups to preserve their characteristics. It is 
persuasively argued that not too much emphasis should be put on the explicit 
expression of subjective expression from a minority group. It is quite advisable that 
determination of the subjective element should be made on the basis of ‘case by case’ 
approach, since one could imagine a situation that the members of a minority accept 
the status quo by the official policy of forced assimilation and a highly oppressed 
atmosphere by their State of residence so that opposing voices cannot be heard. Under 
these circumstances, ‘silence’ may be implied as being the expression of their will to 
preserve their characteristics. Eide’s remark, in this sense, seems quite pertinent:
“The presence or absence of will was closely linked to the policy o f the State in relation 
to minorities. In countries with strong assimilationist policies, for example, the will o f the 
minority to preserve its identity would obviously be less evident than in countries where 
minorities were granted a space to manifest their characteristics.”35
It would be, therefore, appropriate to deal with this subjective element in a balanced 
way in the discussion of the concept of a minority by retaining the requirement while 
allowing for implicit ways of demonstrating the will to preserve distinctive 
characteristics of a minority. Accordingly, depending on a given situation, the mere 
‘continued existence’ of a minority group can be regarded as relevant proof of being a
33 Ermacora, The Protection o f  Minorities before the United Nations, op. cit., p. 300.
34 Capotorti study, op.cit., p. 12.
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minority within a State.
2. 3. Traditional Definition of a Minority and Controversial Aspect of the 
Nationality Requirement in Defining Minority Status
The traditional definition of a minority can be summarised in the following way. The 
one criterion for identifying minority status is the subjective self-perception of the 
group as being distinct from the majority, and the desire of the individual members of 
the group to identify themselves as a group. This self-perception, while critical, is not 
sufficient to constitute a minority. A minority, at the same time, must fulfil another 
criterion, which is the existence of objective characteristics which distinguish the 
group from the rest of the population within their State of residence. Examples of such 
characteristics include ethnicity, language and religion.
Even though the traditional definition of a minority has not been incorporated into 
a specific provision in the international instruments regarding the protection of 
minority rights in a binding way, it seems valid on the whole in describing features of 
minority status as the holder of minority rights under international law.
However, the traditional definition has a fundamental defect in its requirement of 
‘holding the citizenship of the State of residence’ for receiving minority status, since it 
has been based on the premise that ‘minorities’ are identical to ‘citizens’ of the State 
of residence. The requirement of holding citizenship also seems to be logically 
inconsistent, because the demand for the existence of the objective elements of having 
recognisable ethnic, religious and linguistic characteristics assumes long-term 
residence in the territory of the States in which the minorities reside. Yet, as the 
criterion for receiving citizen status is open to abuse by States’ discretion in the 
language of citizenship laws, it is possible for the States concerned to exclude some 
particular ethnic, religious or linguistic groups from the category of ‘minorities’ as the 
holders of minority rights at the domestic legal level. As there is no guarantee that the 
criterion for citizenship is in harmony with full recognition of the existence of ethnic, 
religious or linguistic groups as protected minorities, demanding the holding of 
citizenship of the State of residence could likely result in offsetting the significance of 
the objective elements of the existence of minority groups in a State.
35 UN Working Group on Minorities, Report on its Third Session, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/18, 
para. 22.
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Is it justified to argue that persons who have met all objective elements with a 
firmly subjective desire to maintain their ethnic, religious or linguistic identity can be 
denied minority status, simply because the demand of holding citizenship of their 
State of residence has not been met? Given that citizenship is one of the most basic 
elements in exercising various rights at the domestic legal level, should not the 
demand of holding citizenship of the State of residence for the determination of 
minority status be contrary to the idea of the protection o f human rights?
In this regard, the existence of the ethnic Russian stateless persons or non-citizens 
in Estonia and Latvia, due to restrictive citizenship laws under which the fact of their 
historical residence in the territories of what are now Estonia and Latvia during the 
Soviet period was denied, clearly illustrates the controversial nature of the nationality 
requirement in the definition of a minority. Estonia, for instance, cites its Law on the 
Cultural Autonomy of National minorities as a legal justification for their argument 
that they are protecting minority rights at the domestic legal level. However, to be a 
minority as the holder of minority rights under this law, holding citizenship of Estonia 
is required, along with the requirement of “long-standing ties” with the territory of 
Estonia.36 This provision clearly demonstrates the contradictory nature of the 
traditional definition of a minority in its requirement for holding citizenship of the 
State of residence. As the nationality requirement essentially grants Estonia the 
arbitrary discretion to decide if the ethnic, linguistic Russians in Estonia constitute a 
minority in the form of citizenship without reference to their other objective elements 
of the definition of a minority, it seems patently unfair.
3. The Polish Nationality Case and the Nationality Requirement for 
the Definition of a Minority
? 7The review of the Polish Nationality Case before the PCU reveals that citizenship 
was a critical and delicate matter with respect to the protection of persons belonging to 
minorities during the League of Nations period. Although it is difficult to generalise 
about the system of minority protection under the League period because each 
minority protection treaty reflected different situations in each State, the Polish
36Article 1 o f the Law on Cultural Autonomy o f National Minorities, RT I, No. 71, 1993. Unofficial 
English translation from the Estonian Language Translation Centre.
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Nationality Case can provide a useful reference for the matter of nationality in relation 
to the definitional question of a minority.
3.1. Conflicting Aspect of Article 91 of the Versailles Treaty
Article 91 of the Versailles Treaty, concerning the territories transferred from German 
to Polish sovereignty provides that:
“[I.] German nationals habitually resident in territories recognised as forming part o f  
Poland will acquire Polish nationality ipso facto  and will lose their German nationality.”39
This paragraph enshrined the rule that citizenship follows cession. It assumed that 
German nationals were ‘nationals’ in both the ethnic and State senses, and 
automatically underwent a change of citizenship by virtue of the territorial cession to 
Poland. Article 91 also recognised the right of options to nationality in the following 
manner:
“[3.] Within a period o f two years after the coming into force o f the present Treaty, 
German nationals over 18 years o f age habitually resident in any o f the territories 
recognised as forming part o f Poland will be entitled to opt for German nationality.”40
Poland was given the discretion to refuse citizenship to certain residents of the 
newly Polish territory:
“[2.] German nationals, however, or their descendants who became resident in these 
territories after January 1, 1908, will not acquire Polish nationality without a special 
authorisation from the state.”41
This provision was clearly directed against ‘German nationals’ in both the ethnic 
senses. The recent date of arrival of such Germans in the newly Polish territory raised 
the suspicion that their presence was due to the Prussian policy of germanising 
Poland.42 Article 91(2) thus augmented Poland's sovereign power in an obvious way.
Article 91 (2) was thus a symbolic provision in which the drafters of the peace 
settlement seemed to be guided by conflicting concepts of a minority within a State. 
Article 91 embodied the rule that citizenship follows territory, as well as the
37Acquisition o f  Polish Nationality Case, PCIJ Series B, No. 7, 1923.
38 N. Berman, “But the alternative is despair: European Nationalism and the Modernist Renewal of  
International Law”, Harv. L. Rev., Vol., 106, 1993, pp. 1792-1903.
39 Treaty o f Versailles, art. 91, 225 Consol. T.S. 188, p. 240.
40Ibid.
41 Treaty o f  Versailles, op,cit., art. 91, p. 240.
42 See Speech by Sir Ernest Pollock, German Settlers in Poland  1923 PCIJ Series C, No. 3, pp.496-498 
(Aug. 3) (citing the statute). The statute's first article declared that its purpose was "strengthening the 
German element.. .against Polish endeavors (or strivings).. .by settling German peasants and workmen." 
Ibid. p. 499.
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modifications of that rule. Each of these modifications reflected inherent difficulties in 
defining the concept of a minority group in harmony with State ‘territorial’ 
sovereignty. Article 91 also illustrates that the matter of nationality was the most 
delicate and difficult aspect in defining the concept of a minority.
3. 2. The PC IJ’s Polish Nationality Case
The Advisory Opinion requested of the PCU by the League Council in the Polish 
Nationality Case concerned the recognition of citizenship of the minorities of non- 
Polish origin. The interpretation of Article 4(1) of the Polish Minorities Treaty was 
one of the major concerns.43 That Article extended Article 91 of the Versailles Treaty 
by requiring that Polish citizenship be granted even to certain persons not resident in 
Poland at the time of the coming into force of the treaty. Article 4(1) provides that:
“Poland admits and declares to be Polish nationals ipso facto  and without the requirement 
of any formality persons o f German, Austrian, Hungarian or Russian nationality who 
were bom in the said territory o f parents habitually resident there, even if  at the date of 
the coming into force o f the present Treaty they are not themselves habitually resident 
there.”44
The ambiguity concerned the requirement that the parents be “habitually resident” 
in Poland. According to Poland, the parents had to reside in Poland at the time of the 
coming into force of the Treaty.45 According to Germany, whose German minorities 
had resided in territory now belonging to Poland, such residence was required only at 
the time of the birth of the children now seeking Polish citizenship.46 Before turning 
to the substance, however, the Court had to decide whether disputes over the 
acquisition of Polish citizenship were included in the international guarantee 
embodied in Article 12. Article 12 of the Polish Treaty provides that:
“Poland agrees that the stipulations in the foregoing Articles, so far as they affect persons 
belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, constitute obligations of 
international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee o f the League o f Nations.”47
Poland argued that Article 12's guarantees for “persons belonging to minorities” 
could not apply to provisions concerning the granting of Polish citizenship to former
43 Minorities Treaty Between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland, 225 Consol. T.S. 
412.
44 Ibid., art. 4, pp. 416-17.
45Acquisition o f  Polish Nationality Case, op.cit., p.7.
46 Discours Prononce de M. Schiffer (Ger.), Ibid., p.783, pp.798-805.
47 The Treaty o f  Poland, op.cit., art. 12, pp. 418-19.
102
German citizens.48 For Poland, the term “minority” could only refer to a group of 
Polish citizens constituting a minority as opposed to non-Polish citizens.49 The 
international guarantee, therefore, did not apply to the citizenship provisions of the 
Treaty: prior to their acquisition of Polish citizenship, persons inhabiting Polish 
territory could not be viewed as belonging to a “minority” within Polish society. 
According to Poland, the treaties must be strictly construed, because of their 
derogation from a cardinal principle of the respect of State sovereignty. The Polish 
position is illustrated in the following terms:
“This Treaty. .  . falls outside the orbit o f the general sphere of international law [un traite 
exorbitant du droit commun], in that it contains . . . provisions whereby Poland binds 
herself. . .  to treat a certain category o f her own nationals in a certain way.”50
Poland rejected the concept of ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities within an 
international legal framework, rather the identity of such groups must be structured 
and recognised by a sovereign State.51
The Court's position, however, reflected a far different interpretation. The Court 
focused on the significance of the simultaneity of the genesis of Poland and of its 
obligations under the treaty:
“The first question...is what must be understood by a minority...in the present case a 
German minority-within the meaning of the Polish Minorities Treaty. In order to reply to 
this question it is necessary to bear in mind the conditions under which the Minorities 
Treaty was concluded and the relations existing between that Treaty and the Treaty o f  
Peace which was signed on the same day...Poland...at the moment o f her final 
recognition as an independent state and o f the delimitation o f her frontiers, signed 
provisions which establish a right to Polish nationality, and these provisions, in so far as 
they are inserted in the Minorities Treaty, are recognized by Poland as fundamental laws 
with which no law, regulation or official action may conflict or interfere.”52
Hence, the Court did not view the treaties’ terms as limited to the State-centered 
definition of ‘Poland’ and its ‘majority’ and ‘minority’. Both Article 93 of the Peace 
Treaty and the preamble to the Minorities Treaty refer to Poland's agreement to protect 
those ‘inhabitants’ who composed a racial, linguistic, or religious minority - and not 
merely Polish ‘citizens’ so defined.53 The Court noted that these clauses considerably
48 Acquisition o f  Polish Nationality Case, op.cit., p. 13.
49 Ibid.
50 Discours Prononce par M. Le Comte Michel Rostworowski (Pol.), German Settlers Case in Poland 
(PCIJSeries C, No. 3), op.cit., p. 419, p. 420, translated in ibid.,, p. 458, p. 459
51 Discours Prononce par M. Le Comte Rostworowski (Pol.) in the Acquisition o f  Polish Nationality, 
op.cit., pp. 753-756, translated in ibid., pp.768-771.
Ibid., pp. 13-16 (citing Polish Minorities Protection Treaty, art. 1).
53 Treaty o f  Versailles, op.cit., art. 93 (“Poland accepts and agrees to embody in a Treaty with the 
Principal Allied and Associated Powers such provisions as may be deemed necessary by the said 
Powers to protect the inhabitants o f Poland who differ from the majority o f the population in race,
103
extended the concept of a minority and population, since they alluded on one hand to 
the inhabitants of the territory over which Poland had assumed sovereignty and on the 
other hand to inhabitants who differed from the majority of the population in race, 
language and religion.54 For the Court, an international legal community charged with 
the restructuring of Central Europe according to new, far-reaching principles could 
define the concept of a minority without reference to existing sovereign legal systems.
Turning to the substance of the dispute, Poland asserted that its sovereign 
obligations had to be construed in light of the “nationalness” of the Polish State; in 
effect, it contended that the recognition of States’ power to regulate nationality in 
international law requires a heightened deference to the sovereignty of nation States. 
Poland contended that non-resident individuals bom in Poland should only be allowed 
to acquire Polish citizenship if their parents were “habitually resident” in Poland at the 
time of the coming into force of the Treaty.55 Poland asserted that this extraordinary 
requirement was necessary to protect the “Polishness” of the new State, due to the 
ethnically denationalising effects of German control over Poland; it urged the Court to 
recall the countless army of ethnic Germans who had moved to Poland during more 
than a century of Prussian rule.56 Article 4’s ambiguity must, therefore, be interpreted 
in the most restricted way possible. In the closely related German Settlers Case, 
Poland had argued that its policy of ‘de-germanization’ was sanctioned by certain 
provisions of the Peace Treaty; in particular, it cited Article 91(2), the provision
cn
allowing it to refuse citizenship to Germans who had settled after 1908.
The Court rejected the Polish contention.58 The Court held that the disputed clause 
of Article 4 clearly referred to the “habitual residence” of the parents only at the time 
of the birth of the person in question.59 It declared that this combination of the criteria 
of origin and domicile provided the individual with a moral link to Polish territory that 
required that he or she be granted Polish citizenship.60
The collapse of the imperial States in which diverse ethnic groups resided after the
language or religion.”), p. 242; Polish Minorities Protection Treaty, op.cit„ preamble, p. 413 
(“Poland . . . desir[es] to . . . give a sure guarantee to the inhabitants o f the territory over which she has 
assumed sovereignty.”).
54 Acquisition o f  Polish Nationality Case, op.cit., p. 14
55 Ibid.
56 Discours Prononce par M. Le Comte Rostworowski (Pol.), German Settlers Case in Poland (PCIJ 
Series C, No. 3), op.cit., p.753, pp.763-764, translated in ibid., p. 768, pp. 778-79.
57 Ibid., p. 37.
58 Acquisition o f  Polish Nationality Case, op.cit., p. 17.
59 Ibid., p. 14.
60 Ibid., p. 18.
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end of the World War I did not give way to a transparent new order based on ethnicity. 
On the contrary, the old order gave way to a complex situation marked by a tangle of 
national and State identities, a situation that called for increased international authority. 
The Court explained that it was precisely the complexity of the post-war situation that 
justified heightened international competence over the citizenship issue in the context 
of the protection of ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities. The Court made the 
following statement that:
“one o f the first problems which presented itself in connection with the protection o f  
minorities was that o f preventing [... new States, ... which, as a result o f the war, have had 
their territory considerably enlarged, and whose population was not therefore clearly 
defined from the standpoint o f political allegiance] from refusing their nationality, on 
racial, religious or linguistic grounds, to certain categories o f persons, in spite o f the link 
which effectively attached them to the territory allocated to one or other o f these 
States.”61
The approach of the PCU toward the construction of a nation-State and its 
population gives critical reference to the question of the concept of a minority in 
relation to the nationality requirement of the State of residence. It seems that the Court 
gave more priority for the protection of the existing ethnic, religious or linguistic 
groups within territorial States over the recognition of the States’ discretion to regulate 
citizenship. The PCIJ’s following statement confirms this priority:
“The term o f minority seems to include inhabitants who differ from the population in race, 
language or religion, that is to say, amongst other inhabitants o f the territory o f non- 
Polish origin, whether they are Polish nationals or not.”62
The PCIJ’s approach to the concept of a minority in this case vividly indicates that 
the definition of the concept of a minority must be understood broadly in a way to 
embrace ethnic, religious or linguistic groups as protected minorities, irrespective of 
whether they are ‘nationals’ or ‘citizens’ of their State of residence in such a way that 
minority protection can be effective and meaningful within the domestic legal order.
4. A Recent Development of the Discussion in the Problem of 
Definition of a Minority with regard to the Nationality Requirement
4.1. United Nations
First of all, note should be taken of the wording in Article 27 of the ICCPR as
61 Ibid., p. 15.
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“persons belonging to...minorities.” The holder of minority rights recognised under 
Article 27 cannot be restricted to ‘nationals’, because it refers to ‘persons’ not 
nationals or citizens. Moreover, all member States have an obligation to secure the 
conventional rights for ‘all persons’ under their jurisdiction without distinction as to 
nationality under Article 2 (1) of the ICCPR. Since Article 2 (1) is a type of general 
rule, exceptional provisions should be made explicitly as in Article 25, which is 
related to political right of citizens. However, Article just refers to “persons belonging 
to minorities...” It is interesting to note that the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Minorities 
(The UN Declaration on Minority Rights) also does not restrict minority rights to 
citizens. Unlike Article 27 of the ICCPR, the Declaration on Minority Rights does not 
refer to minorities “in those states” which was designed to restrict its application to 
historic or ‘old minorities’. This matter was sharply debated during the Declaration’s 
drafting process. In contrast to Germany’s restrictive reading confining the 
Declaration’s application to ‘State citizens’, Nigeria contemplated that the Declaration 
addressed the question relating to the “public intolerance of immigrants, including 
refugees” and “widespread xenophobia” directed against foreigners.63 It seems that 
the UN Declaration relates the status of minority to the base of residence. Article 1(1) 
of the Declaration provides that:
“States shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and 
linguistic identity o f minorities 'within their respective territories’. . .”64 (Emphasis 
added.)
The Human Rights Committee (HRC) under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR 
through its General Comments has presented a very broad concept of a minority, 
embracing non-citizens in the category of a minority. This is a profound development 
in terms of the new construction of the definition of a minority, particularly given that 
HRC is in a position to represent UN practice in some parts. The HRC’s General 
Comment on Article 27 states unequivocally as follows:
“The terms used in article 27 indicate that the persons designed to be protected are those 
who belong to a group and who share in common a culture, a religion and/or a language.
Those terms also indicate that the individuals designed to be protected need not be 
citizens o f the State party... A State party may not, therefore, restrict the rights under 
article 27 to citizens alone.”65
62 Ibid.
63 E/CN.4/1992/SR. 19, paras. 34-35.
64 Article 1 (1) o f the UN Declaration on Minority Rights.
65 HRC General Comment 23, Article 27, UN Doc.HRI\GEN\l\Rev.l at 38 (1994), paras., 5-1.
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The HRC’s view seems basically to have followed the subjective and objective 
criteria by the traditional definition of a minority, but it is a new version in that it does 
not require the holding of citizenship of the State of residence in identifying a minority 
status. Furthermore, the HRC held the view on the status of a minority in relation to 
the positions of aliens protected under the ICCPR:
“...In those cases where aliens constitute a minority within the meaning o f article 27, 
they shall not be denied the right, in community with other members o f their group, to 
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion and to use their own 
language. Aliens are entitled to equal protection by the law. There shall be no 
discrimination between aliens and citizens in the application o f these rights. These rights 
of aliens may be qualified only by such limitations as may be lawfully imposed under the 
Covenant.”6
In this context, an attempt to define a concept of a minority for international law made 
by Special Rapporteur Eide of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, indicates the United Nations approach to 
the concept of a minority, which is not limited to citizens of the State concerned. He 
defines a minority as follows:
“For the purpose o f this study, a minority is any group o f persons resident within a 
sovereign State which constitutes less than half the population o f the national society and 
whose members share common characteristics o f an ethnic, religious or linguistic nature 
that distinguish them from the rest o f the population.”67
It is critical to note that Eide has effectively replaced the nationality criterion with the 
standard of place of residence. The populations whose members share common 
characteristics of an ethnic, religious or linguistic nature and have resided in the 
territory of the States concerned are the critical indicators for identifying a minority 
status. If this is the case, it will be more cogent to focus on whether the members of a 
minority group have ‘durable ties’ with the State in which they live. This requirement 
is present in the preparatory work of Article 27 and is expressed in the word ‘exist’ in 
that Article.
The General Comment of the HRC on Article 27 reflects a broad approach in this 
sense. The Committee does not only reject the nationality criterion but also proclaims 
that the length of the residence in the State is irrelevant and that therefore immigrants 
and even visitors could qualify as minorities in the sense of Article 27, depending on 
other factors. The HRC made the statement that:
“Article 27 confers rights on persons belonging to minorities which "exist" in a State 
party. Given the nature and scope o f the rights envisaged under that article, it is not
66 HRC General Comment 15, UN Doc. HRI\GEN\l\Rev.l at 18 (1994), paras.7.
67 A. Eide, “Possible Ways and Means o f Facilitating the Peaceful and Constructive Solution of 
Problems Involving Minorities”, E/CN4/Sub2/1993/34 (1993), p. 7.
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relevant to determine the degree o f permanence that the term "exist" connotes. Those 
rights simply are that individuals belonging to those minorities should not be denied the 
right, in community with members o f their group, to enjoy their own culture, to practise 
their religion and speak their language. Just as they need not be nationals or citizens, they 
need not be permanent residents. Thus, migrant workers or even visitors in a State party 
constituting such minorities are entitled not to be denied the exercise o f those rights.”68
Although the inclusion of visitors in the category of a minority is unrealistic and 
difficult to defend, a broad approach to the category o f a minority is evident and is 
desirable as it will be conducive to the effective protection of persons belonging to 
minorities within a State. The point is that a factual and flexible approach to the 
concept of a minority under which factual aspects of minority, such as long-lasting and 
habitual residence of existing ethnic, religious or linguistic groups are noted, seems to 
be prevalent in recent UN practice.
4. 2. European Level
Firstly, the Ad hoc Committee for the Protection of National Minorities (CAHMIN)’s 
proposal for the definition of a minority needs to be noted.69 The CAHMIN 
formulated a Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
(FCNM).70 On the matters of the definition of the concept of a minority, the 
Explanatory Report71 to the FCNM made an important remark orientated to a flexible 
approach to the question of the concept of a minority, having explained the reason for 
the absence of the definition of a minority in the FCNM. It was explained that the 
position of not having a definitional provision of the concept of a minority was 
adopted, because it was impossible to formulate a definition of a minority that could 
be approved by all the member States of the Council of Europe.
However, it can be argued that the CAHMIN intended to leave the definitional 
question of a minority to constant interpretation of minority rights and the 
development of State practice on the protection of minority groups in Europe. What is 
certain is that the FCNM does not require the holding of citizenship of the State of 
residence for the identification of a minority in terms of literal context. The omission 
of having a nationality criterion for the purpose of defining a minority may arguably
68 UN Doc. HRI\GEN\l\Rev. 1, at 38, 1994.
69 CAHMIN is the ad hoc committee which was given a mandate by the Council o f  Ministers.
70 ETS 157 (1994). The Framework Convention entered into force on 1 February 1998.
71 The Framework Convention together with its Explanatory Report have been published as Document 
H (95) 10, February 1995 and intfRLJ, 1995, Vol.,16, No. 1-3, pp. 92-115.
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lead to the proposition that the FCNM shall be applied to ‘all persons’ living in the
79territory of States parties who have objective as well as subjective elements for 
receiving minority status. Furthermore, the jurisprudence of minority rights under the 
FCNM seems to indicate that the citizenship criterion is not relevant.
The beneficiaries of the provisions of the FCNM are “persons belonging to national 
minorities”. In the absence of a definition in the text, the Advisory Committee under 
the FCNM has accepted that States parties enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in 
defining the scope of application of the FCNM in order to take the specific 
circumstances prevailing in their country into account. However, it is important to 
note that this margin of appreciation must be exercised in accordance with the general 
principles of international law and those recognised in the FCNM, and it should not be 
a source of arbitrary or unjustified distinctions.73 Article 5 (1) of the FCNM refers to 
the essential elements of the identity of persons belonging to national minorities, 
namely their religion, language, traditions and cultural heritage. The provision lists the 
essential elements of the identity of a national minority. Upon signing the FCNM, a 
number of States parties issued declarations on its scope of application.74 Some of 
these simply identify the relevant beneficiaries of the provisions, i.e. the States parties’ 
national minority groups. The declarations by Austria, Estonia and Switzerland 
consider that the term national minority applies to those ethnic, religious or linguistic 
groups that can point to long-standing, firm and lasting ties with the relevant State 
party, and whose members are citizens of the State.75 The declaration by Austria 
defined national minorities as “those groups which come within the scope of 
application of the Law on Ethnic Groups...and which live and traditionally have had 
their home in parts of the territory of the Republic of Austria and which are composed 
of Austrian citizens with non-German mother tongues and with their own ethnic
72 The discussion on objective as well as subjective components for the definition o f the concept o f a 
minority at the UN level is also applied to the European level o f definition.
73 Opinion on Albania, ACFC/INF/OPI (2003), para. 18.
74 On the legal status o f the declarations o f States parties to the FCNM, see M. Telalian, “Europe 
Framework Convention for the Protection o f National Minorities and its personal scope o f application”, 
In G. Alfredsson and M. Stvropoulou (eds.), Justice pending: indigenous peoples and other causes (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), p. 117, pp. 127-132.
75 On the requirement o f citizenship, see also the declarations by Germany (Opinion on Germany, 
ACFC/INF/OPI (2002)008, para. 13, the declaration by Germany provides that the provisions of the 
FCNM will apply with respect to the ‘the Dane o f German citizenship and members o f the ethnic 
groups traditionally resident in Germany, the Frisians o f German citizenship and the Sinti and Roma o f  
German citizenship’, Opinion on Germany, para. 12; Poland (Opinion on Poland, ACFC/INF/OP/I 
(2004)005, para. 15).
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cultures.”76 Estonia referred to the following criteria: citizens of Estonia who reside 
on the territory of Estonia; maintain long-standing, firm and lasting ties with Estonia; 
are distinct from Estonians on the basis of their ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic 
characteristics; and are motivated by a concern to preserve together their cultural 
traditions, their religion or their language, which constitute the basis of their common 
identity.77
However, citizenship may not, by itself, constitute the basis for excluding a group 
of persons from the scope of application of the FCNM. The exclusion of persons who 
would otherwise fall under its scope of application on the basis that they are not 
citizens may be interpreted as being incompatible with the objects and purposes of the 
FCNM. The Advisory Committee has called on Estonia to “re-examine its approach 
reflected in the declarations in consultation with those concerned and consider the 
inclusion of additional persons belonging to minorities, particular non-citizens, in the
78application of the FCNM.” It seems possible to state that ethnic, cultural, religious 
or linguistic communities that have enjoyed a historical presence in a State party may 
not be denied their right to recognition as national minorities under the FCNM.
Secondly, perhaps the most important clue in the definitional question within the 
Council of Europe may be found in the Strasbourg mechanism of the individual
70complaint before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). As for the standing 
for an individual petition before the Court, there is no legal obstacle for members of a 
minority who are not citizens of their State of residence to use the Strasbourg 
mechanism for the protection of their minority rights. Article 14 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on 
Human Rights),80 which refers to ‘minority’, declares the non-discrimination 
principle. According to the ECHR, to treat any person, nongovernmental organization 
or group of individuals in a discriminatory fashion with respect to one of the listed
76 Opinion on Austria, ACFC/INF/OPI (2002), para. 12.
77Opinion on Estonia, ACFC/INF/OPI (2002), para. 13.
78 Opinion on Estonia (2002), para. 18. See, also declaration by the Russian Federation “attempts to 
exclude from its scope...persons who permanently reside in the territory o f States Parties...and who 
previously had a citizenship but have been arbitrarily deprived o f it. This contradicts the purpose of the 
FCNM,” Opinion on Russian Federation, ACFC/INF/OPI (2003)005, footnote at para. 20.
79 G. Gilbert, “The Burgeoning Minority Rights Jurisprudence o f the European Court o f Human 
Rights”, HRQ, Vol., 24, 2002, pp. 736-780. See also Chapter 6 below, pp. 180-192.
80 ETS, No. 5. Article 14 o f the European Convention on Human Rights provides that “The enjoyment 
o f rights and freedom set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any 
ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”
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grounds in Article 14 without reasonable and objective justification is contrary to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).81 The citizenship of the applicant is 
not a precondition for the individual petition before the Court.
Lastly, the practices on the protection of the rights of minorities within the 
framework of the Organisation of the Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 
provide a reference to the definitional question on minorities with respect to the 
nationality requirement. The Final Act, like other Concluding Documents of any 
OSCE meetings, does not contain an official definition of the concept of a minority. 
However, in paragraph 32 of the Copenhagen Document, it is stipulated that persons 
belonging to national minorities have the right freely to express, preserve and develop 
their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity and to develop their culture in all 
its aspects.82 This shows that ethnic, cultural, linguistic, or religious characteristics are
O -J  #
defining features in identifying minority groups. However, all these differences do 
not lead automatically to the creation of ‘standing’ for a minority. According to the 
1991 Moscow Conference on the Human Dimension, the rights of minority groups are 
distinguished from those of migrant workers. By drawing a distinction between 
migrant workers who are residing lawfully in participating States and the members of 
minorities, the 1991 Moscow Conference seems to have implied that citizenship or at 
least eligibility to become a citizen in participating States is a requirement of being a 
member of a minority group.84
The mandate of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) shows, 
however, a different approach to the question of nationality requirement, focusing on 
flexibility depending on given situations of participating States. First of all, the High 
Commissioner has argued that the existence of a minority is a question of fact. Based 
on this flexibility, he has proposed a definition of a minority in the following terms:
“First o f all, a minority is a group with linguistic, ethnic, or cultural characteristics which 
distinguish it from the majority. Secondly, a minority group usually not only seeks to 
maintain its identity but also tries to give stronger expression to that identity.”85
81 Case Relating to Certain Aspects o f  the Laws on the Use o f  Languages in Education in Belgium 
(Merits), ECHR Series A, No. 6, at 252, 1968.
82 Paragraph 32 o f the Copenhagen Document, The Copenhagen Meeting o f the Conference o f Human 
Dimension, 1990, 29 ILM 1305.
83 Report o f the CSCE Meeting o f Experts on National Minorities, 1991, 30 ILM 1692.
84 Document of the Moscow Meeting on the Human Dimension, Emphasising Respect for Human 
Rights, Pluralistic Democracy, the Rule of Law, and Procedure for Fact-Finding, 1991, 30 ILM 1670.
85 See Factsheet o f the HCNM, http://www.osce.org/inst/hcnm/fsheet/factsh.
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While the High Commissioner took into account the special characteristics with 
respect to language, ethnicity and culture as the basis for the components of minority 
membership, he emphasised that deciding whether a minority exists or not for the 
purpose of protection is a question of ‘fact’. It can thus be stated that it is the task of 
the High Commissioner himself to decide in each case whether certain population 
groups can be regarded as the members of a minority. In particular, the activities of 
the High Commissioner in the Baltic States regarding the status of the ethnic Russian 
population indicate that ‘citizenship’ is not a mandatory requirement for being a 
member of a minority.86 Even though one cannot find an officially accepted definition 
of a minority in the official OSCE documents, it is possible to construct a definition of 
a minority at the OSCE level as follows: a minority is a group whose members are 
persons who are citizens or non-citizens sharing common characteristics in relation to 
language, ethnicity, culture or religion in their State of residence.
The preceding analysis clearly indicates that the European definition of a minority 
follows the UN’s flexible posture toward the nationality requirement in defining the 
concept of a minority.
5. The Status of Ethnic, Linguistic Russian Populations in Estonia 
and Latvia and the Definition of a Minority under Present 
International law
The existence of the ethnic, linguistic Russian non-citizens and stateless persons in 
Estonia and Latvia after independence from Soviet Russia in 1991 may illustrate a 
typical case in confirming the problems of the traditional definition of a minority with 
reference to the nationality criterion. As noted, in Estonia, Article 1 of the Law on 
Cultural Autonomy of National Minorities Law stipulates an official definition of a 
minority in the following terms:
“They are citizens o f Estonia; they reside in the territory o f Estonia; they have time- 
honored, stable and strong links with Estonia; they differ from Estonia by their ethnic 
affiliation, cultural and religious idiosyncrasies, or language; they are guided by the 
desire to conserve, by joint efforts their cultural tradition, religion and language,
86 For instance, as noted in Chapter 2, the HCNM criticised the Estonian government against adopting 
restrictive citizenship requirements that might exclude large numbers o f Russian minority groups with 
reference to the protection of minority rights.
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underlying their common identity.87
In other words, persons within a population sharing the same ethnic, linguistic and 
cultural traditions and history may have a different legal status which threatens the 
preservation of their identity as result of the implementation of the restrictive 
citizenship laws under which proficiency of the Estonian language is required for the 
naturalisation procedure and historical and habitual residence is not considered.
However, it is quite obvious that the ethnic, linguistic Russian populations in 
Estonia and Latvia who were denationalised after the independence of Estonia and 
Latvia from the former Soviet Union in 1991 must be persons belonging to minorities 
for the purpose of the definition of a minority. As observed, the traditional definition 
of a minority includes the following elements for receiving minority status as the 
holder of minority rights; numerical inferiority, non-dominance, fairly non-changeable 
ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics, the desire to preserve one's culture and 
lastly holding citizenship of their State of residence. This last element can be 
problematic, given that minority status is determined according to the objective and 
subjective elements and it can grant the State concerned the arbitrary right to decide if 
a particular group constitutes a minority without reference to objective characteristics.
The ethnic, linguistic Russian non-citizens or stateless persons in Estonia and 
Latvia easily fulfil the objective and subjective elements advanced by the traditional 
definition of a minority, except the problematic nationality requirement in the case of 
Estonia. Numerically, they are a minority. Their non-dominant position is evident, as 
clearly demonstrated in the presence of the ethnic, linguistic Russian non-citizens and 
stateless persons in Estonia and Latvia. That the ethnic, linguistic Russians in Estonia 
and Latvia have in fact preserved their language, customs and identity through nearly 
five decades is sufficient evidence to satisfy the requirement of a desire to preserve 
their culture and language. Finally, the ethnic, linguistic Russians in Estonia and 
Latvia have a number of fairly non-changeable ethnic and linguistic characteristics.
The opinions of the Advisory Committee on the FCNM on the situations of the 
ethnic, linguistic Russians in Estonia confirm the controversial nature of the 
nationality requirement for receiving minority status. On citizenship and political 
rights in Estonia, the Advisory Committee questioned the Estonian State's definition of
87Article 1 o f the Law on Cultural Autonomy o f National Minorities. The same definition was again 
declared by Estonia upon the ratification o f the Framework Convention for the Protection o f National 
Minorities.
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a minority as including only citizens. It viewed the definition as “restrictive in nature” 
and pointed out that:
“the citizenship requirement does not appear suited for the existing situation in Estonia, 
where a substantial proportion o f persons belonging to minorities are persons who arrived 
in Estonia prior to the re-establishment o f independence in 1991 and who do not at 
present have the citizenship o f Estonia.”88
Based on this reasoning, the Advisory Committee called upon the Estonian 
government to reconsider the definition of a minority:
“Estonia should re-examine its approach...and consider the inclusion o f additional 
persons belonging to minorities, in particular non-citizens, in the application o f the 
Framework Convention.”89
The view of the Advisory Committee on Estonia clearly demonstrates that the decisive 
criterion in defining minority status must be the recognisable fact of having 
maintained objective characteristics with respect to ethnicity, religion, or language and 
sharing subjective common sentiment to maintain such cultural identity in their State 
of residence over a significant period of time. This position is in line with that of 
recent developments of the United Nations and European organisations with regard to 
the question of the definition of a minority.
Hence, it can be argued persuasively that the status of long established or settled 
ethnic, linguistic non-citizens or stateless persons, like those in Estonia and Latvia, 
regardless of the reason for this status, should be recognised as persons belonging to 
minorities, on the condition that they have met the objective and subjective elements 
for the definition of a minority, apart from the nationality requirement. The fact that 
preparatory works did not exclude immigrants from the protection of Article 27 of the 
ICCPR supports this argument.90
It is thus submitted that in review of the problems with the definition of a minority 
reflected in recent developments of the United Nations, European regional practice 
generally supports the argument that it is more appropriate to use the requirement of 
‘durable ties’ as an alternative to the nationality criterion for the identification of 
membership of a minority in present international law. This interpretation is also 
justified in that States’ recognition of the existence of minorities is not a requirement 
for defining minority status as observed, rather the existence of minorities is a
88 Advisory Comm, on the Framework Convention for the Protection o f National Minorities, Comm, of  
Ministers, (Advisory Committee), Opinion on Estonia, adopted on 14 Sept. 2001, ACFC/INF/OP/I 
(2002)/005, Specific comments with respect to articles 1-19, paras. 17-18.
89 Ibid.
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question of fact, which logically means that States cannot deny the existence of 
minority groups within their territory. Based on the above analysis in this chapter, this 
writer proposes a working definition of the concept of a minority91 for present 
international law as follows: a national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minority is a 
group numerically smaller than the rest of the population of a State, having lived for 
long time in their State of residence. The members of the group have ethnic, religious 
or linguistic features differing from the rest of the population and show a sense of 
mutual solidarity for the preservation of their unique culture, tradition or language.
6. Conclusions
(1). The definition of the concept of a minority for present international law is one of 
the most critical aspects in the discussion of the effective protection of minority rights; 
depending on how the constitutive elements for receiving a minority status as the 
holder of minority rights are viewed, the scope of minority protection under 
international law could differ widely.
(2). Even though the traditional definition of a minority has been accepted generally as 
the definition of a minority at the theoretical level, it has an inherent fundamental 
problem in its demand of holding nationality of the State of residence for recognising 
ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities. Given that citizenship has the 
comprehensive elements of civil, political, social and cultural rights within the 
domestic legal order, the citizenship criterion in determining minority status has a vital 
dimension for the effectiveness of the protection of persons belonging to minorities, 
for determining citizenship is likely to be abused by the States’ discretionary 
interpretation of citizenship criteria.
(3). At the same time, the attempts to define the concept of a minority made by the UN 
and European levels on the basis of flexibility clearly indicate the controversial nature 
of the nationality requirement in determining minority status. Unlike the definition 
under the traditional view, the recent approach does not appear to require a nationality 
or citizenship of a State in which the members of minorities allegedly reside, and is 
more concerned with factual elements such as a close relationship with the State
90 M. Nowak, The UN Convenant on Civl and Political Rights, Commentary on CCPR (Kehl:NP Engel, 
1993), p. 490.
91See Article 4 o f the proposed convention in Chapter 8 below, pp. 258-260.
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concerned and the residential linkage with it by persons belonging to ethnic, religious 
or linguistic groups, while at the same time respecting the traditionally accepted 
objective and subjective elements for the determination of a minority.
(4). This means that the scope of the definition of persons belonging to minority 
groups for the purpose of minority protection in present international law is being 
expanded and this is a meaningful development, indeed, in the sense of providing 
effective minority protection. Accordingly, the ‘persons’ who belong to minorities 
within a State, having met subjective and objective elements, such as unique 
characteristics of culture, language, religion, and the sharing of a common sentiment 
for maintaining their cultural identity, but holding no citizenship of their State of 
residence, due to restrictive, unreasonable legislative measures by the State concerned, 
may be included in the category of a minority for the purpose of the protection of 
persons belonging to minorities under international law.
(5). Based on the analysis in this chapter, this writer has proposed a working definition 
of the concept of a minority in the following terms: a national or ethnic, religious and 
linguistic minority is a group numerically smaller than the rest of the population in 
their State of residence, having lived for a significant period of time in its territory. 
The members of the group have ethnic, religious or linguistic features differing from 
the rest of the population and show a sense of mutual solidarity for the preservation of 
their unique culture, tradition or language. This definition differs from the traditional 
one in that it has made clear that no requirement of holding the nationality of the State 
of residence is needed for receiving minority status, and is more concerned with the 
historical and factual aspects of persons belonging to minorities to their State of 
residence.
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Chapter V
The Protection of Cultural Identity for Minorities under 
Minorities-Specific Standards
1. Introduction
This chapter is primarily concerned with the examination of ‘minorities-specific 
standards’. By these the present writer means the standards on the protection of the 
rights of persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities reflected within 
the League of Nations, the United Nations and European instruments, as well as their 
relevant juridical views and practice which are directly related to the protection of 
minority rights in the sense of having made specific references to “minorities, 
minority rights or minority protection”. The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to 
identify such standards and examine their content for the purpose of seeking to 
establish the basic framework within which the international legal protection of 
minority rights is effectuated. This is a necessary step for advancing the argument that 
an international juridical approach to the protection of persons belonging to minorities 
should be undertaken in a comprehensive and integrative manner so as to protect 
persons belonging to minorities fully and effectively, beyond the ‘minorities specific 
standards’ upon which this chapter primarily focuses.
The concept of minority rights should be broadly understood, which embraces not 
only cultural aspects of minority rights, but also political and participatory aspects of 
their dimension. However, it also true that that respecting the cultural identity of 
persons belonging to minorities has traditionally been regarded as the most essential 
aspect of minority protection under international law of minority protection, which has 
been reflected in minorities-specific standards as examined below. Therefore, the 
examination of minorities-specific standards in this chapter focuses on the protection 
of cultural identity for minorities. The protection of political and participatory aspects 
of minority rights will be examined in Chapter 7 of this thesis within the framework of 
internal self-determination.
At the same time, the reality of the status of ethnic, linguistic Russians in Estonia
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and Latvia since independence from the former Soviet Union in 1991, many of whom 
remain stateless or non-citizens, due to Estonian and Latvian restrictive citizenship 
laws, will be examined with reference to minorities-specific standards. The examples 
of Estonia and Latvia with reference to the protection of the ethnic, linguistic Russians 
in question illustrates why an integrative approach to the protection of minority rights 
under international law is necessary.
2. Minority Protection at the League of Nations
2.1. Main Characteristics of Minority Protection under Minorities Treaties
In 1919, following World War I, the most comprehensive attempt to protect minorities 
through international legal means developed under the auspices of the League of 
Nations in the form of minority treaties, which incorporated protections taken from 
earlier treaty provisions. Concern about the protection of persons belonging to ethnic, 
religious or linguistic minorities in certain European countries following World War I, 
gave rise to the issue of the protection of minorities at the international level. A 
comprehensive and systematic regime of minority protection was needed to protect 
minorities against discrimination in enlarged and newly established States. 
Formulations of standards of minority protection were established through the series 
of treaties called Minorities Treaties.
The Minority Treaties can be divided into three general categories. The first 
category of treaties applied to the defeated States of Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and 
Turkey. The second group of treaties applied to newly created States, and to those 
States whose borders were fundamentally changed to meet particular minority 
problems. Examples of Czechoslovakia, Greece, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia 
could be included within this category. Finally, treaties applying to certain States such 
as Albania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Iraq, required them to provide minority 
protection as a condition to their admission to the League of Nations.1
As the general provisions of the treaties and declaration which constituted the
1 Some o f the League of Nations treaties on minorities were published in the LNTS. For instance, 
Treaty with Romania, LNTS, V. p. 337; Treaty with Greece, LNTS, XXVIII; See J.I.L. Claude, 
National Minorities : An International Problem (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 16.
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‘Minorities Treaties’ followed the pattern of the Treaty of Poland,2 the latter can be 
used as a frame of reference to appreciate the main aims of minority protections under 
the League of Nations. However, it should be noted that as each of the different 
instruments within the Minorities Treaties regulate the situations of specific States and 
certain population groups, it is difficult to generalise the standards of minority 
protection during this League of Nations period. Rather, it may be correct to say that 
respective documents were not identical, which were related to the distinctive and 
different characters of the given situations in the specific documents at this time.3 
Despite this limitation, however, some characteristics o f the minority protection may 
be identified.
First, as to the scope of the application of the Treaty for the protection of 
minorities, the Polish Minority Treaty divided ‘persons’ into three types: inhabitants, 
nationals, and members of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities who are nationals. 
The inhabitants were granted the right to full and complete protection of life and 
liberty and to the free exercise, in public or in private, o f any creed, religion or belief. 
In the case of the nationals belonging to minorities, equality before the law, equality of 
civil and political rights, equality of treatment and security in law, and equal access to 
public employment and to the exercise of profession or industries were guaranteed. 
Not only was the freedom to use any language in private relations, in commerce, in 
religion, in the press or at public meetings ensured, but also adequate facilities were 
promised to make it possible for a minority language to be used before the court in 
context of special measure for the protection of minorities.4
Secondly, the Treaty included citizenship clauses intended to protect individuals
2 Minorities Treaty Between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland (Treaty o f Poland), 
June 28, 1919, 225 Consol. T.S 412; Annex I, in P. Thomberry, International Law and the Rights o f  
Minorities (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).
3 Ibid., pp. 42-44.
4 Article 2 o f the Polish treaty provided for “protection o f life and liberty” and religious freedom to all 
“inhabitants of Poland”. Treaty o f  Poland, op.cit., art. 2, p. 416. Article 7 guaranteed to “all Polish 
nationals” equality before the law, civil and political rights, and the right to use one's own language 
both in private life and in judicial proceedings. Ibid., art 7, p.417. Article 8 provided “the same 
treatment and security in law and in fact” to members o f minorities, in particular the right to “establish, 
manage and control at their own expense charitable, religious and social institutions . . . and . . . 
educational establishments.” Ibid., art 8. Article 9 guaranteed primary instruction in their own language 
for pupils belonging to minority linguistic groups in those areas o f Poland “in which a considerable 
proportion o f Polish nationals of other than Polish speech are residents.” Ibid., art 9, p. 418. Article 9 
also provided that in areas o f Poland “where there is a considerable proportion o f Polish nationals 
belonging to racial, religious, or linguistic minorities,” an “equitable share” o f public funds should go to 
those minority groups for "educational, religious or charitable purposes.” Ibid. Articles 10 and 11 
provided special guarantees for Jews. Ibid. Article 12 placed the provisions o f the treaty under the 
guarantee of the League to the extent that "they affect persons belonging" to minority groups. Ibid.
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against the danger of becoming stateless persons as a result of the transfer of State 
territory. Those of other nationality living in Poland were given the right to choose 
their nationality.5
Thirdly, Minority Treaties were recognised in supremacy over other domestic 
statutes. Under Article 1 of the Treaty, minority provisions were regarded as 
‘fundamental law’ in such a way that they could not be modified by any domestic law. 
At the external level, only amendments formally approved by a majority in the 
Council of the League of Nations would be permitted. This meant that the protection 
of minorities was considered fall under ‘international obligations’.6
Lastly, it is remarkable that various procedures were established to enforce 
minority treaty provisions. Minorities themselves had the right of petition to bring an 
alleged infraction to the attention of the League of Nations under the supervision of 
Minorities Committees. And the creation of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice (PCU) under the League of Nations was significant in that it had jurisdiction to 
review cases where there was a difference of opinion concerning the interpretation or 
application of minority provisions.7
2. 2. The Principles of Minority Protection under the League of Nations and their 
Limitation
The principles of minority protection during the League of Nations period may be 
deduced from the jurisprudence on minority protection at the PCIJ. The legal opinions 
of the PCIJ on the protection of minorities contributed to elucidating the principles of 
the protection of minorities under modem international law that are still valid today.8
5 Ibid., Articles 3-6.
6 Article 1 provides as follows: “Poland undertakes that the stipulations in Articles 2 to 8 o f this 
Chapter shall be recognised as fundamental laws, and no laws, regulation or official action shall conflict 
or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation, or official action prevail over them.” 
For an excellent article about the jurisprudence during the League o f  Nations period, see N. Berman, 
“But the alternative is despair: European nationalism and the modernist renewal o f international law”, 
Harv. L.Rev.,, Vol., 106, 1993, pp. 1792-1903. Berman argues that the jurisprudence o f minority 
protection during the League of Nations should be appreciated positively in that it showed a rather 
innovative approach to the rights of minorities within a new perspective o f international law that 
deserves careful attention for contemporary international law. Gilbert also argues that modem 
mechanisms to guarantee minority rights can be seen to have developed from the perceived need to 
make minority rights a matter of international concern, as illustrated in the case o f minority protection 
under the League o f Nations. See G. Gilbert, “Religio-nationalist minorities and the development o f  
minority rights law”, Review o f  International Studies, Vol., 25, 1999, pp. 389-410.
7 Thomberry, International Law and the Rights o f  Minorities, op.cit., pp. 44-46.
8 The Permanent Court of International Justice issued a number o f advisory opinions on minorities:
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Moreover, the PCIJ, in developing the jurisprudence of minority protection, through a 
series of relevant cases, used the teleological or contextual method of interpretation in 
international law. Given that the treaties or laws related to the status of minorities tend 
to be formulated in negative and vague terms as will be examined in subsequent 
sections of this chapter, a method of teleological interpretation which would give a 
treaty text the most extensive possible meaning and effect is critical for the effective 
protection of minorities.9 For instance, the PCIJ sought a teleological approach to the 
problems concerning the land rights of German settlers in Poland Case by the 
Versailles Peace Treaty10 through its advisory opinion. The PCIJ found that:
“The main object o f the Minority Treaty is to assure respect for the rights o f Minorities 
and to prevent discrimination against them by any act whatsoever o f the Polish State. It 
does not matter whether the rights o f the infraction o f which is alleged are derived from a 
legislative, judicial or administrative act, or from an international engagement. If the 
Council ceased to be competent whenever the subject before it involved the interpretation 
of such an international engagement, the Minorities Treaty would to a great extent be 
deprived o f value... In order that the pledged protection may be certain and effective, it is 
essential that the Council, when acting under the Minorities Treaty, should be competent, 
incidentally, to consider and interpret the laws or treaties on which the rights claimed to 
be infringed are dependent.”11
The PCU also stated, taking into account the nature of the non-discrimination 
principle in the protection of persons belonging to minorities, that “there must be 
equality in fact as well as ostensible legal equality in the sense of the absence of 
discrimination in the words of the law.”12
In the Acquisition o f Polish Nationality Case, the PCU also used the teleological 
method of interpretation in dealing with the Polish government’s refusal to grant 
citizenship to its German minority residents in the country:
“It seems therefore evident that since the Minority Treaty in general, and Article 4 in 
particular, does not exclusively contemplate minorities composed o f Polish nationals or 
of inhabitants o f Polish territory, Poland, by consenting, in Article 12 o f the Treaty, to the 
preceding Articles being placed under the guarantee o f the League o f Nations in so far as 
they concern persons belonging to racial or linguistic minorities, also consents to the 
extension o f this protection to the application o f Articles 3 to 6. If this were not the case, 
the value and sphere o f application o f the Treaty would be greatly diminished.”13
Minority Schools in Albania, PCIJ Series A/B, No. 64, 1935; German Settlers in Poland, PCIJ Series B, 
No. 6, 1923; Acquisition o f  Polish Nationality, PCIJ Series B, No. 7, 1923; Access to German Minority 
Schools in Polish Upper Silesia, PCIJ Series A/B, No. 40, 1931; Treatment o f  Polish Nationals and 
Other Persons o f  Polish Origin or Speech in Danzig, PCIJ Series A/B, No. 44, 1932.
9 Article 31 o f the Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties provides that a treaty shall be interpreted 
“in the light o f its object and purpose.” Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties, 1969, 1155 UNTS 
331
10German Setters in Poland Case, op.cit., pp. 19-26.
11 Ibid., p. 25.
12 Ibid., p. 24.
13Acquisition o f  Polish Nationality Case, op.cit., pp. 16-17.
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The most important product of the teleological method of interpretation regarding 
the protection of minorities by the PCU may be the Advisory Opinion on the Greek 
Minority Schools in Albania Case. The principles on the protection of minorities in 
modem international law were clearly enunciated in this case. Regarding the attempt 
by the Albanian government to close all private schools, and the likely effect of that 
decision on the equality of Albania's Greek minority,14 the Court made the following 
statement:
“The idea underlying the treaties for the protection o f minorities is to secure for certain 
elements incorporated in a State, the population o f which differs from them in race, 
language or religion, the possibility o f living peacefully alongside the population and co­
operating amicably with it, while at the same time preserving the characteristics which 
distinguish them from the majority, and satisfying the ensuing special needs. In order to 
attain this object, two things are regarded as particularly necessary, and have formed the 
subject o f provisions in these treaties. The first is to ensure that nationals belonging to 
racial, religious or linguistic minorities shall be placed in every respect on a footing o f  
perfect equality with other nationals o f the State. The second is to ensure for the minority 
element suitable means for the preservation o f their racial peculiarities, their traditions 
and their national characteristics. These two requirements are indeed closely interlocked, 
for there would be no true equality between a majority and a minority if  the latter were 
deprived o f its own institutions, and were consequently compelled to renounce that which 
constitutes the very essence o f its being a minority.”15
The Court recognised that the Minorities Treaties granted special, differential rights 
for persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities and emphasised that 
differential treatment was a necessary means for achieving real equality for the 
protection of persons belonging to such minorities. The protection of minorities means 
not only the protection of their basic equal rights as opposed to the rest of population 
in their State of residence, but also the protection of their inherent interests to maintain 
cultural identities. The equality for persons belonging to minorities continues to be the 
main element of the principle of the protection of minorities under the Untied Nations 
and European organisations.
Even though the Minorities Treaties system under the League of Nations was not 
perfect in that it was not intended to have universal application, but ‘imposed’ upon 
vanquished States, it must be emphasised that the PCIJ through the ‘Minority School 
in Albania Case’ declared the principles of minority protection for modem
14 The Court referred to the Albanian Declaration with which it was admitted to a membership to the 
League o f Nations. Paragraph 1 o f Article 5 o f the Albanian Declaration read: “Albanian nationals who 
belong to racial, linguistic or religious minorities will enjoy the same treatment and security in law and 
in fact as other Albanian nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to maintain, manage and 
control at their own expense or to establish in the future, charitable, religious and social institutions, 
schools and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise 
their religion”, Minority Schools in Albania, op.cit., p. 5.
15 Ibid., p. 17
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international law. General recognition that the treatment of persons belonging to 
minorities within the territories of States is an ‘international concern’, which is beyond 
the boundary of domestic jurisdiction, was also an important achievement during this 
period. It is thus proper to state that the jurisprudence of minority protection by the 
PCIJ during the League of Nations period had a tremendous impact towards the 
establishment of a minority protection system within the United Nations and European 
organisations, thereby providing the basic foundations upon which the jurisprudence 
of minority protection under the UN and other European organisations primarily rest.16
Despite the significance of the jurisprudence of minority protection during the 
League of Nations period, it is observed that there were some problems that must be 
clarified in the context of the effective protection of minorities under international law. 
This is conspicuous in the problem of citizenship matters of persons belonging to 
ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities in relation to the scope of the application of 
the non-discrimination principle. Despite the PCIJ’s having approached the citizenship 
matter in the Polish Nationality Case in a positive way to protect the existing 
ethnically, religiously or linguistically distinct minority ‘inhabitants’ as opposed to the 
majority population as ‘protected minorities’, irrespective of whether such inhabitants
• • 17belonging to minority groups were citizens or not of their State of residence, the fact 
that the holding citizenship of State of residence was a determining criterion for 
receiving minority status under the Treaty of Poland is problematic. As noted, rights 
were different among inhabitants, nationals, and nationals belonging to minority 
groups under the Treaty of Poland. It seemed to assume that minority protection was 
guaranteed only for persons who held citizenship of their State of residence among all 
residing ‘inhabitants’.18
This confusion of what is really meant by ‘minorities’ for minority protection with 
reference to citizenship may be also understood as the question of the ineffectiveness 
of applicability of the non-discrimination principle as an element of the principles of
16 W. McKean, Equality and Discrimination under International Law  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 
p. 43.
17 For a discussion on the significance of the Polish Nationality Case, see Chapter 4 above, pp. 100-105.
18 Articles 7-9 o f the Treaty o f Poland. See also the case o f Treatment o f  Polish Nationals in the Danzig 
Territory. The PCIJ noted that “The members o f minorities who are not citizens o f the State enjoy 
protection-guaranteed by the League o f Nations- o f life and liberty and the free exercise o f their religion, 
while minorities in narrow sense, that is minorities the members o f which are citizens o f State, enjoy- 
under the same guarantee-among other rights, equality o f rights in civil and political matters, and in 
matters related to primary education...” Treatment o f  Polish Nationals in Danzig Territory, op.cit., p. 
39.
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the protection of minorities in its precise scope of application. Although the 
significance of the declaration of the non-discrimination principle as being 
indispensable for minority protection is undoubtedly evident, whether the principle’s 
scope of application was equally applied to all ethnic, religious or linguistic groups or 
only to nationals (citizens) belonging to such groups is an extremely important matter 
in the context of the effective protection of minorities. This is so, because if the 
principle were understood as being applicable only to groups whose members held 
citizenship of their State of residence, the effectiveness of the non-discrimination 
principle would be questionable for the purpose of the effective protection of 
minorities, as the scope of minority protection would differ completely depending on 
the citizenship policies of States.
In short, the jurisprudence of minority protection during the League of Nations 
period declared the non-discrimination principle as a critical element of minority 
protection, yet it did not elaborate the precise scope of its application.
3. The Protection of Minority Rights at the Untied Nations Level
3.1. Problem of the Protection of Minorities at the United Nations
The events of World War II fundamentally changed the dimensions of the discussion 
of minority protection, and a new approach was developed. It was based on the 
liberalist philosophy of human rights that was represented in the United Nations 
Charter and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However, neither 
document contains any reference to the protection of minorities. Instead, the UN 
Charter proclaims a universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedom, 
equality, and non-discrimination.19
The Preamble of the Charter states that the Participating States “reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal 
rights of men and women and of nations large and small.” These statements are all 
made in the context of the respect of individual human rights. There seem to have 
been two reasons for the shift from a group-oriented to individualistic perspective of 
minority protection following World War II. One was the response to the atrocities
19 UN Charter preamble, art. 1, para. 3, and arts. 13, 55, 56, 62, 76.
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caused by the Nazi regime and the other was a reflection of individualistic ideologies 
of the time.
In a study conducted by the Secretariat of the UN at the request of the Economic 
and Social Council, the Secretary-General of the UN argued that the system of 
minority protection under the League of Nations had ceased to exist. Arguments 
presented by the Secretariat of the United Nations in this study may be summarised in 
three parts:
(a) first, that the whole minorities regime in 1919 was an integral part of the system 
established to regulate the outcome of the First World War and create the League of 
Nations. One principle of that system was that certain States only, i.e. newly 
reconstituted or enlarged, should be subject to obligations and international control in 
the matter of minorities;
(b) secondly, that from the strictly legal point of view, the formal liquidation of the 
war had been completed by the conclusion of peace treaties. The provisions of such 
treaties, and the opinions expressed by their authors imply that the former minorities 
protection regime had ceased to exist so far as it concerned former enemy States with 
which those treaties had been concluded;
(c) Thirdly, the whole system of minorities protection was overthrown by the Second 
World War. After this, and since 1945, a different philosophy ushered in the idea of a
“JOgeneral protection of human rights and fundamental freedom.
The general view was that the minority-protection system was replaced by the 
principle of universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and that the 
conduct of the States parties vis-a-vis the Minorities Treaties since World War II 
justified the termination of the Treaties. However, it should be noted that the emphasis 
on the respect of universal human rights and fundamental freedoms did not necessarily 
mean that the protection of persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities was no longer fundamental in international law. There is no doubt that the 
assumption of the UN at its early period seemed to have relied on the view that 
universal protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms could embrace 
minority protection as well. Yet, this approach is faulty in that the universal protection 
of human rights is not always identical with that of minority rights. Thomberry’s view, 
with which the present writer agrees is quite relevant in this regard. He explains as
20 Study on the Legal Validity of the Undertakings Concerning Minorities, UN ESCOR, 6th Sess., at 
chap. XIV, UN Doc. E/CN.4/367 and Add. 1 (1950).
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follows:
“Perhaps what was rejected was the League system as symbol and spectre: its lack of 
generalization, its misuse by powerful States, its failed political purpose, its limited 
humanitarian concern. But in rejecting its structure and practice, there need not be an 
equal rejection o f its norms. Even if  it may not have generated customary law, the norms 
may none the less form part o f a consistent pattern o f international law .. .It is incorrect to 
set up an antithetical relationship between human rights and minority rights as was done 
in the post-war years.”21
It would be thus more appropriate to state that the omission of the provision on 
minority protection in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and in the Charter 
of the United Nations, was due to the fact that there existed no consensus on how best 
to deal with the minority problem, rather than a total rejection of the concept of the 
protection of minorities.
An important development related to the protection of minorities was the 
establishment of the UN Human Rights Commission under the auspices of the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The Commission's purpose was to develop 
and implement provisions of the Charter relating to human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. To this end, the Commission established a Sub-Commission on Prevention 
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (Sub-Commission), which focused 
specifically on minorities from 1947 to 1954. From 1954 until 1971 the Sub- 
Commission focused almost exclusively on the question of discrimination. In 1971, 
the issue of the protection of the status of minorities regained attention with a decision 
to undertake a study on the Rights of Persons belonging to Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities.22 The protection of minorities was thus again acknowledged as 
‘a domain of concern’ within the UN framework. It was recognition of the need to 
make, for the benefit of persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities, 
a special provision capable of ensuring that they received genuinely equal treatment 
compared with the other majority inhabitants in their State of residence.
3. 2. Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and the Protection of Minority Rights24
21 Thomberry, International law and the rights o f  minorities, op.cit., p. 117.
22 Special Rapporteur F. Capotorti, Study on the Rights o f  Persons belonging to Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities, UN Sub-Commission o f Prevention o f Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities (New York: United Nations, 1991), p. 28.
23 Thomberry, International law and the rights o f  minorities, op.cit., pp. 116-117.
24The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171. The 
Covenant entered into force 23 March 1976. It has 156 States parties as o f 31 August 2005. Estonia 
acceded to the Covenant on 21 October 1991. Latvia acceded to the Covenant on 14 April 1992.
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As already noted in Chapter 4, Article 27 of the ICCPR constitutes evidence of the 
recognition of universal minority rights under present international law. The 
agreement on the provision of Article 27 of the ICCPR means that the need for 
‘special protection’ for the protection of minority rights was recognised simply beyond 
the declaration of the non-discrimination principle within the United Nations Charter. 
International lawyers have been concerned with examining the nature of the protection 
afforded to minorities under Article 27 of the ICCPR. Although Article 27 of the 
ICCPR recognises the existence of minority rights in terms of their literal context, 
protection of such rights is worded in negative rather than positive terms, as is in the
9 <phrase “persons...shall not be denied the right”. Furthermore, as the Covenant fails 
to define minority status, there is a possibility that States may declare that no minority 
population exists within their territories, thus avoiding the applicability of Article 27 
completely.
Scholarly views are divided over whether Article 27 places affirmative duties on 
States to ensure rights for persons belonging to minorities in addition to the non­
discrimination principle contained in the Covenant. The question of whether or not 
positive obligation derives from Article 27 is thus directly related to the legal nature of 
Article 27. In order to clarify this issue, it is necessary to discuss three types of 
doctrinal views as applied to Article 27.
3. 2.1. Negative Views
Certain authors interpret Article 27 ‘negatively’, believing that no positive State 
obligations exist directly from it. Their views seem to be based on historical 
interpretation of the Article. The negative approach relies on the ‘preparatory work’, 
which underscores the intention of the contracting States to avoid such affirmative 
obligations toward minorities. According to their views, States’ duties are only obliged 
to adopt a tolerant attitude towards minorities. Tomuschat asserts that extending the
25 Ibid.
26 The attitude o f the French government is a prime example. The French government argued that there 
are no minorities in France. France’s view may be found in its initial and second periodic reports 
submitted to the HRC under Article 40 of the ICCPR. It reads as follows: “Since the basic principles of 
public law prohibit distinctions between citizens on grounds o f origin, race or religion, France is a 
country in which there are no minorities and, as stated in the declaration made by France, Article 27 is 
not applicable as far as the Republic is concerned.” Consideration o f Reports submitted by States 
Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant: France, UN GAOR, Hum.Rts.Comn., 26 Aug., 1987, 540, UN 
Doc. CCPR/C/46/Add.2(1987).
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scope of Article 27 to include positive State obligations could lead to an outright
breakdown of its guiding value and a total loss of credibility.27 Modeen holds the
same view that States are not required to take positive measures to protect minorities
within their territories, contending that Article 27 cannot be understood as affording
• • 28any collective rights to minorities.
However, these views are flawed, because they cannot explain the reasons why the 
ICCPR provides particular provision of Article 27 for the protection of the rights of 
persons belonging to minorities, apart from the protection by the non-discrimination 
principle. Were not it for the clear intention of protection of persons belonging to 
minorities by way of a particular provision for the purpose of protection, Article 27 
would not have existed.
3. 2. 2. Positive Stance
On the other hand, other authors approach Article 27 as ‘positive’. This position is 
based on a teleological and systematic interpretation of the provision. They abandon 
the so-called historical interpretation which relies heavily on travaux preparatories. 
Thus they assert that the rights explicitly awarded should be interpreted in such a way
90that they can be realised and are capable of having legal effects.
A systematic interpretation pays attention to the place of a certain article in the 
overall framework of the convention and focuses on the possible contribution offered 
by that article to the purpose and objective of the convention. They argue that Article 
27 would be meaningless in light of the non-discrimination provision in the Covenant 
without the recognition of positive State obligations to protect minority rights. 
According to this thinking, because of the enormous material and human resources 
which would be needed for full development, for instance, in the area of culture, 
without positive State assistance to protect and promote minority rights, the rights
27 C. Tomuschat, “Protection o f Minorities under Article 27 o f the International Covenant o f Civil and 
Political Rights”, in R. Bernhardt et al., Volkerrechat als Rechtordnung Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit 
Menschenrechte, Festschrift fur Hermann Mosler (Berlin/Heidelberg/New York, 1983), p.969. However, 
it is interesting to note that Article 27, according to Tomuschat, could give rise to “derivative rights to 
positive State action” by virtue of the principle of non-discrimination. Ibid., p. 970.
8 T. Modeen, The International Protection o f  National Minorities in Europe (Abo: Abo Akademi, 
1969), p. 108.
29 Capotorti study, op. cit., pp. 36-37; Thomberry, International Law and the Rights o f  Minorities, 
op.cit., pp. 185-186;R. Cholewinski, “State Duty towards Ethnic Minorities: Positive or Negative?”, 
HRQ, Vol., 10, 1988, pp. 344-371.
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granted to minorities under Article 27 would lose much of their meaning.
3. 2. 3. Moderate Views
Finally, some authors take a moderate stance to understanding of the nature of Article 
27. Basically, they postulate that Article 27 contains a State obligation to ‘abstain’, but 
also an obligation to take some measures to protect minorities depending on given 
circumstances.
For Higgins, that Article 27 is written in negative terms does not necessarily mean
that it should be interpreted as placing no positive State obligations at all upon
parties.30 This line of thought is followed by Nowak, who emphasises the State’s
obligation to refrain from certain types of actions which threaten the cultural lives of
minorities. However, in his view, the right of minorities to establish educational
•  ^1institutions may be derived from Article 27.
This position has some defects in that it admits a rather broad discretion of States 
to determine the scope of the positive measures for the protection of minority rights. 
Even though their qualification seems reasonable in terms of State interventions 
according to certain circumstances, it cannot be denied that generous granting of 
discretion to States carries the risk of States’ attempting to avoid their obligations to 
minorities.
3. 3. The Nature of Minority Rights within these Contexts: individual rights or 
group rights?
On the surface Article 27, in terms of negative wording such as “persons... shall not 
be denied...”, it appears logical to States that minority rights can only be enjoyed 
‘individually’ by persons belonging to minorities. But as the expression “in 
community with” also indicates, minority rights under Article 27 cannot be absolutely 
individual in nature.
Human beings are social creatures. Most individuals belong to various units,
30 R. Higgins, “Minority Rights: Discrepancies and Divergences Between the International Covenant 
and the Council o f Europe system”, in R. Lawson and M. de Blois (eds.), The Dynamics o f  the 
Protection o f  Human Rights in Europe, Essays in Honour o f Henry G. Schermers, Vol., Ill 
(Dordrecht/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994), p. 201.
31 M. Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Kehl: NP Engel, 1993), p. 501.
129
groups, and communities. It is not surprising, therefore, that international law not only 
recognises the inalienable rights of individuals, but also recognises certain collective 
rights that are exercised jointly by individuals grouped into larger communities, 
including peoples and nations. As will be examined in Chapter 7 of this thesis, self- 
determination is a prime example in this dual aspect of a particular human right 
combining individual aspects with collective ones. As the purpose of the protection of 
minorities is primarily concerned with the respect of identity of persons belonging to 
such minorities and the protection of their interests, the respect and guarantee of the 
collective aspect of minority grouping is a precondition to the effective exercise of 
minority rights. In other words, minority rights are a ‘hybrid’ between individual and 
collective rights. When the minority group secures the rights in question, then the 
benefits rebound to its individual members and are distributed as individual human 
rights. Thomberry notes the difficulty of the contemporary international law of 
minorities to grapple with the group dimension within the individualistic framework 
of human rights work, and considers minority rights as a hybrid between individual 
and group rights because of the community requirement.32 In sum, Article 27 
recognises individual rights premised on the existence of a distinctive community.
The existence of a collective aspect of minority rights will naturally assume that 
States must take positive measures to protect minority interests, because the realisation 
of minority rights cannot be fully achieved without implementing States’ positive 
policy measures to protect and promote this collective aspect of minority rights at the 
domestic legal level. Therefore, to regard minority rights as only individual or 
collective rights is simplistic. Rather, it would be more correct to state that minority 
rights have a collective aspect.33
At the same time, this collective aspect of minority rights also raises the question 
of whether minority rights are ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ rights, as the distinction is said 
to speak to the nature of obligations that rights create.34 A negative right creates an 
obligation of non-interference of States concerned. A negative right requires the States’ 
authorities not to interfere with the exercise of the right in question. By contrast, a 
positive right requires ‘action’ by the States’ authorities concerned for the benefit to 
the right holders in question. However, it should also be noted that the distinction
32 Thomberry, International law and the rights o f  minorities, op.cit., p. 12.
33 See Article 4 (4) o f the proposed convention in Chapter 8 below, pp. 258-260.
34 I. Berlin, "Two Concepts o f Liberty", in I. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (London: Oxford
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between negative and positive rights is less secure than it initially might appear. For 
instance, a right of privacy initially presents itself as a negative right, in the sense that 
it suggests that governments should not act in certain ways. But a right of privacy also 
requires State action in that State action is required in the form of the establishment 
and enforcement of real property and contractual entitlement. In this context, it can be 
argued that minority rights are positive rights, since they create a State’s positive 
obligation to protect minority rights. Minority rights could not be truly achieved 
without positive State intervention to correct existing unequal realities and to protect 
their interests in maintaining their identities with respect to ethnic, religious or 
linguistic characteristics as opposed to the majority population. The validity of this 
argument is evidenced by the practice of the United Nations, as will be examined 
below.
3. 4. Obligatory Nature of the Protection of Minority Rights
The views put forward by the Human Rights Committee (HRC) on Article 2735 are 
instructive of the affirmation of the existence of States’ positive legal obligations to 
protect persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities within their 
territories. The views of the HRC are not legally binding on the contracting States, but 
they have a certain degree of legal authority that cannot be ignored. Moreover, 
examination of the State Reports from the HRC may be regarded as a primary and 
supplementary means of interpretation under Articles 31-32 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties.
The HRC through the process of reviewing State Reports has emphasised that 
States have ‘positive obligations’ to ensure that persons belonging to minorities enjoy 
minority rights as provided in the ICCPR. The HRC made clear that negative tolerance 
by States in which persons belonging to minorities reside is not enough for the 
protection of minority rights. Rather, it requires States concerned to take concrete 
measures to realise and promote minority rights. For instance, the HRC questioned the
University Press, 1969), pp, 121-172.
35 For the general assessment o f the HRC activities, T. Opsahl, “The Human Rights Committee”, in P. 
Alston (ed.), The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1992), pp. 369-443.
36 In the same context, see L.B. Sohn, “The Rights o f Minorities”, in L. Henkin (ed.), The International 
Bill o f  Rights-The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1981), p. 285.
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Mexican government on ‘concrete measures’ taken in order to provide political and 
economic opportunities for ethnic minority groups. The Mexican government 
explained that new economic, social and cultural measures had been adopted for 
protecting land ownership and their natural resources.37 The HRC also held that the 
United States should bear in mind the obligation to provide the Covenant’s rights in 
fact as well as in law when determining affirmative actions, criticising the withdrawal 
of the US’s policies on minorities.38
In 1993, the Third Committee of the General Assembly at its 47th session asked the 
HRC to proceed with the preparation of General Comment on Article 27 of the ICCPR. 
Even though the purpose of the General Comment is to promote and maintain a 
dialogue channel between the HRC and State Parties, they are critical in that they 
reflect the expression of accumulated experiences of an independent expert human 
rights body of ‘universal character’ in consideration of the contents and 
implementation of each Article under the Covenant. As to the meaning of Article 27, 
the General Comment made clear that a State’s positive measures for minority 
protection are required not only against the acts of State parties but also even against 
acts of other persons within the State party. It reads as follows:
“Although article 27 is expressed in negative terms, that article, nevertheless, does 
recognize the existence o f a right and requires that it shall not be denied. Consequently, a 
State party is under an obligation to ensure that the existence and the exercise o f this right 
is protected against their denial or violation. Positive measures o f protection are, therefore, 
required not only against the acts o f the State party itself, whether through its legislative, 
judicial or administrative authorities, but also against the acts o f other persons within the 
State party.”39
The HRC went on to state that:
“The Committee concludes that article 27 relates to rights whose protection imposes 
specific obligations on States parties. The protection of these rights is directed towards 
ensuring the survival and continued development o f the cultural, religious and social 
identity o f  the minorities concerned, thus enriching the fabric o f society as a whole. 
Accordingly, the Committee observes that these rights must be protected as such and 
should not be confused with other personal rights conferred on one and all under the 
Covenant. States parties, therefore, have an obligation to ensure that the exercise o f these 
rights is fully protected and they should indicate in their reports the measures they have 
adopted to this end.”40
The HRC’s view clearly gives support to the proposition that a State is obliged to 
protect persons belonging to minorities residing within its territory, by way of 
implementing protective measures to that effect.
37 A/44/40 (1989), paras. 135-136.
38 A/50/40 (1995), para. 303.
39 General Comment No. 23, UN Doc.HRI\GEN\l\REV.l\ at 35 (1994), para. 6.1.
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The Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada Case41 deserves note reflecting the legal nature 
of Article 27. Chief Ominayak is the leader and representative of the Lubicon Lake 
Band, an Indian band living within the borders of Canada in the Province of Alberta. 
The Band submitted to the HRC a communication claming that the government of 
Canada denied their right of self-determination and the right to dispose freely of their 
natural resources through Chief Ominayak. He alleged that serious damage to their 
traditional way of life had been caused, because of expropriation of land by the 
government. He asserted that the acts of the government had violated Articles, 
1,2,6,7,14,17,18,23,26, and 27 of the ICCPR.
The HRC asserted that the rights enshrined in Article 27 include the rights of 
persons in community with others, to engage in economic and social activities which 
are part of the culture of the community to which they belong. In this regard, it is 
important to note that the HRC sees ‘minority rights’ with group aspects and the scope 
of minority rights within Article 27 in such a broad sense that includes economic and 
social activities. The HRC concluded by saying:
“Historical inequities, to which the State party refers, and certain more recent 
developments threaten the way of life and culture o f the Lubicon Lake Band, and 
constitute a violation o f article 27 so long as they continue. The State party proposes to 
rectify the situation by a remedy that the Committee deems appropriate within the 
meaning o f article 2 o f the Covenant.”42
The Committee thus held the view that the contracting State not only has a duty of 
abstention regarding the activities of minorities within its territory but also has an 
obligation to adopt concrete measures to correct the marginal situations of minorities.
Moreover, positive measures designed to facilitate the rights of members of ethnic, 
religious or linguistic minorities to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise 
their religion, or to use their own language constitute a legitimate differentiation under 
the Covenant, provided that they are “aimed at correcting conditions which prevent or 
impair the enjoyment guaranteed under Article 27”, and “provided that they are based 
on reasonable and objective criteria.”43
Although Article 27 is formulated in negative terms, a contracting State is 
nevertheless obliged to ensure that the existence and the exercise of rights specified in
40 Ibid., para. 9.
41 The Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada Case, Communication No. 167/1984, UN Doc. Supplement No. 
40, A/45/40 (1990).
42 The HRC found that the offer of the Canadian government to set aside 95 square miles o f land for a 
reserve for the Band and 45 million Canadian dollars as compensation for the historical inequities was 
an appropriate remedy.
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Article 27 are protected against their denial and violations. This means that the 
negative wording has been reversed through the interpretative practice of the HRC: a 
State is obliged to undertake special measures to protect the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities. Article 27 establishes rights of individuals belonging to 
minorities, but individuals are to enjoy minority rights “in community with other 
members of their group”. The realisation of rights, therefore, relates to the ability of a 
group to maintain its identity.
Furthermore, it is critical to note that the protection of the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities has become a norm or principle of general international law. 
The HRC states as follow: “The Committee is of the opinion that the international 
protection of the rights of persons belonging to minorities includes elements that must 
be respected in all circumstances.” 44 According to the Badinter Commission’s 
Opinion No.l, Article 27 of the ICCPR reflects a “peremptory norm of international 
law”, which refers to the “rights of peoples and minorities” as “peremptory norms of 
general international law.”45 Upon accession to the ICCPR, France declared that 
“Article 27 is not applicable so far as the Republic is concerned.”46 The HRC 
concluded that it was “not competent to consider complaints directed against France 
concerning alleged violations of Article 27 of the Covenant.”47 However, in its 
Concluding Observations on the State Party report by France, the HRC made the 
following point:
“The mere fact that equal rights are granted to all individuals and that all individuals are equal 
before the law does not preclude the existence in fact o f minorities in a country, and their 
entitlement to the enjoyment o f their culture, the practice o f their religion or the use o f their 
language in community with other members o f their group.”48
3. 5. Citizenship and Minorities Protected under Article 27
As observed in Chapter 4, Capotorti’s definition of a minority refers to a 
“group.. .whose members are nationals of the State.” Deschenes’ definition refers to “a
43 HRC General Comment No. 23, op.cit., para. 6.2.
44 HRC General Comment No. 29, “Derogations During a State o f Emergency (Article 4)”, adopted 31 
August 2001, reprinted in “Compilation o f General Comments and General Recommendations”, p. 184, 
para. 13(c).
45 Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions Arising from the 
Dissolution o f Yugoslavia, 31 ILM 1488 (1992), Opinion No. l,para. fie).
46 H.K. v. France, Communication No. 222/1987), UN Doc. CCPR/C/37/D/222/1987, 8 December 
1989, para. 8.5.
47 Ibid., para. 8.6.
48HRC, Concluding Observations on France, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.80,4 August 1997, para. 24.
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group of citizens of a State.” Where some, but not all, of the members of a particular 
group are citizens, it follows that if non-citizens or stateless persons belonging to 
minority groups of long-term residence are excluded from the scope of minority 
protection by their State of residence, it would be contrary to the object and purpose of 
the ICCPR: the protection of ethnic, religious or linguistic identity of persons 
belonging to minorities in States parties. The HRC General Comment on Article 27 is 
clear on the issue: “a State party may not restrict the rights under Article 27 to its 
citizens alone.”49
3. 6. The UN Declaration of the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities
In 1992, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Declaration of the 
Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities (UN Declaration on Minority Rights).50 The Declaration was the end 
product of nearly 14 years of efforts by the special Working Group, established by the 
UN Commission on Human Rights on recommendation by the UN Sub- 
Commission.51
Even though the Declaration was not adopted in the form of a law-making treaty, it 
is the first comprehensive, universal standard-setting instrument on the protection of 
minority rights. It clarified the contents of Article 27 of the ICCPR and reconfirmed 
that States have obligations to protect minorities through the adoption of various 
policy measures. The Declaration is not legally binding as such but it has a special 
importance as it ‘declares’ rather than proposes legal standards. Moreover, it needs to 
be noted that it was adopted by the General Assembly by ‘consensus’.52 Therefore, it 
may be argued that the Declaration expresses some sense of opinio juris , which could 
be international customary law for the protection of minority rights. This is the very 
reason why despite the Declaration’s status as soft law in nature, it may be described 
as a universal standard for the protection of minority rights under present international
49 HRC General Comment No. 23, op.cit., para. 5.1.
50 Declaration o f the Rights o f Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities, Dec. 18, 1992, GA Res. 135, UN GAOR, UN Doc. A/RES/47/135 (1992).
51 P. Thomberry, “The UN Declaration on the Rights o f Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities: Background, Analysis, Observation and an Update”, in A. Phillips 
& A. Rosas (eds.), Universal Minority Rights (Abo: Abo Akademis Tryckeri, 1995), pp. 11-71.
52 Ibid., pp. 26-60.
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law.
The Preamble recognises that protecting minority rights will “contribute to the 
political and social stability of States in which they live.” Despite the individualistic 
framing of the title, the Declaration asserts that persons belonging to minorities may 
exercise their rights collectively as well as individually.53 It calls for State positive 
action to promote and protect the development of minority languages, cultures, 
religions, and traditions, as well as to encourage full minority participation in the 
economic progress of their country.54
Despite the significance of the Declaration with respect to extending the scope of 
Article 27 of the ICCPR and its codification, it is also observable that the rights of 
persons belonging to minorities are described in vague terms which limit and even 
question the extent and degree of States’ positive obligations to protect and promote 
minority rights. Such phrases as “whenever possible”, “where appropriate”, 55 
inevitably seem to concede a large degree of discretion to the States concerned as well 
as to provide grounds for avoiding their obligations to protect the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities by indirect means.
4. Article 27 of the ICCPR and Customary International Law
Does Article 27 of the ICCPR reflect of rule of customary international law? 
Thomberry argues that “Article 27...appears to be a right granted by a treaty without 
wider repercussions in customary law”.56 His view was essentially based on the 
following arguments: the travaux of the ICCPR do not support a contrary view; the 
considerations of the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction Case (Second Phase) do not 
specifically address minority rights and, as confirmed by such consideration, it is 
difficult to establish human rights mles of customary law, except for a few cases; and 
there is no evidence that domestic arrangements concerning particular minorities are 
made in fulfilment of a general obligation to do so under international law. In recent 
years, however, Thomberry has pointed out that “the concept of an underlying
53 Article 3 of the UN Declaration on Minority Rights.
54 Ibid., Article 4.
55 For instance, Article 2 (3) o f the UN Declaration on Minority Rights.
56 Thomberry, International law and the rights o f  minorities , op.cit., p. 246.
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customary law of minoirty rights should not be lightly dismissed.”57 In fact, some
CO
commentators believe that Article 27 has become customary international law. The 
view was already insinuated, albeit indrectly, by the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights of the OAS in the Yanomami Case of 1985.59 On this occasion, the 
commission invoked Article 27 rights even though Brazil was not a party to the 
ICCPR. It delineated principles of international law aimed at protecting the cultural 
identity of ethnic minority groups.
More recently, justifications for customary law status of Article 27 rights include 
reference to the current large number of States bound by the article as parties to the 
ICCPR, the connection between Article 27 requirements and the geneneral principle of 
equality and non-discrimination. Support for the view that Article 27 rights are part of 
customary law can also be found in the General Comment No. 24 on reservation, 
adopted by the HRC in 1994. The Committee contends that the provisions reflecting 
customary may not be the subejcts of reservation; among such provisions is the one 
concerning minority rights.60 Finally, as noted before, the Badinter Commission made 
an innovative statement to the effect that “peremptory norms of international law 
require States to ensure respect for the rights of minorities.” 61 Although the 
Commission did not expressly refer to Article 27 of the ICCPR, its reference to “the 
right to recognistion of minority identity under international law” suggested a close 
connection with Article 27.
Basic aspects of protection under Article 27, such as the right to the equal 
enjoyment of one’s culture, and to assert and preserve it free of any attempt at 
assimilation against one’s will, currently enjoy wide support from the intemaiotnal 
community. Although specific contours of Article 27 rights requires further 
clarification, at least the aspects above could arguably be considered strong candidates
57 P. Thomberry, “Minority Rights”, in Collected Courses of the Academy o f European Law, VI-2, 
1995, pp. 307-390.
58Dinstein took the clearest view that Article 27 o f the ICCPR represented customary international law. 
Y. Dinstein, “Collective Human Rights o f Peoples and Minorities”, ICLQ, Vol., 25, 1976, p. 118. 
Mullerson takes the same position. He stated as follows: “I believe that article 27 requirements have 
become part and parcel o f universal customary international law. It is not, o f course, due only to the fact 
that by the end o f 1993 there were 124 state parties to ICCPR.. .Confirmation o f my view that article 27 
is a customary norm o f international law may be found in the Document o f the Copenhagen Meeting of  
the Conference on the Human Dimension o f the CSCE.” R. Mullerson, International Law, Rights and 
Politics (London, New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 108-109.
59 Case No. 7615 (Brazil), Resolution No. 12/85, 5 March 1985, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66, 
Doc. 10,rev. 1, 1985 (concerning the Yanomami o f Brazil).
60HRC General Comment No. 24, “Reservation”, CCPR/C/21/Rev. l/Add.6, 1994, para. 8.
61 Badinter Arbitration Commission Opinion No. 1, op.cit., para. fie).
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for customary law through State practice and opinio juris.
The 1994 Report of the European Commission for Democracy Through Law, 
based on responses by 26 States to a questionnaire on the status of minority rights 
protection in their respective national legal systems, reveals that a significant number 
of States do grant special rights to minority groups with regard to language, education 
and culture. This shows that there is arguably a tendency discernible on the part of 
State to acknowledge that mere non-discrimination and formal equality are not 
sufficient for the protection of minority rights in the sense of protection of identity for 
minorities. According to the Report, virtually all States which responded to the 
questionnaire have regulated the issue of linguistic minority protection in the form of 
law. In Greece, Poland and Turkey, the question of the right of minority groups to use 
their mother-tongues is regulated by international treaties, which are, in principle, 
directly applicable in domestic law. The question of the use of languages in the public 
sphere is much more complex. In Germany, German is the only official language of 
the country. According to federal law, only German may be used in the public sphere. 
However, the Sorban minority has the right to use its language in judicial and 
administrative matters at the level of the Land. In Austria, it is guaranteed that persons 
belonging to Slovene and Croat minorities have the right to use their language before 
the judicial and administrative authorities of the regions where they are represented. In 
Belgium, the three languages, French, Dutch and German, have the status of official 
languages. Their use in relation with government departments, as well as in the fields 
of justice and social affairs, is the subject of very detailed legislation. This principle is 
also seen in Switzerland, where German, French, Italian and Romansh constitute the 
four national languages, the first three being official languages. In Canada, the use of 
languages in the official sphere has produced abundant measures of regulations. 
English and French are the two official languages, and linguistic laws are tending to 
establish a generalised official bilingualism. In Cyprus, legislative, executive and 
administrative acts and documents must be written in the two official languages 
(Greek and Turkish). In Italy, while Italian is the only official language of the 
Republic, German enjoys exactly the same status as an official language in the region 
of Trentino-Alto-Adige, particularly in the province of Bolzano where the German­
speaking minority which constitutes about two-thirds of the population is concentrated.
62 European Commission for Democracy Through Law, “The Protection o f Minorities”, Collected 
Texts No.9, 1994.
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It can therefore be used in the public sphere on the same basis as Italian. In Finland, 
the constitution gives both principal languages, Finnish and Swedish, exactly the same 
official status. The Slovak Republic provides that Slovakian is the official language 
throughout its territory, but the constitution, in its Article 34, guarantees to persons 
belonging to a national minority, the right to use their language in official 
communications.63 In the legislative elevation of the Maori language to an official 
language of New Zealand in 1987, persons were given the right to speak Maori in 
legal proceedings.64 However, the system and organisation of teaching of the 
languages of minorities, or in those languages, vary from State to State.
Whatever conclusions for customary law on the matter, it is clear that 
contemporary practice reveals broader contexts where the emergence of customary 
law might be of major significance.65 In this regard, the 1992 UN Declaration on 
Minority Rights is significant in that it was adopted by the UN General Assembly by 
‘consensus’ and it has acquired legal force through bilateral treaties incorporating its 
standards, providing that such commitments were to be applied as legal obligations, 
e.g. Treaty on Good-Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Co-operation between the 
Republic of Hungary and the Slovak Republic of 19 March 1995.66
5. The Protection of Minority Rights at the European Level
This section will review European instruments related to the protection of the rights of 
persons belonging to minorities. The Framework Convention on the Protection of 
National Minorities (FCNM) under the Council of Europe and relevant documents at 
the Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are the main object 
of the discussion. The European Convention on Human Rights is also indirectly 
related to the protection of minority rights, even though the main purpose and
cn
objective of the Convention was not the protection of minority rights as such. The
63 Ibid., pp. 63-64.
64 CCPR/C/37/Add. 8 (1988), para. 149.
65 European Commission for Democracy Through Law, “Local self-government, territorial integrity 
and protection o f minorities”, Collection No. 16, Council o f Europe, 1997.
66 See section 6 o f this chapter “Minority Protection through Bilateral Treaties in Central and Eastern 
Europe”, pp. 147-150.
67 Estonia and Latvia joined the European Union with eight other new member States on 1 May 2004.
It is true that the European Union (EU) is also paying more attention to the protection o f minorities as is 
revealed by the establishment of the Arbitration Commission for Yugoslavia and the requirement that
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protection of minority rights under the European Convention on Human Rights will be 
discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis.
5.1. The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities68
The entry into force of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities (FCNM) is a remarkable development for the protection of the rights of 
persons belonging to minorities at the European level, as it represents the first 
international treaty with a multilateral general regime for the protection of minority 
rights. As the FCNM was adopted within the framework of the Council of Europe, it 
can also be stated that the deficiencies of the European Convention of Human Rights 
concerning the protection of minority rights may be partially rectified. The monitoring 
of States parties compliance with their commitments under the FCNM is the 
responsibility of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.69 States parties 
are obliged to transmit periodic reports providing information on legislative and other 
measures taken to give effect to the principles set out in the FCNM.70 The FCNM is a 
milestone for the Council of Europe as it provides its first comprehensive statement of
States wanting to join the membership o f the union must ensure the protection o f minority rights as 
envisaged by the OSCE. However, as minority protection at the EU level is not currently extensively 
developed and there seems to be no general policy about minority issues yet. O f course, various new 
procedures in the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties are relevant for the protection o f minorities and 
could likely develop in a more elaborate way within the framework of the EU. In particular, the EU has 
been devising a range o f ways and means o f committing Eastern European countries to the protection of 
minorities as a condition to their accession to the EU. C. Hillion “On Enlargement of the European 
Union: The discrepancy between membership obligations and accession conditions as regards the 
protection of minorities”, Fordham Int'l L.J, Vol., 27, 2004, pp. 715-740; M. Johns, “ “Do As I Say, Not 
As I Do”: The European Union, Eastern Europe and Minority Rights”, East European Politics and 
Societies, Vol., 17, 2003, p. 682-699.
68 The Convention was adopted by the Committee o f Ministers on 10 November 1994 and entered into 
force on 2 January, 1998. ETS, 157 (1994). As o f 31 August, 2005, the total number of 
ratifications/accessions is 39 States, including Estonia and Latvia.
69 Article 24 (1) o f the FCNM.
70 The FCNM establishes a reporting system requiring signatories, one year after the instrument has 
entered into force, to transmit “full information on the legislative and other measures taken to give 
effect to the principles set out” in the document. See Article 25 (1) o f the FCNM. Upon receiving the 
information, the Committee o f Ministers is assisted in “evaluating the adequacy o f the measures taken 
by the Parties” by an Advisory Committee, composed o f “recognized experts in the field of the 
protection o f national minorities.” Ibid. Article 26 (1). The FCNM requires States parties to transmit 
“information of relevance to implementation” to the Secretary-General o f the Council o f Europe every 
five years “and whenever the Committee o f Ministers so requests.” Ibid,, Article 25 (2). See Rules 
Adopted by the Committee o f Ministers on the Monitoring Arrangements Under Articles 24 to 26 o f the 
FCNM, Res. 97(10), Comm, o f Ministers, P 21 (1997) Once a State report is received, the Advisory 
Committee evaluates it, preparing an opinion that is submitted to the Committee o f Ministers. In 
drawing up this document, the Advisory Committee is not limited to the information contained in the 
State's report. For example, it may “request additional information from the Party whose report is under
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the rights to which national minorities are entitled and specifies the scope of the 
obligations that signatories have to ensure the “effective protection” of those rights 
and freedoms. Noting that the “upheavals of European history have shown that the 
protection of minorities is essential to stability, democratic security and peace in this 
continent”, the FCNM underlines that “a pluralist and genuinely democratic society 
should not only respect the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of each 
person belonging to a national minority, but also create appropriate conditions 
enabling them to express, preserve and develop this identity.”71
The core of the FCNM, the sixteen articles of Section II, specify the rights of 
persons belonging to minorities that are to be protected. They include: the right of 
equality and equal protection of the law (Article 4); the rights of freedom of peaceful 
assembly, association, and expression, and thought, conscience, and religion (Article 
7); the right for persons to manifest religion or belief and to establish religious 
institutions, organisations, and associations (Article 8); the right to use freely and 
without interference the minority language, in private and in public, orally and in 
writing, and the right for persons to be informed, in a language they understand, of the 
reasons for arrest, the nature of the accusation, and the right to defend themselves in 
this language (Article 10, (1), (3)); the right for persons to use their names in the 
minority language (with official recognition) and the right to display signs in the 
minority language (Article 11(1), (2)); the right to set up and manage their own private 
educational and training establishments (Article 13); and the right to learn the minority 
language (Article 14).
The Framework Convention does not simply recognise rights, but also attempts to 
influence State behavior towards national minorities. On the one hand, signatories 
pledge to limit specific types of State action that may prove injurious to the interests 
of national minorities. Hence, parties undertake to refrain from:
“policies or practices aimed at assimilation of persons belonging to national minorities 
against their will”;72 acts that would “hinder the creation and the use of printed media 
by persons belonging to national minorities”;73 “measures which alter the proportions 
of the population in areas inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities and 
are aimed at restricting the rights and freedoms flowing from the principles enshrined
consideration.” Ibid.,? 29, or "hold meetings" with its government's representatives. Ibid., P 32.
71 Preamble of the FCNM, paragraphs 6-7.
72 Article 5 (2) o f the FCNM.
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in the present framework Convention”;74 initiatives that would either “interfere with 
the right of persons belonging to national minorities to establish and maintain free and 
peaceful contacts across frontiers ... in particular [with] those with whom they share an
7 ^ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity, or a common cultural heritage”; and 
initiatives that would “interfere with the right of persons belonging to national 
minorities to participate in the activities of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
both at the national and international levels.”76
In addition to respecting rights and constraining their behavior, States parties to the 
FCNM agree to take positive measures to advance the status of national minorities. 
For example, the States parties undertake:
“to adopt, where necessary, adequate measures in order to promote, in all areas of 
economic, social, political, and cultural life, full and effective equality between 
persons belonging to a national minority and those belonging to the majority”;77 “to 
promote the conditions necessary for persons belonging to national minorities to 
maintain and develop their culture, and to preserve the essential element of their 
identity, namely their religion language, traditions and cultural heritage”;78 “to 
encourage a spirit of tolerance and intercultural dialogue, to promote mutual respect 
and understanding and co-operation among all persons living on their territory”;79 “to 
protect persons who may be subject to threats or acts of discrimination, hostility or 
violence as a result of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity”;80 “to 
adopt adequate measures in order to facilitate access to the media for persons 
belonging to national minorities and ... to promote tolerance and permit cultural 
pluralism”;81 “to ensure, as far as possible, the conditions which would make it 
possible to use the minority language in relations between those persons and the 
administrative authorities”; “to foster knowledge of the culture, history, language, 
and religion of their national minorities and of the majority”;83 “to provide adequate
73 Article 9 (3) o f the FCNM.
74 Article 16 o f the FCNM.
75 Article 17 (1) o f the FCNM.
76 Article 17 (2) o f the FCNM.
77 Article 4 (2) o f the FCNM.
78 Article 5 (1) o f the FCNM.
79 Article 6 (1) o f the FCNM.
80 Article 6 (2) o f the FCNM.
81 Article 9 (4) o f the FCNM.
82 Article 10 (2) o f the FCNM.
83 Article 12 (1) o f the FCNM.
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RJ.opportunities for teacher training and access to textbooks”; “to promote equal 
opportunities for access to education at all levels for persons belonging to national
Qf
minorities”; “if there is sufficient demand, ... [to] endeavor to ensure ... that persons 
belonging to those minorities [in areas in which they constitute dense populations] 
have adequate opportunities for being taught the minority language or for receiving 
instruction in this language”; and to “create the conditions necessary for the 
effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in cultural, social 
and economic life and in public affairs.”87
It is important to note that the FCNM does mirror Article 27 of the ICCPR in its 
call to promote the conditions necessary for national minorities “to maintain and 
develop their culture” and to preserve their identity, “namely their religion, language, 
traditions and cultural heritage.”88 It also recalls Article 27 of the ICCPR in its 
recognition that “national minorities may exercise the rights and enjoy the freedoms 
flowing from the principles enshrined in the present framework Convention
O Q
individually as well as in community with others.”
Article 10 notes a right to use the minority language in public and private.90 
Article 11 stresses the right to use names and the right to exhibit signs and other 
information in the minority language, and also provides that, in areas of traditional 
habitation, States parties should endeavor, in given circumstances, to display local 
names and street signs in the minority language.91
Article 14 calls for the recognition that every member of a minority has the right to 
learn his or her minority language. While the Explanatory Report to the FCNM notes 
that this “does not imply ... action, notably of a financial nature, on the part of the 
State,”92 Article 14 also calls upon States Parties to endeavor to ensure, under given 
circumstances, that “persons belonging to ... minorities have adequate opportunities 
for being taught the minority language or for receiving instruction in this language.”
In adopting the FCNM, the Council of Europe did much to address the deficiencies
84 Article 12 (2) o f the FCNM.
85 Article 12 (3) o f the FCNM.
86 Article 14 (2) o f the FCNM.
87 Article 15 o f the FCNM.
88Article 5 (1) o f the FCNM.
89 Article 3 (2) o f the FCNM.
90 Article 10 (1) o f the FCNM.
91 Article 11 of the FCNM.
92 Explanatory Report o f the FCNM (Strasbourg: Council o f Europe, 1999), pp. 34-35.
93 Article 14 o f the FCNM.
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of its pre-existing system of minority protection. By championing minority rights as 
an obligation of international law, it incorporated standards that had long been part of 
Article 27 of the ICCPR and reinforced the consensus that minority protection was a 
critical element of global security. By explicitly specifying the rights necessary to 
minority protection, the Council of Europe gave content to prerogatives that were 
undefined under the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms.94
However, it is also true that FCNM has exposed its limitations in terms of the 
effective protection of the rights of persons belonging to minorities. First, while this 
instrument explicitly recognises a broad series of rights for national minorities and 
underlines affirmative measures that States should take to advance these prerogatives, 
that the exercise of minority rights is qualified by the so-called escape clause with 
phrasing like “where such a request corresponds to a real need” and “as far as 
possible” is problematic for the effectiveness of this right.95 For example, in Article 
10, States parties “shall endeavour to ensure” the conditions making it possible to use 
the minority language in relations with administrative authorities, but only 1) in areas 
traditionally inhabited by minorities, 2) if minorities so request, and 3) when that 
request corresponds to a real need.96
5.2. Minority Protection in the Organisation on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE)
07The Organisation on Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is a regional 
security organisation with fifty-six participating States drawn from Europe, Central 
Asia and America. Initially, the OSCE process began with the signing of the Helsinki
Q Q
Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in 
1975. The most significant event that changed the nature of the CSCE forum was the 
collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe. This fundamental change in the character
94See, generally, M. Weller, ed., The Rights o f  Minorities in Europe: A Commentary on the European 
Framework Convention fo r  the Protection o f  National Minorities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005).
95 K. Henrard, Devising an Adequate System o f  Minority Protection: Individual Human Rights (The 
Hague and London: Martinus Nijhoff, 2000), p. 212.
96 Article 10 (2) o f the FCNM.
97 For the main documents for the OSCE, see A. Bloed (ed.), From Helsinki to Vienna: Basic 
Documents o f  the Helsinki Process (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1990).
98 Helsinki Final Act, 14 ILM 1272 (1975).
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of the forum was clearly expressed in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe," which 
‘unanimously’ accepted the inalienability of human rights and the connection between 
democracy and the market economy as the basis for sound economic, social and 
political development. The CSCE shifted focus towards the prevention and 
management of conflict in Europe, and this change required it to institutionalise itself 
at a more advanced level. New structures and new implementation mechanisms were 
developed, and the renaming of the forum to the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was one of those efforts to respond to different 
situations.
A fundamental expansion of human rights commitments came following the end of 
the Cold War and the 1990 Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human 
Dimension100 was ‘revolutionary’ in its expansion of the OSCE human rights 
commitments. The OSCE States agreed on the principles of free elections, 
representative government, the rule of law, separation of States from political parties, 
and the independence of the judiciary. The will of the people, freely and fairly 
expressed through periodic and genuine elections, the participating States declared, is 
the basis of the authority and legitimacy of all government.101 Furthermore, the 
Document contained a number of specific pledges for the protection of minority 
rights.102 OSCE commitments are politically, not legally, binding, although they do
establish standards of behaviour which the participating States are committed to
101upholding. These political commitments may harden into legal norms.
The Helsinki Final Act and the Concluding Document of the Copenhagen Meeting 
on Human Dimension (Copenhagen Document) are the basic documents which give 
substance to the standards of minority rights in the OSCE.104 The basis for the
99 Charter o f Paris for a New Europe, 3 0 ILM 190 (1991).
100 The Copenhagen Meeting o f the Conference o f Human Dimension, 29 ILM 1305 (1990).
101 Ibid., p. 1309.
102 Ibid., pp. 1318-1320.
103Sidiropoulos and 5 others v. Greece, No. 26695/95, 10 July 1998, Reports o f Judgments and 
Decisions, 1998-IV, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int, see Chapter 6 below, pp. 185-186. It has been 
emphasised that the binding force o f such OSCE documents cannot be questioned. Van Dijk states that: 
“A commitment does not have to be legally binding in order to have binding force; the distinction 
between legal and non-legal binding force resides in the legal consequences attached to the binding 
force.” P. Van Dijk, “The Final Act o f Helsinki: basis for a pan-European system?”, Netherlands 
Yearbook o f  International Law, Vol., XI, 1980, p. 110. Although non-compliance with a non-legally 
binding commitment may not per se generate legal responsibility, a violation of politically binding 
commitments is also unacceptable as a violation o f norms o f international law. The provisions 
contained in these OSCE texts often reflect principles o f international law.
104 The Copenhagen Document has been called a European Constitution o f Human Rights, whose 
expression shows the legal significance of the Document in examining minority rights standards in
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protection of minority rights stems from Principle VII of the Final Act, which 
guarantees equality before the law to members of minorities as well as the protection 
of all the general human rights provisions of the OSCE. Principle VII of the Final Act 
contains the following statement:
“The participating States on whose territory national minorities exist will respect the right 
of persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford them the 
full opportunity for the actual enjoyment o f human rights and fundamental freedoms and 
will, in this manner, protect their legitimate interests in this sphere.”105
The Third Basket on “Co-operation and Exchange in the Field of Education” in the 
Final Act, contains another statement concerning minorities:
“National minorities or regional cultures. The participating States, recognizing the 
contribution that national minorities or regional cultures can make to co-operation among 
them in various fields o f culture, intend, when such minorities or cultures exist within 
their territory, to facilitate this contribution, taking into account the legitimate interests of 
their members.”
The important question to answer from the above provisions is how to interpret the 
‘escape clause’ concerning the existence of minorities in the participating States, “The 
participating States on whose territory national minorities exist.. .’’and “.. .when such 
minorities or cultures exist within their territory...” Are these expressions to be taken 
to mean a certain degree of discretion on the part of the participating States to decide 
on the existence of minorities? As the wording of the above provision is similar to that 
of Article 27 of the ICCPR, it would be useful to recall the legal nature of Article 27. 
As observed, the wording of Article 27 of the ICCPR does not give discretion to States 
to accept or refuse the existence of minorities. The existence of a minority in a State is 
an objective issue and does not depend on legal recognition of the State in which the 
persons belonging to minorities reside.106 This principle is also to be applied to the 
above provisions of the Final Act regarding minority protection.
Europe. See A. Bloed., “Successful Meeting o f the Conference on the Human Dimension o f CSCE”, 
Netherlands Quarterly o f  Human Rights, Vol., 8, 1990, pp. 235-260. See also, M. Tabory, “Minority 
Rights in the CSCE Context”, Israel YB. H.R, Vol., 20, 1991, pp. 197-221. The Copenhagen provisions 
have also been incorporated as ‘legal obligations’ in important bilateral treaties, such as the 1995 basic 
treaty between Hungary and Slovakia. The OSCE provisions may also develop into customary law 
through State practice and opinio juris. According to Hofmann, at least some o f the Copenhagen 
provisions may have even developed into customary international law. R. Hofmann, “Minorities: 
Addendum 1995” in P. Macalister-Smith., (ed.), Encyclopedia o f  Public International Law 
(Amsterdam: Elsevier Science B.V., 1993), Vol., 3, pp. 420-421.
105 Reference only to “national minorities” in the Final Act, not national, ethnic and linguistic 
minorities must not be seen as a limitation o f the concept o f  a minority. According to Tabory, the term 
of “national minorities” was chosen as a “hybrid” between the terminology in the international human 
rights documents and the Eastern European concept o f ‘nationalities’. The use o f the term o f  
‘nationalities’ is primarily for historical reasons relating to Eastern Europe. Tobory, Minority Rights in 
the CSCE Context, op.cit., p.208.
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The Copenhagen Document contains important commitments in respect of rights 
of persons belonging to minorities. The participating States recognised the right of 
persons belonging to national minorities “to express, preserve and develop their ethnic, 
cultural, linguistic or religious identity and to maintain and develop their culture in all
1 07its aspects, free of any attempts at assimilation against their will.” Persons 
belonging to national minorities have the right to use freely their mother tongue in
I  / \ Q
private as well as in public, and to establish and maintain educational institutions, 
and to seek voluntary financial and other contributions as well as public assistance.109 
Participating States further committed themselves to “endeavour to ensure” that 
persons belonging to national minorities, notwithstanding the need to leam the official 
languages, have adequate opportunities for instruction in their mother tongue, as well 
as, wherever possible and necessary, for its use before public authorities, in 
conformity with applicable national legislation.110
The Copenhagen Document recognises both the negative and the positive aspects 
of the right to ethnic, religious or linguistic identity: participating States are to “protect 
the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities on their 
territory and create conditions for the promotion of that identity.” 111 The 
commitments do not extend to the introduction of territorial self-government for 
national minorities, although the OSCE participating States have recognised the value 
of “autonomous administrations corresponding to the specific historical and territorial 
circumstances of national minorities” as one mechanism by which the identity of 
national minorities may be protected and promoted.112
6 Minority Protection through Bilateral Treaties in Central and
111Eastern Europe
The protection of ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities through inter-State treaties
106 The Greco-Bulgarian Communities Case, PCIJ Series A/B, No. 17, 1930, p. 22.
107 Para. 32 o f the Copenhagen Document.
108 Para. 32. 1 o f the Copenhagen Document.
109 Para. 32. 2 o f the Copenhagen Document.
110 Para. 34 of the Copenhagen Document.
111 Para. 33 o f the Copenhagen Document.
112 Para. 33 o f the Copenhagen Document.
113 See Article 2 o f the proposed Convention in Chapter 8 below, pp. 257-258.
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does not constitute a new phenomenon in international law, as it was already made in 
the practice of the League of Nations. The idea of minority protection through bilateral 
treaties reappeared after World War II in the peace treaties with Romania, Hungary 
and Bulgaria, as well as in the agreement on the status of South Tyrol. The practice of 
the protection of minority groups through bilateral treaties was reinvented by 
Germany after 1991. The reasons are rooted in German reunification and the related 
need to guarantee the frontiers resulting from World War II, as well as in the presence 
of minorities of German origin in Central and Eastern Europe whose protection 
needed to be ensured. In addition to treaties on neighbourly relations with each of its 
Central European neighbours, Germany has also concluded treaties on friendly co­
operation and partnership with Bulgaria (1991), Hungary (1992) and Romania (1992). 
A similar policy was pursued during this period by Hungary, which concluded 
bilateral agreements with five of its neighbours to deal with the problems of the 
Hungarian minorities. Parallel to this trend, the European Union has also promoted a 
policy aimed at guaranteeing stability in Central and Eastern Europe through bilateral 
agreements on a good neighbourliness, such as the treaties between Poland and its 
neighbours, the treaties between Russia and the CIS States (such as Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan), the treaties signed by Ukraine with Moldova and Lithuania as well as the 
bilateral treaties adopted by Hungary and its neighbours.114 As for the Baltic States, it 
seems that they consider that the negotiations with Russia have not resulted in a major 
change in the delicate relations with their powerful neighbour, particularly with 
reference to the protection of the Russian minorities.115
The main differences between the earlier treaties on minorities (following World 
War I and World War II respectively) and the recent bilateral treaties are of a 
conceptual nature. Whereas the former refer to minorities as such and include different 
concepts and provisions of autonomy, the recent treaties in Central and Eastern Europe 
explicitly provide individuals belonging to minorities with certain individual rights 
and do not envisage autonomies as a means of protecting minority rights. However, 
the examples of the Aland Islands and South Tyrol prove that bilateral agreements may 
be suitable for establishing autonomous and or special statues for regions inhabited by
ll4See, generally, M. Avbelij, European Parliament review o f the situations o f national and ethnic 
minorities in the selected member States (Brussels: European Parliament, 2005), pp. 6-32;
115 R. Mullerson, “New Developments in the Former U.S.S.R and Yugoslavia”, Va.J. In t’l. L, Vol., 33, 
1993, pp. 299-315; See, generally, R. Mullerson, International Law, Rights and Politics (London: 
Routledge, 1994).
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national minorities, or for establishing personal autonomy where the minorities live 
dispersed. Nevertheless, it must be kept in mind that every minority situation presents 
its own particular characteristics. There is consequently no standard means of 
resolving the multitude of concrete problems which each case presents in a national 
context. No definition of minorities appears explicitly in most of the treaties, although 
in almost every case there is an underlying definition: the treaties refer in general to 
national minorities of the same ethnic origin as the majority in the neighbouring 
country. Therefore, the subjects of the minority-related provisions of the bilateral 
treaties are rather restricted, as they do not refer to all the minorities in the respective 
country.116 The only advantage of this restrictive perspective could be the possibility 
of taking into account the specific historical and traditional needs of the minority 
communities concerned more specifically, which is not the case in general minority 
regulations. The minority provisions listed in the bilateral treaties can be grouped 
around some basic rights, such as the right to free expression, the right to maintain and 
develop one’s ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity in general, and linguistic 
rights, educational rights, the right to profess and practice one’s own religion, and the 
right to establish organisations, the right to effective participation in the decision-
117making procedures, in particular.
More importantly, several provisions dealing with minority rights in the bilateral 
treaties strongly bear the imprint of international and regional instruments on minority 
issues. One can find in these treaties provisions quoted almost verbatim from several 
documents on the protection of minority rights, such as the UN Declaration on 
Minority Rights and the OSCE Copenhagen Document. For instance, the treaty 
between Germany and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic of 27 February 1992 
(art. 20) declares that both parties will “fulfil as legal obligations the political 
commitments laid down in CSCE documents, and especially those laid down in the 
Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of 
the CSCE of 29 June 1990.” Even more explicit is the wording of Article 15 of the 
Romanian-German Treaty on Friendly Relations and Partnership in Europe of 21 April 
1992 which declares that both parties should apply the minority rights laid down in the 
Copenhagen Document and other OSCE text as legal obligations. Similar provisions
116 Avbelij, European Parliament review o f  the situations o f  national and ethnic minorities in the 
selected member States, op.cit., p. 30.
149
were enshrined in the treaty between Hungary and Slovakia (arts. 2 and 15): “in the 
interest of defending the rights of persons belonging to the Slovak minority living in 
the Hungarian Republic, as well as the Hungarian minority living in the Slovak 
Republic, shall apply as legal obligations the rules and political commitments laid 
down in the following documents...” The provisions then list the Copenhagen 
Document and the UN Declaration on Minority Rights. However, the wordings used 
in the minority provisions of the treaties are very often limited by vagueness and 
formulations which are difficult to interpret, such as “within the framework of their 
domestic legislation”. These vague expressions could hinder the effective 
implementation of the provisions enshrined in these treaties.118
7. The Protection of Cultural Identity and the Baltic Implications
7. 1. The Protection of Minority Rights and the Status of the Ethnic, Linguistic 
Russian Populations in Estonia and Latvia
Even if the principles of the protection of minority rights are identified as above, this 
does not mean that rights of persons belonging to minorities are necessarily fully and 
effectively protected in their true sense at the domestic legal level. The gap between 
the reality and ideal of the protection of persons belonging to minorities under 
international standards of minority rights is evidently illustrated in the case of the 
fragile status of the ethnic, linguistic Russian populations in Estonia and Latvia. In this 
regard, it is ironic that Estonia and Latvia have both declared their commitments to 
protect minority rights through their own constitutions. For instance, the Constitution 
of Latvia proclaims their commitment to protect the rights of persons belonging to 
minority groups in the following terms:
“Persons belonging to ethnic minorities have the right to preserve and develop their
language and their ethnic and cultural identity.”"9
117 G.E. Edwards, “Hungarian national minorities: recent developments and perspectives”, 
International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, Vol., 5, 1998, pp. 345-367.
118 K. Gal, “Bilateral Agreements in Central and Eastern Europe: A New Inter-State Framework for 
Minority Protection?”, ECMI Working Paper, 1999, p. 12.
119 Article 114 o f the Latvian Constitution. The Constitution o f the Republic o f Latvia o f 1922, 
officially published in Latvijas Republikas Saeimas un Ministru Kabineta Zinotajs (Official Gazette), 
No. 6, 1994 and in Latvijas Vestnesis (LV, Official Gazette), No. 43, 1993. Estonia has similar 
provisions o f minority protection in Articles 37 and 52 under Estonian Constitution. The Constitution of 
the Republic o f Estonia, RT 26, 1992.
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As noted, the Law on Cultural Autonomy for National Minorities in Estonia only 
applies to citizens. The right of all individuals belonging to ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minorities to identify with such a minority group with no disadvantage
deriving from that choice is guaranteed under present international standards of
1 00minority rights. The right of identity is essential in the international protection of 
minority rights, without which the protection of minority rights would be meaningless. 
Despite what the FCNM refers to “all persons living on a State’s territory”,121 and 
exhortations from the OSCE HCNM not to restrict minority status only to “non-ethnic 
Estonians who are Estonian citizens” in ratifying the FCNM, Estonia has narrowed the 
scope of the application of the right to identity basically to Estonian citizens by
1 29
entering a declaration when it ratified the FCNM. In Estonia, the Law on Cultural 
Autonomy of National Minorities of 1993 specifically addresses the issue of the 
protection of minority rights. Article 1 of the Law stipulates an official definition of a 
minority as follows:
“they are citizens of Estonia; they reside in the territory o f Estonia; they have time- 
honored, stable and strong links with Estonia; they differ from Estonian by their ethnic 
affiliation, cultural and religious idiosyncrasies, or language; they are guided by the 
desire to conserve, by joint efforts their cultural tradition, religion and language, 
underlying their common identity.”123
This means that in Estonia this stipulation effectively excludes 20 percent of the 
country’s population or more than half of the Russian minorities from protection under 
the FCNM.124 The Law enumerates basic rights of minority members, stipulating the 
procedure and rules for foundation of cultural autonomies which are supposed to 
maintain the system of minority educational and cultural organisation. However, no 
cultural autonomy for the ethnic, linguistic Russians has been established in Estonia 
since 1993.125
120 FCNM, Article 3(1); See also Article 4 (5) o f the proposed Convention in Chapter 8 below, pp. 258- 
260.
121 Article 6 (1) o f the FCNM provides that “The Parties shall encourage a spirit o f tolerance and 
intercultural dialogue and take effective measures to promote mutual respect and understanding and co­
operation among all persons living on their territory, irrespective o f those persons' ethnic, cultural, 
linguistic or religious identity, in particular in the fields o f education, culture and the media.”
122 Letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs o f the Republic o f Estonia, S. Kallas, 28 October, 1996, 
http://www.osce.Org/hcnm/recommendations/estonia/l 996/4 lhc 17.html.
123 Law on Cultural Autonomy of National Minorities o f 1993, Unofficial translation from the Estonian 
Translation Centre. The same definition was again declared by Estonia upon the ratification o f the 
Framework Convention for the Protection o f National Minorities.
124 Legal Information Centre for Human Rights, Non-Estonians in Figures 2, at 
http://www.lichr.ee/eng/researchers.analysis/non-estonians<uscore>in<uscore>figures2.htm
125 Opinion on Estonia, ACFC/INF/OPI (2002), para. 29; Poleshchuk, Non-citizens in Estonia, op.cit., 
p. 43; From the present writer’s interview with Vadim Poleshchuk.
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Latvia recently ratified the FCNM.126 The Law on the Unrestricted Development 
and Right to Cultural Autonomy of Latvia’s Nationalities and Ethnic Groups in Latvia, 
provides that “Republic of Latvia residents are guaranteed, irregardless of their
197nationalities, equal human rights which correspond to international standards.” 
However, there is no definition of a minority under this law. This law has not had any 
real practical effect for the protection of the Russian population due to its prevailing
198declarative nature. Paragraph 4 of this law provides as follows:
“The Republic o f Latvia government and administration institutions are responsible for 
the preservation o f the national identity and historical cultural environment of Latvia's 
ancient indigenous nationality, the Lives and for the renewal and development o f the 
socio-economic infrastructure o f their inhabited territories.”129
Paragraph 5 also provides that:
“All Republic o f  Latvia permanent residents are guaranteed the right to establish their 
own national societies, associations and organizations. The government's responsibility is 
to promote their activity and material provisions.”130
However, this law has not provided any concrete mechanism for the implementation 
of its principles and goals. Latvia continues the Soviet-era practice of mandatory 
registration of ethnic origin in passports, a practice criticised in the review of the 
United Nations Committee of Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD). The 
CERD expressed its ‘concern’ as follows:
“It is noted with concern that the legislation o f the State party requires a person’s ethnic 
origin to be recorded in his or her passport, which may expose members o f some
126Latvia issued declarations upon ratifying the FCNM (2005) as follows: “the notion "national 
minorities" which has not been defined in the Framework Convention for the Protection o f National 
Minorities, shall, in the meaning of the Framework Convention, apply to citizens o f Latvia who differ 
from Latvians in terms o f their culture, religion or language, who have traditionally lived in Latvia for 
generations and consider themselves to belong to the State and society o f Latvia, who wish to preserve 
and develop their culture, religion or language. Persons who are not citizens o f Latvia or another State 
but who permanently and legally reside in the Republic o f Latvia, who do not belong to a national 
minority within the meaning o f the Framework Convention for the Protection o f National Minorities as 
defined in this declaration, but who identify themselves with a national minority that meets the 
definition contained in this declaration, shall enjoy the rights prescribed in the Framework Convention, 
unless specific exceptions are prescribed by law.”
127 Law on the unrestricted development and right to cultural autonomy, Latvijas Republikas Saeimas 
un Ministru Kabineta Zinotajs, No. 21, 1991; Human Rights Debate in Latvia 1995-1997, Latvian 
Human Rights Quarterly, 3/4, 1998.
128 European Parliament Report on Citizenship and Constitutional Affairs (Brussels: European 
Parliament, 2005), pp. 17-18. In its comment on Ukraine’s report under the FCNM, the Advisory 
Committee criticises the government for the vagueness o f the provisions in the minority protection law. 
It stated the following: “Article 6 of the Law on National Minorities guarantees cultural autonomy for 
national minorities. This is however formulated only in an extremely general fashion, and the Advisory 
Committee considers that the content and the reach o f this concept would merit being defined and 
developed in more detail.” Ukraine State Report, ACFC/SR (99) 14, para. 32.
129Paragraph 4 o f the Law.
130 Paragraph 5 o f the Law.
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minorities to discrimination on grounds o f their origin.”131
The Latvian government further requires that, in order to register a change in ethnicity, 
an individual must prove ancestry of the desired ethnicity within two generations.132
The right to receive education is critical for the maintenance of identity of 
minority groups. The right to receive education in one’s mother tongue is set forth in 
relevant instruments. For instance, Article 14 (2) of the FCNM stipulates that:
“In areas inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities traditionally or in 
substantial numbers, if  there is sufficient demand, the Parties shall endeavour to ensure, 
as far as possible and within the framework o f their education system, the persons 
belonging to those minorities have adequate opportunities for being taught the minority 
language or for receiving instruction in this language.”133
Minority rights related instruments require States to foster knowledge of the 
culture, history, language, and religion of their minorities.134 The FCNM provides that
1 *3 c
minorities have the right to establish and manage educational facilities, and while
there is no obligation upon States to fund them, a separate provision in the
Copenhagen Document explicitly notes that such facilities may “seek public assistance
• 1 ^in conformity with national legislation.”
In Estonia and Latvia, many ethnic, linguistic Russians have complained that the 
governments have not allocated sufficient funding for teacher training in minority
117languages. The Latvian government’s so-called “Integration Programme” stresses 
the need to create a unified educational system in order to ensure the development of 
Latvian society as a civic society with common values and responsibilities. In 
particular, it stresses the importance of a common language for successful integration 
and therefore the need for Latvian language training, especially so that the younger 
generation is able to use it freely as a mean of communication. The main goals of the 
Integration Programme in the field of education are the development and 
implementation of minority education programmes and the promotion of collaboration
11ftbetween Latvian and minority schools. However, the measures proposed in the
131 Concluding observation o f the CERD on Latvia, A/54/18, para. 399.
132Law on Change o f Name, Surname, and Ethnicity Record, Art. 11 (1). LV. 05. 07, 1994. Amendments 
LV, No. 98, 1996; LV, No. 29, 1997; LV, No. 333, 1998; LV, No. 45.46, 1999. LV is Latvijas Vestnesis 
(Official Gazzete).
133 Article 14 (2) o f the FCNM; Article 4 o f the UN Declaration on Minority Rights.
134 Article 12 (1) o f the FCNM; Article 4 o f  the UN Declaration on Minority Rights; Article 7 (3), (4) 
o f the proposed convention in Chapter 8 below, pp. 263-266.
135Article 13 o f the FCNM.
136 Paragraph 32 (2) o f the Copenhagen Document.
137 Minority Protection in Latvia (Budapest: Open Society Institute, 2002), pp. 340-344.
138 Ibid., p. 324.
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field of education are viewed as the most controversial by many civil society
representatives and minority parents, as they are based on the 1998 Education Law.
According to this law, on 1 September 2004, teaching will occur only in the Latvian
1language in all ten grades of State and municipal general education and institutions. 
The United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC) stated as follows:
While noting the explanation provided by the State party for the adoption o f the 
Education Law o f 1998, particularly the gradual transition to Latvian as the language of  
instruction, the Committee remains concerned about the impact o f the current time-limit 
on the move to Latvian as the language o f instruction, in particular in secondary schools, 
on Russian speakers and other minorities. Furthermore, the Committee is concerned 
about the distinction made in providing state support to private schools based on the 
language o f instruction (Articles 26, 27 o f the ICCPR). The State party should take all 
necessary measures to prevent negative effects on minorities o f the transition to Latvian 
as the language o f instruction. It should also ensure that if  state subsidies are provided to 
private schools, they are provided in a non-discriminatory manner.”140
The Estonian government's approach has shifted considerably over the past few 
years. Originally, the government announced that Russian language education would 
be completely discontinued in Estonian schools in 2007. However, with the adoption 
of amendments to the Basic Schools and Upper Secondary Schools Act,141 the 
Estonian authorities eased their stance on this issue. The reform called for the 
elimination of stand-alone Russian schools in 2007, but allowed forty percent of the 
instruction within Estonian language schools to be in the Russian language. This 
treatment was to occur whether or not the school was located in an area of 
concentrated minority settlement. The Estonian Parliament relaxed these restrictions 
completely under Western pressure, however, adopting an amendment that would 
allow “state-funded high school education in the Russian language in Estonia after the 
year 2007.”142 Estonia's original objectives in moving toward an Estonian-language 
curriculum is to provide secondary school attendees with a knowledge of the Estonian 
language sufficient for daily and occupational communication, as well as the ability to 
study in the Estonian language for integrating non-ethnic citizens into the Estonian 
society. Yet, it appears that the ethnic, linguistic Russians do not take such an
139 Latvian Education Law, Article 9 (3). Latvian Education Law, LV. No. 343/344, 1998.
140Concluding observations o f the Human Rights Committee: Latvia. 06/11/2003. CCPR/CO/79/LVA, 
para. 20.
141 1999-2000 Amendments to the Basic Schools and Upper Secondary Schools Act o f 1993, RT I, 
No.33, 2000.
142 Estonia Passes Amendment Leaving Russian Classes in High Schools After 2007, Estonian Review, 
Mar. 25-31, 2002, http://www.vm.ee/eng/kat<uscore> 137/1729.html.
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optimistic view of this programme.143 The UN CERD has expressed concern that, in 
both Estonia and Latvia, instruments in minority languages may be reduced in the 
future.144
The right to language is essential for the preservation of the identity for minority 
groups and international standards of minority rights require States concerned to take 
steps to facilitate the use of minority languages in contacts between public officials 
and individuals belonging to minorities. These standards also underline the right of 
everyone belonging to minorities to “use freely and without interference his or her 
minority languages, in public and in private, orally and in writing.”145 In certain 
circumstances, the FCNM requires States parties to “make possible the use of minority 
languages in communication with administrative authorities.”146 This requirement 
applies “in areas inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities traditionally or 
in substantial numbers, if those persons so request and where such a request 
corresponds to a real need...” 147 The protection of language rights for minority 
groups causes serious concerns in Estonia and Latvia, whose minority languages are 
officially “foreign” despite being spoken by more than 30 percent of inhabitants.148 In 
both countries, legal provisions require that all communication with the pubic 
authorities must be carried out in the majority language. In Latvia, where about 40 
percent of the population do not speak Latvian as a first language,149 State authorities 
are nevertheless explicitly prohibited from receiving written submission in language 
other than the State language, except in emergency cases. Latvian State Language Law 
prohibits acceptance and consideration of any application or complaints from 
individuals if they are not now written in the State language or not supplied with a 
certified translation into the State language. Article 10 (2) provides that:
“State and municipal institutions, courts and agencies belonging to the judicial system, as
143 Minority Protection in the EU Accession Process (Budapest: Open Society Institute, 2001), pp. 54- 
56.
144 Concluding observation o f CERD on Latvia, 12/04/2001. CERD/C/304/Add.79, para. 18; 
Concluding observation o f the Committee on the CERD: Estonia, 19/04/2000, CERD/C/304/Add. 98, 
para. 12.
145 Article 10 (1) o f the FCNM.
146 Article 10 (2) o f the FCNM.
147 Ibid.
148 Article 5 of Latvian Law on State Language provides that “For the purpose o f this Law, any other
language used in the Republic o f Latvia, except the Liv language, shall be regarded as a foreign
language.” Latvian Law on State Language, LV. No. 428/433, 1999. Estonian Language law, Article 2 
(1) provides that: “For the purposes of this Act, any language other than Estonian is a foreign 
language.” Law on Language, RT, No. 23, 1995.
149 Data from the Latvian Naturalisation Board, in July 2005; See also Minority Protection in the EU  
Accession Process, op.cit., p. 52.
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well as state and municipal enterprises (or companies) shall accept and examine 
documents from persons only in the state language, except for cases set forth in 
paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article and in other laws. The provisions o f this Article do not 
refer to the statements o f persons submitted to the police and medical institutions, rescue 
services and other institutions when urgent medical assistance is summoned, when a 
crime or other violation of the law has been committed or when emergency assistance is 
requested in case o f fire, traffic accident or any other accident.”150
This provision has resulted in widespread official refusal to consider appeals and 
petitions submitted to various State institutions by ethnic, linguistic Russian minorities 
under investigation. The UN HRC expressed its concern as follows:
“The Committee is concerned about the impact o f the state language policy on the full 
enjoyment o f rights stipulated in the Covenant. Areas o f concern include the possible 
negative impact of the requirement to communicate in Latvian except under limited 
conditions, on access o f non-Latvian speakers to public institutions and communication 
with public authorities. The State party should take all necessary measures to prevent 
negative effects o f this policy on the rights o f individuals under the Covenant, and, if  
required, adopt measures such as the further development o f translation services.”151
In Estonia, local governments may adopt languages other than Estonian as their 
official working language where minorities make up at least 50 percent of permanent 
residents, upon the approval by the national government of a formal local government 
request.152 However, no such requests have been approved.153 Moreover, the 
Advisory Committee on the FCNM is seriously concerned about Article 23 of the 
Language Act, which provides that public signs, signposts, announcements, notices 
and advertisements shall be in Estonian. The Advisory Committee is of the opinion 
that this provision is so wide in its scope that it hinders the implementation of the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities, especially since the term “public” appears in 
this context to encompass also a range of information provided by private actors and 
since the obligation to use Estonian is largely interpreted as excluding the additional 
use of a minority language. The Advisory Committee stresses that, to the extent that 
the provision at issue prevents a person belonging to a national minority from 
displaying signs and other information of a private nature visible to the public, it is not 
compatible with Article 11 of the FCNM. Bearing in mind that the expression “of a
150 Latvian Law on the State Language, Article 10(2)
151Concluding observations o f the Human Rights Committee: Latvia. 06/11/2003. CCPR/CO/79/LVA, 
para. 19.
52 Article 10 (1) o f the Estonian Language Law provides that: “In local governments where at least 
half o f the permanent residents belong to a national minority, everyone has the right to receive answers 
from state agencies operating in the territory of the corresponding local government and from the 
corresponding local government and officials thereof in the language o f the national minority as well as 
in Estonian.”
153 V. Poleshchuk, Non-Citizens in Estonia (Tallinn: Legal Information Centre for Human Rights, 
2004), pp. 15-16.
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private nature” in Article 11 of the FCNM refers to all that is not official, there should 
not be a prohibition to use a minority language for example in a sign, poster or an 
advertisement of a private enterprise by persons belonging to a national minority. 
Against this background, the Advisory Committee is of the opinion that Estonia 
should revise the relevant legislation and practice with a view to guaranteeing full 
implementation of the FCNM.154
The question of the protection of persons belonging to minority groups is 
inseparable from language issues in Estonia and Latvia. At the same time, language 
usage is intimately related to citizenship status and community membership and, 
fundamentally, to national identity: language is the chief marker of both the ethnic, 
linguistic Russian minority populations and Estonian and Latvian majorities.155 This 
issue, in relation to the protection of the ethnic, linguistic Russians was dealt with 
within the European Court of Human Rights.156 The view of the Advisory Committee 
on the FCNM also reflects this contradictory reality of the protection of minority 
rights in Estonia. The Advisory Committee addressed Estonia's requirement of 
language proficiency in areas of public and private employment. While it 
acknowledged that a certain level of language proficiency may be legitimately 
required in a number of areas of employment and that this can cause difficulties for 
persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities in their attempts to gain 
access to employment, it emphasised that it was “nevertheless concerned that the 
current language legislation of Estonia contains provisions that could be interpreted in 
a manner that would make such proficiency requirements overly extensive and further 
exacerbate problems related to the implementation of Article 15 of the Framework 
Convention of the Protection of National Minorities.”157 Singling out the passed 
proficiency requirements for service and sales employees, it underlined that “the 
application of this and other proficiency requirements must be strictly limited to the
• t * 1 SRsituations where they are necessary to protect a specified public interest.” The UN 
HRC also stated as follows:
“The Committee is concerned at the practical implementation o f Estonian language 
proficiency requirements, including in the private sector, and the effect this may have on 
the availability o f employment to the Russian-speaking minority. It is also concerned that,
154Opinion on Estonia, ACFC/INF/OPI (2002), para. 43.
155 N. Maveety & A. Grosskopf, “Constitutional Articulation: “Constrained” Constitutional Courts as 
Conduits for Democratic Consolidation”, Law & Soc'y Rev., Vol., 38, 2004, pp. 463-486.
156 See the Podkolzina Case in Chapter 6 below, pp. 188-190.
157Opinion on Estonia, ACFC/INF/OPI (2002), para. 60.
158 Ibid.
157
in those areas where a substantial minority speaks primarily Russian, public signs are not 
posted also in Russian. The State party is invited to ensure that, pursuant to article 27 of 
the Covenant, minorities are able in practice to enjoy their own culture and to use their 
own language.”159
7. 2. The Protection of the ethnic, linguistic Russians under Minorities-Specific 
Standards and its Implications
The preceding examinations of minorities-specific standards in this chapter have 
demonstrated that the ethnic, linguistic Russians in Estonia and Latvia are entitled to 
the enjoyment of minority rights under present international law and that Estonia and 
Latvia, as the parties of the ICCPR and the FCNM, are obliged to protect their cultural 
identities by way of implementing protective measures at the domestic legal level. 
Citizenship is not relevant to the determination of the members of minority groups as 
the holders of minority rights, provided that they have met objective and subjective 
criteria for the determination of minority status, as examined in Chapter 4. In this 
regard, Estonia’s limited granting of minority rights with reference to the status of 
citizenship at the domestic legal level is contrary to the aim of minority protection 
under minorities-specific standards, since it would result in leaving a substantial part 
of persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minority groups outside the 
scope of minority protection.160 In the case of Latvia, even though it does not require 
citizenship to grant minority status at least in formal terms, given that many ethnic, 
linguistic Russians remain stateless and non-citizens because of Latvia’s restrictive 
citizenship law, the effectiveness of minority protection is dubious. Furthermore, 
whether the Law on Unrestricted Development of National or Ethnic Groups in Latvia 
and the Rights to Cultural Autonomy 1991 can be regarded as a special law for the 
protection of minority rights is uncertain, as there is no concrete mechanism for the 
protection of cultural identity for ethnic, religious or linguistic minority groups.161
More seriously, even if the ethnic, linguistic Russians in Estonia and Latvia are 
entitled to minority rights in principle, irrespective of whether the persons in question 
are citizens of Estonia and Latvia under minorities-specific standards, it seems clear 
that the protection of cultural identity alone is not sufficient for the effective protection
159 Concluding observations o f the Human Rights Committee: Estonia 15/04/2003. CCPR/CO/77/EST, 
para. 16.
60 See Article 1 of the proposed convention in Chapter 8 below, pp. 256-257.
161 European Parliament Report on Citizenship and Constitutional Affairs (Brussels: European 
Parliament, 2005), pp. 17-18.
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of ethnic, linguistic Russians, considering the existence of stateless persons and non­
citizens as persons belonging to the Russian minority. For instance, the protection of 
minority rights in Estonia and Latvia may lack effectiveness in that the realisation of 
minority rights in its real sense is, to a larger extent, intimately related to the 
enjoyment of the rights derived from citizenship status, such as the exercise of the 
right to political participation. Under the FCNM, States parties are obligated to respect 
the rights of persons belonging to minorities to effective participation in public affairs, 
including matters relating to minority identity, and in regional and national decision­
making.162 The FCNM requires States Parties to “create” conditions necessary for 
such participation.163 However, in Estonia and Latvia, many ethnic, linguistic 
Russians still lack citizenship, and therefore face limitations to full political 
participation in their States of residence. An estimated 555,000 stateless ‘non-citizens’ 
in Latvia, the majority of whom are ethnic, linguistic Russians were under-represented 
in both the national legislation and the municipal level.164 In Estonia, provision was 
made for Soviet-era settlers to vote in local elections, although non-citizen ethnic, 
linguistic Russians that make up approximately 20 percent of the total population are 
still unable to participate in national elections.165 Moreover, until recently legislation 
in Latvia prescribed language requirements for members of Parliament and candidates 
for positions in representative bodies, with the consequence that ethnic, linguistic 
Russian ‘citizen’ candidates could be barred from running for public office. In both 
Estonia and Latvia, citizenship laws and language legislation restrict the employment 
of non-citizens in a wide range of public and private positions.166 This is the reason 
why the right to political or public participation of persons belonging to minorities in 
relevant decision-making processes in their States of residence is central to the 
effective protection of persons belonging to minority groups. This issue is examined in 
Chapter 7 of this thesis.
162Article 15 of the FCNM.
163 Ibid.
164 Data from the Latvian Naturalisation Board, 2005; Minority Protection in the EU Accession Process, 
op.cit., p. 60.
165 Under Article 41 o f the Estonian Constitution, only Estonian citizens can be members o f a political 
party. See also, Poleshchuk, Non-Citizens in Estonia, op.cit., p. 25.
166 Minority Protection in the EU  Accession Process, op.cit., pp. 60-61 and Appendix A; Ibid., pp. 21- 
31.
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8. Conclusions
(1). The jurisprudence underlying the protection of ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minority groups by the PCIJ has provided the principles of the protection of minority 
rights in modem international law that are still valid today. They are non- 
discriminatory of persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities as 
opposed to the majority population of their State of residence and the protection of 
their ethnic, linguistic and religious characteristics made effective by positive 
measures of the States concerned. Yet, it is also observable that the effectiveness of the 
principle of non-discrimination for the protection of such minorities during the League 
of Nations period was questionable in terms of the exact scope of its applicability to 
concrete situations, as illustrated by the differences of the enjoyment of rights, 
according to citizenship status under the Treaty of Poland. However, it also should be 
noted that the PCU’s Advisory Opinion in the Polish Nationality Case rejected this 
restricted version of minority protection.
(2). Article 27 of the ICCPR and the UN Declaration on Minority Rights can be taken 
as evidence of the existence of the rights of persons belonging to minorities at the 
United Nations level. The range of relevant legal opinions and UN practice studied 
above on the nature of Article 27 of the ICCPR as well as the review of the UN 
Declaration on Minority Rights have indicated that a State’s positive measures are 
required to protect the identity of persons belonging to minority groups at the 
domestic legal level. It may be stated that the principles of minority protection under 
the League of Nations by way of justified and proportionate differential treatment for 
the benefits of persons belonging to minorities are incorporated in the spirit and aim of 
Article 27 of the ICCPR and the UN Declaration on Minority Rights, constituting the 
principles of minority protection at the UN level.
(3). The weak basis of the protection of minority rights under the European 
Convention on Human Rights has been overtaken by the FCNM and the normative 
authority of the OSCE Documents relating to the protection of minority rights. The 
FCNM keep in line with the principles of the protection of minority rights affirmed at 
the UN level.
(4). Although the question of whether the legal status of Article 27 of the ICCPR has 
become a norm of customary international law or not is not certain at present, it can be 
interpreted that the protection of minority rights in the sense of the protection of
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identity for minorities requires States concerned to protect and promote the cultural 
identity of persons belonging to minority groups in their State of residence through the 
implementation of protective measures at the domestic legal level under minorities- 
specific standards.
(5). The examination of minorities-specific standards in this chapter as well as the 
definitional question of a minority in Chapter 4 have indicated that the ethnic, 
linguistic Russians stateless persons and non-citizens in Estonia and Latvia are entitled 
to minority rights. The practice of Estonia under which only citizens can be members 
of a minority as holders of minority rights is contrary to the aim of minority protection 
under minorities-specific standards. Even though Latvia does not require citizenship 
as a requirement for receiving minority status, given that many people have remained 
stateless and non-citizens because of restrictive citizenship laws and that there is no 
special law for minority protection, the effective protection of minority rights in 
Latvia is hardly secured. States’ policies concerning minority protection will be 
decided within domestic institutions, so concrete State practice may vary from State to 
State. But the important point is that minorities-specific standards require States 
concerned to protect the cultural identity of persons belonging to minorities by way of 
providing protective measures for the purpose of protecting and promoting their ethnic, 
religious or linguistic characteristics in principle.
(6). It is thus possible to argue that, as the parties of the ICCPR and the FCNM, 
Estonia and Latvia are obliged to protect the ethnic, linguistic Russians in order for 
them to maintain and promote their ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics at the 
domestic legal level. The practice in Estonia and Latvia in relation to the protection of 
the ethnic, linguistic Russians seems to fall short of this demand in terms of effective 
minority protection. However, it is also true that the examples of Estonia and Latvia 
with reference to the existence of ethnic, linguistic Russian non-citizens and stateless 
persons have shown that cultural protection of minority rights in terms of the 
protection and promotion of identity for persons belonging to minorities under 
minorities-specific standards is not sufficient for the effective protection of persons 
belonging to minorities, because in many cases citizenship status has been linked to 
the ability to enjoy various human rights at the domestic legal level, which obviously 
affects the question of the effectiveness of minority protection in its real sense.
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Chapter VI
Minority Protection under General Human Rights 
Standards with an Emphasis on the Principle of Substantive 
Equality
1. Introduction
The legal basis for the protection of minority rights can be found in general human 
rights standards beyond minorities-specific standards. There is no doubt that minority 
rights form an integral part of the international protection of human rights.1 For 
instance, Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) situates the issue of minorities within a wider context of human rights 
entitlements. The Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities 
(FCNM) also confirms this by explicitly recognising minority rights as a human rights 
issue.2 However, these considerations also reveal that minority rights and human 
rights are not identical notions. The concept of human rights is something qualitatively 
different in that the rights of all individuals are placed under international protection, 
whereas minority rights can be described as special rights recognised to the exclusive 
benefit of persons belonging to minority groups. However, human rights and minority 
rights are complementary and mutually reinforcing for the purpose of effective 
minority protection. For instance, as will be examined in this chapter, the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on 
Human Rights) does not have specific minority rights provisions. However, there are 
in fact many rights which minorities will find protected under the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Although not always well understood, there are a 
growing number of decisions which are creating a framework which minorities may 
be able to use for their greater protection under the European Convention on Human 
Rights.
1 See Article 1 o f the proposed convention in Chapter 8 below, pp. 256-257.
2 Article 1 o f the FCNM states that “The protection o f national minorities and o f the rights and 
freedoms o f persons belonging to those minorities forms an integral part o f the international protection 
of human rights, and as such falls within the scope o f international co-operaton.”
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In particular, this chapter shall pay a special attention to the non-discrimination 
principle and its positive effects on the protection of minority rights. As observed in 
Chapter 5, the non-discrimination principle is the critical element for achieving the 
objective of protecting minority rights in the context of the protection and promotion 
of cultural identity for persons belonging to minority groups within minorities-specific 
standards. The important point is that the non-discrimination principle has not only 
been one of the most essential norms for the protection of human rights, but also a 
necessary element to achieve the objective of protecting persons belonging to ethnic, 
religious or linguistic minority groups under international law. However, the non­
discrimination principle can be applied extensively to minority protection beyond the 
protection of the cultural identity for minorities within minorities-specific standards. 
Bearing this wide-ranging scope of the non-discrimination principle and its positive 
effects on the protection of minority rights in mind, this chapter is primarily concerned 
with discussing the non-discrimination principle for the protection of minority rights 
with a special emphasis on the ‘substantive equality principle’, as the scope of 
application of the non-discrimination principle could differ depending on whether it 
will be considered as formal equality or substantive equality.
As to the question of the protection of the ethnic, linguistic Russians in Estonia 
and Latvia, the native language requirements in the Estonian and Latvian citizenship 
laws raise an important question about discrimination for members of the Russian 
minority with regard to citizenship.4 The important aspect of this chapter within the 
present thesis is to show that the substantive equality principle under general human 
rights standards may be a basis for requiring States in which persons belonging to 
minorities have resided to protect their rights and interests in an effective way, and 
will serve to consolidate the legal and normative bases for the effective protection of 
minority rights under international law.
2. The Non-Discrimination Principle and International Protection of 
Human Rights
3 For a general discussion, see W. McKean, Equality and Discrimination under International Law 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985); P. Thomberry, International Law and the Rights o f  Minorities 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).
4 For a general review o f citizenship policies o f Estonia and Latvia, see Chapter 2 o f this thesis and L. 
Barrington, “The Domestic and International Consequences o f Citizenship in the Soviet Successor 
State”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol., 47, 1995, pp. 731-764.
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2.1. The Development of the Non-Discrimination Principle in International Law
The Universal Declaration on Human Rights declares the non-discrimination 
principle:
“Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction o f any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”5
Article 1 (3) of the United Nations Charter includes among the purposes of the 
United Nations “promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedom for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or 
religion...”6 Article 55(c) of the Charter also commits the United Nations to promote 
non-discrimination. Prohibitions against discrimination are included in major human 
rights instruments, such as the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), and the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR),8 the 1966 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination 1966, the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, and 
the 1960 UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education.9 These 
instruments illustrate that the non-discrimination principle prohibits distinctions based 
on various characteristics such as race, sex, religion, language, or nationality.10 
Moreover, non-discrimination is widely considered as a customary norm of 
international law.11
5 Universal Declaration o f Human Rights, GA Res. 217 A, UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Article 2, UN Doc. 
A/810 (1948).
6 Article 1 (3) o f the United Nations Charter.
7 Article 55(C) o f the United Nations Charter.
8 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, 999 UNTS 174; International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, 999 UNTS 3.
9 International Convention on the Elimination o f All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1966, 660 UNTS 
195; Convention on the Elimination o f All Forms o f Discrimination Against Women, 1979, 1249 UNTS 
13; Convention on the Rights o f the Child, 1989, 1577 UNTS 3; Convention Against Discrimination in 
Education, 1960, 429 UNTS 93.
10 For an excellent study on the concept o f discrimination in international law, see H. Lauterpacht, An 
International Bill o f  the Rights o f  Man (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945); N. Lemer, Group 
Rights and Discrimination in International Law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991);W. 
McKean, Equality and Discrimination under International Law  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1983); E.W. Vierdag, The concept o f  discrimination in international law, with special reference to 
human rights (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973); S. Fredman (ed.), Discrimination and Human Rights 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
11 As Ramcharan aptly pointed out, “equality and non-discrimination constitute the most dominant 
single theme o f the ICCPR.” B.G Ramcharan, “Equality and Non-discrimination”, in Henkin (ed.), The 
International Bill o f  Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1981), pp. 246-269.
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A detailed structure of the non-discrimination principle in general and the 
prohibition of racial discrimination in particular have been formulated in the Untied 
Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(ICERD). There is no doubt that prohibition of ‘racial discrimination’ now forms a
1 9jus cogens’. According to Schwelb’s view, “if there is a subject matter in the 
present day international law which appears to be a successful candidate for regulation 
by peremptory norms, it is certainly the prohibition of racial discrimination.”13 Judge 
Tanaka also stated that:
.. we consider that the norm o f non-discrimination or non-separation on the basis o f race 
has become a rule of customary international law as is contended by the Applicants, and 
as a result, Respondant’s obligation as mandatory is governed by this legal norm in its 
capacity as a member o f the United Nations.”14
Judge Tanaka went on to state that the principle of non-racial discrimination belongs 
to peremptory norms of jus cogens, 15 and the Court has said it belongs to the category 
of obligations, erga omnes.16 Thus, non-discrimination as a fundamental foundational 
human rights principle can be invoked for the protection of ethnic, linguistic and 
religious minorities from racial discrimination in the international legal order.
2.2. The Theoretical Consideration of the Non-Discrimination Principle and the 
Protection of Persons belonging to Minority Groups17
That like should be treated alike conforms to a basic notion of justice. However, this 
assumes that an initial judgment as to two individuals, A and B, being alike had been 
made under given circumstances. As noted above, non-discrimination is an established 
international legal principle under which characteristics based on race, sex, religion, 
colour, ethnic origin or others should not in themselves constitute grounds of 
justification for treating some people differently. However, if one understands this 
notion of non-discrimination as being equal under ‘given situations’, it is inherently 
limited, because, ‘a given norm under a given situation’ has not eradicated all
12 Dicta in the Barcelona Traction, the Namibia, Western Sahara and East Timor cases support this 
assertion. The Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited, ICJ Reports, 1970, p. 3, para. 
33; Legal Consequences fo r States o f  the Continued Presence o f  South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), ICJ Reports, 1971, p.16; Western 
Sahara Case, ICJ Reports, 1975, p. 12; East Timor Case (Port. v. Austl), ICJ Reports, 1995, p. 90.
13 E. Schwelb, “Some Aspects o f International Jus Cogens as Formulated by the International Law 
Commission”, AJIL, Vol., 61, 1967, p. 956.
14 South West Africa Case (Second Phase), ICJ Reports, 1966, p. 293.
X5Ibid., pp. 208-209.
16Barcelona Traction Case, op.cit., p. 3.
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exclusionary rules and regulations from the start. For instance, controlling 
immigration according to citizenship criteria could be a source of racial 
discrimination; yet it can be accepted that a State has the discretion to exclude from 
citizenship anyone whom it wishes, arguing that those criteria do not involve stripping
‘existing citizens’ of their right to domicile. In other words, ‘formal equality’ is based
* 18on assumption of conformity to ‘given norms’ in a society.
According to Parekh, this will lead to a forced assimilation in which all members 
of a society share a common a national culture. He observes that:
“The choice before minorities is simple. If they wish to become part o f and be treated like 
the rest o f the community, they should think and live like the latter.”19
An individual can be considered in abstract terms within the concept of formal 
equality, yet this is not always immediately visible. For instance, ‘abstract’ individuals 
may be the members of the majority in respect of race, sex, religion and culture in a 
society. This means that the right to equality and non-discrimination is reserved to 
those who confirm to a ‘given norm’.
The unreasonable outcome of the application of formal equality seems to lie in the 
limitations of formal equality as a concept. It is satisfied so long as likes are treated 
alike. Once two individuals are found to be relatively alike and are treated equally, it 
demands no more than like treatment. It does not make a distinction about whether the 
individuals in questions are treated equally badly or equally well. Yet, this has 
profound consequences for the persons whose status is the object of the application of 
equality, because it may well be the refusal to recognise the needs and aspirations of 
distinct minority groups against the backdrop of the overall structure of a society. A 
series of negative problems in the application of a qualified equality principle will 
emerge, because of the inherent limitations of formal equality.
Formal equality can also ignore the group aspect of minority status. In focusing on 
the individualistic approach in the protection of human rights according to his or her 
own qualities or merits, and not on the basis of negative stereotypes of race, sex, or 
nationality, formal equality can deny the value of the group aspect in defining an 
individual’s identity. This is nothing less then to deny the very legal philosophical
17 See Article 6 o f the proposed convention in Chapter 8 below, pp. 262-263.
18 S. Fredman, “Combating Racism with Human Rights: The Right to Equality”, in Discrimination and 
Human Rights: The Case o f  Racism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 16-18; C. Barnard 
and B. Hepple, “Substantive Equality”, Cambridge Law Journal, Vol., 59, 2000, pp. 562-585.
19 B.C. Parekh, “Integrating Minorities”, in Race Relations in Britain (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 2
20Fredman, Combating Racism with Human Rights, op.cit., pp. 16-18.
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foundation for the protection of the rights of persons belonging to minorities. As a 
logical result, it has also had inevitable limits on the protection of the ethnic, religious 
or linguistic groups, since States have only negative obligations to refrain from 
discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, religion and language. No positive 
obligations are imposed under this individualistic perspective of equality. Yet racial 
discrimination extends far beyond individual acts of racial prejudice, which requires a 
State’s positive actions to correct the problems of existing unequal situations. Of 
course, international instruments on minority rights require a State’s positive action for 
the protection of persons belonging to minorities. However, as the application of the 
non-discrimination principle is primarily concerned with the protection of the cultural 
identity of minorities in minorities-specific standards, it is possible for States to argue 
that they are respecting the non-discrimination principle, even if it does not mean 
‘substantive equality’ in its true sense.
It should be noted that substantive equality is fundamentally different from formal 
equality, because the former goes beyond consistent treatment of likes. Substantive 
equality can be secured by way of guaranteeing ‘equality of opportunity’ and ‘equality 
of results’.21 Equality of opportunity pays attention to the fact that the discriminatory 
aspect of a ‘given norm’ can make it extremely difficult for members of particular 
groups such as ethnic, religious or linguistic groups to cross the threshold condition of 
similarity required to trigger the right to like treatment. It asserts that real equality 
cannot be achieved without guaranteeing the equality of opportunity. If individuals 
begin the race from different starting points, equality in its fullest extent cannot be 
secured. Therefore, equality of opportunity demands ‘necessary State action’ for
disadvantaged or marginalised groups in order to equalise the starting point of the
22race.
Williams’s distinction between a procedural and a substantive sense of equality is 
instructive in materialising States’ positive actions to protect disadvantaged groups in 
a society. On a procedural level, equality of opportunities requires the removal of 
obstacles to the advancement of disadvantaged groups such as ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minorities and women. But this does not itself guarantee greater 
substantive fairness in the results. The substantive sense of equality of opportunities,
21 Ibid., pp. 19-22.
22 Ibid., pp. 20-21.
23 B. Williams, “The Idea o f Equality”, in P. Laslett and W. G Runciman (eds.), Philosophies, Politics
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by contrast, requires measures to be taken to ensure that persons from all sections of 
society have a genuinely equal chance of satisfying the criteria for access to a 
particular social good.24 This requires not only that States have negative obligations to 
abstain from discriminating but also should reconsider existing criteria of merit. That 
is, a State is not securing genuine equality of opportunity if that State applies an 
unchallenged criterion of merit to people who have been deprived of the opportunity 
to acquire ‘merit’.
‘Equality of results’ requires that the result be equal. Equality of results would be 
the more obviously redistributive aim of requiring an equal outcome, for instance, 
equal representation of minorities in a particular grade. Equality of results assumes 
that specific and concrete measures are required to meet the needs and desires of
c
disadvantaged groups to achieve equality and non-discrimination. A definition of 
substantive equality is provided by Justice L'Heureux Dube of the Supreme Court of 
Canada in the following manner:
“This term reflects the underlying goal o f achieving an equality o f outcome or substance 
among all members o f society, regardless o f differences... This ideal can be contrasted 
with the concept o f “formal equality” or sameness o f treatment in the law, which does 
little to overcome patterns o f social disadvantage and indeed, may perpetuate them.”26
It can be observed from the above that formal equality may play some role in 
prohibiting blatant racial prejudice and discrimination. But, at the very least, it cannot 
‘guarantee’ the protection of the interests of persons belonging to ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minority groups in a fully satisfactory way. Formal equality would be empty, 
if there were no obligatory concrete policy measures to correct the existing unequal 
reality. A State’s obligations to protect the rights of persons belonging to minorities
97must be based on the objective of achieving substantive equality.
The critical question then to be answered would be whether equality and non­
discrimination provisions in major international human rights conventions are based 
on substantive equality or formal equality, which requires an in-depth analysis of the 
nature of the non-discrimination principle with reference to relevant positive legal 
provisions. It is important to note that these non-discrimination provisions in relevant 
conventions should be approached in light of a contextual interpretation in a way that
and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 110.
24 Ibid., pp. 125-126.
25Fredman, Combating Racism with Human Rights, op.cit., p. 19.
26 C. L'Heureux Dube, “Making a difference: The pursuit o f equality and a compassionate justice”, 
SAJHR, Vol., 13, 1997, p. 338.
27 See Article 6 (2) o f the proposed convention in Chapter 8 below, pp. 262-263.
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will maximise the aims of each provision in those conventions for the achievement of 
the non-discrimination principle.
3. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (ICERD)29
3.1. The Definition of Racial Discrimination and the Comprehensive Scope of the 
ICERD
According to Article 1, paragraph 1 of the ICERD, racial discrimination is “any 
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or 
national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms on the political, economic, social, cultural or other field of 
public life.”30
Racial discrimination occurs when there has been an act or omission that can be 
described as a distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference; the act or omission was 
based on one of more of the following grounds; race, colour, descent, or national or 
ethnic origin; the action has the purpose or effect of nullifying the exercise of an 
individual’s human rights and fundamental freedoms in a political, economic, social, 
cultural or other field of public life. However, the list of protected fields is not 
exhaustive. It covers an area of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including 
equality before the law, the right to security, political and civil rights as well as
31economic, social and cultural rights.
That the term “race” is not used in a narrow biological sense is significant for the 
protection of ethnic, religious and linguistic groups as the ICERD uses the race 
concept in its sociological context. The definition of racial discrimination is thus not 
limited to physical characteristics; it also covers various phases of discrimination such
28 Article 31 o f the Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties provides that a treaty shall be interpreted 
“in the light o f its object and purpose”. Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties, 23 May, 1969, 1155 
UNTS 331.
^International Convention on the Elimination o f All Forms o f Racial Discrimination, 1966, 660 UNTS 
195. This convention entered into force on January 1, 1969. There are 172 States parties to this 
convention as o f 31 August 2005 including all member States o f the Council o f Europe.
30 Article 1 (1) o f the ICERD.
31 R Justesen, “Equality for Ethnic Minorities-Intemational and Danish Perspectives”, International
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as historical and cultural discrimination. The socially constructed term ‘race’ has 
significant impact in terms of addressing the problem of discrimination, because it can 
defend the rights of all individuals, while at the same time dealing with racial 
discrimination.32
States are obliged to prohibit both ‘direct and indirect racial discrimination’ under 
the ICERD. Discriminatory intent, therefore, is not required. If a superficially neutral 
measure has the effect of denying certain ethnic, religious or linguistic groups a 
specific right, it may be an act of illegal indirect discrimination, because it has 
perpetrated a ‘discriminatory outcome’. The Committee of Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (the CERD Committee) under the ICERD made it clear that racial 
discrimination is comprehensive, which includes ‘indirect discrimination’ within the 
meaning of ‘discrimination’. Recognition of the concepts of direct discrimination and 
indirect discrimination can be found in the Committee’s following views:
“...There is, thus, no question o f direct discrimination (purpose or intent) in the case. The 
Committee furthermore noted that, on the basis o f the information provided by the author 
it is not possible to reach the conclusion that the system works to the detriment of persons 
of a particular race or national origin. There is no question o f 'indirect discrimination 
(effect) either. ”’33 (Emphasis added.)
3. 2. The State’s Required Obligations to Eliminate Racial Discrimination
States are obliged to “undertake to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay 
a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms” under Article 2 of the 
Convention. Article 2 is characterised as a ‘promotional provision’, which means that 
States are obligated to promote a defined objective rather than maintain a defined 
standard.34 According to the view of the CERD Committee, the State’s obligations 
under Article 2 will not simply be satisfied by incorporating the Convention into a 
domestic law. Nor is a general pronouncement of the prohibition of racial 
discrimination in domestic law sufficient. The prohibition of discrimination has to be 
discrete, and its enforcement must be effective. This means that if  a legal prohibition 
of discrimination does not become generally effective, the State is obligated to
Journal on Minority and Group Rights, Vol., 10, 2003, pp. 1-43.
32 KJ. Partsch, “Fundamental Principles o f Human Rights: Self-determination, Equality and Non­
discrimination”, in K. Vasak (ed.), The International Dimensions o f  Human Rights (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 1982), p. 76.
33 B.M.S. v. Australia, Case No. 8/1996, Views adopted on 12 March 1999, CERD/C/54/D/8/1996, para. 
9-2.
34E. Schwelb, “The International Convention on the Elimination of all forms o f Racial Discrimination”, 
ICLQ, Vol., 15, 1966, p. 1016.
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strengthen its efforts against discrimination by various means. The demand of a 
‘concrete obligation’ of States to establish and implement a policy against racial 
discrimination is clearly illustrated by an individual communication to the Committee. 
The Committee stated that:
“The Committee cannot accept any claim by the Dutch government that the enactment of 
law making racial discrimination a criminal act, in itself, represents the full compliance 
with the obligations o f states parties under the Convention.”35
The Committee’s opinion demonstrates that even if apparently comprehensive 
legislation exists, this will not automatically satisfy the requirements of the 
Convention, as long as the law in question is not effectively enforced in a positive way 
to prohibit racial discrimination. That the ICERD requires the States’ positive 
measures to eliminate racial discrimination indicates that the Convention goes further 
than just establishing formal equality before the law and equal protection of law.
This also can be inferred from the goals of the Convention. The preamble refers to 
the right of every individual to human rights without distinction as to race, colour, or 
national origin and it underscores that State parties must secure the earliest adoption of
7 (\positive measures to eliminate racial discrimination. That the preamble of the treaty 
forms an integral part of the treaty for the purpose of interpretation is an established 
principle of international law. This was observed by the International Law 
Commission (ILC) in 1966 in its Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties when the 
Commission declared that “that preamble forms part of a treaty for the purpose of 
interpretation is too well settled to require comment.”
As to the States’ positive measures, Article 1 (4) of the Convention provides as 
follows:
“Special measures taken for the sole purpose o f securing adequate advancement o f certain 
racial and ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in 
order to ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment o f or exercise o f human rights 
and fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed racial discrimination, provided, however, 
that such measures do not, as a consequence, lead to the maintenance o f separate rights 
for different racial groups and that they shall not be continued after the objectives for 
which they were taken have been achieved.”38
This qualification of the positive measures, however, must not be interpreted as 
restrictive in terms of the States’ obligations to eliminate racial discrimination, since
35 L.K. v. The Netherlands, Communication No. 4/1991, UN Doc. A/48/18 at 131 (1993), para. 6-4.
36 The preamble to the ICERD, paras. 2 and 12.
37 Paragraph 13, Commentary to Articles 27 and 28 o f the Draft Articles on the Law o f Treaties, 
Official Records o f the United Nations Conference on the Law o f Treaties (first and second secession), 
Documents o f the Conference, 1969, UN Doc. A/Conf. 39/11/Add 2., p. 41.
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Article 1(4) explicitly exempts ‘special measures’ taken for the sole purpose of 
securing advancement of certain racial groups requiring such protection in the 
definition of non-discrimination. A contextual interpretation of relevant provisions 
also supports this argument. Article 5 requires equality before the law, and Article 2 
declares the prohibition of racial discrimination. Article 2, paragraph 2 contains the 
States’ obligations to protect the equal enjoyment of human rights through the 
establishment of special measures. The definition of racial discrimination in Article 1 
incorporates special measures, defined in Article 1 (4) as a necessary corollary to the 
prohibition of discrimination and not as an exception to the principle of non­
discrimination.39 According to Articles 1(4) and 2(2), the ICERD indicates that 
special measures must fulfil the following requirements:
• Special measures must be in the interests of ethnic minorities and must be 
voluntary for ethnic minorities;
• Special measures must be established with the aim of securing de facto 
equality;
• Special measures are necessary to secure this aim;
• Special measures must be limited in time; they must be stopped when the goal 
of equality has been reached.
This shows that mere legislation securing formal equality for minority groups is not 
sufficient under Article 2 (2). Ethnic, religious or linguistic groups must be guaranteed 
de facto equality. Nevertheless, States might still have a considerable measure of 
discretion, since special measures according to Article 2 must only be taken “when the 
circumstances so warrant.” Yet, Article 2 does not provide standards for determining 
“when circumstances so warrant.” No matter how the text is read, it is clear that States 
do not have unlimited discretion in appreciating “when circumstances so warrant.” In 
the concluding observation to the United States on the question of affirmative action in 
2001, the CERD Committee indicated a frame of reference for determining the 
“circumstances” in the following manner:
“With regard to affirmative action, the Committee notes with concern the position taken 
by the State Party that the provisions o f the Convention permit, but do not require States 
Parties to adopt affirmative action measures. The Committee emphasized that the 
adoption o f special measures by State parties when the circumstances so warrant, such as 
in the case o f 'persistent disparities', is an obligation stemming from Article 2(2) o f the
38 Article 1(4) o f the Convention.
39 Mckean, Equality and Discrimination under International Law, op.cit., p. 159.
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Convention.”40 (Emphasis added.)
In other words, the existence of administrative, legislative or social practice that will 
virtually result in “persistent disparities” as regards the interests of persons belonging 
to ethnic, religious or linguistic groups within an overall social structure of a State will 
require the State concerned to implement special measures to correct the persistent 
disparities. This statement of the Committee seems to have confirmed substantive 
equality for which the States positive measures should be designed.
Taken together, theses provisions create a systematic unity, which establishes the 
States’ obligations to secure real or factual equality by way of law. In this regard, 
Meron’s observation of “equality of result” as the principle object of the ICERD 
seems to have sharply pointed out the essence of the Convention in which substantive 
equality is implied.41
3. 3. Discrimination permitted with regard to Non-Citizens
Article 1 (2) provides an exception to the applicability of the Convention. It allows 
States parties to make “distinction, exclusion, restrictions or preferences...between 
citizens and non-citizens.” It gives due regard to State sovereignty in matters of 
citizenship, nationality, and naturalisation, provided States do not discriminate against 
categories of foreigners (Article 1(3)).42 Under the wording of Article 1 (2), there 
might be a situation that a State discriminating on the basis of race or ethnic origin 
may try to justify their actual discriminatory measures, arguing that they are based 
upon alienage. However, other articles have been interpreted to ensure that non­
citizens are not completely unprotected under the Convention. The inclusion of non­
citizens within the reach of Article 4 has never been disputed nor that equality before 
the law must be guaranteed to ‘everyone’ without distinction as to race or ethnic origin 
(Article 5). The distinction established in Article 1(2) should have no impact on the 
implementation of Article 6. Article 6 provides that:
“States Parties shall assure to everyone within their jurisdiction effective protection and 
remedies, through the competent national tribunals and other State institutions, against 
any acts o f racial discrimination which violate his human rights and fundamental
40 The Committee on the Elimination o f Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observation: United States 
of America, 14/08/2001, UN Doc. A/56/18 para. 399.
41 T. Meron, “The Meaning and Reach of the International Convention on the Elimination o f All Forms 
o f Racial Discrimination”, AJIL, Vol., 79, 1985, p. 287.
42Article 1(3) o f the ICERD.
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freedoms contrary to this Convention, as well as the right to seek from such tribunals just 
and adequate reparation or satisfaction for any damages suffered as a result o f such 
discrimination.”4
There is no doubt that the fact that many non-nationals, such as immigrants, are 
visibly different from the majority of the population makes them an easier target of 
racial discrimination. The Convention would be undermined if the protection it affords 
did not extend to such categories of people. ICERD has recognised that States have 
the sovereign right to impose a distinction between citizens and non-citizens insofar as 
their purpose or effect contains no element of discrimination based on race, colour, 
descent, or national or ethnic origin. However, it has also held that Article 1 (2) “must 
not be interpreted to detract in any way from the rights and freedoms recognised and 
enunciated in other human rights instruments.”44 It is critically important to note that 
CERD has been consistent in asking States parties to report on the status of non­
citizens on the question of access to citizenship, particularly migrant workers and 
refugees, who usually belong to a single ethnic group. Denial of access to citizenship 
is frequently directed against ethnic, linguistic minorities, even when relevant 
legislation does not say so directly. There is scope under the Convention for calling on 
States to facilitate naturalisation of non-nationals as a means of combating racial 
prejudice and discrimination.45
43 Article 6 o f the ICERD.
44 ICERD, General Recommendation XI on Non-citizens, Forty-second session, 1993, UN Doc. 
A/48/18 at 112 (1994), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations 
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, UN Doc. HRI\GEN\l\Rev.6 at 202 (2003).
45 CERD/C/60/CO/14, paras.10 and 14, Switzerland; A/57/18, para.464, Yemen; A/56/18, para.334, Sri 
Lanka; CERD/C/60/CO/4, para. 14, Croatia; CERD/60/CO/11, para. 11, Qatar; “The Committee 
expresses concern at the continued practice o f segregation o f Roma children within the educational 
system and at the reports o f discrimination against the Roma regarding access to employment, health, 
political representation and citizenship rights...The Committee...encourages the State party to reinforce 
its efforts to train and recruit Roma teachers and to prevent discrimination against the Roma in access to 
employment, health, political representation and citizenship rights.” Croatia, CERD, A/57/18 (2002) 24 
at paras. 97, 99 and 100.“The Committee notes the information provided by the delegation on the 
conditions governing the acquisition of the nationality o f  Qatar. It is nonetheless concerned at the 
distinction made in article 3 o f Act No. 3/1963, as amended by Act No. 3/1969, between nationals of  
Arab countries and others as regards the length o f time they must reside in Qatar before they can submit 
an application for naturalization. The Committee requests the State party to consider the possibility of 
modifying this provision in order to conform to article 5 (d) (iii) o f the Convention...” Qatar, CERD, 
A/57/18 (2002) 38 at paras. 193, 194 and 196.“The Committee notes the information given by the 
delegation regarding the conditions governing the acquisition o f Yemeni nationality. The Committee 
recommends that the State party take effective measures to ensure the right to acquire nationality for 
non-citizens, including for non-Muslims and children o f mixed couples, without any discrimination.” 
Yemen, CERD, A/57/18 (2002) 74 at para. 464; The CERD also recommends that the States parties to 
the Convention, as appropriate to their specific circumstances, adopt the following measures: that 
ensure that particular groups o f non-citizens are not discriminated against with regard to access to 
citizenship or naturalization, and to pay due attention to possible barriers to naturalization that may 
exist for long-term or permanent residents; recognize that deprivation o f citizenship on the basis o f race,
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4. Articles 2 and 26 of the International Covenant and Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR)46
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) applies to all 
individuals within a State party's territory and subject to its jurisdiction. Article 2 
(1) prohibits distinctions based on race among other categories, as follows:
“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant, without distinction o f any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status.”47
Article 2(2) of the ICCPR also provides that:
“Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State 
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary step, in accordance with 
its constitutional processes and with the provisions o f the present Covenant, to adopt such 
legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in 
the present Covenant.”48
The Human Rights Committee (HRC) has stated that Article 2 is to be interpreted 
as meaning that “a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the 
Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State party, even if 
not situated within the territory of the State party.”49 Similarly, the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) has stated that the ICCPR “is applicable in respect of acts done by a 
State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory.”50
Despite this wide field of application, certain rights are expressly limited to 
specific classes of persons. For instance, the enjoyment of certain political rights is 
limited to citizens, thus excluding non-citizens or stateless persons from the scope of
colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin is a breach o f States Parties’ obligations to ensure non- 
discriminatory enjoyment o f the right to nationality; take into consideration that in some cases denial o f  
citizenship for long-term or permanent residents could result in creating disadvantage for them in access 
to employment and social benefits, in violation o f the Convention’s anti-discrimination principles; 
reduce statelessness, in particular statelessness among children, by, for example, encouraging their 
parents to apply for citizenship on their behalf and allowing both parents to transmit their citizenship to 
their children; regularize the status o f former citizens of predecessor States who now reside within the
jurisdiction o f the State Party. The CERD General Recommendations 30, CERD/C/64/Misc.ll/rev.3 ,
2004.
46The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 
(entered into force 23 March 1976). It has 156 parties, and Estonia acceded on 21 October, 1991. 
Latvia acceded to the Covenant on 14 April, 1992.
47 Article 2(1) o f the ICCPR.
48 Article 2(2) o f the ICCPR.
49 HRC General Comment No. 31, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add. 13 (2004), para. 10.
50 Legal Consequences o f  the Construction o f  a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004, ICJ 
No. 131, at 111 (July 9, 2004).
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the provision. Further, Article 13, regulating expulsion from a State, applies solely to 
aliens lawfully in that State.51 It has also been questioned whether the provision on 
minority rights applies to non-citizens.52
Turning to the non-discrimination clause of the ICCPR, Article 2(1) ensures to “all 
individuals” the rights contained in the ICCPR “without distinction of any kind, such 
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status.” What is most pertinent to the protection of the 
rights of non-citizens or stateless persons is that discrimination is not explicitly 
prohibited on the ground of nationality or citizenship. While reference is made to 
“national origin”, as was considered above, this cannot be assumed to mean that 
discrimination on the ground of nationality is prohibited.53 It is clear, however, that 
the grounds of discrimination in Article 2 of the ICCPR are illustrative and not 
exhaustive. Thus, Bossuyt notes that “proposals to add ‘association with minority 
groups’, ‘economic or other opinion’ and ‘educational attainment’ to the enumeration 
were thought to be unnecessary since they were deemed adequately covered by the 
expressions ‘discrimination on any ground’ and ‘other status.’”54 In light of the non- 
exhaustive nature of the list, Bayefsky argues that “if a distinction of any kind has 
been made the right is engaged and the issue of whether or not it has been violated 
does not turn on questions such as whether ‘sex’ includes sexual orientation or 
pregnancy, or whether ‘national origin’ includes nationality or citizenship.”55 The 
point was raised in the context of Article 26 of the ICCPR. However, the same 
reasoning can be applied to Article 2 of the ICCPR.
As regards whether discrimination on the ground of nationality or citizenship is 
prohibited, the point of departure is that discrimination against aliens is prohibited in 
principle. That this should be so is evident from the fact that a suggestion to replace 
the word “persons” in Article 2(1) of the Covenant with the word “nationals” or 
“citizens” was not pressed.56 The express limitation of certain specified rights to 
nationals or persons lawfully present in the territory of the State also suggests that all
51Articles 12, 13 o f the ICCPR.
52 UN Doc. HRI\GEN\l\Rev. 1, at 38, 1994.
53 R. Cholewinski, Migrant Workers in International Human Right Law: Their Protection in Countries 
o f  Employment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 51.
54 M.J. Bossuyt, Guide to the “Travaux Preparatoires ” o f  the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff ,1987), p. 486.
55 A.F. Bayefsky, “The Principle o f Equality or Non-discrimination in International Law”, HRLJ, 
Vol., 11, 1990, p. 6.
56 Ramcharan, Equality and Non-discrimination, op.cit., p. 263.
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other rights are to be afforded to each and every person irrespective of his or her 
nationality. Further, the HRC has stated that “aliens receive the benefit of the general 
requirement of non-discrimination in respect of the rights guaranteed in the Covenant,
cn
as provided for in article 2 thereof,” and that “there shall be no discrimination 
between aliens and citizens in the application of these rights.”58 Thus, in the case of 
Gueye and Others v. France, the HRC held the term “other status” in Article 26 of the 
Covenant to encompass nationality.59
Thus, the principle is that the ICCPR affords its protections to all persons, 
including persons belonging to minorities. The position of aliens under the Covenant 
has been the subject of a General Comment by the HRC. The relevant paragraph is 
worth quoting again:
“In those cases where aliens constitute a minority within the meaning o f article 27, they 
shall not be denied the right, in community with other members o f their group, to enjoy 
their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion and to use their own language.
Aliens are entitled to equal protection by the law. There shall be no discrimination 
between aliens and citizens in the application o f these rights. These rights o f aliens may 
be qualified only by such limitations as may be lawfully imposed under the Covenant.”60
From the above interpretation of the nature of Article 2 of the ICCPR, it is evident that 
the restrictions which are imposed by law on the minority rights provided in Article 27 
of the ICCPR with reference to citizenship status are contrary to the non­
discrimination principle.
At the heart of equality and non-discrimination in the ICCPR lies Article 26. It 
provides that:
“All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without discrimination to the equal 
protection o f the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit discrimination and guarantee 
to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any grounds such 
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property or other status.”61
Even a derogation clause in Article 4 which permits signatories to deviate from 
protection of certain rights “to the extent strictly required” in times of public 
emergency contains a proviso that derogation does “not involve discrimination solely 
on the ground of race.” Hence, it is clear that racial discrimination as such is
57 HRC General Comment 15, UN Doc. HRI\GEN\l\Rev.l at 18 (1994), para 2..
58 Ibid., para. 7.
59 Gucye and Others v. France, Communication No. 196/1983 (3 Apr. 1989), UN Doc. Supp. No. 
A/44/40, at 189 (1989).
60HRC General Comment 15, op.cit., para. 7.
61 Article 26 o f the ICCPR.
62 Article 4 o f the ICCPR.
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generally not permissible under the ICCPR.
The crucial issue is whether the prohibition of discrimination is limited to the 
rights in the Covenant or beyond them. The issue was settled through the cases Broeks 
v. Netherlands63 and Zwaan-de Vries v. Netherlands64 before the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC). The issue before the Committee was whether discriminatory 
provisions in the Dutch Unemployment Benefits Act fell within the scope of Article 26. 
The Dutch government submitted that discrimination in social security benefit 
provision was not within the scope of Article 26, as the right was contained in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), not the 
ICCPR. They contended that Article 26 did not extend to the social, economic, and 
cultural rights contained in the ICESCR. The Committee rejected this, arguing that 
Article 26 applied to rights beyond the Covenant including the rights in other 
international treaties such as the right to social security in the ICESCR:
“Although article 26 requires that legislation should prohibit discrimination, it does not of 
itself contain any obligation with respect to the matters that may be provided for by 
legislation...However, when such legislation is adopted in the exercise o f a State’s 
sovereign power, then such legislation must comply with article 26 o f the Covenant.”65
The legal reasoning in the Broeks Case was confirmed in the HRC’s General 
Comment 18 in the following terms:
“While article 2 limits the scope o f the rights to be protected against discrimination to 
those provided for in the Covenant, article 26 does not specify such limitation. That is to 
say, article 26 provides that all persons are equal before the law and entitled to equal 
protection o f the law without discrimination, and that the law shall guarantee to all 
persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any o f the enumerated 
grounds. In the view o f the Committee, article 26 does not merely duplicate the guarantee 
already provided for in article 2 but provides in itself an 'autonomous right \  It prohibits 
‘discrimination in law or in fact in any field’ regulated and protected by public authorities.
Article 26 is therefore concerned with the obligations imposed on States parties in regard 
to their legislation and the application thereof. Thus, when legislation is adopted by a 
State party, it must comply with the requirement o f article 26 that its content should not 
be discriminatory. In other words, the application o f the principle o f non-discrimination 
contained in article 26 is not limited to those rights which are provided for in the 
Covenant”.66 (Emphasis added.)
The General Comment 18 clearly affirms that Article 26 is a freestanding non­
discrimination provision and as such it is not ancillary to any other Covenant right. A 
requirement to take positive measures may be found in the call by Article 26 for State 
parties to guarantee to all persons equal and “effective protection” against
63 S. W. M. Brooks v. The Netherlands, Communication No. 172/1984, UN Doc. Supp. No. 40 
(A/42/40) at 139 (1987).
64 F. H. Zwaan-de Vries v. the Netherlands, Communication No. 182/1984 (9 April 1987), UN Doc. 
Supp. No. 40 (A/42/40) at 160 (1987).
65 S.W.M. Broeks v. The Netherlands, op.cit., para. 12.4
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discrimination.67 The Comment made it clear that the prohibition on discrimination 
does not prohibit a State party taking affirmative action on the basis of substantive 
equality. It reads as follows:
“...the principle o f equality sometimes requires States parties to take affirmative actions 
in order to diminish or eliminate conditions which cause or help to perpetuate 
discrimination prohibited by the Covenant. For example, in a State where the general 
conditions o f a certain part o f the population prevent or impair their enjoyment of human 
rights, the State should take specific action to correct those conditions. Such actions may 
involve granting for a time to the part o f the population concerned certain preferential 
treatment in specific matters as compared with the rest o f  the population. However, as 
long as such action is needed to correct discrimination ‘in fa c t’, it is a case o f legitimate 
differentiation under the Covenant.”68 (Emphasis added.)
This view reflects the essence of equality and non-discrimination in the sense of 
substantive equality for which States’ positive actions are required. The HRC, in its 
concluding Comment on the State report by the Czech Republic, said that the State 
party should, in order to assist the Roma community, take “all necessary measures to 
eliminate discrimination against members of minorities... and to enhance the practical 
enjoyment of their rights.”69
70An intention to discriminate is not needed to establish a violation of Article 26. 
But, at the same time, if there is an intent to discriminate, a reasonable and objective
71basis for different treatment may become unreasonable. In the Diergaardt Case, the 
authors were members of the Rehoboth Baster community. Originally from the Cape, 
they moved to their present location in Namibia in 1872, living as an autonomous 
community. Their language was Afrikaans. However, upon independence, English 
became the official language in Namibia. A Namibian government circular instructed 
civil servants not to reply in Afrikaans to the authors’ written communication, even 
when the civil servants were perfectly capable of doing so. The Committee has 
consistently held that distinctions between official and unofficial languages are 
objective and reasonable and do not constitute discrimination. However, in this 
Communication, the majority found that the facts reveal a violation of Article 26. The
66HRC General Comment No. 18, UN Doc., HRI/GEN/1 (1992).
67 M. Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights-CCPR Commentary (Kehl:NP Engel, 1993), 
p. 476.
68HRC General Comment No. 18, op.cit., para. 10.
69 UN Doc. CCPR/CO/72/CZE, paras. 8., 2001.
70 Simunek, et al. v. The Czech Republic, Communication No. 516/1992, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/54/D/516/1992 (1995), para. 11.7. “The Committee is o f the view that the intent o f the 
legislature is not alone dispositive in determining a breach of article 26 o f the Covenant. A politically 
motivated differentiation is unlikely to be compatible with article 26. But an act which is not politically 
motivated may still contravene article 26 if  its effects are discriminatory.”
liDiergaard, et al. v. Namibia, Communication No. 760/1997, UN Doc. CCPR/C/69/D/760/1997 (2000).
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majority view took note that the government instructions to civil servants indicated 
that the authors were being singled out for different treatment. The Committee was 
therefore required to give “due weight to the allegations of the authors that the circular 
in question was intentionally targeted against the possibility to use Afrikaans when
79dealing with pubic authorities.” The majority upheld the authors’ argument that the 
circular had indicated an intention to discriminate against them.
The ICCPR, Article 13, contains special provisions on the expulsion of aliens. The 
ICCPR, Article 25, limits citizens to the right to vote and the right to be elected. In 
these two situations it is permissible to distinguish on the basis of citizenship. A 
systematic interpretation of Article 26 with reference to the ICERD leads to the 
preliminary conclusion that States may distinguish between citizens and non-citizens 
only with regard to these two specific civil and political rights: the right to vote and 
the right to be elected. In light of the above noted HRC’s General Comment criteria, 
States may distinguish on account of citizenship status if the distinction is reasonable 
and objective, and the aim of the limitation on the rights of non-citizens is intended to 
achieve a legitimate purpose. At the same time, if the reasoning of the HRC in the 
noted Diergaardt Case is applied to the protection of persons belonging to minorities 
with reference to citizenship status, where citizenship status is used in reality as a form 
of racial discrimination, it follows that it will be an impermissible discrimination. In 
other words, if a restriction on account of citizenship has a discriminatory impact on 
particular ethnic, religious or linguistic groups, it can be an impermissible indirect 
racial discrimination under Article 26 of the ICCPR.
5. The Protection of Minority Rights under the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms73
5. 1. Minority Protection under the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms
72 Ibid., para. 10.10.
73 213 UNTS 221; ETS 5., The Convention entered into force on 3 September, 1953. As o f 31 August, 
2005, the total number of ratifications/accessions o f the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedom is 46. Estonia ratified the Convention on 16 April, 1996 and Latvia ratified the 
Convention on 27 June, 1997.
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The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights) has no ‘direct binding minority 
provision’ akin to Article 27 of the ICCPR. At first glance, it would seem that since no 
specific minority rights are recognised, there is no direct way for members of a 
minority to claim minority rights before the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR).74 This is, however, a mistaken view. There is a burgeoning minority rights 
jurisprudence of the Court based on interpretation and application of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.75 A number of individual rights guaranteed in the 
Convention are relevant to the protection of persons belonging to minority groups. In 
addition, many minority rights are in fact based on general human rights standards, 
and can therefore also successfully be claimed and protected under the European 
Convention on Human rights. It is thus important to examine to what extent the 
fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention relate to the protection 
of the rights of persons belonging to minorities. Cases have been dealt with the Court 
on expulsion, degrading treatment, freedom of expression, language and religion, 
family and private life, all of which are directly and indirectly related to the protection 
of minority rights. National minority is undefined in the European Convention on 
Human Rights, as is the case with every other international instrument dealing with 
minority rights. However, it should be noted that it is contrary to the European 
Convention to treat “any person, non-governmental organization or group of 
individuals” in a discriminatory fashion with respect to one of the listed grounds
7 f%without reasonable and objective justification. At the same time, that groups or 
organisations might have standing opens up various possibilities for protecting 
interests of members of minority groups, even though there is no express minority 
rights provision in the Convention. The European Convention on Human Rights is a 
human rights instrument, but since groups can claim to be victims, discrimination in 
the enjoyment of rights as between the minority group and the majority groups might
74 The European Court o f Human Rights (ECHR) is an institution created pursuant to the European 
Convention on Human Rights and is a constituent part o f the Council o f Europe, which was created in 
1949 after World War II. In 1998, Protocol 11 o f the Convention revamped its institutional structure to 
phase out the European Commission on Human Rights, which previously reviewed all cases prior to 
their submission to the ECHR, and the creation o f single European Court o f Human Rights. Protocol 11, 
ETS, No. 155, reprinted in 33 ILM 943 (1994).
75 G. Gilbert, “The Burgeoning Minority Rights Jurisprudence o f the European Court o f Human 
Rights”, HRQ, Vol., 24, 2002, pp. 736-780.
76 Case Relating to Certain Aspects o f  the Laws on the Use o f  Languages in Education in Belgium 
(Merits), 1 EUR. HUM. RTS. REP. 252 (1968).
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77well give rise to a violation by the State justiciable before the Court.
While it appears that the ECHR is willing to admit the existence of a minority is 
an objective, factual determination, it was less willing to admit to the existence of any 
special category of minorities which could bring about special legal entitlements in a
7 0
State’s domestic legal regime. In Gorzelick and Others v. Poland, “registered
association of national minorities” were in parliamentary elections entitled to a 
number of privileges under the electoral law of Poland. When members of the Silesian 
minority tried to register as a “national minority’ association, it was claimed by Polish 
authorities that they would automatically have been afforded an unqualified and 
legally enforceable claim to special privileges granted to national minorities by their 
relevant legislation. The Court decided that since it would have been simple to change 
a few words in order to be registered with no real consequences for the applicants, and 
without risking recognition of special privileges by using the words “national 
minority”, there was no violation of freedom of association in not registering the 
association as a “national minority”. The Court stated that:
“65. ...the applicants could easily have dispelled the doubts voiced by the authorities, in 
particular by slightly changing the name o f their association and by sacrificing, or 
amending, a single provision of the memorandum o f association.. .Those alterations 
would not, in the Court’s view’, have had harmful consequences for the Union’s existence 
as an association and would not have prevented its members from achieving the 
objectives they set for themselves. 66. The Court accordingly considers that, in the 
particular circumstances o f the present case, it was reasonable on the part o f the 
authorities to act as they did in order to protect the electoral system o f the state, a system 
which is an indispensable element o f the proper functioning o f a “democratic society” 
within the meaning o f Article l l .”79
In other words, the Court was acknowledging that the individuals were members of 
the Silesian minority, but unwilling to propose their registration as a “national 
minority” because the legal consequences this might have had in Poland in relation to 
the electoral system. However, the important point is that in the increasingly 
numerous cases,81 there has never been a difficulty for the Court to acknowledge their 
objective, factual presence within a State, often referring to them specifically as
77 Gilbert, "The Burgeoning Minority Rights Jurisprudence o f  the European Court o f  Human Rights ”, 
op.cit., pp. 736-739.
7 Gorzelick and Others v. Poland, Application Number 444158/98, Judgment o f 20 December 2001.
79 Ibid., paras. 65-66.
80 In this regard, it is also true that the Gorzelik and Others v. Poland Case has illustrated the point that 
the lack o f a definition o f a minority produces significant disadvantage for the concrete minority groups
in the States in which they might not be even be able to achieve a formal legal recognition o f their 
minority status. This situation, o f course, will lead to an inadequate legal treatment o f these groups. 
SiOzgur Giindem v. Turkey, judgment o f 16 March 2000; Anguelova v. Bulgaria, Judgment o f 6 June 
2000; Noack v. Germany, Judgment o f  25 May 2000; Podkolzina v. Latvia, Judgment o f 9 April 2002.
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minorities, regardless of their status or of a country’s recognition.
A number of cases under the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) have dealt 
with linguistic rights of persons belonging to minorities, but the Strasbourg institutions 
have consistently held that there is no right to use a particular language in contacts 
with the government authorities. In the case of judicial proceedings, however, 
everyone has the right to be informed promptly, in a language he or she understands, 
of the reasons for arrest (Article 5.2) and the nature of any criminal charges (Article 
6.3.a). There is also the right to a free interpreter if a defendant cannot speak or 
understand the language used in the Court (Article 6.3.e).
Even though there is no direct reference to the protection of linguistic rights of the 
members of minorities, ‘freedom of expression’ under Article 10 guarantees the use of 
a minority language in private or among members of minorities. Thus, minorities have 
a right to publish their own newspapers or use other media without interference by the 
State or others.
The State must allow minorities free political expression, even if this will lead to 
questioning the social and political structure of the State in which persons belonging 
to minorities reside. Incal v. Turkey82 was the case which addressed the conviction of 
the applicant, Mr. Incal, a Turkish national and member of the executive committee of 
the Izmir section of the People’s Labour Party, on account of his contribution to the 
preparation of a leaflet criticising measures taken by the local authorities of Izmir, 
Turkey. The leaflets in question criticised the hostility created against the Kurdish 
minorities and were seized because they allegedly contained separatist propaganda, 
which violated Turkish domestic law. In this case, the Court confirmed the freedom of 
expression in a democratic society:
“...the freedom o f expression enshrined in Article 10 constitutes one o f the essential 
foundations o f a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and 
each individual's self-fulfilment. Subject to paragraph 2, it is applicable not only to 
“information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a 
matter o f indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb; such are the 
demands o f that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no 
“democratic society”.”83
The Court then considered the relevant passage of the leaflet to assess whether State 
interference was necessary or not. The Court held the view that the content of the 
leaflet could not be taken as incitement to the use of violence, hostility or hatred
82 Incal v. Turkey, no. 22678/93, Reports o f Judgements and Decisions, 1998-IV, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.
83 Ibid., §. 46.
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between citizens, even though the pamphlet contains “appeals to the population of 
Kurdish origin, urging them to band together to raise certain political demands.” 
The Court, consequently, ruled that Mr. IncaTs conviction was disproportionate, 
violating Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.85
Although the Court did not comment upon the issue of minority protection as such, 
the enhanced protection of the political freedoms of persons belonging to minorities 
may be interpreted as providing a necessary legal foundation for the protection of the 
freedom of expression of minorities in general. In the Arslan v. Turkey Case, the Court 
reiterates the fundamental principles underlying its judgments relating to Article 10 
that (i) Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a 
democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each 
individual's self-fulfilment. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is applicable not 
only to “information” or “ideas” that are favorably received or regarded as inoffensive 
or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are 
the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is 
no “democratic society”. As set forth in Article 10, this freedom is subject to 
exceptions, which must, however, be construed strictly, and the need for any 
restrictions must be established.86
The Belgian Linguistic Case may be taken as a case for analysing the possible 
linguistic aspects of the right to education for persons belonging to minorities. The 
case concerned the French-speaking minority in Belgium and the applicants wanted 
their children to be taught in French at school in a region considered Flemish-speaking 
by law. The case raised issues related to the right to education87 and the protection of 
family life88 in conjunction with the right to non-discrimination.89 The Court 
remarked that the right to education does not mean the right to establish or receive 
subsidisation for schools offering education in the language of choice. The contracting 
States have no general obligation to finance ‘private’ educational institutions.90 The 
Court, however, found a violation of the first sentence of Article 2 of the First Protocol 
in connection with Article 14 insofar as Dutch-speaking pupils from the Dutch regions
84 Ibid., §. 50.
85 Ibid., §. 59.
86 Arslan v. Turkey Case, Application Number 23462/94, 1999, at 44.
87 Article 2 o f Protocol I.
88 Article 8
89 Article 14 o f the Convention.
90Belgian Linguistic Case, ECHR Series A, No. 6, 1968, pp. 35-36.
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in Belgium had free access to education in their own language, while the French- 
speaking pupils did not have such access. The Court’s view is problematic in that it 
approached the question simply as the problems of ‘residence’, not that of the right to 
language for persons belonging to minority groups.91
09However, the Commission came to a different conclusion. The Commission 
stated that the Belgian regulation in question had as its goal to prevent the spread of a 
different language and culture into one region, and also to assimilate minorities 
against their will into the language of their surrounding. The Commission expressed 
its view:
“In the view o f the majority o f the Commission, the intention o f the Belgian Government 
and o f the Belgian legislature was to place the French-speaking population in the Flemish 
region at a disadvantage in relation to the Dutch-speaking inhabitants.”93
In the area of the protection of right to religion for persons belonging to minority 
groups, Article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights deserves to be noted. 
The individual right to freedom of religion includes the right to manifest that religion, 
which can be interpreted as allowing a minority the necessary degree of control over 
community religious matters.94 In the Kokkinakis v. Greece Case,95 the Court held 
that the State must not interfere in the internal affairs of the church:
“.. .freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one o f the foundations o f a ‘democratic 
society’ within the meaning o f the Convention.. .The pluralism indissociable from a 
democratic society, which has been dearly won over the centuries, depends on it.”96
Persons belonging to minorities also need to be able to participate effectively in 
social, economic and public life97 for the effective realisation of their rights. The 
Sidiropoulos & 5 others v. Greece Case is relevant for Article 11, which has 
implications for the protection of political rights of persons belonging to minorities. 
The applicants, who claimed to be of Macedonian ethnic origin and with a 
Macedonian national conscience, established an association, the “Home of 
Macedonian Civilisation”. The aims of the organisation were the development of
91 A.S. Akermark, Justification o f  Minority Protection in International Law (Kluwer Law International: 
London-the Hague-Boston, 1997), p. 207.
92 Even though the European Court o f Human Rights had priority over the European Commission on 
Human Rights, it is also true that the case laws developed by the Commission still have influence for 
the examination o f European human rights jurisprudence. Thus, it would be appropriate to include the 
views o f the Commission for the discussion on the protection o f minority rights in this section.
93Belgian Linguistic Case, op.cit., p. 41.
94 Article 9 o f the European Convention o f Human Rights.
95 Kokkinakis v. Greece, No. 14307/88, 25 May 1993 ECHR, Series A No. 260-A, 
http.V/cnuskp.echr.coe.int/tkp 197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en.
96 Ibid., § 31.
97 Articles 3, 11 o f the European Convention o f Human Rights.
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traditional culture and the protection of the natural and cultural environment of the 
region. The Greek courts, however, refused its registration on the grounds that the 
association engaged in promoting the idea of the existence of a Macedonian minority
ORin Greece, undermining the national sovereignty of Greece. The Court 
acknowledged the State’s ‘margin of appreciation’ in the evaluation of the necessity of 
limitation in a democratic society, but they concluded that they violated the spirit of 
Article 11 of the Convention. The Court stated that even if the refusal of the Greek 
courts to register the association was aimed at protecting national security and public 
safety, there was nothing in the case file to suggest that any of the applicants had 
wished to undermine Greece’s territorial integrity, national security or public order. 
Moreover, the Court affirmed that democratic States’ obligations to protect minority 
rights are in accordance with general principles of international law:
“...Territorial integrity, national security and public order were not threatened by the 
activities o f an association whose aim was to promote a region’s culture, even supposing 
that it also aimed partly to promote the culture of a minority; the existence o f minorities 
and different cultures in a country was a historical fact that a “democratic society” had to 
tolerate and even protect and support according to the principles o f international law.”99
That the Court made an explicit statement in accepting the international legal 
obligation to the protection of minority rights, referring to the Organisation for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) Copenhagen Document is also critical. 
The Court stated as follows:
“...the aims o f the association called “Home o f Macedonian Civilisation”, as set out in its 
memorandum o f association, were exclusively to preserve and develop the traditions and 
folk culture o f the Fiorina region... Such aims appear to the Court to be perfectly clear 
and legitimate; the inhabitants of a region in a country are entitled to form associations in 
order to promote the region’s special characteristics, for historical as well as economic 
reasons. Even supposing that the founders o f  an association like the one in the instant 
case assert a minority consciousness, the Document o f the Copenhagen Meeting o f the 
Conference on the Human Dimension o f the CSCE (Section IV) o f 29 June 1990 and the 
Charter o f Paris for a New Europe of 21 November1990 -  which Greece has signed -  
allow them to form associations to protect their cultural and spiritual heritage.”100
Nevertheless, it is also true that the Buckley v. UK Case has illustrated the negative 
attitude of the Court toward the protection of minority rights in a cultural context. Ms. 
Buckley was a British citizen and a Gypsy. She lived with her three children in 
caravans parked on land owned by her off Meadow Drove, Willingham, South 
Cambridgeshire, England. She complained of their eviction from a site on which they
98iSidiropoulos and 5 others v. Greece, No. 26695/95, 10 July 1998, Reports o f Judgments and Decisions, 
1998-IV, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int.
99 Ibid., § .41.
100 Ibid., § 44.
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had lived for 16 years. They claimed that the eviction violated Articles 8 and 14 of the 
Convention. The applicant’s complaint that her prevention from living with her family 
in her caravans on her land was basically related to the right to a traditional lifestyle.
The Commission concluded that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the 
Convention. But the Court reversed the decision, focusing solely on the applicant’s 
right to a home, not to a particular way of life. The Court restricted its assessment to 
the ‘individual right’ of Ms. Buckley to respect her home on the one hand, and the 
interests of society that the planning regulations would be respected on the other. This 
is flawed in that the Court totally ignored the fact that she belonged to the gypsy group 
and the related concerns of indirect discrimination arising from that membership. In 
this context, two dissenting opinions of the case should be noted, which took the 
legitimacy of Article 8 as the legal basis for a right to a traditional way of life. Judge 
Repik expressed his opinion that:
“...In these circumstances, the Court, in order to fulfil its supervisory role, ought itself to 
have considered whether the interference was proportionate to the right in issue and to its 
importance to the applicant, all the more so as where a fundamental right o f a member of 
a minority is concerned, especially a minority as vulnerable as the Gypsies, the Court has 
an obligation to subject any such interference to particularly close scrutiny. In my opinion, 
the Court has not fully performed its duty as it has not taken into account all the relevant 
matters adduced by the Commission and was too hasty in invoking the margin of  
appreciation left to the State.”101
Judge Lohmus furthered the essential appreciation of the nature of the protection of 
minority rights in the following terms:
“It has been stated before the Court that the applicant as a Gypsy has the same rights and 
duties as all the other members of the community. I think that this is an oversimplification 
o f the question o f minority rights. It may not be enough to prevent discrimination so that 
members o f minority groups receive equal treatment under the law. In order to establish 
equality in fact, different treatment may be necessary to preserve their special cultural 
heritage.”102
A similar line of reasoning is found in the Chapman Case under which the question 
arose whether the traditional lifestyle of the Roma should be facilitated by positive 
State protective measures for that purpose. The Court stated that:
“...although the fact o f being a member o f a minority with a ‘traditional lifestyle’ 
different from that o f the majority o f a society does not confer an immunity from general 
laws intended to safeguard assets common to the whole society such as the environment, 
it may have an incidence on the manner in which such laws are to be implemented. As 
intimated in the Buckley judgment, the vulnerable position o f gypsies as a minority 
means that some special consideration should be given to their needs and their different 
lifestyle both in the relevant regulatory planning framework and in arriving at the
101 Buckley v. UK Case, no. 20348/92, 25 September 1996, Reports o f Judgments and Decisions, 1996- 
IV, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/, Dissenting opinion o f Judge Repik.
102 Ibid., Dissenting opinion o f Judge Lohmus.
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decisions in particular cases. To this extent there is thus a positive obligation imposed on 
the Contracting States by virtue o f Article 8 to facilitate the gypsy way o f life.”103
The dissenting opinions in the Buckley Case as well as the significant comment on the 
nature of the protection of traditional life style in the Chapman Case above reflects 
precisely the potential implication of the obligatory nature of States’ positive measures 
for minority protection under the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court 
has underlined in several judgments that Article 8 not only prohibits interference by 
States, but also imposes certain positive obligations on the contracting States, even 
though these are not specifically attuned to the protection of minority rights.104
An action from Latvia, Affaire Podkolzina c. Lettonie, demonstrates that the 
European Court of Human Rights may be willing to rule on protection for national 
minorities in a very positive way.105 In this case, Ms. Podkolzina, a member of the 
Russian minority in Latvia, complained that Latvian authorities had wrongly struck 
her from the list of candidates for parliamentary election for insufficient knowledge of 
the Latvian language.106 The State's actions, she charged, not only violated her right 
to stand for election (under Article 3 of the First Optional Protocol to the European 
Convention) and to have an effective remedy (under Article 13), but also violated the 
Article 14 prohibition against discrimination on the basis of language, national origin, 
or association with a national minority.107 Although she had already obtained 
certification of her knowledge of Latvian by the relevant commission in the city of 
Daugavpils, she was subjected to an oral examination at her place of work by an 
inspector from the State Language Inspectorate. During the course of this examination, 
the inspector asked her why she had chosen to run for the National Harmony Party and 
not another political organisation. The next day, the inspector, with three witnesses in 
tow, returned and subjected the plaintiff to yet another written examination, allegedly
I AO
to determine if she exhibited "third-level" proficiency in Latvian. Two weeks later, 
on 21 August, 1998, the Central Electoral Commission struck her from the list of
103 Chapman v. UK, No. 27238/95, 18 January 2001, Reports o f Judgments and Decisions 2001-1, 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int, § 96. See also Marckx v. Belgium, judgment o f 13 June 1979, ECHR Series A 
No. 31, p. 15, § 31; Keegan v. Ireland, judgment of 26 May 1994, ECHR Series A, No. 290, p. 19, § 49; 
and Kroon and Others v. the Netherlands, judgment o f 27 October 1994, ECHR Series A, No. 297-C, p. 
56, §31.
104Gaskin v. UK, ECHR Series A , No. 160, 7 July 1989; Johnston et al v. Netherlands, ECHR Series A., 
No. 112. 18 December 1986.
105Affaire Podkolzina c. Lettonie (Podkolzina v. Latvia), App. No. 46726/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 9, 
2002), at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/judgments.htm.
X06Ibid., pp. 3, 8.
107 Ibid., p. 4.
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candidates for lack of proficiency in Latvian.109 The Party of National Harmony 
appealed the ruling, but it was upheld by both the Riga regional court and the 
President of the Civil Division of the Supreme Court.110
In its ruling, the Court noted that the right to stand for election under Article 3 of 
the First Optional Protocol was not absolute. The Court observed that States had great 
latitude to establish criteria for eligibility in their parliamentary statutes, and 
concluded that the requirement that “a candidate for election to the national Parliament 
have sufficient knowledge of the official language pursues a legitimate aim.”111 
However, the Court stressed that State decisions on these questions “must be reached
i p
by a body which can provide a minimum of guarantees of its impartiality.” In the 
instant case, it found that the decision did not meet this requirement. The Court 
expressed “grave doubts about the legal basis” for requiring the plaintiff (along with 
eight others) to take a second examination.113 Further, it found that this test did not 
conform to the requirements established by the electoral law as it vested full discretion 
in a lone functionary. The Court, finding that the procedures were incompatible with 
procedural fairness and legal certainty, therefore held that Latvia violated Article 3 of 
the First Optional Protocol.114 Having resolved the case on this basis, the Court did 
not proceed to examine the complaints under Articles 13 and 14.115 As compensation, 
the Court required Latvia to pay damages to the plaintiff for the associated mental 
anguish and humiliation, as well as for fees, expenses, and interest.116
The Podkolzina Case also has significant implications for the protection of the 
rights of ethnic, linguistic Russians in Estonia within the framework of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Although Estonia has recently repealed a similar law 
requiring linguistic competence from candidates for State and national office, there are 
provisions on the books that could serve as the basis for a challenge under the 
European Convention. For example, the Advisory Committee of the FCNM has noted 
that Article 23 of the Language Law is so wide in its scope that it hinders the 
implementation of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, especially
108 Ibid., p. 11.
m Ibid., p. 13.
110 Ibid., pp. 14-16.
111 Ibid., p. 34.
1,2 Ibid., p. 35.
113 Ibid., p. 36.
114 Ibid., pp. 36, 38.
1,5 Ibid., pp. 42, 45.
116 Ibid., pp. 46-56.
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since the term “public” appears in this context to encompass also a range of 
information provided by private actors and since the obligation to use Estonian is 
largely interpreted as excluding the use of a minority language.117 Accordingly, it may 
be argued that Article 23 may violate the ethnic, linguistic Russians’ Article 8 right to 
respect for private and family life and home, their Article 10 right to freedom of 
expression without interference by public authority, and their Article 14 right to be 
free from discrimination based on language, national origin, or association with a 
national minority. The decision in the Podkolzina Case is significant because it 
demonstrates that the European Court of Human Rights will uphold the rights of 
persons belonging to minorities. As such, it sends a message to those States that have 
taken a harder line against their minorities- Estonia and Latvia included - that there are 
limits and, if invoked in the context of an appropriate case, they will be enforced.
5. 2. Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms
Equality and non-discrimination provision is provided for in Article 14 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European 
Convention on Human Rights), including a reference to ‘minorities’ as follows:
“The enjoyment o f rights and freedom set forth in this Convention shall be secured 
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, ‘association with a national minority', 
property, birth or other status.”118 (Emphasis added.)
Article 14 has been understood as not being a freestanding clause like Article 26 of 
the ICCPR, which means that it can only be invoked in conjunction with another 
substantive right in the Convention. However, the Council of Europe promulgated 
Protocol 12, on 4 November 2000, to the European Convention on Human Rights that 
will provide a right to non-discrimination separate from other substantive provisions 
in the Convention. Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 provides as follows:
“1 .The enjoyment o f any right set forth by law shall be secured without discrimination on 
any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other 
status.
2. No one shall be discriminated against by any public authority on any ground such as 
those mentioned in paragraph 1 19
,17Opinion on Estonia, ACFC/INF/OPI (2002), para. 43.
118 Article 14 o f the European Convention on Human Rights.
119 Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights entered into force on 1 April, 
2005, ETS. No. 177. The total number o f signature not followed by ratifications is 22 and the total
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With the entry into force of Protocol 12, it is not necessary to prove a link between 
the discrimination and one of the other rights in the Convention. The autonomous 
application of Article 14 will be critical in that the equality and non-discrimination 
principle can be substantiated within a single free-standing anti-discrimination 
provision.
Nevertheless, apart from the positive effects of the Protocol 12, it bears repeating 
that the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights has interpreted the 
accessory character of Article 14 with increasing flexibility. The formulation of Article 
14 reveals that the enumerated grounds of prohibited discrimination are merely
190examples. Consequently, the members of ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities 
can invoke these grounds when relying on the prohibition of discrimination.
More importantly, as an explicit reference to ‘minorities’ is included in Article 14, 
the contracting States of the European Convention on Human Rights should take into 
account ‘effective’ protection of minority rights in conjunction with Article 14, as a 
reference to “minorities” as explicitly expressed in Article 14. Otherwise, it may be 
argued that the contracting States are in violation of the general rule of treaty
• 191interpretation in which treaty terms must not be ‘devoid of purpose or effect’.
5. 3. Article 16 and Article 14 of the Convention
Article 16 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that “Nothing in 
Articles 10, 11, and 14 shall be regarded as preventing the High Contracting Parties
1 99from imposing restrictions on the political activity of aliens.” The first two articles 
address freedom of expression and association, the last the prohibition of 
discrimination.123
However, it appears that the possibility of restriction on the rights of ‘aliens’ under 
Article 16 may decrease with the entry into force of Protocol No. 12 to the European 
Convention. In Article 3, Protocol No. 12 notes: “As between the States Parties, the 
provisions of Articles 1 and 2 of this Protocol shall be regarded as additional articles
number o f ratifications/accessions is 13. Estonia and Latvia had not yet as o f 31 August, 2005.
120 K. Henrard, Devising an Adequate System o f  Minority Protection (The Hague/Boston/London: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2000), pp. 72-73; D J. Harris, M. O’Boyle & C. Warbrick, Law o f  the 
European Convention on Human Rights (London: Buttersworth, 1995), p. 465.
121 Article 33 (4) o f the Vienna Convention on the Law o f the Treaties, 8 ILM 679, 1969.
122 Article 16 o f the European Convention on Human Rights.
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to the Convention, and all the provisions of the Convention shall apply 
accordingly.”124 The explanatory Report accompanying Protocol No. 12 notes that 
while “all the provisions of the European Convention shall apply in respect of Articles 
1 and 2 of the Protocol” - making special reference to Article 53 and its future 
application “in the relations between the present Protocol and the Convention itself’-it 
observes in the next sentence: “It was decided not to include a reference to Article 16 
of the Convention in this Protocol.”125 This means that the Protocol is separate from 
Article 16’s limitations on Article 14. That is, Article 16 of the Convention does not 
apply to Article 1 of Protocol No. 12, hence, Article 1 of Protocol 12 overrules Article 
16 of the Convention rather than being conditioned by the latter provision.
Given that Protocol No. 12 will expand the protection afforded aliens under the 
European Convention on Human Rights, it may be argued that it will provide stateless 
persons or non-citizens belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic groups, such as the 
ethnic or linguistic Russian stateless persons or non-citizens of Estonia and Latvia 
with more effective legal grounds to contest discriminatory treatment by State 
authorities.
5. 4. Margin of Appreciation and the Protection of Minority Rights
A critical question, then, would be the assessment of criteria to determine 
‘discrimination’ within the meaning of Article 14. It is likely to clarify the scope of the 
non-discrimination principle reflected in Article 14 of the Convention. According to
1 96the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the non­
discrimination principle provided in Article 14 is deemed to have been violated when 
the difference in treatment of comparable situations did not have an objective and 
reasonable justification.
Not every differential treatment of the Convention’s rights amounts to a violation 
of Article 14. The equality and non-discrimination principle is violated if the 
distinction or differential treatment has no ‘objective and reasonable justification’, and 
that the existence of such a justification has to be evaluated in relation to the aims and
124Protocol No. 12, op.cit., Article 3.
125 Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights, at 
http://conventions.coe.int/ Treaty/en/Reports/Html/177.htm (2000).
126 Belgian Linguistic Case, ECHR, Series A., No. 6, 1968; Petrovic v. Austria, Reports o f Judgments 
and Decisions, 1998-11, 1998\Larkosv. Cyprus, Reports o f Judgments and Decisions, 1999-1, 1999.
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effects of the measure in question against the background of the principles inherent in 
democratic societies. The measures taken must be ‘proportionate’ to the ‘aim’ sought 
to be realised. In evaluating the proportionality, emphasis is put on the basic values of
1 77democratic societies, such as broadmindedness, tolerance and mutual respect.
States have been given a certain degree of margin of appreciation in putting into
1 7Rpractice those special measures to realise ‘legitimate aims’. However, as far as the 
margin of appreciation is concerned, it is also true that it has been described as a 
negative practice limiting the protection and expansion of minority rights at the 
European level.129 Under this doctrine,130 States’ authorities or national governments 
are given a certain degree of discretion regarding the specific manner in which they 
implement the rights in the European Convention on Human Rights.
The doctrine, which permeates the jurisprudence of the ECHR, is based on the 
primacy of national implementation of rights and the notion that State authorities are 
often better situated to judge local conditions and the various public interests that 
inevitably compete with the claims of individuals.131 A critical question in relation to 
the non-discrimination principle would be, however, whether the doctrine of margin of 
appreciation is really compatible with the idea of universal human rights and 
protection of the rights of minorities. The emphasis of supporting the doctrine and the 
lack of corresponding emphasis on universal standards of human rights may 
undermine the effectiveness and credibility of the protection of the rights of minorities 
under international law. As Henrard notes:
“The interests o f the contracting states have a tendency to predominate the balancing 
process and the states also enjoy a wide margin o f appreciation, which is not conducive to 
the realization o f minority protection goals.”132
However, the ECHR, while recognising the need for a State to be able to act within 
its own national discretion, has also repeatedly noted that the margin is limited by the 
concept of European supervision. Under this principle, the EHCR, as the final arbiter 
of European Convention on Human Rights, must assert its role to determine the
127Henrard, Devising ari\ Adequate System o f  Minority Protection, op.cit., pp. 74-75.
128 In the European Court's jurisprudence, “legitimate aim” is often used synonymously with “objective 
and reasonable justification”. See L. Clements et al., European Human Rights: Taking a Case Under the 
Convention (London : Sweet & Maxwell 1994), pp. 216-217.
129Henrard, Devising anl Adequate System o f  Minority Protection, op.cit., p. 75.
130 For a general approach to the concept of margin o f appreciation, H.Yourow, The Margin o f  
Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics o f  European Human Rights Jurisprudence (Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1996).
131 Lawless v. U.K., ECHR Series A-3, 1961; Ireland v. United Kingdom, ECHR, Series A-25, 1978;
Brannigan & McBride v. United Kingdom, ECHR, Series A-258-B,1993.
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consistency of State conduct with the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Therefore, the margin doctrine is essentially not static, but dynamic. The ECHR’s 
teleological treaty interpretation, demanding scrutiny of State justification and 
emphasis on the effectiveness of the rights in question, explains the dynamic nature of 
the concept of the margin of appreciation, which tends to be limited by European 
supervision.133
Although not strictly limited to such rights, the doctrine is frequently invoked 
when the ECHR is evaluating the scope of personal liberties under Articles 8 to 11, 
which inevitably implicate the exception clauses of those provisions, requiring a 
balance between individual and public interests. Freedom of speech, religion, family 
life, and privacy are included in these Articles, which address personal liberties. These 
Articles expressly allow for limitations on those rights in order to protect certain 
categories of public interests which are “necessary in a democratic society”.134 The 
ECHR has relied on this language to formulate tests for evaluating and limiting the 
exercise of States’ discretion allowed national authorities in their implementation of 
rights. Thus, limitation on such rights by States must be with the intention of 
achieving a pressing social need in a democratic society, and the means sought must 
be proportionate to those ends. It is important, in this regard, to note that the exact 
measure of proportionality will vary depending upon the context and the rights 
involved. More ‘exacting proportionality’ has been required when States have justified 
restrictions on personal freedoms, as opposed to State restrictions affecting property
rights. The more exacting proportionality principle is also used in the context of non-
1
discrimination under Article 14 of the Convention.
The area of tension between the two paragraphs of Article 8 of the Convention 
became obvious in the Slivenko Case.136 The applicants in this case, Tatjana Slivenko 
and her daughter Karina, were permanent Latvian residents of Russian origin. Tatjana 
Slivenko, whose father was an officer in the Soviet army, moved to Latvia when she 
was one month old. She married Nikolay Slivenko, who served as a Soviet military
n2 Henrard, Devising ah Adequate System o f  Minority Protection, op.cit., p. 144.
133 Jbwraw, The Margin o f  Appreciation Doctrine, op.cit., p. 15.
134 The language o f Article 8 is typical among these provisions. It explicitly allows for restrictions 
“necessary in a democratic society in the interests o f national security, public safety or the economic 
well-being o f the country, for the prevention o f disorder or crime, for the protection o f health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms o f others.”
135 P. van Dijk & G.J.H. van Hoof, Theory and Practice o f  the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1990), p. 81.
136 Slivenko v. Latvia, Application Number, 48321/99, judgment o f 9 October, 2003.
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officer in Latvia. Their daughter, Karina, was bom in Riga, Latvia, in 1981. After 
Latvia regained independence in 1991, Tatjana and Karina Slivenko were entered in 
the register of Latvian residents as ‘ex-USSR-citizens’. In 1994, however, the Latvian 
immigration authorities annulled this registration, relying on the fact that Soviet 
military officers and their families were required to leave Latvia under the terms of the 
Latvian-Russian treaty on the withdrawal of Russian troops. Consequently, the 
Slivenko family received a deportation order. Only Tatjana Slivenko’s parents were 
allowed to stay because the Latvian-Russian treaty did not affect military officers that 
had retired from office before 28 January 1992, as was the case with Tatjana’s father. 
The applicants proclaimed that their removal from Latvia had violated their right to 
respect for their ‘private life’, their ‘family life’ and their ‘home’ within the meaning 
of Article 8. The Latvian government, on the other hand, maintained that this decision 
pursued the legitimate aims of the protection of national security and the prevention of 
disorder and crime in a democratic society.137 The Court accepted that the Latvian- 
Russian Treaty and its implementing measures sought to protect the interests of 
national security. Accordingly, the obligation to leave the country was not in itself 
objectionable from the perspective of the Convention. However, application of 
removal orders without any possibility of taking into account individual circumstances
1 - lO
is deemed to be incompatible with the requirement of Article 8. The Court referred
to the applicant’s ‘personal, social and economic ties’ in Latvia and concluded that
1 ^0they were sufficiently integrated into Latvian society. According to the Court, these 
elements were not taken into consideration by the Latvian authorities. Moreover, the 
Latvian government had based its decision on the family links with Tatjana Slivenko’s 
father, who was not himself considered to present a danger to the national security of 
the country. The Court, therefore, concluded that the Latvian authorities “overstepped 
their margin of appreciation” and awarded a compensation amount of 10,000 Euro to 
each of the applicants.140
The margin of appreciation has been noted as being justified as a means to 
promote democracy within communities in a State. The delicate problem is, as far as 
the protection of minority rights is concerned, democracy with the superiority of the 
views of the majority is prone to undermine the interests of persons belonging to
137 Ibid., p. 77.
138 Ibid., p. 122.
139 Ibid., p. 125.
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minority groups. As majorities dominate political processes with the numerical 
superiority of voting power, the democratic practice can be utilised as a means to 
secure the interests of the majority at the expense of minorities. If the interests of the 
members of minority groups were secured to the fullest extent that such protection of 
the interests and benefits of the members of minorities were guaranteed, the doctrine 
of margin of appreciation would not be problematic. However, when the guarantees of 
democratic practices for the equal status of persons belonging to minorities are not 
secured, no margin must be tolerated.
While the doctrine may be justified in certain matters that affect the general 
population in a society, it is not appropriate when the issue of the protection of the 
rights of minorities arises. In the case of conflicts between majorities and minorities, 
the doctrine must not be applied, because applying the doctrine under those 
circumstances will eventually result in restrictions exclusively on the rights of persons 
belonging to minority groups. Hence, the application of the margin doctrine is only 
justified with regard to policies that affect the ‘general population’ equally, such as 
restriction on hate speech towards persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic 
groups, as a way to protect public order and morality.141 On the other hand, no margin 
is called for when the rights of the members of a minority group are restricted, for 
instance, in the field of the freedom of speech or freedom to set up an association, 
educational opportunities and allocation of resources affecting minority rights, 
because giving wide discretion to States in these instances, in fact, is to give unfair 
benefits to the majorities by constraining minority rights. Benvenisti’s following 
argument, in this sense, seems to have got the point:
“To grant a margin o f appreciation to majority-dominated national institutions in such 
situations is to stultify the goals of the international system and abandon the duty to 
protect the democratically challenged minorities.”142
Granting a margin of appreciation to States in regulating the matters of the 
protection of minority rights in which formal equality treatment of minorities is likely 
to result in factual inequalities is to violate the equality and non-discrimination 
provision. In such cases, the margin doctrine must be rejected and, rather the margin 
must be used for the protection of persons belonging to minorities on the basis of
140 Ibid.
141 Jersild v.Denmark, ECHR Ser. A-19, 1994.
142 E. Benvenisti, “Margin o f appreciation, consensus, and universal standards”, N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & 
P o l, Vol., 31, 1999, p. 850.
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substantive equality.
In this context, it is possible and necessary to link the concept of “the legitimate 
aim” within the equality and non-discrimination jurisprudence of the ECHR in a 
positive way to implement substantive equality for the protection of the rights of 
persons belonging to minorities. The concept of the legitimate aim relates to the basic 
interests of a society, such as ‘national security’, ‘public safety’, ‘economic well- 
being’, ‘public interest’, etc.143 Referring to the jurisprudence of Dworkin, it seems to 
the present writer that the concept of ‘legitimate aims’ is similar to ‘collective goals’, 
which is not only advisable but also ‘essential’ in a democratic society.144 According 
to Akermark, the concept of ‘legitimate aims’ shows the link between the 
permissibility of distinctions under Article 14 and the grounds of restrictions under 
each substantive provision of the Convention and its protocols. She went on to state 
with reference to the Belgian Linguistic Case,145 that:
“Cultural preferences and politics such as, in this case, the aim o f “linguistic 
homogeneity” and the effort to strengthen the Flemish-speaking group, may come under 
this term and the organs o f the Convention must evaluate whether they are consistent with 
Article 14.”146
The ECHR has indicated that these legitimate aims may well prevail over 
individual rights under certain circumstances. Thus, it is possible to conceive of the 
protection of ethnic, religious or linguistic minority groups as a ‘legitimate aim’ in 
view of the ECHR jurisprudence, as Akermark suggested, since a State’s positive 
measures to protect minority rights may be included within the legitimate aims, 
assuming that the measures are proportionate to the aims of the protection of minority 
rights in a society.147 The requirement of an objective and reasonable justification of 
‘legitimate difference’ for achieving the ‘legitimate aims’ in a society seems to 
conform to ‘substantive equality’ in the context of equality and non-discrimination. 
Substantive equality seeks to introduce a different treatment for the benefits of the 
members of minority groups in which temporary differential policies by States are 
justified and States are obligated to correct the existing ‘factual’ inequalities. 
Therefore, it may be argued that legislative or administrative measures designed to
143 See Articles 8 (2), 9(2), 10(2), 11(2) of the Convention; P. van Dijk & G.J.H. van Hoof, Theory and 
Practice o f  the European Convention on Human Rights, op.cit., pp. 583-585.
144 R.Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977).
145Belgian Linguistic Case, ECHR Series A, No. 6, 1968.
146 A. S. Akermark, Justification o f  Minority Protection in International Law (London/The 
Hague/Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1997), p. 208.
147 Ibid.
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protect the rights of the members of such ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities for 
the purpose of correcting unequal situations are justifiable and necessary to achieve 
the ‘legitimate aims’.
6. More Solid Legal Bases for the Protection of Minority Rights by 
Linking Minorities-Specific Standards to General Human Rights 
Standards
The non-discrimination provisions in the ICERD, Articles 2 and 26 of the ICCPR, and 
Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights all appear to contain 
substantive equality within the meaning of the non-discrimination principle. Unlike 
the ICERD under which a State’s positive action to achieve substantive equality is 
explicitly stipulated, Articles 2, 26 of the ICCPR and Article 14 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights have not provided an explicit expression for substantive 
equality in each provision. Nevertheless, contextual and systematic interpretation of 
the provisions with reference to the ICERD, as well as the review of the HRC General 
Comments and the examination of the ECHR’s jurisprudence support the substantive 
equality in the nature of those provisions.
Articles 1 (2), and 4 (2) of the UN Declaration on Minority Rights imply that 
States are expected to “create special structures or conditions” ensuring the
• 148 • •preservation of minority cultures. If this provision is understood as being 
applicable for the protection of minority rights in the sense of formal equality, 
effective protection could not be achieved. In the same context, paragraph 33 of the 
Copenhagen Document provides that:
“The Participating States will protect the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity 
o f national minorities on their territory and ‘create conditions ’ for the promotion o f that 
identity...”149 (Emphasis added.)
This provision would also be empty without the possible applicability of substantive 
equality, as “creating conditions” would naturally mean the necessity of providing 
positive State actions for the full equality of persons belonging to minorities. 
Paragraph 31 of the Copenhagen document provides that:
“...The Participating State will adopt, where necessary, special measures for the purpose 
of ensuring to persons belonging to national minorities 'full equality with other citizens ’
148 Articles 1 (2), and 4 (2) o f the UN Declaration on Minority Rights.
149 Paragraph 33 o f the Copenhagen Document.
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in the exercise and enjoyment o f human rights and fundamental freedoms.”150 (Emphasis 
added.)
The expression of “full equality with other citizens in the exercise and enjoyment of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms” seems to encapsulate exactly substantive 
equality within the meaning of the equality and non-discrimination principle for the 
protection of persons belonging to minorities.
As to the limitation on qualification for political candidacy for the ethnic, 
linguistic Russians in Latvia, the Advisory Committee on the FCNM, referring to the 
Podkolzina Case151 before the ECHR, concluded that such restrictions have violated 
norms of minority protection, not because they have intruded upon an individual's 
procedural due process rights, but because they are incompatible with the duties 
undertaken by States parties to “create the conditions necessary for the effective 
participation” of national minorities.152 The Advisory Committee’s view illustrates 
that substantive equality must be a reference of interpretation for instruments on the 
protection of minority rights, without which it would be difficult to achieve the goals 
of the protection of minority rights under international law.
However, it also should be noted that the scope of the non-discrimination principle 
with respect to its application needs to be carefully co-ordinated. Under general 
human rights standards, the non-discrimination principle can be invoked for everyone, 
including women, persons who hold particular views, persons identified with 
particular political causes, and others. Persons belonging to minorities often feel 
discriminated against, and they, too may invoke the anti-discrimination provisions. Yet 
the non-discrimination provisions under general human rights standards are not 
reserved for ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities as such. In contrast, minorities- 
specific standards, such as Article 27 of the ICCPR and the FCNM, provide certain 
guarantees which are available only to persons belonging to national, ethnic, religious 
or linguistic minority groups. In this regard, it would be correct to say that minorities- 
specific standards and general human rights standards are complementary and may be 
used in a constructive way to protect minority rights effectively. This reasoning is 
confirmed in the HRC General Comment No. 23. Some States argue that they have no 
minorities, hence no minority rights to protect, as they comply with anti-
150 Ibid., Paragraph 31.of the Copenhagen Document.
151 Podkolzina v. Latvia, No. 46726/99, Apr. 9, 2002, at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/judgments.htm.
152Opinion on Estonia, ACFC/INF/OPI (2002), paras. 52-55.
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discrimination clauses. This argument is aptly dismissed by the HRC as follows:
“The Covenant also distinguishes the rights protected under article 27 from the
guarantees under article 2(1) and 26. Under these articles on non-discrimination rights are
conferred on individuals within the jurisdiction on the State Party irrespective o f whether
they belong to the minorities specified in article 27 or not. Some states parties who claim
that they do not discriminate on grounds o f ethnicity, language or religion, wrongly
153contend, on that basis alone, that they have no minorities”
7. The Substantive Equality Principle and the Baltic Implications
Article 12 of the Estonian Constitution, for instance, establishes an explicit ban of 
discrimination as follows:
“Everyone is equal before the law. No one shall be discriminated against on the basis o f 
ethnicity, race, color, sex, language, origin, religion, political or other opinion, property or 
social status, or on other grounds. The incitement o f national, racial or political hatred, 
violence or discrimination shall, by law, be prohibited and punishable. The incitement of 
hatred, violence or discrimination between social strata shall, by law, also be prohibited 
and punishable.”154
Article 9 also provides that:
“The rights, freedom and duties o f each and every person, as set out in the Constitution, 
shall be equal for Estonian citizens and for citizens o f foreign states and stateless persons 
in Estonia.”155
In October 1998, a new section devoted to “Fundamental Human Rights” was 
added to the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia. The Constitution, as amended, 
provides for the non-discrimination of all human beings before the law and stipulates 
that human rights shall be realised without discrimination of any kind.156 The right of 
persons belonging to minorities to preserve and develop their language and their 
ethnic and cultural identity is enshrined in Article 114. Article 105 guarantees to 
everybody the right to own property and makes property rights subject to restriction
1 57only in accordance with the law.
The main problem for the ethnic, linguistic Russian stateless persons or non­
citizens in access to citizenship in Estonia and Latvia seems to consist of two aspects. 
One is the Estonian and Latvian language examination test and the other is the 
requirement of knowledge of Estonian and Latvian history and their constitutions as
153 HRC General Comment No. 23 (Article 27), UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.5, 1994, para. 4.
154Article 12 o f the Estonian Constitution.
155 Article 9 o f the Estonian Constitution.
156 Article 91 o f the Latvian Constitution. English language text provided by the Translation and 
Terminology Centre for Information only.
157 Article 105 o f the Latvian Constitution.
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part of the naturalisation procedure. During the Soviet period, learning the Estonian 
and Latvian languages was not necessary and therefore many ethnic, linguistic 
Russians living in the territories of what are now Estonia and Latvia do not speak, 
write or understand the titular languages of Estonian and Latvian. Moreover, for 
elderly people, preparing for the examination on one’s own can be very difficult, while 
attending language courses and obtaining the necessary course materials can incur 
additional expenses.158 At the same time, during the former Soviet Union times it was 
compulsory to learn only the history of Soviet Russia. However, in the naturalisation 
procedure for the citizenship of Estonia and Latvia, this uniqueness of the existence of 
ethnic, linguistic Russians is almost ignored, which means that the history of Latvia 
and Estonia should be learned from the beginning. More serious is that these ethnic, 
linguistic Russians cannot easily accept these requirements internally, simply because 
they think they deserve citizenship of Estonia and Latvia by reference to their long­
term and habitual residence in Estonia and Latvia.159
In spite of the existence of restrictive citizenship criteria for the ethnic, linguistic 
Russians in Estonia and Latvia, as noted above, it is ironic that these countries claim 
non-discrimination of all persons, particularly on the grounds of race or ethnicity
158The Language laws o f Estonia and Latvia seem to have made worse the marginalisation o f the ethnic, 
linguistic Russian groups rather than integrating them into the Estonian and Latvian societies. The core 
legal act o f Estonian ethnic policies is the Law on Language. Article 1(1) o f the Law repeats Article 6 of 
the Constitution that “Estonian is a State language o f Estonia”. According to Article 4 (1) o f the Law, 
“everyone has the right to access public administration and to communicate in Estonian in state 
agencies, local governments, bureaus o f notaries, bailiffs and certified interpreters and translators, 
cultural autonomy bodies and institutions, companies, non-profit associations and foundations’” 
According to the 1989 national census, only 15% o f local ethnic Russians can speak the Estonian 
language. In 2000 this figure rose to 40%. The level o f proficiency was much higher among 
representatives o f the young generation. (59% of persons aged 15-19.) Under these circumstances, 
unification o f Estonian society on the basis o f the language is hardly possible. V. Poleshchuk, Non- 
Citizens in Estonia (Tallinn: Legal Information Centre For Human Rights, 2004), p. 15. According to 
Article 1 o f the new Latvian State Language Law (adopted in December 1999 and entered into force on 
1 September 2000), the purpose of the law is to ensure: the preservation, protection and development of 
the Latvian language; the preservation of cultural and historical heritage o f the Latvian nation; the right 
to use the Latvian language freely in any spheres o f life in the whole territory o f Latvia; the integration 
o f national minorities in the society while observing their right to use their mother tongue or any other 
language; and the increase o f the influence o f the Latvian language in the cultural environment or 
Latvia by promoting a faster integration o f society. Article 5 o f the Law, stipulates that any languages 
used in Latvia other than Latvian, with the exception o f the Liv language (spoken by the Livs, long- 
established ethnic group in the territory o f Latvia), shall be considered as ‘other’ languages. However, 
this provision can be problematic in that it appears to contribute to the creation o f an atmosphere of 
antagonism in language policy with regard to use o f all other languages o f the territory o f Latvia which 
might qualify as regional or minority languages. European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, 
Second Report on Latvia, adopted on 14 December 2001, pp. 9-11.
159 According to Vadim Poleshchuk, the language test is the most often mentioned by stateless or non­
citizens as the most difficult barrier in access to citizenship. From the present writer’s interview with 
Vadim Poleshchuk in July 2005; Poleshchuk, Non-citizens in Estonia, op.cit., pp. 19-20.
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under their respective constitutions. While declaring adherence to the non­
discrimination principle, the Estonian and Latvian governments have also denied the 
historical fact of the long-term residence of the ethnic, linguistic Russians during the 
Soviet period by setting restrictive criteria in the citizenship laws.160
Racial discrimination and discrimination on the grounds of nationality or 
citizenship often overlap such that distinguishing between the two is not easy. As a 
result, the grounds for a particular discriminatory act may not always be clear. As 
noted, the prohibition of racial discrimination is a jus cogens norm. But the ICERD 
specifically exempts from its application the “legal provisions of States Parties
concerning nationality, citizenship or naturalisation.”161 However, it also prohibits
• 1 (\) • “discriminating against any particular nationality”. It needs to be emphasised that
the legal philosophical foundation of the international protection of human rights is
built upon the premise that ‘all persons’ should enjoy human rights “unless
exceptional distinctions serve a legitimate State objective and are proportional to the
achievement of that objective.”163 The HRC’s General Comment on the position of
aliens emphasises the universality of human rights as follows:
“...the rights set forth in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights apply to 
everyone, irrespective o f reciprocity, and irrespective o f his or her nationality or 
statelessness... The general rule is that each one o f the rights o f the Covenant must be 
guaranteed without discrimination between citizens and aliens.”164
The limited attention given to the rights of non-citizens165 by human rights 
monitoring organs has meant that the particulars of the legal regime governing 
discrimination against non-citizens are not clear. The less developed nature of the 
prohibition against discrimination on the grounds of citizenship status is a serious 
problem for the effective protection of persons belonging to minority groups.166 The
160 This required proficiency and knowledge for the naturalisation procedure was criticised by the 
HCNM for demanding high threshold, Letter to V. Birkavs, Minister for Foreign Affairs o f the Republic 
o f Latvia from OSCE HCNM, Max van der Stoel, see H. M. Morris, “EU Enlargement and Latvian 
Citizenship Policy”, JEMIE, Issue 1/2003, p. 14.
161 Article 1(2) o f the ICERD.
162 Article 1 (3) o f the ICERD.
163 UN Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection o f Human 
Rights, “Prevention o f Discrimination: The rights o f non-citizens-Final Report o f the Special 
Rapporteur, Mr. D. Weissbrodt”, 26 May, 2003, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23, para. 6.
164 HRC General Comment 15 on the position o f aliens under the Covenant (1986), 11/04/86, paras., 1- 
2 .
165 The broad category of ‘non-citizens’ must not detract from the different groups o f persons covered 
by it. It indeed covers such diverse groups as stateless persons and asylum seekers. The Committee on 
the Elimination o f Racial Discrimination (CERD) has appealed to States to reduce statelessness in this 
context. See Concluding Observations on Switzerland, 21 May 2002, CERD/C/60/CO/14, para.10.
166 D. A. Martin, “The Authority and Responsibility of States”, in T. Aleinikoff and V. Chetail (eds.),
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gap between the declaration of the prohibition against racial discrimination as such in 
general and the much more mixed protection against discrimination against persons 
belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic groups at the domestic legal level creates a 
difficult problem, because what is in fact racial discrimination can sometimes be 
confused with or justified as a problem of citizenship for which States may have their 
own discretion.
Lady Hale’s opinion in the Belmarsh Case in the UK, in this regard, has nicely 
illustrated the problem. The case in which the Law Lords gave judgment relates to the 
internment of foreign terrorist suspects under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security 
Act 2001 (ATCSA). The internment law required the government to issue a derogation 
from Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the right to liberty), 
which it could only do in cases of a “public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation”. The Lords were asked to decide firstly whether the government was entitled 
to claim that there was such a public emergency justifying the law; secondly, whether 
the internment law was proportionate to the threat of terrorism, and finally, whether it 
was discriminatory. The differential treatment of foreigners versus British suspects had 
been justified by the Attorney-General on the basis that the foreigners, unlike the 
British suspects, had no right to be in the country. This argument had held sway in the 
Court of Appeal. But, said the Lords, that was irrelevant to the threat of terrorism, 
which was as real in relation to the British terror suspects as it was in relation to the 
foreign ones. Lady Hale described the law in question was disproportionate precisely 
because it discriminated between British and foreign suspects. Her opinion, which is 
significant in the appreciation of the essence of the equality principle, is worth quoting 
at length:
“ The Government knew about certain foreign nationals presenting this problem, because 
they were identified during the usual immigration appeals process. But there is absolutely 
no reason to think that the problem applies only to foreigners. Quite the reverse. There is 
every reason to think that there are British nationals living here who are international 
terrorists within the meaning of the Act...who cannot be deported to another country 
because they have every right to be here. Yet the Government does not think that it is 
necessary to lock them up...It is also inconsistent with our other obligations under 
international law from which there has been no derogation, principally article 14 o f the 
European Convention...the fact that it is sometimes permissible to treat foreigners 
differently does not mean that every difference in treatment serves a legitimate 
aim.. .Democracy values each person equally. In most respects, this means that the will o f  
the majority must prevail. But valuing each person equally also means that the will o f the 
majority cannot prevail if  it is inconsistent with the equal rights o f minorities.”167
Migration and international legal Norms (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 34-35.
167 A and others v. Secretary o f  State fo r the Home Department, X  and another v. Secretary o f  State fo r  
the Home Department, 2004 UKHL 56, paras. 228-237.
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Both problems, that is, the confusion of racial discrimination with citizenship- 
based distinctions and the use of language of citizenship to justify racial 
discrimination, are compounded by States’ possible arbitrary determination of 
citizenship. A State’s discretion to define the contours of citizenship has been 
recognised under public international law. Determining membership in the territorially 
circumscribed political community remains one of the core attributes of State 
sovereignty under the present state of public international law. However, aside from 
the recognition of a State’s discretion in regulating citizenship under international law, 
restrictive citizenship criteria in citizenship law can be assessed from the principle of 
substantive equality in relation to the effective minority protection.
As observed above, the scope of Article 26 of the ICCPR is not confined to its 
application to the rights set forth in the Covenant. The critical point is that Article 26 
applies ‘autonomously’ to all legislative acts by State parties, including nationality 
legislation, and not merely those in furtherance of the other rights secured by the 
Covenant. The autonomous nature of the non-discrimination provision in Article 26 of 
the ICCPR is critical for the protection of persons belonging to ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minority groups, particularly in the context of State succession in relation to 
citizenship. A new State is naturally faced with the task of creating its national identity, 
a process of defining itself as a ‘people’. Sometimes, this process tends to be quite 
volatile given the determination of one group in a State to define its identity as against 
other groups in the State. The main tool for the objective of forming ‘national unity’ is 
to set restrictive citizenship criteria in citizenship law in a way to exclude different 
ethnic, religious or linguistic minority groups. These types of restrictive criteria in 
citizenship laws, however, would seem to be contrary to the non-discrimination 
principle.
In the same context, Article 2 (c) of the ICERD requires States parties to “nullify 
any laws and regulations which have the effect of creating or perpetuating racial 
discrimination.”168 Hence, States parties of the ICERD could be in breach of Article 2 
(c) if some criteria in their citizenship laws and policy have the effect of 
discriminating against persons of a particular ethnic, religious or linguistic origin.
The existence of the ethnic, linguistic Russian stateless persons or non-citizens in 
Estonia and Latvia is a case in point. After the fall of the former Soviet Union, over a
168 Article 2 (c) o f the ICERD.
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third of the Estonian and Latvian populations became non-citizens, since nationality 
legislation of the two countries, unlike the case of Lithuania, only permitted those who 
were Estonians and Latvians by birth to become citizens. A language requirement was 
added to the naturalisation requirements- a very considerable obstacle to overcome for 
those who have only used Russian. Half the population was required to register to 
obtain resident permits- a very humiliating and difficult process that they were forced 
to undertake in a foreign language. Many of these ethnic, linguistic Russians were 
classified as illegal residents and ran the risk of being deported to Russia, where, 
having lived in Estonia and Latvia their whole lives, they had no families and no 
social connections.169
Despite the reality of the marginal status of the Russian residents in question, the 
Estonian and Latvian laws proclaim that universally recognised principles and norms 
of international law shall be an inseparable part of the Estonian and Latvian legal
i  n  A
system. Such international norms and practices, to be sure, include the non­
discrimination principle. The opinions of the Advisory Committee on the FCNM on 
the situation of the ethnic, linguistic Russians in Estonia, in this regard, appear to have 
provided critical evidence of Estonia’s violation of the non-discrimination principle 
under international law. Even though these opinions have dealt with the Estonian 
situation, this legal reasoning could be equally applied to the case of Latvia. On the 
matter of Estonia’s minority policies, the Advisory Committee questioned the 
effectiveness of the Estonian government's provision of the National Minorities 
Cultural Autonomy Act of 1993. Estonia’s definition of national minority was the 
object of criticism.171 It concluded that “the law excludes non-citizens from the 
leading bodies of the cultural autonomies, despite the fact that a high proportion of the 
minority population does not have Estonian citizenship, and it leaves out some of the 
numerically smallest minorities from its scope altogether.” 172 To address this 
deficiency of minority protection in Estonia, the Committee advocated “initiatives to 
revise or replace this legislation with a view to strengthening the applicable norms and
169 Poleshchuk, Non-Citizens in Estonia, op.cit., pp. 12-13; Human Rights in Latvia, op.cit., pp. 23-24.
170 For instance, Article 3 (1) o f the Estonian constitution provides that “The state authority shall be 
exercised solely pursuant to the Constitution and laws which are in conformity therewith. Generally 
recognised principles and rules o f international law are an inseparable part o f the Estonian legal 
system.” Translated by Estonian Legal Translation Centre.
171 Advisory Comm, on the Framework Convention for the Protection o f National Minorities, Comm, 
of Ministers, (Advisory Committee), Opinion on Estonia, adopted on 14 September 2001, 
ACFC/INF/OP/I (2002)/005, Specific comments in respect o f articles 1-19, para. 29.
172 Ibid.
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to adapting them to the current minority situation of Estonia.”173 Moreover, as to the 
issue of naturalisation, the Committee emphasised that the lack of citizenship can 
bring inequality for the ethnic, linguistic Russian stateless persons and non-citizens, 
arguing that:
“...lack o f citizenship often has a detrimental impact on the enjoyment of full and
effective equality and can give rise to discriminatory practices.”174
It further made clear that this lack of citizenship has a “detrimental impact on the 
enjoyment of full and effective equality” for the ethnic, linguistic Russian residents
and that practice is the violation of the duties of States Parties to adopt adequate
measures to promote such equality under Article 4(2) of the FCNM.175
The United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC) under the ICCPR’s 
assessment of Latvian citizenship law also provides an important reference in this 
matter. The Committee stated as follows:
“The Committee is concerned at the possible obstacles posed by the requirement to pass a 
language examination, The State party should further strengthen its efforts to effectively 
address the lack o f applications for naturalization as well as possible obstacles posed by 
the requirement to pass a language examination, in order to ensure full compliance with 
article 2 o f the Covenant...the Committee is also concerned about the large proportion of  
non-citizens in the State party, who by law are treated neither as foreigners nor as 
stateless persons but as a distinct category o f persons with long-lasting and effective ties 
to Latvia, in many respects comparable to citizens but in other respects without the rights 
that come with full citizenship. The Committee expresses its concern over the 
perpetuation o f a situation o f exclusion, resulting in lack o f effective enjoyment o f many 
Covenant rights by the non-citizen segment o f the population...The State party should 
prevent the perpetuation of a situation where a considerable part o f the population is 
classified as “non-citizens”.176
It concluded that Latvia must take more positive measures to increase the rate of 
naturalisation and improve the integration of ethnic, linguistic Russians into Latvian 
society. Latvia was also required to ensure general equality of treatment for non­
citizens and ethnic, linguistic minorities, in particular in job opportunities and 
participation in the democratic process.177
It is possible to argue that the requirements of language proficiency for 
naturalisation in citizenship laws in Estonia and Latvia have a ‘discriminatory impact’ 
on the ethnic, linguistic Russians. It denies the historical fact that those ethnic, 
linguistic Russians had long resided there using the Russian language during the
173 Ibid.
174 Ibid., para. 26.
175 Ibid., para. 23.
176Concluding observations o f the United Nations Human Rights Committee: Latvia, 6 November 2003, 
CCPR/CO/79/LVA, paras. 16-18.
206
period of the former Soviet Union, thereby establishing emotional, factual and social 
connections to what are now Estonia and Latvia. Therefore, it can be argued that a 
language requirement for naturalisation in the citizenship laws is contrary to the non­
discrimination principle in the sense of substantive equality under international law.
8. Conclusions
(1). Equality and non-discrimination are universally accepted principles of human 
rights as well as critical elements for achieving the objective of protecting minority 
rights under international law. In particular, prohibition of racial discrimination is a jus  
cogens norm that binds all member States of the international community.
(2). Aside from the irrelevance of citizenship to the enjoyment of minority rights under 
minorities-specific standards, it is also observed that the limitation of the personal 
scope of the enjoyment of minority rights with reference to citizenship status is 
contrary to the non-discrimination principle under general human rights standards. In 
this sense, Estonia’s limitation of the enjoyment of minority rights to only ‘Estonian 
citizens’ is contrary to the non-discrimination principle.
(3). Despite the absence of positive minority rights provisions, the European Court of 
Human Rights nevertheless sets out a rights agenda which interacts with essential 
concerns of minorities. Moreover, with the entry into force of Protocol 12, it is not 
necessary to prove a link between the discrimination and one of the other rights in the 
European Convention on Human Rights. The autonomous application of Article 14 of 
the Convention will be critical in the context of the protection of minority rights. With 
the entry into force of Protocol No. 12, it is possible to interpret that equality and non­
discrimination extend the protections accorded to individuals by scrutinising whether 
restrictions that are superficially neutral are nonetheless violations, because they 
discriminate in the restriction of Convention rights on the basis of “association with a 
national minority.”
(4). Examination of the nature of the non-discrimination principle at the theoretical 
level as well as relevant equality and non-discrimination provisions in the major 
human rights conventions such as the ICCPR, ICERD and the European Convention 
on Human Rights beyond minorities-specific standards indicates that equality and
177 Ibid., para. 18.
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non-discrimination under those conventions do arguably conform to ‘substantive 
equality’ within the meaning of the non-discrimination principle. On this basis, it may 
be argued that States parties to those conventions in which ethnic, religious or 
linguistic groups have resided have obligations to protect the interests of members of 
such minority groups ‘effectively’, by way of providing positive measures to correct 
existing ‘factual’ and ‘indirect’ discrimination including citizenship matters that 
persons belonging to such groups have suffered or are suffering in such a way to 
achieve substantive equality.
(5). The linkage of the prohibition of racial discrimination as such to that of 
discrimination on the basis of citizenship within the non-discrimination principle is 
critical in resolving the problem of the protection of persons belonging to minority 
groups caused by restrictive citizenship measures of States in which they reside. 
Although a State has broad discretion in regulating citizenship matters under 
international law, if eligibility criteria for citizenship have ‘discriminatory impacts’ on 
particular ethnic, religious or linguistic groups, they can be contrary to the non­
discrimination principle in the sense of substantive equality under international law.
(6). The language requirement for naturalisation in the citizenship laws of Estonia and 
Latvia, both of which are parties of the ICCPR, ICERD and the European Convention 
on Human Rights, may be stated as being contrary to the non-discrimination principle, 
since it ignores the historic and habitual residence of the ethnic, linguistic Russians in 
the territories of what are now Estonia and Latvia, thereby justifying factual and 
indirect discrimination or inequalities in the language of citizenship laws.
(7). The linkage of minorities-specific standards to general human rights standards 
with emphasis on ‘substantive equality’ is significant in the sense of the consolidation 
of the legal and normative bases for the effective protection of minority rights under 
international law. Members of minority groups may be protected in the sense that they 
are protected individual human beings on the basis of the substantive equality 
principle under general human rights standards, beyond the protection as members of 
minority groups under minorities-specific standards.
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Chapter VII
Minority Protection under Internal Self-determination
1. Introduction
When one considers the existence of the ethnic, linguistic Russian stateless persons or 
non-citizens in Estonia and Latvia, who can be considered persons belonging to ethnic, 
religious or linguistic minorities by reference to a new definition of the concept of a 
minority observed in Chapter 4 of this thesis, the question of protecting their right to 
political participation in their State of residence becomes more serious and urgent. In 
this sense, the vagueness of the legal basis for the participation rights of persons 
belonging to minorities in international law is a fundamental problem in the context of 
the effective protection of the rights of persons belonging to minority groups. Even if 
the maintenance of cultural identity of minorities were guaranteed, if the right to 
participate in the public and political process by persons belonging to such minorities 
in their States of residence were not secured, the protection of persons belonging to 
minority groups would be purely theoretical.
This chapter is primarily concerned with the examination of the right to self- 
determination as a legal and normative basis for the protection of minority rights in the 
context of the guarantee of political and public participation, with special reference to 
the conceptual aspects of peoples and minorities in the right to self-determination. 
This approach seems quite necessary, because the definition of the concept of peoples, 
as the holders of the right to self-determination under international law, has 
consequences with respect to the protection of minority rights.1 Depending on how 
the concept of peoples as the holders of the right to self-determination is defined, the 
extent and degree of the protection of minority rights will be affected accordingly, 
since persons belonging to minorities have resided in a particular State to which self-
1 The terms ‘people’ and ‘peoples’ are used alternatively in this chapter depending on given contexts. 
This is necessary to avoid terminological confusion in discussing the right to self-determination under 
international law. In this chapter, the term ‘people’ refers to the entire body o f persons who satisfy the 
criteria generally accepted for determining the existence o f a people in a territorial unit. However, if  the 
holders o f the right to self-determination are to be referred to universally beyond a single territorial unit, 
the expression ‘peoples’ will be used instead.
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determination is being applied as an organising and governing principle.
However, it is also necessary to note from the outset that self-determination has 
evolved gradually as a legal norm under present international law in terms of its 
contents and effects, even though it was declared as a peremptory norm of jus cogen 
by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). For a coherent and effective norm from 
which relevant legal rights spring, it needs to be developed in order to resolve the 
potentially competing claims and obligations arising from it.4 It needs, therefore, to be 
narrowed down for the purposes of the present limited research objective of a 
productive discussion on self-determination in relation to the protection of minority 
rights. This chapter shall pay special attention to the development of the internal 
aspect of self-determination, under which members of the people are entitled to 
representative governance and government in their State of residence, as it may be a 
relevant legal and normative basis for the effective protection of minority rights under 
present international law.
2. Internal Self-Determination in International Law
The United Nations Charter mentions self-determination twice, Article 1 (2) and 
Article 55. Article 1(2) speaks of one of the purposes of the UN “to develop friendly
2 The theoretical and doctrinal elements o f self-determination are extensively addressed in a number of  
works. See, e.g., M. Pomerance, Self-determination in Law and Practice: The New Doctrine in the 
United Nations (The Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982); M H. Halperin, et al., 
Self-Determination in the New World Order (Washington D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 1992); H. Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-Determination (Philadelphia: University of  
Pennsylvania Press, 1990); A. Heraclides, The Self-Determination o f  Minorities in International Law 
and Politics (London: Frank Cass, 1991); C. Tomuschat (ed.), Modern Law o f  Self-Determination 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993); A. Cassese, Self-Determination o f  Peoples: A Legal 
Reappraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995);T.D. Musgrave, Self-Determination and 
National Minorities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); J. Crawford, “The Right o f Self- 
Determination in International Law: Its Development and Future”, in P. Alston (ed.), Peoples ’ Rights 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 7-67.
3 See, e.g., South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa) (Second Phase), 
ICJ Reports, 1966, p.4; Frontier Dispute Case (Burkina Faso v. Republic o f Mali), ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 
554, p.662; Western Sahara Case, ICJ Reports, 1975, p.55; H.G Espiell, The Right to Self- 
Determination: Implementation o f United Nations Resolutions, at 11, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev.l, UN Sales No. E.79.XIV.5 (1980). The ICJ has reaffirmed the erga omnes 
character o f the right to self-determination as "irreproachable" in the case o f East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 
ICJ Reports, 1995, p. 90, reprinted in 34 ILM1583, 1589.
4 According to Falk, a positivist exercise in the case of self-determination is difficult. He noted that: 
“The right has been continuously evolving conceptually and experientially in response to the pressure 
o f events, geopolitical priorities, and the prevailing moral and political climate. This combination of 
factors tends to produce a confusing pattern o f historically conditioned precedents, leaving considerable 
room for widely disparate interpretations bearing on legal doctrine.” R. Falk, Human Rights Horizons
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relations based on the respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination 
of peoples.”5 Article 55 also prescribes that “stability and well-being... are necessary 
for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of 
equality and self-determination of peoples.”6
Self-determination has been upgraded from a political and moral principle to a 
‘legal right’. In 1960, the UN General Assembly declared that:
“All peoples have the ‘right’ to self-determination; by virtue o f that ‘right’ they freely 
determine and freely pursue their political, economic, social and cultural development.”7 
(Emphasis added.)
However, this declaration limits the scope of the right in a way so as not to permit 
secession by residing ethnic, religious or linguistic groups from the existing State in 
the following manner:
“Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption o f the national unity and territorial 
integrity o f a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of 
the United Nations.”8
While Self-determination might have attained some measure of normative 
consistency for the purpose of decolonisation,9 self-determination with emphasis on 
decolonisation seemed to have ignored the internal problems of those States which had 
benefited from self-determination, as illustrated in the case of South African apartheid, 
or Rhodesia after its Unilateral Declaration of Independence from the United 
Kingdom.10 The ICJ affirmed the principle of self-determination for non-self 
governing territories in the Namibia Case, which has generally been regarded as 
giving a right to self-determination to colonial peoples.11 In the Western Sahara Case, 
the ICJ through its Advisory Opinion held that the right to self-determination requires 
a free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples concerned for liberation from
(New York, London: Routledge, 2000), p. 109.
5 Article 1(2) o f the UN Charter.
6 Article 55 o f the UN Charter.
7 Declaration on the Granting o f Independence, GA Res. 1514, UN GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 
15(1960).
8 Ibid., para., 6.
9 G J. Simpson, “The Diffusion o f Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Age”, Stan. J  
Int'lL, Vol., 32, 1996, p. 273.
10 Ibid; C. J. Ioms, “Indigenous Peoples and Self Determination: Challenging State Sovereignty”, Case 
W. Res. J. Int'l L, Vol., 24, 1992, pp. 253-54. She argues that the Declaration o f the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples neglected the possible applicability o f the right to self- 
determination to ethnic minorities and rather its purpose was to achieve independence and self- 
government o f colonies.
nLegal Consequences fo r States o f  the Continued Presence o f  South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), ICJ Reports, 1971, p.16.
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1 9colonial rule. The emphasis of the requirement of “a free and genuine expression of 
the will of the people concerned” in the Namibia Case was significant in that it noted 
the necessity of having a democratic character for a political and territorial entity to 
achieve independence in the context of self-determination, but its implication seemed 
to have been confined within the context of decolonisation.
From the 1970s on, however, decolonisation declined as the dominant reason for
i ^
self-determination. Higgms has argued that self-determination as set out in the UN 
Charter was never intended to be the basis of a right to decolonisation, let alone that it 
should develop into a general right for ethnic minority groups in a State. She meant by 
this statement that self-determination as a norm of international law is evolving and 
dynamic in its nature.14 Her view can equally be applied to the development of 
internal self-determination.15
Common Article 1 of the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (IESCR) provides that:
“1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue o f that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.”16
As to the nature of the self-determination provisions in the Covenants above, 
Cassese explains that:
“First - and here lies the primary significance o f the provision - Article 1(1) requires that 
the people choose their legislators and political leaders free from any manipulation or 
undue influence from the domestic authorities themselves.”17
For Cassese, Article 1 of both Covenants constitutes a codification of the internal 
aspect of self-determination in international law. In this regard, it must be remembered 
that a number of State parties to the Covenants rejected India’s declaration regarding 
Article 1 of the ICCPR, which provides that the right does not apply “to sovereign 
independent States or to a section of a people - which is the essence of national
n Western Sahara Case, op.cit., 1975, p.55.
13 For instance, the colonial period has since ended. One o f the last major official colonies, Palau, has 
become independent. See, SC Res. 956, UN SCOR, 49th sess., 3455th mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/956 
(1994).
14 See R. Higgins, “Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession, Comments”, in Peoples and 
Minorities in International Law (Dordrecht, London : Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), C. Brumlmann et al 
(eds.), p. 29.
15 For a general observation, R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How to Use It 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 111-128; H. Hannum, “Rethinking Self-Determination”, Va. J. 
In t’L. Vol., 34, 1993, pp. 1-69
16 GA Res. 2200A (XXI), UN GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, UN Doc. X (1966); 999 UNTS 
171; 6 ILM 368 (1967).
17 Cassese, Self-Determination o f  Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal, op.cit., p. 53.
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integrity.”18 In its General Comment on Article 1 of the ICCPR, the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) suggested a generally internal focus of the right to self- 
determination beyond the context of decolonisation by requiring State parties to 
describe in their reports “the constitutional and political processes which in practice 
allow the exercise of this right.”19 In paragraph 6, the General Comment states as 
follows:
“all States parties to the Covenant should take positive action to facilitate realization of 
and respect for the right o f peoples to self-determination.”20
The 1970 Declaration on Principles on International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United
91 • •Nations (Declaration on Friendly Relations) links self-determination to the
99upholding of fundamental human rights. The final version of the 1970 Declaration 
included a clause which attempted to construe the principle as not “authorizing or 
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the
91territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States.” However, 
the penultimate paragraph of that clause also contained the critical statement on self- 
determination:
“...States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle o f equal rights and 
self-determination o f peoples as described above and 'thus possessed o f  a government 
representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, 
creed or c o l o u r (Emphasis added.)
Cassese has made a distinction between external and internal self-determination in 
the following manner:
“a. All peoples subjected to colonial rule have a right to self-determination, that is to 
“freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development” (operative paragraph 2 o f Resolution 1514(XV);
b. This right only concerns external self-determination, that is, the choice o f the 
international status o f the people and the territory where it lives;...
c. Once a people has exercised its right to external self-determination, the right expires.
This may be inferred from paragraph VI o f the Principle on self-determination laid down 
in the Declaration on Friendly Relations.. .”24 (Emphasis in original.)
Sohn also writes about the nature of Articles 1 of the ICCPR and DESCR:
18 Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General: Status as o f 31 December, 1993, at 116 
(declaration), 134-37 (objections), UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/12 (1994).
19 General Comment 12/21, A/39/40 (1984).
20 Ibid., para. 6.
21 United Nations Declaration on Principles o f International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res. 2625, UN 
GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, UN Doc. A/8028 (1970).
22Ibid.
23 Ibid., at 279.
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“The Covenants clearly endorse not only the right o f external self-determination, but also 
the right o f internal self-determination: the right o f a people to establish its own political 
institutions, to develop its own economic resources, and to direct its own social and 
cultural evolution... A people should be free both from interference by other peoples or 
states and from deprivation o f its right to self-determination by a tyrant or dictator.”25
‘Internal’ self-determination is thus not a separate norm distinguished from external 
self-determination, rather it is the ‘internal aspect’ of self-determination. Internal self- 
determination concerns the right of a people ‘within’ a State to choose their political 
status, “the extent of their political participation and the form of their government”.26 
Self-determination has come to operate in such a way as to affect the very structure of 
a State for the protection of human rights of the persons living ‘within’ the self­
determining regime.27
Furthermore, the notion of democracy has begun to take hold as a critical element 
for the right to internal self-determination, as it implies that the exercise of the right to 
self-determination is made ‘within’ a State except on rare occasions. As Franck points 
out, self-determination has begun to make possible the right of a people organised in 
an established territory to determine its political destiny in a democratic fashion. 
Self-determination, therefore, is not only confined to the right of oppressed peoples 
under colonial or alien domination, but also must be exercised in a democratic way for 
the protection of a people ‘within’ the boundary of an independent State.
The shift of emphasis toward the internal aspect of self-determination found 
clearer expression in the European Union’s Declaration on Yugoslavia and the 
Guidelines on the Recognition of New States (EU Declaration), which the European 
Union applied to the newly independent States that emerged after the break-up of both 
the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The EU Declaration invoked the standards 
and values expressed by the Helsinki, Copenhagen, and Paris texts:
“The European Community and its Member States confirmed their attachment to the 
principles o f the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter o f Paris, in particular the principle o f  
self-determination.”29
24 Cassese, Self-Determination o f  Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal, op.cit., pp. 72-73.
25 L.B. Sohn, “The New International Law: Protection of the Rights o f Individuals Rather Than States”, 
AM. U. L. Rev., Vol., 32, 1982, p.50.
26R. McCorquodale, “Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach”, ICLQ, Vol., 43, 1994, p. 864.
27 H.J. Steiner, “Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle over Autonomy Regimes for Minorities”, 
Notre Dame L. Rev, Vol., 66, 1991, p. 1539. Rosas also argues that the practice o f international human 
rights organs, State practice and legal doctrine are moving towards the internal aspect o f  self- 
determination. A. Rosas, “Internal Self-Determination”, in Modern Law o f  Self-Determination, op.cit., 
pp. 225-229.
T. M. Franck, “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance”, AJIL, Vol., 86, 1992, pp. 46-52.
29 Declaration on Yugoslavia and the Guidelines o f the Recognition o f New States, Dec. 16, 1991, 
European Community, 31 ILM 1485, 1486 (1992).
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At the same time, internal self-determination is ‘constant’ in its applicability, as it is 
implemented and realised in a democratic way in a State’s overall structure. The 
British government’s account of internal self-determination, in this regard, seems to 
have properly elucidated the nature of internal self-determination. The UK’s 
representative in the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly stated the 
following:
“Self-determination is not a one-off exercise. It cannot be achieved for any people by one 
revolution or one election. It is a continuous process. It requires that peoples be given 
continuing opportunities to choose their governments and social systems, and to change 
them when they so choose ... Many peoples today are deprived o f their right o f self- 
determination, by elites o f their own countrymen... through the concentration o f power in 
a particular political party, in a particular ethnic or religious group, or in a certain social 
class.”30
However, this does not mean that internal self-determination requires a certain type 
of political system, because the method of implementation of internal self- 
determination at the domestic level would differ from State to State.31 Therefore, self- 
government for ethnic, religious or linguistic minority groups who have resided in a 
particular region in their State of residence would not necessarily be the only way for 
realising internal self-determination.32
3. Internal Self-Determination and the Definition of the Term People: 
Baltic Implications
3.1. The Definitional Problem of the Term People33
There are doubts, however, as to whether the legitimate interests of ethnic, religious or 
linguistic groups can be effectively secured under such internal self-determination, 
even if the normative basis for the protection of minority groups may be established in
30 Statements by its representative to the Third Committee o f the UN General Assembly (Mr. 
R. Fursland), 12 Oct. 1984, B.Y.I.L, Vol., 55, 1984, p.432, quoted in McCorquodale, Self- 
Determination: A Human Rights Approach, op.cit., p.865; Pomerance also notes that “If...self- 
determination is seen as a continuum of rights, it also, in a real sense, comes closer to the idea o f a 
continuing right.” Pomerance, Self-determination in Law and Practice, op.cit., p. 75.
MaCorquo dale, Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach, op.cit., p. 865; A. J. Hanneman, 
“Independence and Group Rights in the Baltics: A Double Minority Problem”, Va. J. Int'l L., Vol., 
35,1995, pp. 485-527.
32 G. Gilbert, “Autonomy and Minority Groups: A Right in International Law?”, Cornell Int'l L.J, Vol., 
35,2002, pp. 340-341.
33 See, generally, R.N. Kiwanuka, “The Meaning o f  “People” in the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights”, AJIL, Vol., 82, 1988, pp. 80-101.
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the internal aspect of self-determination. The problem is acute in countries where 
‘democratic decisions’ have led to the progressive disenfranchisement of ethnic, 
religious or linguistic groups. Even when the territory is relatively undisputed in terms 
of potential secessionist movements by minority groups, the question of citizenship 
for persons belonging to such groups can arise in the context of political participation.
Estonia and Latvia in the Baltic region, for instance, have argued that the presence 
of the ethnic Russians in these republics is a denial of self-determination for all 
Estonians and Latvians. A Latvian delegate at the Unrepresented Peoples and Nations 
Assembly in the Hague in 1991 even argued that to allow these Russians to vote in 
democratic elections would imply the end of Latvia as an independent State.34
The status of the ethnic, linguistic Russians in Estonia and Latvia has been the 
main cause of the conflicts between titular Estonian and titular Latvian nationals on 
the one hand and the ethnic, linguistic Russian populations in Estonia and Latvia on 
the other. The Baltic States put the question of independence to a referendum as they 
underwent historical transformation in the 1990s. Relying on the social contract theory 
of State legitimacy and on claims to the right of self-determination, the Balts argued 
that if their populations voted for self-governance, then continued rule from Moscow 
would be impermissible. In Estonia, 78% of those who turned out to vote chose 
independence, while in Latvia the corresponding figure was 74%. Voting results 
showed that 30-40% of the ethnic, linguistic Russians supported separation from the 
USSR as well.37 Despite the fact that a significant number of the Russians in the 
Baltic States supported the move to independence, Estonia and Latvia disenfranchised 
most of their ethnic, linguistic Russian populations through restrictive citizenship 
laws.38 The new native Estonian and Latvian majorities were suspicious of the 
resident Russians’ loyalties, and as a result, those Russians who supported secession 
felt disillusioned. A 1991 poll of the population of Latvia found that many ethnic,
34 UNPO Report, Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), Self-Determination in 
Relation to Individual Human Rights, Democracy and the Protection o f the Environment, UNPO 
GA/1993/CR/1 (Conference Report 1993), at 3; See also, I. Grazin, “The International Recognition of  
National Rights: The Baltic States’ Case”, Notre Dame L. Rev, Vol., 66, 1991, pp. 1385-1419.
35 G. Smith, A. Aasland & R. Mole, “Statehood, Ethic Relations and Citizenship,” in G. Smith (ed.), 
The Baltic States: The National Self-Determination o f  Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (London: 
Macmillan Press, 1996), pp. 181-205.
36 K. Gemer & S. Hedlund, The Baltic States and the End o f  Soviet Empire (London, New York: 
Routledge, 1993), p. 155.
37 D. M. Crowe, The Baltic States and the Great Powers: Foreign Relations, 1938-1940 (Oxford: 
Westview Press, 1993), p. 181.
38 For an overview o f the citizenship laws in Estonia and Latvia, see Chapter 2 above, pp. 52-54.
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linguistic Russians fully supported secession, believing it to be an act “in the 
mainstream of the democratic transformations”. In 1994 many of the non-native 
peoples believed that they were misled, saying that Latvia’s “democracy for all had 
been used to build a Republic of South Africa in the Center of Europe.”40
Although the Latvian Declaration of Independence on 4 May, 1990 called for 
guaranteed rights to all permanent residents of Latvian territory, the ethnic, linguistic 
Russians in Latvia claimed that they had been denied these rights.41 They complained 
that they had been denied the opportunity to participate in the political process and 
that they had been labelled as “invaders”.42 Even Latvian-born Russians were not 
citizens and found themselves in danger of losing their jobs because of laws that 
required knowledge of Latvia. The situation in Estonia showed similar patterns. Many 
ethnic, linguistic Russians, worried about their unprotected status in Estonia and 
Latvia, have been fleeing to Russia and to other countries. This is precisely the action 
advocated by ultra-nationalists in Estonia and Latvia.43
It is important to note that both the Balts and the ethnic, linguistic Russians have 
relied on the right to self-determination to emphasise the validity of their own views in 
the territories of Estonia and Latvia. Ethnic Latvians and Estonians on the one hand, 
and the ethnic, linguistic Russians, on the other, all view themselves as victimised 
minorities.44 Under former Soviet rule, the Baltic peoples experienced discrimination 
and believed that they were in danger of becoming minorities in their own States. 
Since independence, they have been determined to safeguard their language, identity, 
and nationhood. Baltic attitudes toward citizenship are coloured by fears of ethnic 
extinction, as well as resentment of the non-titular population that they identify with 
the former Soviet regime. Following the break-up of the former Soviet Union, 
however, the Russians in the Baltic States lost their former privileged status; they are 
no longer associated with the ruling power and dominant culture, and are now in a
39 Non-Latvians Hold Riga Protest Meeting, FBIS-SOV, Mar. 10, 1994, at 39.
40 Ibid. O f course, this comparison may no longer be valid following the elections in South Africa in 
April 1994.
41 V. Alksnis, “Suffering from Self-Determination”, Foreign Policy, Fall 1991, pp. 61-63.
42 Ibid.
43 The Foreign Relations Commission o f the Citizen's Congress of the Latvian Republic is committed 
to the repatriation o f all Russians who came to Latvia during the Soviet period. When asked whether he 
would advocate the use o f force towards this end, V. Brinkmanis, the Commission's head, replied, “We 
will arrange it so that they leave voluntarily,” R. Krickus, Latvia's “Russian Question”, RFE/RL 
Research Report, Apr. 30, 1993, p. 34.
44 R C. Visek, “Creating the ethnic electorate through legal restorationism: citizenship rights in 
Estonia”, Harv. Int’l L.J, Vol.,38, 1997, pp. 315-373.
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minority. They feel that they have been unjustly denied automatic citizenship, 
considering their long-term residence prior to the independence of Estonia and Latvia 
in 1991. Most of them do not think they should have to apply for citizenship status or 
even be required to learn the local language for that purpose.45
As peoples who had managed to free themselves from the yoke of foreign 
domination, it seems clear that the titular Estonians and Latvians have the right to self- 
determination. If the right to self-determination did grant the Estonians and Latvians 
the right to pursue their political, economic, social, and cultural development as 
peoples, should there not be any room within this right that could provide the same 
entitlement to the ethnic, linguistic Russians who had lived and even participated in 
the Estonian and Latvian independence movements from the former Soviet Union?
The case of the status of the ethnic, linguistic Russian non-citizens and stateless 
persons in Estonia and Latvia illustrates that minority protection under internal self- 
determination is also a problem of how to define the term ‘peoples’ for the purpose of 
self-determination. Because even if the democratic character based on ‘representative 
government’ without distinction of race, creed or colour of a State is required by 
internal self-determination in the context of a normative basis, what is not clear is 
what is meant by the ‘peoples’ who shall enjoy the right to self-determination. The 
marginal status of the ethnic, linguistic Russian stateless persons or non-citizens in 
Estonia and Latvia clearly illustrates that a State can arbitrarily limit the membership 
of the people as holders of the right to self-determination, thereby excluding some 
particular ethic, religious or linguistic groups in the political process in the form of 
citizenship. This is the reason why the question of how to define the term peoples as 
holders of the right to self-determination is a critical task in terms of the protection of 
persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic groups under internal self- 
determination. This is evident, given that the larger the definition of peoples for self- 
determination is, the larger the number of persons who can enjoy the right to self- 
determination will be in its internal aspect.
The UN Charter was adopted in the name of “We the Peoples...” and it recognises, 
in Article 1(2), the principle of “self-determination of peoples.” Common Article 1 of 
the 1966 International Human Rights Covenants declares the right of “peoples” to 
self-determination. In spite of this concern for “peoples” and peoples’ rights, the term
45 Ibid., pp. 320-322.
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“people” has not been authoritatively defined in any of the instruments that employ 
it.46 As the text of the UN Charter and the traveaux prepatoire provide little insight 
into identifying what was meant by the term peoples, the definition of the term people 
must be examined by reviewing international practice and making theoretical 
observations.
The HRC has made it clear, as recently confirmed in Apirana Mahuika et a l v. 
New Zealand that, unlike Article 27 rights, self-determination is not a recognisable 
right under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.47 However, the HRC’s rejection of 
the claim to self-determination by an individual should be understood such that the 
right to self-determination is exercised by individuals comprising peoples ‘as a whole’, 
rather than the total rejection of the subject of self-determination, since self- 
determination is a ‘legal right’ and a legal right assumes the existence of the holder of 
the right. In the same context, as to the enforceability of the right to self-determination 
in relation to a legal right of self-determination, Gilbert argues that:
“The fact that the right can only be concretized by reference to local facts does not mean 
that the right itself is uncertain; merely that its implementation must be case 
specific...And just because it is non-justiciable in most instances, that again does not 
detract from its status as a right in international law.”48
What is clear is that the right to self-determination is vested in peoples not 
governments, as the UN Charter and the two International Covenants expressly 
declare.
3. 2. Peoples and Territorial Connection
The review of practices of the UN in supervising the decolonisation of dependent 
territories after World War II and the election monitoring missions in some ‘failed’ 
territories since the end of the Cold War may be instructive in assessing the definition
46 Crawford notes that the key feature of the phrase in ‘rights o f peoples’ is not the term ‘rights, but the 
term ‘people’. See, J. Crawford, “The Rights of Peoples : ‘People’ or ‘Governments’?”, in J. Crawford 
(ed.), The Rights o f  Peoples (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), p.55.
47 Apirana Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand, Communication No. 547/1993, views o f 27 October 2000, 
CCPR/C/70/D/541/1993. See also, Ominayak and the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, “...that the author, 
as an individual, could not claim under the Optional Protocol to be a victim o f a violation o f the right of 
self-determination enshrined in Article 1 o f the Covenant, which deals with the rights conferred on 
peoples, as such.” HRC Report Doc.A/45/40, Vol. II, Annex IX, p. 1 at. 27, para. 32.1.
48 Gilbert, Autonomy and Minority Groups, op.cit., p. 353.
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of peoples as the holders of the right to self-determination.49 At the same time, the 
negative response of the international community toward the secessionist movements 
of ethnic, religious or linguistic minority groups from the existing territorial boundary 
can also help make clear the concept of peoples, because it supports a proposition that 
the holders of the right to self-determination should remain ‘within’ the existing State.
In the decolonisation setting, the UN consistently applied the principle of self- 
determination solely to the ‘inhabitants’ of the pre-existing political State.50 The UN, 
in supervising the decolonisation of Africa, accepted the territorial divisions of the 
colonial powers despite the arbitrariness with which they were originally drawn.51 
The practice of the UN in overseeing the decolonisation process suggests that the right 
to self-determination is to be applied to ‘all inhabitants’ of a unified pre-existing 
territorial unit rather than to any particular ethnic, religious or linguistic groups within 
it. Post-Cold War self-determination, which is moving in the direction of internal 
self-determination also appears to focus on the aspect of an existing territorial 
boundary in which inhabitants have lived, observing basically the territorial integrity 
of States. In other words, the internal focus of self-determination in the post-colonial 
and Cold War eras appears to regard the ‘territorial State’ as the ‘self’.53 The new 
States of the 1990s seem to have owed more to territorial coherence than any former 
discrimination against a particular ethnic, religious or linguistic groups within some 
larger ‘former’ State.54 Recent practice invites further reflection. Despite the strong 
ethnic characterisation of the Yugoslav constituent republics and thus its crucial 
significance in the context of the crisis, the overall approach eventually taken by the 
international community has appeared conceptually and operationally unchanged with 
regard to the material identification of the ‘self’. Self-determination has been 
recognised as a whole unit, not to minorities or other specific ethnic communities 
living within those units. This principle may be inferred from the Opinion of the
49 For a general observation, Y. Beigbeder, International Monitoring o f  Plebiscites, Referenda and 
National Elections: Self-determination and Transition to Democracy (Drodrecht/Boston/London: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994).
50 S.J. Anaya, “The Capacity o f International Law to Advance Ethnic or Nationality Rights Claims”, 
Iowa L.Rev, Vol., 75, 1990, pp. 841-844..
51 L. Brilmayer, “Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation”, Yale J. Int'l L, 
V ol.,16, 1991, pp. 177-182.
52 Ibid., pp. 182-183.
53 G. H. Fox, “Self-determination in the post-Cold War era: A new internal focus?”, Mich. J. Int'l L, Vol., 
16, 1995, pp. 733-781.
54 Ibid., pp. 752-756. See also Opinion No. 3, International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, 
Arbitration Commission, 1992, 31 ILM 1499.
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Badinter Commission of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. It 
was asked for its opinion as to whether the Serbian populations of Bosnia and Croatia 
had the right to self-determination. The Commission answered that while they did 
indeed have such a right, its exercise could not (in the absence of agreement) result in 
changes to State borders existing at the time of independence. Rather, the right 
required acknowledgment of peoples’ cultural identity and their legal protection as 
minorities under relevant international instruments.55
The question of defining ‘people’ for self-determination purposes was also 
incidentally addressed by the Canadian Supreme Court in its Opinion in Reference re 
Secession of Quebec of 20 August 1998.56 The proceeding arose from a reference by 
the Government of Canada in relation to the secession of Quebec. A number of 
questions were put to the Court, including whether there was a right to self- 
determination under international law that would categorise Quebec’s population as a 
‘people’; the Court, while tentatively observing that this notion might include a 
portion of the population of an existing State, declined to argue that the francophone 
community of Quebec, and/or other groups within Quebec, were as such a ‘people’ in 
the sense of international law.57
Negative response to the major secessionist movements of ethnic, religious or 
linguistic groups of the post-war era under the banner of self-determination indicates 
that those minority groups’ demands for independent statehood are generally not 
acceptable.58 Iraqi Kurds have been given military and humanitarian assistance, but 
the possibility of independence has been denied and avoided.59 India changed its 
supporting policy in favour of Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka, having signed in 1987 a 
peace accord with the Sri Lankan government.60 The support of the Tibetan struggle 
against China has not crossed a threshold of moral support.61 Despite widespread 
condemnation of Russia’s tactics in suppressing the rebellion in Chechnya, news that
55 Opinion No. 2, International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, 1992, 
31 ILM 1497, 1498-99.
56 Reference re Secession of Quebec from Canada, 1998, 2 SCR 217, 133-39.
57 Ibid.
58 For a comprehensive review o f this issue, see T.R. Gurr, Minorities at Risk (Washington, D.C: 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), pp. 294-298; A. Heraclides, “Secessionist Minorities and 
External Involvement”, Int'l Org, Vol., 44, 1990, pp. 341-346.
59 Solving the Kurds, Economist, 31 October, 1992, at 17.
60 S.W.R. de A. Samarasinghe, “The Dynamics o f Separatism: the Case o f Sri Lanka”, in Secessionist 
Movements in Comparative Perspective (London: Pinter, 1990), R.R. Premdas, S.W.R. de A. 
Samarasinghe, A.B. Anderson (eds.), pp. 48-63.
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States have recognised Chechnya as an independent State has not yet been heard.62 
While the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)’s intervention to protect 
Kosovo’s Albanians was waged against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) due 
to the ‘gross’ human rights violations perpetrated by the Yugoslav army, the 
international community has so far continued to uphold the territorial integrity of the 
FRY.63
While secession is the preferred option for decolonisation, self-determination 
beyond decolonisation may be satisfied by internally exercised self-determination 
through the guarantee of democratic process and the operation of democratic 
representative government to protect and guarantee the civil and political rights of all 
people ‘within a State’. Nevertheless, it is still unclear who meets the definition of the 
term ‘people’ among the inhabitants in question.
3. 3. Ethnic or Racial Grouping and Sharing Common Historical, Political or 
Social Experiences
Dinstein identifies relevant elements for determining the term ‘people’ in the 
following way:
“The objective element is that there has to exist an ethnic group linked by common 
history... It is not enough to have an ethnic link in the sense of past genealogy and history.
It is essential to have a present ethos or state o f mind. A people is both entitled and 
required to identify itself as such.”64
Ethnic or racial grouping and sharing of common historical and political experiences 
should thus be understood broadly so that it can embrace diverse ethnic, religious or 
linguistic groups within the territory of a State. Though Brownlie’s view is a bit 
lengthy, it deserves quoting. He observes that:
“No doubt there has been continuing doubt over the definition o f what is a “people” for 
the purpose o f applying the principle o f self-determination. Nonetheless, the principle 
appears to have a core of reasonable certainty. This core consists in the right of a 
community which has a distinct character to have this character reflected in the 
institutions o f government under which it lives. The concept o f distinct character depends 
on a number of criteria which may appear in combination. Race (or nationality) is one of  
the more important o f the relevant criteria, but the concept o f race can only be expressed
61 W.G. Vause, “Tibet to Tienanmen: Chinese Human Rights and United States Foreign Policy”, 
Vand.L.Rev, Vol., 42, 1989, pp. 1575-1597.
62 G. Larson, “The Right o f International Intervention in Civil Conflicts: Evolving International Law on 
State Sovereignty in Observance o f Human Rights and Application to the Crisis in Chechnya”, 
Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs, Vol., 11, 2001, pp. 252-274.
63UNSC Res. 1244, UN SCOR, 54th Sess., 4011 mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999), at 10-11.
64 Y. Dinstein, “Collective Human Rights o f Peoples and Minorities”, ICLQ, Vol., 25, 1976, p. 104.
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scientifically in terms o f more specific features, in which matters o f culture, language, 
religion and group psychology predominate. The physical indicia o f race and nationality 
may evidence the cultural distinctiveness o f a group but they certainly do not inevitably 
condition it. Indeed, if  the purely ethnic criteria are applied exclusively many long 
existing national identities would be negated on academic grounds as, for example, the 
United States.”65 (Emphasis in original.)
The Declaration on Friendly Relations also provides critical evidence in defining 
peoples in terms of ethnic or racial characteristics. Paragraph 7 of the Declaration 
refers to States complying with the right to self-determination and “thus possessed of a 
government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without 
distinction as to race, creed or colour.”66 It suggests that the reference to “race, creed 
or colour” highlights that ethnicity is not a decisive element for determining the term 
people. More than anything else, it must be recognised that ethnic or racial grouping is 
a concept which seems to defy precise definition. Although it might be defined in 
terms of both objective and subjective criteria, fixing appropriate objective criteria is 
nearly impossible.
An independent State in the context of internal self-determination, then, is a 
political and cultural entity in which residents have created a nation by establishing a 
common solidarity under State sovereignty. By ‘common solidarity’ the writer means 
a progressively and loosely formulated state of mind and ethos of the inhabitants 
springing from common historical and social experiences living together in the same 
territory. Territorial boundaries form the nature and future identity of the people and it 
is quite natural that persons who have shared common historical, political and social 
experiences within a specific territorial space offer better foundations for co-operation 
than those who do not. The important point is that the common solidarity is broadly 
defined. It cannot be a unified or fixed sense of solidarity, as the people which various 
ethnic, religious or linguistic groups may constitute could not have a single fixed sense 
of common solidarity.
The definition of the term people with reference to internal self-determination can 
thus be described as follows: People, as the holders of the right to self-determination, 
are residing inhabitants in their State of residence. In order to be considered as 
members of a people, they must be connected to their State by reference to some 
nexus such as long and habitual residence and sharing broadly defined common
65 I.Brownlie, “The Rights o f Peoples in Modem International Law”, in The Rights o f  Peoples, op.cit., 
p. 5.
66The Declaration on Friendly Relations, op.cit., para., 7.
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historical, political and social experiences with other residents as indications of 
common solidarity.67
4. Integration of Minorities and Peoples under Internal Self- 
Determination
The internal aspect of self-determination requires that all people ‘within’ their State of 
residence enjoy the right to vote and be elected in genuine periodic elections by 
universal equal suffrage based on true representation.68 Further, they may constitute 
one or more ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities whose rights are likely to be 
abused at the discretion of government authorities. Herein lies the essence of the 
problem of the protection of existing ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities within a 
State, as history, warfare, and migrations have divided the world into cultural units 
that do not always correspond with the existing territorial unit. Minorities are groups 
within a State who see themselves as in some way separated from the rest of society. 
In principle, international legal standards of minority rights require that such persons 
be included in the ‘common good’ and never denied their human rights on the basis of 
distinctions such as race, religion, or language. States in which minorities reside have 
positive international obligations to protect their rights by way of implementing 
protective measures to that effect.69
The definition of a minority examined in Chapter 4, reflecting the recent 
international trend in the area of the protection of the rights of persons belonging to 
minorities, is a national or ethnic, religious and linguistic group numerically smaller 
than the rest of the population of a State, having lived over a significant period of time 
in their State of residence. The members of the group have ethnic, religious or 
linguistic features differing from the rest of the population and show a sense of mutual 
solidarity for the preservation of their unique culture, tradition or language. Persons, 
whether they are citizens or non-citizens in legal terms, may belong to several
67 See Article 8 (2) o f the proposed convention in Chapter 8 below, pp. 266-268.
68 Beigbeder, International Monitoring o f  Plebiscites, Referenda and National Elections, op.cit., 
pp. 151-212.
69 The legal basis o f States’ obligations to protect minority rights may be evidenced in relevant 
provisions in the international instruments on the rights o f minorities, as examined in Chapter 5 o f this 
thesis. For instance, Article 27 o f the ICCPR, 999 UNTS 171, 179; Declaration on the Rights of  
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, GA. Res. 135, UN, 
GAOR 3d Comm., 47th Sess., UN Doc.A/RES/47/135 (1992).
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different ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities and they may be geographically 
scattered across several States, but they are part of only one people of their State of 
residence. Minorities may exclude their fellow citizens and neighbours, but the 
‘people’ of a given territorial State must embrace every ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minority.
In a report written for the UN, Cristescu offered a limited definition of the term 
‘people’ for self-determination:
“(a). The term “people” denotes a social entity possessing a clear identity and its own 
characteristics;
(b). It implies a relationship with a territory, even if  the people in question has been 
wrongfully expelled from it and artificially replaced by another population;
(c). A people should not be confused with ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities, whose 
existence and rights are recognized in article 27 o f the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights.”70
The problem of his definition is that it approached the concept of people so narrowly 
as to exclude minorities from membership of the category of people. Cristescu's 
exclusion of minorities from being members of a people depended on certain 
assumptions that are no longer acceptable. In other words, Cristescu's interpretation 
was an extension of earlier attempts within the UN to confine the right to self- 
determination to the peoples of the non-self-governing territories. Since secession of 
ethnic, religious or linguistic minority groups from the existing State is generally 
impermissible under present international law of self-determination, all references to 
self-determination in relation to independent States require respect for the rights of 
ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities residing therein. If the term people is 
understood in this way, and the right to self-determination is interpreted in a broader 
manner to include internal aspects, it is difficult not to integrate minorities into the 
membership of the people.
The respect of the right to self-determination and the protection of minority rights 
in international law are complementary in their scope of application. As Gilbert 
pointed out, “much time and energy has been wasted trying to justify the exclusion of
t 71minorities in the concept of the people under Article 1 of the ICCPR.” As to the 
relationship between self-determination and the international protection of minority 
rights in terms of the normative consideration, it may be correct to say that they
70 A. Cristescu, The right to self-determination, historical and current development on the basis o f the 
United Nations instruments, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/404/Rev.l, UN Sales No. E. 80.XIV.3 (1981), para. 
279.
71 Gilbert, Autonomy and Minority Groups, op.cit., p. 339.
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occupy their own separate space. But this does not mean that the two areas are
mutually exclusive. On the contrary, the scope and dimension of each type of 
protection are different yet overlapping under present international law. Ermacora 
states as follows:
“Unless the United Nations has not developed clear-cut ideas about the holder o f the right 
to self-determination my opinion is that minorities also can be considered holders o f the 
right to self-determination. Minorities must be considered as people. They must live also 
in a territory or they must have been living in a territory which is now occupied; they 
must have cultural or religious characteristics; they must be politically organized so that 
they can be represented . . .  It does not depend on governments as to how they are 
describing an entity as a people; it depends on objective and subjective criteria of a group.
It depends also on the self-consciousness o f identity. I think, therefore, that national and 
racial, perhaps also religious, minorities could be considered peoples in the sense o f an 
autonomous concept o f the United Nations instruments. For them self-determination is 
inalienable.”72
Ermacora concludes that minorities must be considered as people. As noted, this was 
also the finding of the Badinter Arbitration Commission’s Opinion No. 2 of 1992. It is 
important to note that it applied Article 1 of the International Human Rights 
Covenants to the Serbian minorities, holding that they had a right to self- 
determination.73 However, it has to be reiterated that the Commission declared that 
“the right of self-determination must not involve changes to existing frontiers.”74 The 
Commission equated the concept of minorities to that of peoples, but made clear that 
those minority groups were certainly not entitled to determine their political status 
through secession.75 This means that individual members of ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minority groups in a State shall enjoy self-determination by virtue of their 
membership in the larger entity, the State, and participating in its political processes as 
part of the people. Thus the proposition by Higgins that members of distinct minorities 
in a State are part of the people in the context of self-determination is basically correct. 
She emphasises the rights of minorities ‘within’ their State of residence:
“Peoples means the entire people o f a State.. .The emphasis in all the relevant instruments 
in the State practice-on the importance o f territorial integrity, means that ‘peoples’ is to be 
understood in the sense of all the peoples o f a given territory. Of course, all members o f  
distinct minority groups are part o f the peoples o f the territory. In that sense, they too, as 
individuals, are the holders o f the right to self-determination.”76 (Emphasis in original.)
It is argued here that persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities
72 F. Ermacora, “The Protection of Minorities Before the United Nations”, RECUEIL DES COURS, 
Vol. 182, 1983, p.327.
73 Badinter Commission Opinion No. 2, op.cit., at 1498.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Higgins, Problems and Process, op.cit., p. 124.
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living in a State are integrated as constituents of the broad category of people in the
77context of the exercise of the right to internal self-determination. Persons belonging 
to minorities are holders of minority rights recognised under present international law 
and at the same time, they are part of the people of their State of residence, because 
they have satisfied criteria for the determination of people by reference to the internal 
aspect of self-determination.
5. The Rights to Political Participation under Internal Self- 
Determination
Under internal self-determination, it is thus required generally that democratic 
representative governance be guaranteed for all peoples who have settled down and 
resided in their States of residence, in terms of the effects of internal self- 
determination upon the lives of such peoples.78 The problem is, however, what the 
elements constituting democatic governance are in the context of internal self- 
determination.79
77 In the case o f Freedom and Democracy Party (OZDEP) v. Turkey before the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR), the applicant party was dissolved for allegedly promoting terrorism and 
advocating the creation of a Kurdish State. The programme of the party made a number o f references to 
the right o f “our peoples” to self-determination, to “oppressed peoples”, stating that it “will fully 
respect the Kurdish people’s right to self-determination so that a democratic solution based on self- 
determination can be found”. In finding a violation o f Article 11, the Court read OZDEP’s programme 
to reflect something like the right to internal self-determination, in line with the developments in 
international law. The Court stated that: “the passage in issue presents a political project whose aim is 
in essence the establishment- in accordance with democratic rules- o f ‘a social order encompassing the 
Turkish and Kurdish peoples’...It is true that in its programme OZDEP also refers to the right o f self- 
determination o f the ‘national or religious minorities’; however, taken in context, these words do not 
encourage people to seek separation from Turkey but are intended instead to emphasise that the 
proposed political project must be underpinned by the freely given, democratically expressed, consent 
of the Kurds.” Freedom and Democracy Party (OZDEP) v. Turkey, Application No. 23885/94, 
Judgment o f 8 December 1999, para. 41.
78 R.A. Miller, “Self-Determination in International Law and the Demise o f Democracy?”, Colum. J. 
Transnat'l L, Vol., 41, 2003, pp.601-648; General Recommendation XXI on the right to self- 
determination by the CERD has confirmed this in principle in the following terms: The right to self- 
determination o f peoples has an internal aspect, that is to say, the rights o f  all peoples to pursue freely 
their economic, social and cultural development without outside interference. In that respect there exists 
a link to the right o f every citizen to take part in the conduct o f public affairs at any level, as referred to 
in article 5 (c) o f the International Convention on the Elimination o f All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 
In consequence, Governments are to represent the whole population without distinction as to race, 
colour, descent or national or ethnic origin.” UN Doc. CERD/48/Misc.7/Rev.3, 1996, para. 4.
79 The question of democracy in the context o f internal self-determinaiton shows that self- 
determination must be appreciated in conjuction with other norms o f international law, as Higgins 
implied before. This shows a much closer linkage between self-determination and human rights. For a 
general observation, see Lung-Chu Chen, “Self-Determination as a Human Right”, in M. Reisman & B. 
Weston (eds.), Toward World Order and Human Dignity (New York: The Free Press, 1976), pp. 198- 
261; McCorquodale, Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach, op.cit., pp. 870-878.
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The rights to political participation are recognised in Article 25 of the ICCPR: 
citizens have the right to (a) “take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or 
through freely chosen representatives”, and (b) “vote and to be elected at genuine 
periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by
on
secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors”. In its 
General Comment on Article 25, the HRC explained the relationship between the right 
to self-determination and the rights to political participation:
“By virtue o f the rights covered by Article 1(1), peoples have the right to freely determine 
their political status and to enjoy the right to choose the form o f their constitution or 
government. Article 25 deals with the right to individuals to participate in those processes 
which constitute the conduct o f public affairs.”81
Article 25 is concerned with the right of individual political participation in a 
system of collective decision-making. According to the HRC, it “lies at the core of 
democratic government based on the consent of the people and in conformity with the 
principles of the Covenant.”82 In a number of reports to the HRC, States parties to the 
ICCPR associate the right of peoples to self-determination with a right to democratic 
government. For instance, the report submitted by India provides: “The internal 
aspects of self-determination, it is suggested, include the right of people to choose 
their own form of government and the right to democracy.” In its Concluding 
Observations on Congo, the HRC expressed its concern that the Congolese people had 
been unable, owing to the postponement of general elections, “to exercise their right to 
self-determination.” The Committee called on Congo to organise general elections 
as soon as possible in order to enable its citizens to exercise their rights under Articles 
1 and 25.85 The right of peoples to self-determination creates an obligation for the 
150-plus States parties to the ICCPR both to introduce and maintain democratic forms 
of government.
Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration)
o / r
emphasises the overriding importance of the “will of the people”. A government that
is not based on the consent of the governed is not democratic in nature. In addition, the
80 Article 25 of the ICCPR.
81HRC General Comment No. 25, CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add. 7, 1996, para. 2.
82 Ibid., para. 1.
83 Third Periodic Report (India), UN Doc. CCPR/C/76/Add. 6,1996, para. 32.
84 HRC, Concluding Observation on the Second Periodic Report o f the Congo, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add. 118, 2000, para. 20.
85 Ibid.
86 Article 21 (3) o f Universal Declaration o f Human Rights.
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government of a State must be substantially representative of all distinct ethnic, 
religious or linguistic groups living in it. This is a logical interpretation of the phrase 
“everyone has the right to take part in the government” in Article 21 of the Universal 
Declaration.87
In order not to lose the essence of democratic representation in a State, it is 
assumed that a government must guarantee the substantial and effective representation 
of all residents, not a mere nominal representation. Representation should thus be 
materialised in active participation such that representation and participation are
o o
experienced as part of a continuum. Article 21 of the Universal Declaration did, in 
fact, contemplate a solution to the question of representation by providing that 
everyone has the right to take part in government. It seems that the provision denotes 
an active and substantive participation beyond the initial consent usually expressed 
through free elections. Even if some inhabitants within the State have voted in a 
government, every segment of the population within it must not be deemed, a fortiori, 
to be participating, because, to be legitimate and democratic, the emerging 
government must be representative of all ethnic, religious or linguistic groups within 
the territory of the State.
Lijphart's account of the so-called ‘consociational democracy’, which is intended 
to address the ethnic tensions that have driven the separatist and secessionist 
movements of the last decade under the banner of self-determination, may be said to 
have succinctly described the essence of internal self-determination with respect to 
democratic representation. He writes that:
“In ethnically and communally divided countries - that is, in most o f the countries o f the 
world - the breadth o f representation is also important for the viability of democracy...
The most important requirement o f democracy is that citizens have the opportunity to 
participate, directly or indirectly, in decision-making. This meaning o f democracy is 
violated if  significant minorities are excluded from the decision-making process for 
extended periods o f time. Under such circumstances, narrow majority rule is totally 
immoral, inconsistent with the primary meaning o f democracy, and destructive o f any 
prospect o f building a nation in which different peoples might live together in 
harmony.”89
Therefore, it is argued that the participation of persons belonging to minorities in 
the democratic process of their State of residence is basically required under internal
87 See W. O. Kodjoe, “The United Nations and the Protection o f Individual and Group Rights”, Int'l 
Soc. Sci. J, Vol., 47, 1995, pp.315-317 (stating that self-determination is a right for every person).
88 P. Thomberry, “The Democratic or Internal Aspect o f Self-Determination with Some Remarks on 
Federalism”, in Modern Law o f  Self-Determination, op.cit., p .l 16.
89 A. Lijphart, “Back to Democratic Basics: Who Really Practices Majority Rule?” in A. Hadenius 
(ed.), Democracy's Victory and Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 144.
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self-determination, without which it is virtually impossible for them to achieve and 
realise their rights in the State. For instance, Paragraph 30 of the Copenhagen 
Document emphases that the “questions relating to national minorities can only be 
satisfactorily resolved in a democratic political framework [which] guarantees ... 
political pluralism.”90
An electoral politics based upon simple majoritarian rule could not be said to 
secure fully effective participation of minority groups in public affairs. This argument 
is supported by the requirement in the Declaration on Friendly Relations that 
participation of ethnic, religious or linguistic minority groups in a democratic political 
process is a necessary constituent of ‘representative government’. The right to self- 
determination, as described by the Declaration, requires that peoples should enjoy 
representative government that governs ‘without distinction as to race, creed or 
colour’ in a State that conducts itself in accordance with the principle of equal rights 
and self-determination of peoples.91 Hannum argues as follows:
“A more persuasive interpretation, consistent with the concerns o f most United Nations 
members when the declaration was adopted in 1970, is that a state will not be considered 
to be representative if  it formally excludes a particular group from participation in the 
political process, based on that group's race, creed, or color (such as South Africa or 
Southern Rhodesia under the Smith regime). ”92
It is important to note that participation in the electoral system in the sense of 
formal participation, which can vary depending upon the constitutional structure of a 
State, will not necessarily guarantee that minorities are ‘represented’. The Declaration 
on Friendly Relations provides authority for the proposition that the establishment and 
operation of a system of democratic elections to a legislature is a necessary first step, 
not a completely sufficient one, for the right to internal self-determination to be 
fulfilled. In order for the whole people to be represented in government without 
“distinction as to race, creed or colour”, it must be assumed that persons belonging to 
minorities have access to the political process in their State of residence, thus 
achieving de facto parity with the dominant majority population who, by the fact of
90 Paragraph 30 o f the Copenhagen Document.
91 According to Kirgis, a strong showing o f opinio juris may overcome a weak basis o f State practice to 
establish a customary international rule. He presents the self-determination provisions in the 
Declaration on Friendly Relations as being included in this category, meaning that the Declaration on 
Friendly Relations reflect an opinio juris. See, F. L. Kirgis, “Appraisal o f the I d ’s Decision: Nicaragua 
v. United States (Merits)”, AJIL, Vol., 81, 1987, pp. 146-151.
92 Hannum, Rethinking self-determination, op.cit., p. 17.
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numerical domination, control various matters affecting minorities. Thomberry’s 
following argument may be understood in this context:
“It is possible to read self-determination as mandating neither secession nor the artificial 
homogeneity o f States but as a potential synthesis o f respect and mutual concern between 
whole societies and their component groups...”94
It must be emphasised that the rights recognised in Article 25 of the ICCPR are to 
be enjoyed without any of the distinctions mentioned in Article 2 of the ICCPR and 
without unreasonable restriction.95 The distinctions in Article 2 of the ICCPR concern 
“race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status”.96 Moreover, the rights to political participation, 
including the right to stand as a candidate, are also to be enjoyed without 
discrimination, inter alia on the ground of language. The question arises as to whether 
State parties of the ICCPR may exclude candidates from the electoral process where 
they are not proficient in the official or working language(s)of the State. In Ignatane v. 
Latvia, the author, a Latvian citizen of Russian origin, was prevented from standing as 
a candidate in a local election, following a decision that she did not have the required
07proficiency in the Latvian language. The HRC held that this constituted a violation 
of Article 25, taken in conjunction with Article 2 of the ICCPR.98 The imposition of 
mandatory language requirements on candidates for elective office precludes the 
possibility of the electorate voting for persons from linguistic minorities nor proficient 
in the official or working language(s) of the State. At the same time, it can be argued 
that mandatory language requirements are not incompatible with the primary object 
and purpose of Article 25(b) of the ICCPR: the expression of the will of the people in 
free and fair elections.99
Kirgis’s approach on self-determination in its possibility of secession by a 
minority group in a State illustrates that a people of a State have a legal right to 
representative government, the existence of which does deny the possible right to
93 It needs to be remembered that Paragraph 31 o f the Copenhagen provides that: “The Participating 
State will adopt, where necessary, special measures for the purpose o f ensuring to persons belonging to 
national minorities ‘fu ll equality with other citizens’ in the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.” (Emphasis added.)
94 P. Thomberry, “The Democratic or Internal Aspect o f Self-Determination with some remarks on 
Federalism”, in Modern Law o f  Self-Determination, op.cit, p. 138.
95 Article 25 o f the ICCPR.
96 Article 2 (1) o f the ICCPR.
97Ignatane v. Latvia, Communication No. 884/1999, UN Doc. CCPR/C/72/D/884/1999, 31 July 2001, 
para. 7.3.
98 Ibid. para. 7.5
99HRC General Comment No. 25 ( ‘Article 25’), op.cit., para. 21.
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secession.100 He bases this on the penultimate paragraph of the Declaration on 
Friendly Relations bringing a right to secession for minorities from their State of 
residence. He argues that territorial integrity and political unity could not be impaired 
by self-determination where the State was “conducting itself in compliance with the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus 
possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory 
without distinction of any kind.”101 On this basis, however, he maintains that if any 
State is not providing ‘internal self-determination’ through non-discriminatory 
representative government for all its peoples, then excluded ethnic, religious or
1 0 9linguistic groups within their State of residence could secede. A 1995 Report of the 
UN Secretary General dealing with minority protection states as follows:
“As a general rule, a solution to minority protection had to be found within the 
framework of existing States. Legitimate claims by individuals and groups should 
normally be accommodated within the State constitutional system by creating adequate 
political arrangements, structure and procedures. Thus, the staring point o f a model world 
order was that there was no generally recognized right o f secession, that State borders 
were not to be altered except with the consent o f the parties concerned, and that weight 
should not be put on external self-determination. Instead, the focus must be on the 
creation and pragmatic development o f flexible forms o f internal self-determination 
which gave all social groups- majorities and minorities, ethnic and other groups- a fair 
chance o f political autonomy and other form o f self-realization.”103
The Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession Case by implication also 
accepted, obiter, that where “a people is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its 
right to self-determination internally,” it could secede.104
In sum, the ‘consent of the governed’ and ‘true representative’ quality of the 
government are necessary components to guarantee the right to internal self- 
determination. Given that internal self-determination requires true representative 
government without distinction of race, creed or colour, it may be argued that when a 
State precludes effective participation of members of ethnic or linguistic minority 
groups, it denies its people their right to internal self-determination.
100 F. L. Kirgis, “The Degrees o f Self-Determination in the United Nations Era”, AJIL, Vol., 88, 1994, 
p.305.
101 Ibid., pp. 305-306.
102Ibid.
103 Report Secretary General, Protection o f Minorities: Possible Ways and Means o f Facilitating the 
Peaceful and Constructive Solution o f Problems Involving Minorities, 14 June 1995, UN  
Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/33, 14.
104 Reference re Secession o f Quebec from Canada, 1998, 2 SCR 217, 133-39. The case o f Kosovo is 
exceptional in that human rights violations perpetrated by the Yugoslav army during its programme of 
ethnic cleansing were so gross that after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s intervention,
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6. Participation Rights of Persons belonging to Minorities
The UN HRC concluded in its General Comment on Article 27 of the ICCPR that the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities “may require ...measures to ensure the 
effective participation of members of minority communities to ensure the effective 
participation of members of minority communities in decisions which affect them.”105 
The Optional Protocol to the ICCPR provides a procedure under which persons 
belonging to minorities can claim that their rights to enjoy their own culture, to 
profess and practise their own religion, to use their own language have been violated. 
In its opinions concerning on Article 27 of the ICCPR, the formulation hardens to 
“measures must be taken” to ensure the effective participation of members of minority 
communities in decisions which affect them.106
The HRC pays particular attention to the extent to which a minority group has 
been involved in relevant decision-making processes, and the extent to which its 
interests and perspectives have been taken into account. In Mahuika v. New Zealand, 
members of the Maori people of New Zealand complained that the Government’s 
action threatened their way of life and the culture of their tribes, in violation of Article 
27 of the ICCPR.107 In 1992, the Government of New Zealand had agreed to pay 
NZ$150 million to the Maori for the purchase of Sealords, the largest fishing company 
in Australia and New Zealand, in final settlement of all claims by Maori in respect of
1 rtQ
commercial fishing. The settlement was enacted in the Treaty of Waitangi 
(Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992. The HRC accepted that the Act, and its 
mechanisms, limited the right of the authors to enjoy their own culture, which 
included the use and control of fisheries, as an essential element of their culture.109 
The question was whether the measures amounted to a denial of minority rights.110 
The opinion noted that, in its case law under the Optional Protocol, “the Committee 
has emphasised that the acceptability of measures that affect or interfere with the 
culturally significant economic activities of a minority depends on whether the
it was subsequently decided that only international protectorate status would suffice. See UN SC Res. 
1244, UN Doc. S/RES/1244 1999, at 10-11.
105 HRC General Comment No. 23 (Article 27), UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. l/Add.5, 1994, para. 7.
106 Lansman et al. v. Finland (N o.l), Communication No. 511/1992/, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992, 8 November 1994, para. 9.5. (Emphasis added.)
107 Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand, op.cit., para. 6.2.
108 Ibid., para. 1.12.
109 Ibid., para. 9.3.
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members of the minority in question have had the opportunity to participate in the 
decision-making process in relation to these measures.”111 Maori communities and 
national Maori organisations were consulted on the proposals for the settlement of 
claims by Maori in respect of commercial fishing. Their responses did affect the 
design of the final agreement, which was only enacted following evidence of
119substantial Maori support. Special attention was paid to the cultural significance of 
fishing for the Maori. The HRC concluded that, while it was a matter of concern that 
the settlement and its process had contributed to divisions among Maori, the State 
party had “by engaging itself in the process of broad consultation before proceeding to 
legislate, and by paying specific attention to the sustainability of Maori fishing 
activities, taken the necessary steps to ensure that the relevant measures were 
compatible with Article 27 of the ICCPR.”113 The Committee noted that “the State 
party continues to be bound by Article 27 which requires that the cultural and religious 
significance of fishing for Maori must deserve due attention.. .In order to comply with 
Article 27, measures affecting the economic activities of Maori must be carried out in 
a way that the authors continue to enjoy their culture, and profess and practice their 
religion in community with other members of their group.”114
The opinion of the HRC demonstrates the need for States parties to ensure that the 
interests and preferences of persons belonging to minorities are effectively 
‘represented’ in a relevant decision-making process. The right of effective political or 
public participation for minorities is parasitic to broadly defined minority rights, 
which have not only cultural aspects, but also political or public aspects. A State’s 
positive measures in favour of the effective participation in the political or public 
process by persons belonging to minorities, rather than being non-discriminatory by 
refraining from negative intervention by the government to the life of minority groups, 
is thus required to ensure political or public participation ‘without distinction of race, 
creed or colour’.115
The importance of political or public participation for persons belonging to 
minorities is also reflected in the FCNM. Article 15 of the FCNM provides that: “The
110 Ibid., para. 9.4.
111 Ibid., para. 9.5.
m Ibid., para. 9.6.
1,3 Ibid., para. 9.8.
114 Ibid., pain. 9.9.
n5 Prime evidence may be found in Article 5 o f the FCNM, Article 2 o f the UN Declaration on 
Minority Rights, and Paragraph 5 o f the Copenhagen Document.
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Parties shall create the conditions necessary for the effective participation of persons 
belonging to national minorities in cultural, social and economic and public affairs, in 
particular those affecting them.”116 Public participation requires the inclusion of 
persons from ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities in relevant decision-making 
processes, in particular where issues affecting the national minority are under 
consideration. In a number of Opinions, the Advisory Committee on the FCNM has 
affirmed the importance of establishing formal bodies as one mechanism by which the 
rights of political or public participation for national minorities may be given effect.117
Participation is not confined to the political sphere, but also implicates wide areas 
of public and social life. In education processes, for instance, it would not be in 
accordance with the FCNM to allow decisions on educational curricula that affected 
minority interests to go ahead without appropriate minority participation.118 Article 15 
of the FCNM does not specify precise modalities of minority participation. However, 
the explanatory report offers suggestions that States parties to the FCNM could 
promote the participation of persons belonging to minorities through, among other 
measures, the following: consultation...when parties are contemplating legislation or 
administrative measures likely to affect them directly;119 involving these persons in 
the preparation, implementation and assessment of national and regional development 
plans and programmes likely to affect them directly; undertaking studies, in 
conjunction with these persons, to access the possible impact on them of projected 
development activities; effective participation...in...decision-making processes and 
elected bodies of both at national and local levels; and decentralised or local forms of 
government.120
116 Article 15 o f the FCNM. In relation to Article 15 o f the FCNM concerning the right of political 
participation, Weller observes that while the provision is expressed in general terms, lacking details on 
the necessary measures, the obligation is a “provision o f hard law-and it is an obligation o f result.” M. 
Weller, “Conclusion”, in M. Weller, ed., The Rights o f  Minorities in Europe: A Commentary on the 
European Framework Convention fo r  the Protection o f  National Minorities (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), p. 635.
117See following: “in a number o f countries in Europe, special representative bodies in the form of 
Councils o f National Minorities have been successfully established to further the dialogue and to ensure 
the effective participation o f  persons belonging to national minorities.” Opinion on Albania, 
ACFC/INF/OPI (2003)004, para. 69; “bodies established by the Government to deal with minority 
issues.. .are important from the perspective o f the implementation o f Article 15 o f the FCNM.” Opinion 
on Romania, ACFC/INF/OPI (2002)001, para. 65). “That official bodies should be consulted on all 
issues specifically affecting minorities.” Opinion on Romania, ACFC/INF/OPI (2002)001, para. 66.
118 Opinion on Albania, op.cit., para. 75.
119However, it is important to note that consultation may not necessarily amount to the ‘effective 
participation’ referred to in Article 15 o f the FCNM. Opinions on Cyprus, ACFC/INF/OPI (2002) 004, 
para. 41.
,20Explanatory Report on the FCNM, para. 80.
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In the Copenhagen Document, the participating States of the OSCE in Europe 
recognised that the “questions relating to national minorities can only be satisfactorily
191resolved in a democratic political framework.” They agreed to respect the right of 
persons belonging to minorities to effective participation in public affairs, including 
participation in the affairs relating to the protection and promotion of the identity of 
such minorities.122 The participating States committed themselves to protect the 
ethnic, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities on their territory and to 
create conditions for the promotion of that identity, and agreed to take the necessary 
measures to that effect “after due consultation, including contacts with the 
organizations or associations of such minorities, in accordance with the decision-
19^making procedures of each State.”
In terms of the effectiveness of minority rights, it should be emphasised that the 
link between effective participation and other types of minority rights is obvious and 
critically important. If minority groups are effectively ‘represented’ in public life and 
cultural, social and economic affairs, discriminatory standards and practices may be 
more readily excluded. If, on the other hand, persons belonging to minorities are 
systematically discriminated against, they manifestly cannot participate fully in a 
given society. Similarly, effective participation ensures that persons belonging to 
minorities can participate in public decisions that generate space for the maintenance 
and promotion of minority identities and interests.124 At the same time, persons 
belonging to minorities that are enabled fully to develop their identity with other 
minority members will be better able to contribute to the functioning of a given society,
• 19Sand to seek effective ‘representation’ within it.
121 Paragraph 30 o f the Copenhagen Document.
122 Paragraph 35 of the Copenhagen Document.
123 Paragraph 33 of the Copenhagen Document. An important contribution to the elaboration o f OSCE
commitments, in respect o f national minorities and political participation, was provided with the 
adoption o f the “Lund Recommendation on Effective Participation o f National Minorities in Public 
Life”. Recommendation 1 provides that “in order to promote participation, governments often need to 
establish specific arrangements for national minorities to have an effective voice at the level o f central 
government.” This may require special representation for representatives o f minorities, for example, 
through a reserved number o f seats in parliament; mechanisms to ensure that minority interests are 
considered within relevant government departments; and special measures for minority participation in 
the civil service. See also Article 8 (3) o f the proposed convention in Chapter 8 below, pp. 266-268.
124 See Article 9 o f the proposed convention in Chapter 8 below, pp. 268-270.
125Some States have made provisions which make it possible to take account o f the existence o f  
minorities on their territory for electoral purposes. Thus, in Croatia, if  the members o f an ethnic or 
national minority comprise more than 8% of the population, they can be represented proportionally in 
the national Parliament and in the Government, as well as in the superior courts. A number o f  seats in 
the national Parliament are also reserved for those minorities which do not reach this threshold. 
Similarly, in Denmark, legislation makes provision for two to be given to representative for the Faroe
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7. The Justification of Minority Protection under Internal Self- 
Determination: Baltic Implications
If a people of a State is to be defined as above, the question of how to determine 
citizenship of those people within their State of residence becomes a critical matter. 
This is evident, because the exercise of self-determination with regard to its political 
aspect, such as participating in national elections is made by means of citizenship at 
the domestic legal level. The presence of the ethnic, linguistic Russian stateless 
persons or non-citizens in Estonia and Latvia, who had resided in the territories of 
what are now Estonia and Latvia before independence in 1991 and even participated 
in the Estonian and Latvian independence movements from the former Soviet Union, 
illustrates the importance of citizenship in the context of self-determination. 
Examination of citizenship with reference to the Russian stateless persons or non­
citizens in Estonia and Latvia within their States of residence brings one face to face 
with a reality permeated by a multitude of contradictions in the application of self- 
determination to the people within ‘a State’. The fall of the former Soviet Union led to 
the birth of States founded on ethnic-nationalist oriented claims under the banner of
Islands and two to representatives from Greenland. In the German Lander, the parties o f the Danish and 
Sorban minorities are exempted from the rule according to which a political party must obtain more 
than 5% of the national vote in order to be represented in Parliament. Romania also makes special 
provision for associations o f citizens belonging to national minorities, seats in the lower house being 
reserved for them on certain conditions. In Switzerland, linguistic criteria have had a certain influence 
on the mode o f election o f the principal confederal organs. This is also applicable to certain bilingual 
Cantons. In Belgium, special measures have been taken both in the constitution and by law to ensure 
the effective participation o f minorities in political life. Such participation is provided for at all levels of 
government- executive, legislative and judicial. In addition, this protection is not valid only for the 
federal government: the Flemish minority resident in the federated entity o f the Region o f Brussels also 
benefits from mechanisms quite similar to those used at federal level to protect the Francophone 
minority. In Switzerland, the mode o f election to the principal confederal organs is influenced by the 
will to represent the various linguistic regions equitably. In Italy, in the province o f Bolzano, in the 
Trentino-Alto-Adige, the membership o f the provincial and local government executive bodies is 
corrected to ensure an adequate representation o f the different linguistic communities, including the 
Ladin communities. Some States have created bodies for the management o f problems relating to 
minorities. These bodies are generally confined to a consultative power. Thus, in Romania, there is the 
Council for National Minorities. Austria has a system o f “Councils for ethnic groups” for each group. In 
Finland, separate communities have been set up for Sami affairs and Roma affairs. Under the 
constitution, Sami representatives have a right to be heard on matters concerning this minority. In 
Norway, a consultative Sami Parliament is established. In Hungary, there is a national body for the self­
management o f minorities. In Cyprus, the Armenian, the Maronite and the Latin religious minorities 
each elect a representative to the Chamber o f Representatives. In the Netherlands, a national 
consultation Council in which all ethnic minority groups are represented discusses all major initiatives 
and can make recommendations with regard to them. In Slovakia, an advisory board for minority issues 
can be consulted by the executive. See generally, European Commission for Democracy Through Law, 
“The Protection o f Minorities”, Collected Texts No.9, 1994, pp. 74-75; See also “Overview o f forms of  
participation o f national minorities in decision-making processes in seventeen countries”, prepared by
237
national unity such as Estonia and Latvia in the Baltic region. The problem of 
restrictive citizenship laws by the newly independent States of Estonia and Latvia 
through which mass statelessness was created, clearly illustrates the difficulty of the 
protection of ethnic, religious or linguistic groups with reference to citizenship.
It is necessary to repeat that international concern over citizenship laws in Estonia 
and Latvia arose precisely because of those laws’ potential to ‘disenfranchise’ 
substantial portions of the ethnic, religious or linguistic minority population. It can be 
argued that the restrictive citizenship measures by ‘a State’ targeting resident ethnic, 
religious or linguistic minorities are contrary to internal self-determination, as certain 
crucial aspects of the processes by which a State determines its political future is a 
question of internal self-determination for all people. This means that a State may not 
manipulate the political participation of the people for political purposes of the State. 
Large populations who have settled and resided in a territorial State cannot be blocked
from the political process without justified reasons for excluding them as members of
1the people in the context of internal self-determination. It may be possible to argue 
that the cases of Estonia and Latvia have been that the States have tried to exclude 
ethnic, linguistic Russians from the political process by making it difficult for them to 
become Estonian and Latvian citizens by means of restrictive citizenship laws.127
Minority groups can be effectively excluded from meaningful participation in the 
political process in their States of residence by government authorities. Indeed, when 
the Badinter Commission was asked to render an opinion as to whether Serbian 
populations in Croatia and Bosnia were entitled to self-determination, it answered 
almost solely by reference to “the - now peremptory - norms of international law [that] 
require States to ensure respect for the rights of minorities.”128 It also affirmed that 
“ the republics ought to grant to the members of these minorities and ethnic groups the 
totality of human rights and fundamental freedoms recognized by international law,
1 9Qincluding, as the case may be, the right to choose their nationality.”
The practical effect of internal self-determination on the protection of minority 
groups within their State of residence, therefore, lies in the structural change of the
the Minorities Unit o f the Council o f Europe Directorate o f Human Rights, February 1998.
126 It is to be noted that internal self-determination takes into account the fact that struggles for 
autonomy by ethnic, religious or linguistic minority groups often find their roots in the failure of 
national political institutions to address the interests o f those groups. Fox, Self-determination in the 
post-Cold War era, op.cit, p. 752.
I27See Article 9 (2) o f the proposed convention in Chapter 8 below, pp. 268-270.
128 Badinter Commission Opinion No. 2, op.cit., at 1498.
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protection of the groups from preventing the secessionist claims to guarantees of civil 
and political rights within the State. As observed above, it needs to be emphasised that 
all inhabitants who can be integrated as constituents of the category of people in their 
State of residence have the right to take part in governing their country as holders of 
the right to self-determination in the context of internal self-determination, since the 
deliberation and judgment of the people is the only legitimate basis of governmental 
authority. The peoples’ voice may only be expressed through universal and equal
1 -1A
suffrage in periodic and genuine elections. A manifest and continued abuse of 
governmental power, to the detriment of any section of the population of a State, 
implicitly recognises the victim group as a separate nation for seeking secession under
i q 1
the right to self-determination.
In the Gillot v. France case,132 the HRC ruled that for the inhabitants in the 
territorial entity in the context of self-determination to participate in local referendums, 
they must be genuinely connected to the territory in question. The applicants in Gillot 
v. France were French nationals, resident in New Caledonia, who claimed to be 
victims of violation by France of Articles 2(1), 12 (1), 25 and 26 of the ICCPR. They
129 Ibid.
130 Internal self-determination is based on democratic practice, for which an election system is required 
and operated. United Nations organs have consistently singled out free and fair elections as essential to 
this transformative process: See, e.g., SC Res. 968, UN SCOR, 49th Sess., UN Doc. S/RES/968 (1994) 
(international assistance to resolve the conflict in Tajikistan “must be linked to the process of national 
reconciliation, including inter alia free and fair elections”); SC Res. 957, UN SCOR, 49th Sess., UN 
Doc. S/RES/957 (1994) (calling on parties to the Mozambique conflict to base reconciliation “on a 
system o f multi-party democracy and the observance o f democratic principles which will ensure lasting 
peace and political stability”); SC Res. 919, UN SCOR, 49th Sess., UN Doc. S/RES/919 (1994) 
(welcoming South Africa's “first all-race multiparty election and the establishment o f a united, 
democratic, non-racial government”); GA Res. 149, UN GAOR 3d Comm., 48th Sess., at 1, UN Doc. 
A/RES/48/149 (1993) (reconciliation process in El Salvador requires support for the “democratization 
process under way”); GA Res. 150, UN GAOR 3d Comm., 48th Sess., at 3, UN Doc. A/RES/48/150 
(1993) (urging Myanmar to “allow all citizens to participate freely in the political process ... and to 
accelerate the process o f transition to democracy, in particular through the transfer of power to the 
democratically elected representatives”); GA Res. 151, UN GAOR 3d Comm., 48th Sess., UN Doc. 
A/RES/48/151 (1993) (condemning events in Haiti “which abruptly and violently interrupted the 
democratic process in that country”); GA Res. 152, UN GAOR 3d Comm., 48th Sess., at 3, UN Doc. 
A/RES/48/152 (1993) (urging comprehensive political solution to Afghan crisis based, inter alia, “on 
the free exercise o f the right to self-determination by the people, including free and genuine elections”); 
Assistance to Georgia in the Field o f Human Rights, Hum. Rts. Comm'n. Res. 1993/85, UN ESCOR, 
49th Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 252, UN Doc. E/1993/23 (1993) (encouraging Georgia to continue the 
“process o f democratization, including elections”); Support for the Restoration of Democracy in Peru, 
Hum. Rts. Comm'n. Res. 1992/12, in Report o f the Sub-Commission on Prevention o f Discrimination 
and Protection o f Minorities on its Forty-Fourth Session, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1993/2, at 46 (1992) 
(praising Peru's decision “to choose a democratic constituent congress by means o f an election to be 
accompanied by every guarantee o f the free expression o f the popular will”).
131 The Aaland Islands Question, Report Presented to the Council o f the League by the Commission of 
Rapporteurs, League o f Nations Doc. B .7.21/68/106 (1921).
132 Gillot v. France, CCPR/C/75/D/932/2000.
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did not fulfil the requirement to vote in the referendum on the approval of the so- 
called Noumea Accord. The Accord, which forms part of a process of self- 
determination, established the framework for the institutional development of New 
Caledonia over the next 20 years. New Caledonia is a former colony of France and an 
overseas territory under the 1946 French Constitution. The Accord also recognises 
New Caledonian citizenship and provides that “New Caledonian citizens” are to take a 
decision, within a 15 to 20 year time frame, on accession to independence or 
autonomy. The HRC had to determine whether the restrictions imposed on the 
electorate for the purpose of the local referendums of 8 November 1998 and in 2014 
or thereafter constituted a violation of Article 25 and Article 26 of the ICCPR. The 
Committee said that:
“The Committee recalls that, in the present case, article 25 o f the Covenant must be 
considered in conjunction with article I. It thereafter considers that the criteria established 
are reasonable to the extent that they are applied to strictly and solely to ballots held in 
the framework o f self-determination process... Without expressing a view on the 
definition o f the concept of ‘peoples’ as referred to in article 1, the Committee considers 
that, in the present case, it would not unreasonable to limit participation in local 
referendums to persons ‘concerned’ by the future o f New Caledonia who have proven, 
sufficiently strong ties with the territory.”133
Although this case was applied here to the traditional context of decolonisation, the 
fact that the HRC noted the genuine territorial connection between the inhabitants to 
the territorial entity in exercising self-determination in the form of a referendum 
implies that political participation of the inhabitants who have been connected to the 
territory in question must be guaranteed in the context of self-determination.
Internal self-determination indicates that the ‘self’ be regarded as co-existent with 
the territory of the existing State, with the ‘people’ consisting of all inhabitants 
historically and residentially connected to the territory in question. Under such 
reasoning, except in rare situations, such as the case of the extreme suppression of 
purposefully targeted ethnic, religious or linguistic groups within a State, there would 
be no independent right for ethnic, religious or linguistic minority groups to secede 
because one cannot secede from oneself in the context of the ‘internal self’. Denied 
the possibility of sub-dividing, the people’s political, economic, social, and cultural 
rights are to be achieved within the existing State through democratic political 
participation, good governance, and effective legislation protecting the rights of 
persons belonging to minorities based on the principle of substantive equality as
133 Ibid., para. 13. 16.
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observed in Chapter 6.
When confined to the citizens of a State as the membership of the people, self- 
determination offers no effective protection to non-citizens and stateless persons. 
Where, as in Estonia and Latvia, such persons form a significant and distinct portion 
of the permanent population, such a denial is at odds with self-determination as an 
inclusive right that encompasses a right of democratic political participation. If only 
citizens can enjoy the right to full access to political participation, a very unreasonable 
situation cannot be avoided in such countries as Estonia and Latvia. This means in 
Estonia and Latvia that nearly 60 percent of persons belonging to ethnic, linguistic 
minority groups (some 20 percent of the total population in Estonia and 23.3 percent 
in Latvia) are deprived of effective political participation at the national level,134 
despite the historical fact that they had resided therein and some of them even 
participated in the independence movement along with titular Estonians and Latvians 
from the former Soviet Union in 1991. The opinions of the UN Committee on 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) on Estonia noted the fragile status of 
non-citizens in stating that “according to article 48 of the Estonian Constitution, only 
citizens can be members of political parties.”135
The situation in Latvia is similar. A number of laws and secondary legislation 
reserve certain rights and opportunities to citizens only, such as the right to participate 
in national elections and to form political parties. Other laws restrict non-citizens' 
property rights, the right to work in a number of professions, both in the State and the
• 13Aprivate sector, and the right to receive social and other benefits. The CERD report 
on Latvia held the views that “the Committee concerns... about reports that there are 
still unjustified differences of treatment between citizens and non-citizens, mostly a 
number of minorities, in the enjoyment of the rights provided for in article 5 (e) of the
134 Both in Estonia and Latvia, the ethnic, linguistic Russian minorities tend to be underrepresented in 
State institutions. In 2001, in Estonia, the Russian minorities made up only nine percent o f all judges 
and six percent o f officers within the Ministry o f Internal Affairs whereas there were no Russian 
minorities working as officials in the Ministries of Justice or Education. In Latvia, statistical research of 
minority representation in State ministries revealed that minorities are employed by 65 percent less than 
their ratio among the citizenry. Minorities are also insufficiently and unevenly represented in municipal 
councils and administration and are underrepresented in the judiciary. Monitoring the EU Accession 
Process: Minority Protection (Budapest: Open Society Institute, 2002), pp. 350-351; Legal Information 
Centre For Human Rights, Estonia, “differences in the legal status” at 
www.licht.ee/eng/researchers.anlysis/diffl.htm, Report note 123.
135 Concluding observations o f the CERD, A/57/18, 2001, paras.344-366, para. 359.
136 For the full list o f differences between the rights o f citizens and non-citizens, see LICHR Report, 
http://www.riga.lv/minelres/count/non_cit-rights_l. htm.
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Convention.”137
Even if persons belonging to the ethnic, linguistic Russian population are Latvian 
citizens by way of naturalisation, their political participation was restricted until 
recently. Minority representatives seeking election in national as well as municipal 
elections were required by law to demonstrate the highest level of fluency in the 
Latvian language to register as candidates. As noted, the HRC ruled that the Latvian 
municipal election law provision requiring candidates to obtain a Latvian language 
proficiency certificate from the State Language Board contravenes the ICCPR.138
Governments, elected by the majority, are likely to reflect the interests of the 
majority. This may be true, or at the very least perceived to be true, both in the 
formulation of policy and in its application, for example in the apportioning of school 
funding or the provision of government spending to different regions. It is clear, 
however, that in all aspects of government decision-making (including education and 
language policy) minorities are entitled to be consulted as to developments in policy, 
especially where the decision will have direct or indirect impact on the interests of 
minority groups.139 In responding to Estonia’s report, the Advisory Committee on the 
FCNM especially emphasised the need to include minorities in the consultation 
process as follows:
“As regards the allocation o f this support, the Advisory Committee considers it important 
that representatives o f national minorities are involved in the decision-making process 
and that the needs of all minorities including the numerically small ones, are completely 
addressed.”140
Estonia and Latvia were able to realise their right to self-determination by 
achieving independence from the former Soviet Union in 1991. Now, as independent 
sovereign States, however, Estonia and Latvia should respect the right to self- 
determination in relation to the protection of the ethnic, linguistic Russians. In 
particular, the ethnic, linguistic Russian stateless persons or non-citizens in Estonia 
and Latvia who had resided in the territory of what are now Estonia and Latvia before 
independence in 1991 fit exactly into the category of members of ‘people’ and that of 
‘minority’ for international law. It is debatable whether ethnic, linguistic Russians in 
Estonia and Latvia meet the criteria for external self-determination in the sense of 
secession, which applies to relations with other States. In a most persuasive remark,
137 CERD/C/304/ADD.79, 2001, para. 14
138 A. Ignatane v. Latvia, HRC Communication No. 884/1999, 25 July 2001.
139 See Article 5 o f the proposed convention in Chapter 8 below, pp. 260-262.
140Advisory Committee Opinion on Estonia, ACFC/INF/OP/I (2002) 005, para. 28.
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MaCorquodale argues that:
“It appears that only a government o f a State which allows all its peoples to decide freely 
their political status and economic, social and cultural development has an interest o f  
territorial integrity which can possibly limit the exercise of a right of self-determination.
So territorial integrity, as a limitation on the exercise o f the right of self-determination, 
can apply only to those (minority of) States in which the government represents the whole 
population in accordance with the exercise o f internal self-determination.”141
In other words, even if it would be difficult for the Russian populations in Estonia and 
Latvia to defend their rights on the basis of external self-determination, they should 
still have the right to internal self-determination, which concerns the right of people 
'within' their State of residence to participate in the political, economic, and social 
process as members of the people.142 Put differently, it can be argued that if a State 
limits the boundary of the body of citizenship by enacting restrictive citizenship laws 
on the basis of ethnic, or linguistic distinctions or preferences, with the result being 
that some particular ethnic or linguistic minority residents are actually ‘excluded’ 
from the members of the category of a people of the State and thereby cannot 
participate in the political process effectively, this can be contrary to internal self- 
determination under international law.
8. Conclusions
(1). Self-determination will be effectuated through the formation of an independent 
statehood in its external aspect. However, as soon as a self-determining regime attains 
independent statehood, internal self-determination primarily operates as a governing 
and organising principle of the State. A people within ‘a State’, as holders of the right 
to self-determination under international law should have the right to choose their 
form of government, and their economic, social, and cultural systems, based on their 
entitlement to democratic representative government.
(2). International law generally does not recognise, outside of colonial contexts, an 
affirmative right on the part of people to exercise their self-determination right by 
seceding from the existing State. As the right to self-determination has evolved from
141 MaCorquodale, Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach, op.cit., p. 880.
142 The Estonian scholar o f international law Miillerson correctly observes as follows: “It would not be 
correct, to say, as it is sometimes asserted, that there is no right o f self-determination for minorities. It 
would be more accurate to say that they can exercise the right o f self-determination together with the
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the context of decolonisation to its internal aspect since the post-colonial and the Cold 
War eras, it is observed that the right to internal self-determination is applicable to the 
protection of persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic groups with respect to 
their political participation in their State of residence.
(3). The concept of people as holders of the right to self-determination includes ‘all 
inhabitants’ residing in ‘a territorial State’, who have been connected to that State with 
reference to historical and habitual residence and the sharing of broadly defined 
common political and social experiences as indication of common solidarity. It 
embraces ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities as members of a people for the right 
to self-determination in a State. Moreover, as the internal aspect of the right to self- 
determination guarantees a people’s right to freely determine their political status and 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development in a ‘democratic way’ in their 
State of residence, it can be argued that citizenship is given to the members of that 
people without discrimination, because the holding of citizenship is essential for those 
inhabitants to participate politically in their State of residence.
(4). Democracy has a direct relationship with the right to internal self-determination. 
Internal self-determination guarantees the political participation of persons belonging 
to ethnic, religious or linguistic minority groups in their State of residence without 
discrimination.
(5). Minority rights are not the rights which are only confined to the cultural aspect of 
minority phenomena. They also include the rights of political or public participation of 
persons belonging to minority groups in their State of residence. The grounds for 
support of the rights of political or public participation of persons belonging to 
minorities may be confirmed in the UN Human Rights Covenants, the UN HRC 
minority rights jurisprudence as well as Article 15 of the FCNM.
(6). The case of the ethnic, linguistic Russian stateless persons or non-citizens in 
Estonia and Latvia presents the possibility of the application of the right to internal 
self-determination for their status as ‘members of protected minority group’. There 
seems to be no reason to deny that the ethnic, linguistic Russian residents in Estonia 
and Latvia who had resided in the territories of what are now Estonia and Latvia 
before independence in 1991 are to be integrated as constituents of the peoples for the 
purpose of the right to internal self-determination. In this context, the Estonian and
rest o f the population o f a given state, as a part o f this population.” R. Miillerson, International Law, 
Rights and Politics (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 73.
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Latvian citizenship measures since independence in 1991 are problematic, because it 
is evident that Estonia and Latvia have limited the boundary of the body of citizenship 
by enacting restrictive citizenship laws on the basis of ethnic and linguistic 
distinctions or preferences, with the result being that some particular ethnic or 
linguistic residents (the ethnic, linguistic Russians) have actually been ‘excluded’ from 
the members of the category of peoples for the States.
(7). The issue of the protection of minority rights under international law is not 
separate from the right to self-determination. Rather, they are mutually connected and 
the effective realisation of minority rights could be made possible and more secure 
with the legal and normative basis of the right to self-determination.
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Chapter VIII
Conclusion and Recommendations
1. Continuity and Change in the Discussion on the Protection of Minority Rights 
in International Law
In international law, there is no such thing as an officially accepted definition of a 
minority. According to the traditional definition of a minority, citizenship is the 
distinctive feature of a minority under international law. The issue of whether minority 
rights by definition apply only to citizens is a fundamental question for the effective 
protection of minority rights under international law. If citizenship is the requirement 
for receiving minority status, it follows that minority rights are citizens’ rights. 
Already at the beginning of the United Nations discussions on the protection of 
persons belonging to minorities, shortly after World War II, whether legal protection 
should be offered only to citizens was a serious topic. As Eide pointed out, some 
Western members of the UN Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination, such 
as Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom, wanted to limit minority rights to only 
those citizens of the country concerned.1 Reflecting this position, the oft-cited 
Capotorti definition of a minority for the purpose of international law requires the 
holding of citizenship of the State of residence in order to receive minority status and 
enjoy minority rights.
However, as examined in this thesis, this traditional, narrow approach to the 
concepts of minority and minority rights is being challenged by recent developments 
in international law of minority protection. As observed, according to the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC), it is necessary that minorities, and the 
persons belonging to them, “exist”, while it is not relevant to determine the degree of 
permanence that the term “exist” connotes. Given this approach, it is in no way 
surprising that the HRC does not distinguish between migrants and persons belonging
1 A. Eide, “Citizenship and Minority Rights o f Non-citizens”, working paper for the 5th session o f the 
Sub-Commission’s Working Group on Minorities, 2000, p. 3
2 General Comment No. 23, CCPR/21/Rev. l/Add.5, General Comment No. 23 (50), 26 April 1994, 
para. 5.2.
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to minorities.3 From the perspective of the protection to be offered, the simple fact of 
being on a State’s territory is enough.
The discussion about the legal and normative bases for the protection of the ethnic, 
linguistic Russians in Estonia and Latvia as persons belonging to minorities with 
reference to their citizenship status is thus significant for the purpose of reinforcing 
the pillars for the effective protection of minority rights under international law. The 
situation of the stateless or non-citizen ethnic, linguistic Russians in Estonia and 
Latvia has illustrated the necessity for the effective protection of persons belonging to 
minority groups under international law. Most resided in the territories of what are 
now Estonia and Latvia since before these countries regained independence from the 
former USSR in 1991. They became ‘instant aliens’ as soon as Estonia and Latvia 
enacted citizenship laws under which only citizens of pre-war Estonia and Latvia (and 
their descendants) would be granted automatic citizenship. This was in contrast to 
Lithuania, where the demographic effects of Sovietisation were less pronounced than 
in Latvia and Estonia, and where Lithuanians constituted about 80 percent of the 
population. Lithuania adopted a zero option approach that in effect gave automatic 
citizenship to all who were resident in 1991: Of course, the Estonian and Latvian 
citizenship laws have undergone significant changes over the past few years. However, 
basically it cannot be denied that the citizenship policy measures of Estonia and Latvia 
have resulted in the denial of the historic and habitual residence of the ethnic, 
linguistic Russian populations in the Baltic region during the period of the former 
USSR, thereby threatening the stabilised lives and the maintenance of identity for the 
ethnic, linguistic Russians in Estonia and Latvia.
The international legal and normative bases for the justification of the effective 
protection of the rights of the ethnic, linguistic Russians in Estonia and Latvia as 
persons belonging to minorities can be found in minorities-specific standards with the 
focus on the protection of cultural identity for minorities, general human rights 
standards with an emphasis on substantive equality, and the right to internal self- 
determination. The linkage of these legal and normative bases to the justification of 
the protection of the rights of the ethnic, linguistic Russians in question leads to the 
strong suggestion that Estonia and Latvia should protect their interests in an effective 
manner at the domestic legal level, by taking into account their concrete needs and
3 Ibid., paras. 5, 2 and 7.
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problems, including the matter of citizenship.
The discussion about the protection of the Russian minorities in Estonia and 
Latvia is significant in that it has shown that the concepts of minority rights and 
minority protection should be understood broadly. Minority rights are interconnected 
with general human rights and the right to internal self-determination. The effective 
realisation of minority rights can be better secured with the legal and normative bases 
of general human rights and internal self-determination, beyond minorities-specific 
standards. For too long, the contents of minority rights have been understood as 
having been confined only to the maintenance of cultural identity for persons 
belonging to minority groups, and this negative perception of minority rights seems to 
have been based on the assumption that minority rights are essentially ‘citizens’ rights’. 
This narrow approach to the concept of minority rights has undoubtedly been related 
to States’ concerns that giving broad meaning to minority rights would contribute to 
secessionist movements of minority groups, thereby bringing about social disorder and 
threatening State sovereignty. However, the scope of minority rights has been 
expanding in present international law, being confined not only to cultural aspects, but 
also open to political aspects of minority phenomena in a State, as is confirmed by the 
significance of the implication of Article 15 of the Framework Convention on the 
Protection of National Minorities (FCNM), with respect to participation rights of 
persons belonging to minority groups in their States of residence.
In the case of Estonia, only citizens are entitled to minority rights at the domestic 
legal level. The Estonian position is in line with the traditional view of the definition 
of a minority under which only citizens are entitled to minority rights. In Latvia, 
holding citizenship is not required to receive minority status in formal terms. However, 
given that there exist many non-citizens and stateless persons belonging to the ethnic, 
linguistic Russian groups as a result of Latvia’s restrictive citizenship law and that 
there is no specific, detailed minority protection law at the domestic legal level, the 
situation is not wholly different from the case of Estonia. As examined in Chapter 5, 
although whether Article 27 of the ICCPR has become the part of customary 
international law or not is not certain at present, it can be interpreted that the 
protection of minority rights in the sense of the protection of identity for minorities 
requires States concerned to protect and promote the cultural identity of persons 
belonging to minority groups in their State of residence through the implementation of 
protective measures at the domestic legal level under minorities-specific standards.
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Furthermore, Estonia and Latvia’s obligations to protect minority rights of the ethnic, 
linguistic Russians, irrespective of whether they hold the citizenship of Estonia and 
Latvia, are reinforced by the bases of the substantive equality principle and internal 
self-determination. There is no doubt that the restrictive citizenship laws of Estonia 
and Latvia have had serious negative consequences on the rights and interests of the 
ethnic, linguistic Russians in terms of maintaining and promoting their identity, 
because persons within a population sharing the same ethnic and linguistic 
characteristics may have a different legal status, based on citizenship, which threatens 
the preservation and promotion of their identity. Estonia and Latvia, as parties of the 
ICCPR, the ICERD and the FCNM, are required to implement concrete protective 
measures for the protection and promotion of the rights of the ethnic, linguistic 
Russians as members of minority groups. In implementing such State protective 
measures for minority protection, it seems clear that citizenship issue for the ethnic, 
linguistic non-citizen and stateless persons should be considered in a positive way to 
protect their right to identity effectively, as citizenship and the maintenance and 
promotion of identity are inherently and actually related to each other in effectuating 
broadly defined minority rights at the domestic legal level in a State.4
If this is the case, the question arises as to whether persons belonging to minorities 
have the right to citizenship as such under international law. As observed in Chapter 3, 
it appears difficult to state that Estonia and Latvia have obligations to grant automatic 
citizenship to the ethnic, linguistic Russian non-citizens and stateless persons at least 
from the present state of international law, given that a State’s discretion to regulate 
citizenship is generally recognised and the legal status of the right to nationality as a 
‘positive human right’ has remained unclear. However, this does not mean that a State 
may treat persons belonging to minorities arbitrarily in the form of citizenship under 
present international law. The discussion about the legal and normative bases for the 
protection of the ethnic, linguistic Russians with reference to their citizenship status 
suggests that a State’s power to regulate citizenship can be ‘constrained’ by its 
obligations to protect minority rights in an effective way under international law. The 
present writer does not intend to suggest that a State must grant citizenship to ‘anyone’. 
Rather, it would be more correct to say that a State’s power to regulate citizenship can 
be constrained ‘to the extent’ that it is obliged to protect minority rights effectively at
4 See Article 7 o f the proposed convention in this chapter, pp. 263-266.
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the domestic legal level under international law. From this perspective, though Estonia 
and Latvia have no direct obligations to grant automatic citizenship to the Russian 
non-citizens and stateless persons in question under present international law, it would 
be recommended that Estonia and Latvia abolish the language requirements of the 
naturalisation process or simplify the process ‘as a way’ of protecting the ethnic, 
linguistic Russian non-citizens and stateless persons as persons belonging to minority 
groups.5 In the case of Estonia, the present writer also pleads for the renouncing of the 
citizenship criterion as a requirement for membership of a national minority.
The minority situation can be very different from State to State, reflecting the 
unique social and cultural backgrounds of each State, such as the composition of the 
minority and majority population. However, as there is no guarantee that the criterion 
for receiving citizenship is in harmony with full and effective protection of the rights 
of persons belonging to existing ethnic, religious or linguistic minority groups as a 
‘protected minority’ at the domestic legal level, a State’s discretion to regulate 
citizenship is open to abuse.6 To that extent, the proposition that a State’s power to 
regulate citizenship can be ‘constrained’ by its obligations to protect broadly defined 
minority rights would be critical for the purposes of effective international minority 
protection.7
For instance, citizenship has been used consistently throughout South Asia as a 
political instrument for targeting ethnic, religious or linguistic minority groups. It has 
posed a long-term pervasive threat to the fundamental human rights of millions of 
people who for more than fifty years have been without effective protection from its 
abuse. The wilful denial of citizenship to large groups of minorities in Bhutan,
5 It is generally admitted that a language test is a common requirement for naturalisation in many 
European countries. However, it is also true that some States, including Belgium, Finland, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Russia, Spain, Sweden, do not have a language requirement for naturalisation. See, R. 
Hansen, “A European Citizenship or a Europe o f Citizens”, Journal o f  Ethnic and Migration Studies, 
Vol., 24, 1998, pp. 751-768.
6 A number o f examples can be provided o f persons belonging to minorities who were allegedly denied 
citizenship and therefore also the enjoyment of certain fundamental rights. These include: the Kurdish 
minority in the Syrian Arab Republic who were denied citizenship and thus faced widespread 
discrimination; the Turkish minority in Greece who were arbitrarily deprived o f Greek citizenship; the 
Korean minority in Japan who were denied re-entry permits, thus curtailing their right to travel and to 
livelihood; the Lahu, Lisu and Ahaka tribal communities in Thailand, who did not have Thai citizenship, 
and therefore no identity cards, travel documents or right to vote; the Banjara Gypsies of Rajasthan, 
India, who had settled down but who were denied citizenship; and the pygmy and Mbororo minorities 
in Cameroon, whose citizenship rights were curtailed. Cited in Paragraph 39, Prevention o f  
Discrimination against and the Protection o f Minorities, Report o f the Working Group on Minorities on 
its fifth sessionJE/CN.4/Sub.2/l 999/21.
7 See Article 10 o f the proposed convention in this chapter, pp.270-271; Article 9 o f the proposed 
convention in this chapter, pp. 268-270.
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Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and India has left its indelible mark on the region. 
Following the process of decolonisation and the subsequent creation of newly 
independent States in South Asia, governments began to change their citizenship laws 
and introduce severe restrictions to retaining, acquiring or re-acquiring citizenship, 
creating millions of stateless persons. In post-colonial Bhutan, Pakistan, Myanmar and 
Sri Lanka, the trend has been for the State to seek control by using a strong central 
government to determine citizenship based on the pursuit of a national ideology aimed 
at excluding segments of society who refuse to submit to the nationalist line.
Nearly 100,000 ethnic Nepalese from Bhutan, many of whom lived in Bhutan for 
generations, were stripped of their citizenship and pushed out of Bhutan by its 
government following the implementation of ‘Bhutanisation’. Following the 1977 
revision of the 1958 Nationality Law, the monarchy imposed the 1985 Citizenship Act. 
In addition to the inclusion of a language requirement and a strong understanding of 
Bhutanese history, culture and tradition, the updated Act required anyone who had 
only one Bhutanese parent and bom after 1958 to apply for naturalisation. By 1992, an 
estimated 100,000 Lhotshampas had left Bhutan.9
The indigenous Sinhalese-controlled government of Sri Lanka enacted citizenship 
legislation aimed at deliberately disenfranchising the ethnic Indian Estate Tamils. The 
Estate Tamil migrants represented British colonialism and were never welcomed by 
many Sri Lankan Sinhalese, the predominant ethnic group. Shortly after independence, 
the newly independent State of Sri Lanka enacted the 1948 Ceylon Citizenship Act, 
which required that the applicant’s father or both the applicant and the applicant’s 
grandfather had to be bom in Sri Lanka. This ruled out many of the Tamil minority 
group who had been living and working in Sri Lanka for generations.10 In Sri Lanka 
as in Bhutan, the denial of citizenship to a minority group was used as an instrument 
to assist the State in its pursuit of a monolithic nationalisation aimed at protecting or 
creating a national identity.11
Similar to the Estate Tamils in Sri Lanka, the Bihari of Bangladesh have been
8 J.W. Heffeman, “Being Recognized as Citizens: A Human Security Dilemma in South and Southeast 
Asia”, Report on the Commission on Human Security, 2002, pp. 3-18.
9 Ibid, pp. 3-5; See, generally, N. Mishra & S.K. Singh, Status o f  Minorities in South Asia (Delhi: 
Authorspress, 2002), Chapter 3.
10 P. Sahadeven, India and the Overseas Indians: The Case o f  Sri Lanka (Kalinga Publications: New  
Dehli, 1995), Chapter 4.
"However, the Sri Lankan parliament implemented a naturalising remedy for statelessness in 2003 
when it passed a law granting citizenship to over 168,000 stateless Tamils. BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 
7, October 2003.
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denied citizenship of Bangladesh and have suffered many years of statelessness. The 
Urdu-speaking Bihari Muslims fled India during India’s 1947 independence and 
became a linguistic minority among the Bengali-speaking majority in former East 
Pakistan. The newly independent of Pakistan, led by the Urdu-speaking ethnic 
Punjabis who dominated West Pakistan, took a centrist approach, reducing local 
government influence as well as limiting the power of those who were not Urdu­
speaking ethnic Punjabis including the Bengali-speaking majority in East Pakistan. 
When the Bengali majority of East Pakistan seceded from Pakistan to create an 
independent Bangladesh in 1972, the Bihari minority were initially granted full 
citizenship rights and equal treatment under Bangladeshi law. This was subsequently 
ignored by the new government, which claimed that the Biharis were Pakistanis, not 
Bangladeshis. With their homes destroyed and property confiscated, most Biharis were 
forced to live in camps and await repatriation to Pakistan where they had never lived, 
but claimed citizenship. Thirty years later, over 200,000 remain in camps in 
Bangladesh, effectively stateless as a consequence of neither Pakistan nor Bangladesh 
recognising them as citizens.12
The case of the Rohingya in Myanmar is a blatant example of a State’s long term 
policy of citizenship denial and deprivation. Following independence from the British 
in 1948, the Rohingya Muslims of Myanmar, who were predominantly concentrated in 
the northern part of Rakhine State, claimed a separate ethnic identity and were 
recognised by the newly independent government. In 1950, Rohingyas had 
representation in parliament and held high-level government posts. After the 1962 
military take-over, however, the Rohingyas were systematically denied their civil, 
political, economic and social human rights, culminating in the Citizenship Act of 
1982. The 1982 Act was clearly designed to exclude the over one million Rohingyas 
from citizenship.13 The Act set two criteria for defining “full citizens”: they should 
either belong to one of the 50-plus national races, or be able to prove that they were 
bom in Myanmar, and in addition, that their parents have resided in the country before 
4 January 1948. The Rohingyas were denied citizenship as they were considered by
12 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), The State o f  the World's Refugees: 
Fifty Years o f  Humanitarian Action (2000), at 189; Bangladesh, Country Report, Country Information 
& Policy Unit, Immigration & Nationality Directorate, Home Office, United Kingdom, 2004.
13Zama Coursen-Neff, Living in Limbo: Burmese Rohingyas in Malaysia (2000), available at 
www.hrw.org/reports/2000/malaysia.
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the authorities unable to meet the requirements of any of these categories.14
Historically speaking, the question of the protection of persons belonging to 
minorities in relation to the citizenship of their State of residence is not a new issue, as 
observed in Chapter 4 of this thesis on the protection of minority groups during the 
period of the League of Nations.15 However, one should not forget the progressive 
development of international law of minority protection in terms of the efforts to set 
general standards for the protection of minority rights since the establishment of the 
United Nations and the end of the Cold War, and its positive impact on the 
effectuation of minority rights at the international and regional levels.16 Although the 
outcomes generated by the minority question throughout history have been markedly 
different depending on legal and political settings, the important point is that the 
question of minority protection has been one of the most delicate and sensitive issues 
on the international agenda. Writing in 1950, Lauterpacht stated that the protection of 
minorities was a fundamental element of human rights involving the preservation of
1 7peace between and within nations. Indeed, the international protection of minority 
rights may be a representative area which indicates the state of the development of 
international law, because it presents a crossing point between the two fundamental 
norms of international law: the respect of State sovereignty and the protection of 
human rights. The reason for the progressive and gradual development of international 
standards of minority rights, even though minority issues have been unending and 
crucial issues in international relations, may be found in this inherent tension between 
two fundamental norms of international law.
After 1945, the issue of the protection of minority rights was constrained by the 
strict leash of Cold-War dynamics, and remained somewhat obscured or unresolved, 
though never fading away. Rather, the post-Cold War upsurge of minority problems in 
numerous countries, coupled with social tension and even violence, has prompted the 
international community to tackle the issue of minorities more constructively than in 
the past, thereby placing renewed emphasis on the principle that such issues are a
14 Myanmar, The Rohingya Minority: Fundamental Rights Denied, Amnesty International, AI Index 
ASA 16/005/2004
15 See Chapter 4 above, the Polish Nationality Case, pp. 100-105.
16 In this regard, it is important to note that three international institutions were set up during the 1990s 
to address minority situations: The Office o f the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), 
set up under the CSCE (now OSCE); the UN Working Group on Minorities (UNWG), set up under the 
Sub-Commission on Prevention o f Discrimination and Protection o f Minorities in 1995, and the 
Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention (ACFC) set up by the Council o f Europe.
17 H. Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights (London: Stevens & Sons, 1950), p. 352.
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matter of legitimate international concern and do not constitute exclusively an internal 
affair of the respective State.18 ‘Continuity’ and ‘change’ may thus be appropriate 
words to describe the nature of minority issues in international law.
Despite the importance of certain gains in the international protection of minority 
rights, much remains to be done. For this reason, the present writer thinks that it would 
be worthwhile to think about adopting a new convention on the protection of persons 
belonging to minorities at the universal level. Minority protection can be 
accomplished through bilateral treaties between the States concerned, and minority 
protection can be finalised by way of domestic legislature. Nevertheless, the adoption 
of a new convention on the protection of minority rights would be valuable, as it could 
provide consolidated international standards for the protection of minority rights, 
which might have a positive impact on the States concerned. More specifically, the 
adoption of a new convention would be necessary for at least two reasons. First, the 
contents of minority rights and the corresponding States’ obligations to uphold 
minority rights need to be elaborated. It is true that many provisions regarding 
minority rights under present standards are vague, and the extent and degree of the 
corresponding States’ obligations are insufficient. Moreover, the FCNM applies only 
to Europe19 and the 1992 UN Declaration on Minority rights is not a legally binding 
document, at least in formal terms. Secondly, the power of the supervisory machinery 
to ensure the implementation of States’ obligations to protect minority rights needs to 
be strengthened in view of strong criticism made of the weakness of the control 
mechanism for the FCNM. Bearing this in mind, the present writer now proposes a 
mini-sample draft of the international convention on the protection of the rights of 
persons belonging to minorities as a recommendation.
It should be reiterated that the Badinter Arbitration Commission which was established in 1991 by 
the European Union in the wake of the break-up o f Yugoslavia, explicitly recognised that the protection 
o f the rights o f minorities, particularly with regard to the right to identity o f minorities is part o f the 
“peremptory norms of general international law”. Badinter Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 2, 20 
November 1991, 3 1 ILM 1497.
19 Asia has not produced a regional organisation comparable to the Council o f Europe, the European 
Union, the Organisation o f American Sates or the African Union. Moreover, there is no regional 
convention on the protection o f minority rights in the Asian region. Due to the diversities of cultural 
and linguistic backgrounds and to the pluralism in the legal systems, it is very difficult for the Asian 
countries to draft successfully a convention. Since many Asian countries are confronted with major
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2. Proposed International Convention on the Rights of Persons belonging to 
National, Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities and its Commentary
Preamble
The States signatory hereto of the Convention on the Rights of Persons belonging to 
National, Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities, considering that the upheavals of 
world history have shown that the protection of ethnic, religious or linguistic minority 
groups is essential to stability, democratic security and peace in the world; considering 
that, a pluralist and genuinely democratic society should not only respect the ethnic, 
religious or linguistic identity of each person belonging to minority groups and 
minority groups as such, but also create appropriate conditions enabling them to 
express, preserve and develop this identity; considering that the creation of a climate 
of tolerance and dialogue is necessary to enable cultural diversity to be a source and a 
factor, not of division, but of enrichment for each society; considering that the 
realisation of a tolerant and prosperous world community does not depend solely on 
co-operation between States but also requires trans frontier co-operation between local 
and regional authorities without prejudice to the constitution and territorial integrity of 
each State; having regard to the human rights principles contained in the United 
Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities as well as other 
relevant international instruments that have been adopted at the universal or regional 
level and those concluded between individual States Members of the United Nations; 
being resolved to define the principles to be respected and the obligations which flow 
from them, in order to ensure in States, the effective protection of national, ethnic, 
religious or linguistic minorities and of the rights and freedoms of persons belonging 
to such minorities, within the rule of law; respecting the territorial integrity and 
national sovereignty of States; being determined to implement the principles set out in
problems that have human rights dimensions and most o f these cases are directly involved with 
minority rights, it is highly desirable to have regional co-operation to face these problems.
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this Convention through national legislation and appropriate governmental policies; 
and recognising the need to ensure even more effective implementation of 
international protection of the rights of persons belonging to minorities, have agreed 
as follows:
<Notes>
1. The purpose of this Convention is to promote more effective implementation of the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities and more generally to contribute to the 
realisation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of the human 
rights instruments adopted at the universal or regional level. This Convention is 
particularly inspired by Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to 
National, Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities, and the European Framework 
Convention on the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM). The Convention is 
based on the principle that the protection and promotion of minority rights contribute 
to the political and social stability of the States in which minorities live and contribute 
to the strengthening of friendship and co-operation among States.
2. The Convention builds on and adds to the rights contained in the International Bill 
of Human Rights and minority rights related instruments by strengthening and 
clarifying those rights which make it possible for persons belonging to minorities to 
preserve and develop their group identity. The human rights set out in the International 
Bill of Human Rights must at all times be respected in the process, including the 
principle of non-discrimination between individuals. The States are obliged to respect 
and ensure to every person within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction, 
without discrimination on any ground, including race, ethnicity, religion or national 
origin, the rights contained in the instruments to which those States are parties.
3.It is in light of these purposes and principles that the articles of the Convention must 
be interpreted.
Part 1. General provisions
Article 1
The protection of the rights and interests of national, ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities and persons belonging to those minorities forms an integral part of the 
international protection of human rights, and States parties are obliged to protect and
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promote the rights of persons belonging to such minorities at the domestic legal level. 
<Notes>
4. The purpose of Article 1 is to specify clearly that the protection of persons 
belonging to national, ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities is an integral part of 
human rights and does not fall within the reserved domain of States. It is necessary to 
realise that minority protection may not undermine but strengthens territorial integrity 
and State sovereignty and is designed to promote a democratic political system. It 
should be noted that the Badinter Commission of the International Conference on the 
Former Yugoslavia stated that the protection of minority rights with particular 
reference to identity constitutes the peremptory norm of international law. This should 
not be understood as being only declarative in nature without substance. The 
protection of minority rights should be realised by States parties through the 
implementation of ‘concrete protective measures’ at the domestic legal level.
Article 2
States parties should co-operate on questions relating to the protection of persons 
belonging to minorities, inter alia, by exchanging information and experiences, in 
order to promote mutual understanding and confidence.
<Notes>
5. Situations involving minorities often have international conflicts and repercussions. 
Tensions between States have arisen in the past and in some cases continue in the 
present over the treatment of minorities, particularly in relations between the home 
State of a given minority and other States where persons belonging to the same ethnic, 
religious or linguistic group reside. Article 2 encourages States parties to co-operate in 
order to find constructive solutions to situations involving minorities. It is expected 
that States parties should engage in constructive co-operation to facilitate, on a 
reciprocal basis, the protection of minority groups and their identities.
6. One approach, much used in Central and Eastern Europe, is for States to conclude 
bilateral treaties or other arrangements concerning good neighbourly relations, based 
on the principles of international human rights law, combining commitments of strict 
non-intervention with provisions for co-operation in promoting conditions for the 
maintenance of group identities and cross-border contacts by persons belonging to 
minorities. In this context, it is important to note that provisions on minorities 
contained in such treaties and other bilateral arrangements should be based on 
universal and regional instruments relating to equality, non-discrimination and
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\minority rights. Such treaties should include provisions for the settlement of disputes 
regarding their implementation for the effectuation of minority rights.
Article 3
The exercise of the rights set forth in the present Convention shall not prejudice the 
enjoyment by all persons of universally recognised human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.
<Notes>
7. The rights of specific categories of persons belonging to minorities are 
supplementary to the universally recognised rights of every person. This Convention is 
intended to strengthen the implementation of human rights in regard to persons 
belonging to minorities, not to weaken for anyone the enjoyment of universal human 
rights. Consequently, the exercise of rights under the Convention must not negatively 
affect the enjoyment of human rights for persons who do not belong to a minority, nor 
for persons who do belong to a minority.
8. Minority rights and human rights are not identical notions. The concept of human 
rights is different in that the rights of all individuals are placed under international 
protection, whereas minority rights can be described as special rights recognised to the 
exclusive benefit of persons belonging to minorities. However, human rights and 
minority rights are complementary and the legal basis for the protection of minority 
rights can be made more solid with the normative basis of human rights.
Article 4
1. A minority is a group numerically smaller than the rest of the population whose 
members have lived for a significant period of time in their State of residence. The 
members of the group have ethnic, religious or linguistic features differing from the 
rest of the population and show a sense of mutual solidarity for the preservation of 
their unique culture, tradition or language.
2. Any group coming within the terms of this definition shall be treated as an ethnic, 
religious or linguistic minority.
3. Holding citizenship of the State of residence is not a mandatory requirement for 
receiving minority status as the holder of minority rights recognised in the present 
Convention.
4. Persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minority groups may exercise 
the rights and enjoy the freedoms flowing from the principles enshrined in the present 
Convention individually as well as in community with others.
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5. Every person belonging to an ethnic, religious or linguistic minority should have the 
right freely to choose to be treated or not to be treated as such and no disadvantage 
shall result from this choice nor from the exercise of the rights which are connected to 
that choice.
<Notes>
9. This Convention contains the official definition of a minority. The definitional 
question of the concept of a minority as the holder of minority rights goes to the heart 
of the issue of the international ‘legal protection’ of minority rights. If international 
law is the ‘legal basis’ for the protection of the rights of persons belonging to 
minorities, identification of persons belonging to such groups is essential. Without 
identification of what constitutes the concept of a minority, the international legal 
protection of minority rights may lack effectiveness. Bearing this in mind, the 
Convention introduces the definition of a minority. The definition of a minority under 
this Convention is primarily concerned with the historical and factual aspects of 
persons belonging to minorities in their State of residence with the subjective belief of 
members of minority groups to maintain and promote their own identity in their States 
of residence.
10. The beneficiaries of the rights under Article 27 of the ICCPR, which have inspired 
this Convention, are persons belonging to “ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities”. 
This Convention has added the term “national minorities”. However, that addition 
does not extend the overall scope of application beyond the groups already covered by 
Article 27 of the ICCPR. There is hardly any national minority, however defined, that 
is not also an ethnic or linguistic minority. Regional European instruments on minority 
rights such as the FCNM and the instruments and documents of the Council of Europe 
and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) use only the 
concept “national minorities” and do not refer to “ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities”. When applying those instruments it is important to define “national 
minority”, but the same problem does not arise for this Convention. Even if a group is 
held not to constitute a national minority, it can still be an ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minority and therefore be covered by this Convention.
11. Citizenship as such should not be a distinguishing criterion which excludes some 
persons or groups from enjoying minority rights under the Convention. This is also the 
view expressed by the Human Rights Committee (HRC) in paragraphs 5.1 and 5.2 of
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its General Comment No. 23 (fiftieth session, 1994).20 Persons who are not (yet) 
citizens of the country in which they reside can form part of or belong to a minority in 
that country and are recognised as the right holder for minority rights. That this 
Convention clearly express no relevance of citizenship for the determination of a 
minority is significant, as it can be conducive to the prevention of States’ possible 
limitation of the personal scope of minority protection by means of citizenship status 
at the domestic legal level.
12. While the rights are consistently set out as rights of individuals, minority rights by 
their nature have a collective aspect. The duties of States parties concerning minority 
protection are in part formulated as duties towards minorities as groups. States cannot 
fully implement minority rights without ensuring adequate conditions for the existence 
and identity of the group as a whole. The main point here is that persons can exercise 
their rights both individually and collectively, the most important aspect being the 
collective exercise of their rights, be it through associations, cultural manifestations or 
educational institutions, or in any other way.
13. While Article 3 of the Convention provides that persons belonging to minorities 
shall not be subjected to discrimination for exercising, individually or collectively, 
their minority rights, Article 4 (5) makes it clear that they shall also not be 
disadvantaged in any way for choosing not to belong to the minority concerned. This 
provision is directed both towards the States concerned and the agencies of the 
minority groups. States parties cannot impose a particular ethnic identity on a given 
person through the use of negative sanctions against those who do not want to be part 
of that group; nor can persons belonging to minorities be subject to any disadvantage 
as persons who on objective criteria may be held to form part of their group but who 
subjectively do not want to belong to it. States Parties would have a duty to prohibit 
the taking of measures by minorities to impose their particular rules on any person 
who did not want to be part of the minority concerned, and therefore did not want to 
exercise her or his rights.
Article 5
1. Persons belonging to national, ethnic, religious and linguistic minority groups 
(hereinafter referred to as persons belonging to minorities) have the right to enjoy their 
own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, and to use their own language,
20 HRC General Comment No. 23, UN Doc.HRI\GEN\l\REV.l\ at 35 (1994), paras. 5.1-5.2.
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freely and without interference or any form of discrimination.
2. Persons belonging to minorities have the right to participate effectively in cultural, 
religious, social, economic and political life in their State of residence.
3. Persons belonging to minorities have the right to participate effectively in decisions 
at a national and regional level concerning the minority to which they belong or the 
regions in which they live, in accordance with relevant national legislation.
4. Persons belonging to minorities have the right to establish and maintain their own 
associations.
<Notes>
14. Article 27 of the ICCPR has almost the same language, but the Convention is more 
explicit in requiring positive action. Article 27 of the Covenant requires that persons 
belonging to minorities “shall not be denied the right to ...,” and the FCNM also uses 
the expression “shall”. However, the Convention uses the positive expression “have 
the right to ...” Article 27 of the ICCPR has been interpreted by the Human Rights 
Committee as requiring more than mere passive non-interference. The Convention 
makes it clear that these rights require ‘concrete positive action’, including protective 
measures and encouragement of conditions for the promotion of their identity and 
active measures by the State. The words “freely and without interference or any form 
of discrimination”, at the end of Article 5.1, show that it is not enough for a State to 
abstain from interference or discrimination. It must also ensure that individuals and 
organisations of the larger society do not interfere or discriminate.
15. The right to participate in all aspects of the life of the larger national society is 
essential, both in order for persons belonging to minorities to promote their interests 
and values and to create an integrated but pluralist society based on tolerance and 
dialogue. By their participation in all forms of public life in their country, they are able 
both to shape their own destinies and to contribute to political and social change in the 
larger society.
16. It is critically important to note that the words “public life” should be interpreted 
in the broad sense, though much is covered already by the preceding words “cultural, 
religious, social and economic.” Included in “public life” are, among other rights, 
rights relating to election and to being elected, the holding of public office, and other 
political and administrative domains.
17. Participation can be ensured in many ways, including the use of minority 
associations, membership in other associations, and through their free contacts both
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inside the State and across borders. While Article 5.4 deals generally with the right to 
participation in all aspects of the public life of a society, Article 5.3 deals specifically 
with the right of persons belonging to minorities to effective participation “in 
decisions ... concerning the minority to which they belong or the regions in which 
they live.” As such decisions have a great impact on persons belonging to minorities, 
the emphasis on effective participation here is of particular importance. 
Representatives of persons belonging to minorities should be involved already from 
the initial stages of decision-making. Minorities should be involved at the local, 
national and international levels in the formulation, adoption, implementation and 
monitoring of standards and policies affecting them. Persons belonging to minorities 
are entitled, in the same way as other members of society, to set up any association 
they may want, including educational or religious institutions, but their right to 
association is not limited to concerns related to their cultural, linguistic or religious 
identity.
Article 6
1. Any person belonging to minority groups has the right to enjoy the same right to 
enjoy the same rights as any other citizen, without distinction and on an equal footing.
2. States parties should take concrete measures to ensure that persons belonging to 
minorities in their States of residence may exercise fully and effectively all their 
human rights and fundamental freedoms without any discrimination and in full 
equality before the law.
<Notes>
18. In accordance with Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, all 
human beings are bom free and equal in dignity and rights. Article 2 of the Universal 
Declaration provides that everyone is entitled to all the rights set out in that 
declaration without distinction of any kind such as race, language, religion or national 
origin. The question has been raised as to whether special measures in favour of 
national or ethnic or linguistic minorities constitute a distinction in the enjoyment of 
human rights. The same question could be put with even greater emphasis with respect 
to the definition of racial discrimination contained in Article 1.1 of the ICERD, which 
reads: “The term ‘racial discrimination’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion, 
restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin 
which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment 
or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the
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political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.” While States are 
generally obliged under international law to ensure that all members of society may 
exercise their human rights, States must give particular attention to the human rights 
situation of persons belonging to minorities because of the special problems they 
confront. They are often in a vulnerable position and have, in the past, often been 
subjected to discrimination. In order to ensure substantive equality in fact, it may 
under some circumstances be necessary for the State to take affirmative action, as 
provided for in Article 2.2 of the ICERD, which is applicable to ethnic as well as 
racial minorities, provided these measures do not disproportionately affect the rights 
of others.
19. It should be noted that substantive equality is fundamentally different from formal 
equality, because the former goes beyond consistent treatment. Substantive equality 
can be secured by way of guaranteeing ‘equality of opportunity’ and ‘equality of 
results’. It is important to note that mere domestic legislation securing formal equality 
for minority groups is not sufficient for the effective protection of minority rights. 
National, ethnic, religious or linguistic groups must be guaranteed de facto equality. 
Article 7
1. States parties should create the conditions necessary for the effective participation 
of persons belonging to minorities in cultural, social and economic life and in public 
affairs.
2. States parties should take appropriate measures to create favourable conditions to 
enable persons belonging to minorities to express their characteristics and to maintain 
and develop their culture, language, religion, traditions and customs.
3. States parties should take appropriate measures so that persons belonging to 
minorities may have adequate opportunities to learn the mother tongue of their 
minority or to have instruction in their mother tongue.
4. States parties should take concrete measures in the field of education, in order to 
encourage knowledge of the history, traditions, language and culture of the minorities 
existing within their territory. Persons belonging to minorities should have adequate 
opportunities to gain knowledge of the society as a whole.
<Notes>
20. It is necessary to interpret “promotion of the identity of minorities” in a very broad 
way covering a variety of areas, which requires special measures by States concerned 
to facilitate the maintenance, reproduction and further development of their identity.
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Cultures have multi-dimensional meanings and have their own dynamics; minorities 
should be given the opportunity and institutional framework to develop their own 
culture in the context of an ongoing process in their States of residence. That process 
should be an interaction between the persons belonging to the minority themselves, 
between the minority and the State, and between the minority and the wider national 
society. The measures required to achieve this purpose must be implemented in an 
effective manner at the domestic legal level.
21. Article 7 of the Convention calls for more than mere tolerance of the manifestation 
of different cultures within a State. The words “cultural, social and economic life and 
in public affairs” should be understood in the broad sense. The protection and 
promotion of the cultural identity of ethnic, religious or linguistic groups in a State is 
not an isolated phenomenon and should be realised in conjunction with the guarantee 
of various other civil, political and social rights for persons belonging to minorities. 
The creation of favourable conditions requires active measures by States concerned, 
which are to cover diverse areas not only cultural, but also civil and political for the 
benefits of persons belonging to minorities. The participation of persons belonging to 
minorities in cultural, social and economic life and in public affairs can be achieved 
only if their interests are taken into account in the planning and implementation of 
national policies and programmes. The nature of those measures depends on the 
situation of the minority concerned, but should be guided by the purpose set forth in 
Article 6 of the Convention on the basis of the ‘substantive equality principle’. 
Planning of educational policy, citizenship policy, and various welfare policies are 
among the many aspects of State measures in which the interests of minorities should 
be taken into account by means of concrete domestic legislature. The interests of 
minorities should be given “due regard”, which means that they should be given 
reasonable weight compared with other legitimate interests that the Government has to 
take into consideration. It is to be noted that the citizenship status of persons 
belonging to minorities can affect the question of the maintenance of identity for 
persons belonging to ethnic, linguistic minorities. It is difficult to deny the fact that 
‘citizenship’ is a critical condition for gaining full membership in a nation-State unit in 
today’s international community. As citizenship is a basic legal element in realising 
one’s human rights at the domestic legal level, it is readily conceivable that citizenship 
can affect directly or indirectly the question of maintenance and promotion of identity 
of minority groups within the framework of State in which minorities reside. Although
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admittedly the concrete situation would differ from State to State, States parties should 
take into account the citizenship matter in terms of concretising minority protection 
policies, having realised that citizenship can be directly or indirectly related to the 
maintenance and promotion of minority identity.
22. Language is among the most important elements of group identity. States should 
encourage the promotion of the linguistic identity of the minority concerned. Various 
measures are required for persons belonging to minorities to learn their mother tongue 
(which is a basic minimum) or to have instruction in their mother tongue (which goes 
some steps further). The steps required in these regards depend on a number of 
variable factors. Of significance will be the size of the group and the nature of its 
settlement. In cases where the language of the minority is a territorial language 
traditionally spoken and used by many in a region of the country, States should to the 
maximum of their available resources ensure that linguistic identity can be preserved. 
Where there is a large linguistic minority within the country, it is strongly 
recommended that the language of the minority be made an official language of the 
regions in which linguistic minorities reside. In regard to non-territorial languages 
spoken traditionally by a minority within a country, but which are not associated with 
a particular region of that country, a uniform solution is more difficult to find. Where 
the persons belonging to the minority live dispersed, with only a few persons in each 
particular place, their children need to learn the language of the surrounding 
environment more fully at an earlier stage. Nevertheless, they should always also have 
an opportunity to learn their mother tongue. In this regard, persons belonging to 
minorities have a right, like others, to establish their private institutions where the 
minority language is the main language of instruction. However, the State is entitled to 
require that the State language also be taught. One question to be addressed is whether 
States concerned are obliged to provide subsidies for such teaching. It would be a 
requirement that the State ensure the existence of and fund some institutions which 
can enable the teaching of that minority language.
23. In societies where different national, ethnic, religious or linguistic groups coexist, 
the culture, history and traditions of minority groups have often been neglected and 
the majorities are frequently ignorant of those traditions and cultures. Where there has 
been conflict, the minority groups’ culture, history and traditions have often been 
subject to distorted representations, resulting in low self-esteem within the groups and 
negative stereotypes towards members of the group on the part of the wider
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community. Racial hatred, xenophobia and intolerance sometimes take root. To avoid 
such circumstances, States’ policy intervention is required for promoting the both 
multicultural and intercultural education.
Part 2. Democratic Governance and the Rights of Political Participation for 
Persons belonging to Minorities
Article 8
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of the right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.
2. A government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without 
distinction as to race, creed or colour can be considered to be complying with the right 
to self-determination.
3. Peoples have a right to democratic governance which shall consist of:
(1). a political system based on the free will of the peoples expressed in periodic and 
genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be by secret 
vote or by equivalent free-voting procedures.
(2). a political system based on constitutional guarantees and an institutional 
framework for the realisation of fundamental human rights.
<Notes>
24. States enjoying full sovereignty and independence, and possessed of a government 
effectively representing the whole of their population, shall be considered to be 
conducting themselves in conformity with the principles of equal rights and self- 
determination of peoples as regards that population. Nothing in the foregoing 
paragraphs shall be construed as authorising any action which would impair, totally or 
in part, the territorial integrity, or political unity, of such States. The meaning of this is 
plain. Once an independent State has been established and recognised, its constituent 
peoples must express their aspirations through the national political system, and not 
through the creation of new States. That holds true unless the national political system 
becomes so exclusive and non-democratic that it no longer can be said to “represent 
the whole of the population.” At that point, and if all reasonable international legal and 
diplomatic measures fail to protect the peoples concerned from the State, they may 
perhaps be justified in exercising their right to self-determination to the extent of
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creating a new State for their safety and security. The rights of persons belonging to 
minorities differ from the rights of peoples to self-determination. The rights of persons 
belonging to minorities are basically individual rights with a collective aspect. The 
rights of peoples, on the other hand, are collective rights. However, this does not rule 
out that persons belonging to minority group may in some contexts legitimately make 
claims based on minority rights and, in another context, when acting as a group, can 
make claims based on the right of self-determination. It is important to note that the 
right to self-determination as a ‘group right’ does not and would not, necessarily imply 
their automatic priority over individual rights. Individual human rights can limit the 
exercise of group rights. However, individual human rights also can often contribute 
to defining and enriching the actual content of group rights. There is a definite link 
between the right of persons belonging to minorities to effective political participation 
and the right of peoples to self-determination. If participation is denied to a minority 
and its members, this might in some cases give rise to a legitimate claim to self- 
determination in its external sense. If the group claims a right to self-determination 
and challenges the territorial integrity of the State, it would have to claim to be a 
people, and that claim would have to be based on common Article 1 of the ICCPR and 
would therefore fall outside this Convention. Self-determination is a continuing 
dynamic right, in the sense that it can be re-awakened if, at any moment, 
‘representative democracy’ fails and no alternative exists for the defence of 
fundamental rights. Self-determination has consequently taken on a new meaning in 
the post-colonial and Cold War eras. Ordinarily, it is the right of the members of a
91people as a whole of an existing, independent State to share power democratically. 
However, the State may sometimes abuse this right of its people so grievously and 
irreparably that the situation is tantamount to classic colonialism, and may have the 
same legal consequences.
25. The Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession Case stated that: 
“international law expects that the right to self-determination will be exercised by 
peoples within the framework of existing sovereign states and consistently with the 
maintenance of the territorial integrity of those states. Where this is not possible, in the 
exceptional circumstances a right of secession may arise.. .A number of commentators
21 J. Park, “Integration o f Peoples and Minorities: An Approach to the Conceptual Problem o f Peoples 
and Minorities with Reference to Self-Determination under International Law”, International Journal 
on Minority and Group Rights, Vol., 13, 2006, pp. 69-93.
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have further asserted that the right to self-determination may ground a right to a 
unilateral secession in a third circumstance. Although this third circumstance has been 
described in several ways, the underlying proposition is that, when a people is blocked 
from the meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination internally, it is entitled, 
as a last resort, to exercise it by secession.” ‘Internal’ self-determination is thus a 
part of self-determination. Internal self-determination concerns the right of a people 
‘within’ a State to choose their political status, the extent of their political participation 
and the form of their government. Democracy has a direct relationship with the right 
to internal self-determination. Internal self-determination guarantees the political 
participation of persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities in their 
State of residence without discrimination. The respect of the right to self- 
determination and the protection of minority rights are complementary in their scope 
of application. The effective realisation of minority rights in a State can be 
consolidated and made more secure with the legal and normative basis of the right to 
internal self-determination.
26. Representative government through free, fair and periodic elections is the hallmark 
of contemporary democracy. The fundamental objective is, in the words of Article 
21(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that a “the will of the people 
shall be the basis of the authority of government.” This basic standard is articulated in 
universal and European treaties, namely Article 25 of the ICCPR and Article 3 of 
Protocol I additional to the European Convention on Human Rights. For OSCE 
participating States, paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Copenhagen Document specify that, 
“among those elements of justice which are essential to the full expression of the 
inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all human beings,” “the will 
of the people, freely and fairly expressed through periodic and genuine elections, is 
the basis of the authority and legitimacy of all government.” The essence of 
democratic representation in a State assumes that a government must guarantee the 
substantial and effective representation of all residents including persons belonging to 
national, ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities, not a just nominal representation. 
Article 9
1. States parties should take effective legislative, administrative, judicial, or other 
measures to protect the right of persons belonging to minorities to participate in public
22 Reference re Secession o f Quebec from Canada, 1998, 2 SCR 217, 122-134.
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and political affairs in their States of residence without discrimination.
2. Public institutions should not be based on ethnic or religious criteria. Governments 
at local, regional and national levels should recognise the role of multiple identities in 
contributing to open and democratic society.
<Notes>
27. While States have considerable power in choosing the specific manner with which 
to comply with these obligations, they must do so without discrimination of persons 
belonging to minorities and should aim for as much representativeness as possible. 
Insofar as no electoral system is neutral from the perspective of varying views and 
interests, States should adopt the system which would result in the most representative 
government in their specific situation. This is especially important for persons 
belonging to ethnic, linguistic minorities who might otherwise not have adequate 
representation in their States of residence. The electoral system should facilitate 
minority representation and influence. The protection of participation rights of persons 
belonging to minorities should be concretised by means of domestic legislature.
28. Effective participation for minorities requires providing channels for consultation 
between and among minorities and Governments. It can serve as a means of dispute 
resolution and sustain diversity as a condition for the dynamic stability of a society. 
The number of persons belonging to minorities is by definition too small for them to 
determine the outcome of decisions in majoritarian democracy. They must as a 
minimum have the right to have their opinions heard and fully taken into account 
before decisions which concern them are adopted. A wide range of constitutional and 
political measures should be used to provide access for minorities to decision-making.
29. States parties should also establish advisory or consultative bodies involving 
minorities within appropriate institutional frameworks. Such bodies or round tables 
should be attributed political weight and effectively consulted on issues affecting the 
minority population.
30. There should be equal access to public sector employment across the various 
ethnic, linguistic and religious communities.
31. Citizenship is a critical condition for full and effective participation of persons 
belonging to minorities in their States of residence, given that it is a basic legal 
element for exercising the right to political participation. The State may fashion the 
restrictions on immigration as it sees fit and allow the entry of people wishing to settle 
in the State on the basis of a connection between the applicant and the population of
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the State that has its origin in the past, or on the basis of other criteria established by 
the State. Although a State has broad discretion to regulate citizenship matters, barriers 
to the acquisition of citizenship for members of minorities, which are linked to ethnic 
or linguistic distinctions and preferences, and other unreasonable restrictions can be 
contrary to the equality principle as a general norm of international law. States parties 
in this Convention should pay special attention to the requirements of naturalisation 
under citizenship laws in terms of whether they are in harmony of minority protection. 
Once the State has given a person an opportunity to immigrate and he or she has 
exercised that right and subsequently lived in the State for a substantial period of time, 
the State must allow him or her to become a full member of society, a citizen of the 
State. Diverse forms of political participation by resident non-citizens belonging to 
minority groups should also be developed, including participating in local elections 
after a certain period of residence. Inclusion of elected non-citizen observers in 
municipal, regional and national legislative and decision-making organs is also 
encouraged.
Part 3. The Protection of Persons belonging to Minorities in the case of State 
Succession
Article 10
1. In matters of nationality in the case of State succession, each State party concerned 
should respect the human right to citizenship, the principle of dominant and effective 
links and the protection of persons belonging to national, ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities in regulating citizenship
2. In deciding on the granting or the retention of nationality in the case of State 
succession, each State party concerned should grant the right of option to persons 
belonging to national, ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities.
<Notes>
32. These provisions are aimed at avoiding potentially damaging uncertainty as to the 
nationality of persons affected by State succession as well as at respecting the right to 
nationality as a positive human right for members of ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minority groups.
33. The right of option is understood as the right of persons affected by territorial 
changes to choose between either the nationality of successor State and that of the
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predecessor State or between the nationalities of several successor States. The right of 
option must be granted not to all persons who pass from one sovereignty to another 
but only to those who have genuine links with a predecessor or successor State. This 
solution is based on the principle that persons may not be deprived of their nationality 
against their will. As far as the right of option is concerned, the term ‘genuine links’ 
implies substantial, dominant and effective links between the persons concerned and 
the State, which will serve the protection of stabilised lives of persons belonging to 
ethnic, religious or linguistic minority groups affected by a change of territory.
Part 4. Control Machinery
Article 11
1. To ensure the observance of the undertakings by the States parties in the present 
Convention, there shall be set up a Minority Protection Committee (hereinafter 
referred to as “the Committee”).
2. The Committee shall consist of a number of members equal to that of the States 
parties.
3. The members shall serve in their individual capacity.
Article 12
1. The members of the Committee shall be elected by the United Nations Human 
Rights Commission by an absolute majority of votes, from a list o f names presented 
by the Secretariat of the United Nations.
2. Each national delegation of the States parties shall put forward three candidates on 
the list.
3. The members of the Committee shall be elected for a period of five years. They 
may be re-elected.
4. The Committee shall draw up its own Rules of Procedure.
Article 12
1. The States parties shall submit to the Committee, through the Secretary General of 
the United Nations, reports on the measures that they have adopted to give effect to 
their undertakings under this Convention, within one year of entry into force of the 
Convention. The States parties shall submit supplementary reports at two-yearly 
intervals concerning any new measure adopted, as well as any other report requested 
by the Committee.
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2. By a majority of two-thirds of the members of the Committee, the Committee may 
make any necessary recommendations to a State party.
Article 14
1. Provided that a State party has, by a declaration addressed to the Secretary General 
of the United Nations, recognised the competence of the Committee to receive 
petitions, it may receive such petitions from any State party which considers that 
another State party does not respect the provisions of this Convention
2. Provided that a State party has, by a declaration addressed to the Secretary General 
of the United Nations, recognised the competence of the Committee to receive 
individual petitions, it may receive such petitions from any person, group of 
individuals or any international non-governmental organisation representative of 
minorities, claiming to be the victim of a violation by this State party of the rights set 
forth in this Convention.
Article 15
1. The Committee may only deal with the matter referred to it under Article 14 (2) 
after all domestic remedies have been exhausted.
2. The Committee shall declare inadmissible petitions submitted under Article 14 (2) 
which are anonymous; have already been submitted to another international body; are 
incompatible with the provisions of this Convention, manifestly ill-founded or 
represent an abuse of the right of petitions.
Article 16
1. The Committee shall undertake an examination of the petition and, if need be, an 
investigation.
2. In the event of the Committee accepting a petition referred to it, it endeavours to 
reach a friendly settlement of the matter on the basis of respect of this Convention. If 
it succeeds, it shall draw up a report which shall contain a statement of the facts and of 
the solution reached to be sent to the State or States concerned.
Article 17
1. If no friendly settlement has been reached, the Committee shall draw up a report as 
to whether the facts found disclose a breach by the State concerned of its obligations 
under this Convention and make such proposals as it thinks are necessary.
2. The report shall be transmitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations, to 
the State or States concerned and to the Secretary General of the United Nations.
3. The Committee may take up any follow-up action it thinks fit in order to ensure
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respect of the Convention.
<Notes >
34. As to the State compliance system, the Framework Convention on the Protection 
of minorities (FCNM) has been criticised for its weakness. Within the framework 
provided by the FCNM, the role of the Advisory Committee is, in dialogue with the 
States parties and in partnership with the Committee of Ministers, to develop a 
narrower and clearer understanding of the content of the legal obligations in the 
FCNM, and to highlight areas where the operation of the treaty regime iftight be 
improved. It is not the function of the Advisory Committee to act as a mediator in 
disputes between majority and minority communities. This is the function of the 
OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. The provisions provided in the 
Part 4 Control Machinery of this Convention have been influenced by this problem, 
because even though the FCNM is the first legally binding instrument on minority 
rights, its supervisory mechanism leaves much to be desired. The proposed 
Convention has established the Minorities Protection Committee, an independent 
committee with sufficient resources to enable it to carry out its duties, which should 
go beyond being purely an advisory committee. Further, the proceedings of the 
Minorities Protection Committee should be public, transparent and seek the co­
operation of non-governmental partners concerned with minority rights. Finally, the 
Committee, while seeking a dialogue with State parties, should focus on monitoring 
legal obligations and speaking out on violations of international law of minority 
protection.
35. A quasi-judicial control mechanism is adopted in this Convention. It may be useful 
to note that establishing State reports, optional State petitions and optional individual 
petitions appears to operate as a half-way course between a flexible model and the 
stringency of the judicial control model. In the case of individual petitions, the review 
includes complaints from allegedly directly affected groups of individuals and NGO 
representatives of minorities as well. The idea of using a quasi-judicial model adopted 
in this Convention is inspired by the positive influence of the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee (HRC) under the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR upon 
minority rights jurisprudence.
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